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Current patterns in the production and consumption of goods, energy and services fail 
to meet basic requirements of environmental sustainability in both industrialised and de-
veloping countries. The use of natural resources and the utilisation of the environment as 
a sink for emissions exceed tolerable rates, and most producers and consumers are still 
able to externalise costs caused by their emissions or by the extraction of materials at the 
expense of future generations or of other world regions. Although some indicators point 
to an increasing decoupling of economic growth from environmental degeneration, most 
observers agree that this is not sufficient for sustainable economic and environmental 
conditions. A more comprehensive industrial transformation towards sustainability is 
hence needed, in particular in the richer countries of the North. But what forms of gov-
ernance are likely to pave the way for such transformation?  
Some scholars view market failure as the chief cause of the problem. They see the state 
as the appropriate actor with sufficient capacity and legitimacy to correct these failures. 
Others argue, however, that in addition to market failures, the limited capacities of gov-
ernments to intervene in market activities are part of the problem. They claim that ‘state 
failure’ results from conflicting policy objectives for governments to protect the environ-
ment and to further economic growth and employment at the same time. In addition, 
governments often lack the necessary information and knowledge required for the effec-
tive and efficient correction of market failures. Governmental regulations therefore at best 
support the ecological modernisation of economies by redirecting modernisation proc-
esses towards environmentally sounder technologies. Ecological modernisation alone, 
however, will not overcome structural rigidities, and in many cases, its achievements are 
compensated, and often overcompensated, by economic growth. The policy recommenda-
tions based on this state failure diagnosis vary considerably. Some scholars stress the need 
to better involve other stakeholders to compensate insufficient state capacities. Others 
hope that in the long run, autonomous trends of technical modernisation will reduce 
emissions. A third group of studies stresses the deficits of traditional command and con-
trol but also simple incentive based policies. More complex strategies, often in an evolu-
tionary spirit, have been advocated for, such as strategic niche management, transition 
management, or recently “time strategies” and other types of innovation policies and 
“ecological industrial policy” which try to modulate ongoing innovation dynamics and rely 
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more on the interaction of political and broader societal forces. Yet it is open if these 
strategies are likely to bring about the necessary changes. 
Given this dilemma of simultaneous market and state failure, the 2003 Berlin Confer-
ence on the Human Dimension of Global Environmental Change aimed to bring together 
new and innovative research in this field – in particular with an empirical emphasis – that 
indicates possible pathways for the successful governance of industrial transformation 
processes.  
The 2003 Berlin Conference “Governance for Industrial Transformation” focused on 
political strategies capable of limiting the overuse of natural resources and the emissions 
from industrial activities. About 140 researchers from all over the world presented and 
discussed their recent research. The conference has been endorsed by the  International 
Human Dimensions Programme On Global Environmental Change core project on In-
dustrial Transformation. It has been organised by the Environmental Policy Research 
Centre of the Freie Universität Berlin. It was supported by the SUSTIME Project of the 
University of Applied Sciences Lausitz and partners, the Global Governance Project of 
the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), the Freie Universität Berlin and 
Oldenburg University, and the German Association for Ecological Economic Research 
(VÖW e.V.). Financial Support has been provided by the German Science Foundation.  
Plenary Speakers included Nicholas Ashford, Director of the Technology and Law 
Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Rainer Baake, State Secre-
tary, Federal Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation and Reactor Safety, Frans 
Berkhout, Director of the Sustainable Technologies Programme, University of Sussex, 
Marina Fischer-Kowalski, member of the IHDP-IT Scientific Steering Committee, Uni-
versity of Vienna; Ken Green, Director CROMTEC/Institute of Innovation Research, 
Manchester School of Management, Ashok Jaitly, Rural Energy Division, The Energy and 
Resources Institute (TERI), New Delhi; Jan Rotmans, Director ICIS, University of Maas-
tricht; Pier Vellinga IHDP-IT and  Stefan Zundel University of Applied Sciences Lausitz.  
This volume represents a selection of thirty papers of the 2003 Berlin Conference. We 
hope that the volume will contribute to the ongoing academic and political debates on 
opportunities and barriers for an encompassing industrial transformation. 
For the preparation of these proceedings we are indebted to Stefan Lindemann and 
Jochen Biedermann for their support.   
In: Klaus Jacob, Manfred Binder and Anna Wieczorek (eds.). 2004. Governance for Industrial
Transformation. Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental
Change, Environmental Policy Research Centre: Berlin. pp. 7 – 20.
Governance for Industrial Transformation – 
The Scope of the Challenge
Klaus Jacob
Freie Universität Berlin, Environmental Policy Research Centre, Berlin, Germany
Needs and Outline of an Industrial Transformation Research1
Despite  considerable  efforts  in  cleaning  up  industrial  production  since  the
emergence of modern environmental policy about 30 years ago, the patterns of eco-
nomic  activities  are  far  from  environmental  sustainability,  especially  in  the  indus-
trialised countries. Many problems remain unsolved, many new problems emerge at
the horizon. Climate change, the loss of biodiversity, water stress, soil degradation or
the exposition to dangerous chemicals are examples for that. Although some indica-
tors point to a decoupling of economic growth from environmental degeneration, the
overall consumption of natural resources and the utilisation of the environment as a
sink for emissions exceeds tolerable rates. This calls for an encompassing industrial
transformation  towards  sustainability,  in  particular  in  the  richer  countries  of  the
North.
This is not a new diagnosis. The need of fundamental changes in the patterns of
production and consumption has been discussed already since the 1970s. That little
progress  has  been  made  so  far,  is  not  a  great  surprise,  given  the  scope  of  the
challenges of such an undertaking as the industrial transformation of both rich, indus-
trialised  countries  and to  direct  the  process  of  development  in  the  industrialising
countries. 
Lots  of academic work has been conducted to analyse the determinants of un-
sustainable economies, such as external effects of production processes, problems of
internalisation,  consumer preferences that are not sufficiently considering the envi-
ronmental burden of consumption and hence the lacking market signals for a more
sustainable production. Many scholars with different scientific backgrounds have un-
dertaken research concerning the questions, which policies and regulations are likely
to bring forward the necessary change, which actors are able to enforce these policies
and which overall necessities, opportunities, and impediments exist for such policies.
Given the rather dispersed fields of research, there is a need for an overarching
framework as it  is  offered in the Science Plan of the IHDP-IT. There are several
characteristics mentioned of what could qualify for Industrial Transformation rese-
arch:
• Industrial  Transformation research deals  with the relationship between societal,
technological, and environmental change; 
• Industrial Transformation focuses on systems and system changes that are relevant
in view of the global environment (such as the energy system, the food system,
and the urban system); systems are defined as chains of related economic activities
1 Many thanks to Axel Volkery, Simone Klawitter, Kerstin Tews and Per-Olof Busch for
comments on earlier versions of this paper
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that provide a specific need for society. Thereby it goes beyond single enterprises,
sectors and countries. 
• Industrial  Transformation research relates  producer and consumer perspectives,
including the incentives and institutions that help in shaping these perspectives; 
• Industrial Transformation research is international in scope; and
• The research is necessarily multi-disciplinary, it encompasses economics, political
sciences, psychology, sociology and history.
(Vellinga and Herb 1999). 
The overall rationale of IT research is to understand the conditions for changes in
the relation of society and the environment that lead to a de-linking of economic ac-
tivities and environmental burden. How can the desired changes in economy-environ-
ment relations effectively promoted? Until now it was mainly the state that has been
the most important actor to promote improvements in environmental performance.
However, because of the dynamic development of the socio-economic and the politi-
cal systems it is questionable if past patterns of industrial change are likely to occur
also in the future. It is called for new forms of governance in particular to cope with
the challenges of economic globalisation. 
The modes of governance are changing as well. The transformation in governance
is usually described by three trends (s.a. Heritier 2002; Hey, Jänicke et al. 2003): 
• the broadening of the spectrum of actors involved in the policy making process,
and by this the decline of authority of the central government towards non-state
actors. To safeguard the participation of the affected stakeholders it is often called
for more democracy and new forms of participation;  
• the  broadening  of  the  instruments  applied,  away  from  command  and  control
towards  economic  instruments  and  new  flexible,  co-operative  measures  with
shared responsibilities of government and target groups; and
• the declining importance of the level of national policy making, while other levels
both internationally and subnationally gain additional importance.
What does this mean for policies that aim to contribute to an encompassing In-
dustrial Transformation? Many scholars subsume implicitly all political strategies un-
der the heading of industrial transformation that are able (or aim) to influence the
choice  of  technologies  and  hence  the  environmental  performance  of  enterprises,
branches or consumers. These approaches can be analysed as end-of-pipe strategies,
ecological modernisation or green industrial policies. 
However, the above cited IHDP-IT Science Plan takes a different direction: It fo-
cuses on systems and system changes that are relevant to the global  environment.
Thereby, the perspective is broadened to the actors that are involved in the produc-
tion and consumption, the flow of goods and services, and the institutional setting
that frames these activities (Vellinga and Herb 1999). It is open to investigation if this
opens up some room for manoeuvre within the above depicted new modes of gover-
nance. 
In the following, recent contributions of political science on strategies that aim at a
greening of industries are analysed regarding their possible contribution to an Indus-
trial Transformation, their degree of difficultness and in how far they are affected by
the depicted trends of governance. 
An analytical framework 
Political strategies can be distinguished regarding the actors and their configurati-
on, the policy style, and the instruments that are applied (s.a. Jänicke, Blazejczak et al.
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2000). By this criteria it is possible to describe and to distinguish political strategies,
and to assess their likely effects. 
• Actors and their configuration: Policymakers aim at restricting, determining or
broaden the set of feasible alternatives for (groups of) actors or to influence the
consequences or the evaluation of their action. Target groups can be firms (both
polluting sectors  as well  as  ‘helping’  industries,  i.e.  producers  of  environmental
technologies,  insurance  companies,  environmental  consultants,  etc.),  private
households, but also NGOs, governmental departments or other governments. 
The selection of a policy measures and their specific design is a complex process.
A simple two actors model with the policy maker on the one side and the target
group  on  the  other  side  could  not  explain  the  policy  output.  The  internal
conditions of the policy making process have to be taken into account as well: The
relative strengths of environmental authorities in the government is of importance,
their  abilities  to  implement  policies,  the  degree  of  horizontal  (among  other
departments)  and  vertical  (among  other  levels  of  government)  integration  and
fragmentation determines the effectiveness of regulations. Frequently, the target
groups  of  environmental  policy  do  have  trustees  in  ‘their’  governmental
departments  and  by  them  their  interests  are  well  represented  in  government,
objectives of environmental policies are questioned, instruments are applied less
strictly. But also the target groups are often not homogenous, in particular if there
are  innovators  that  expect  to  protect  their  markets  by  environmental  policy
measures, the interests of the target group may be fragmented.  
Policy  programmes  are  developed  and  implemented  in  a  specific  actors’
configuration.  Whether  a  policy  is  adopted,  implemented  and  turns  out  to  be
effective,  depends  on  a  large  degree  on  the  participation  (and  the  mutual
recognition of legitimacy) of the relevant actors. E.g. the chemical policy changed
fundamentally after the environmentalists groups became an accepted participant
in the policy networks during the 1980s in many western industrialised countries
while e.g. in the steel industry environmentalists hardly have an important role and
environmental demands are mainly imposed by the public authorities.  
It is not only governmental actors that issue policies, but also NGOs that may take
an equivalent role. Many policy instruments, in particular persuasive instruments
are available to private actors as well. Furthermore, NGOs play a vital role in the
development of objectives, communicating problems, monitoring the achievement
of targets, all of them are important parts of the policy making process.
• Policy Style: The effects of policies, in particular those policies that don’t imply a
complete determination for the target group, largely depend on the policy style.
Policy style describes the manner how a policy is formulated and implemented.
Policy maker may seek a consensus with the target group or prefer a strategy of
conflict.  Their  behaviour  may  be  calculable  or  erratic.  In  particular  the
effectiveness and the scope of voluntary approaches depends on the (perceived)
readiness to implement regulatory measures in case of failure. Innovation effects
of policy instruments rely on credible long-term commitments: E.g. the innovation
effects of an eco tax will be higher, if a rise in rates is announced for several years
in advance, compared to the same tax that is risen on an ad hoc basis. 
Policy analysts as well as policy makers have stressed the importance of long-term
objectives in particular to stimulate innovations. However, objectives are cannot
chosen freely, they are subject of dispute and change in a bargaining process inside
government and with the target group. Therefore, policy objectives are frequently
based on a minimal consensus between departments, hence unclear, short termed
and not operationalised for target groups.
• Instruments:  The  number  of  possible  instruments  is  limited  only  by  the
creativeness of policy actors. There are many typologies in the literature, mostly
based  on  the  degree  of  determination  for  the  target  group.  It  ranges  from
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voluntary/persuasive  instruments  over  economic  instruments  (subsidies,  taxes,
certificates,  etc.),  to  so  called “command and  control”  measures.  Furthermore,
instruments  can  be  distinguished  regarding  direct  or  indirect  effects:  direct
instruments aim at influencing the behaviour of the target group, while indirect
instruments stimulate other  actors  to enforce environmental  friendly behaviour.
E.g.  liability  rules  creating  insurance  companies  as  actors  that  influence  the
environmental  performance  of  a  firm.  More  generally,  indirect  instruments
generate helping  interests  to  solve  environmental  problems.  Policy  instruments
may be demanding - ranging from technology forcing, support for diffusion of
improved technologies, to fixing the current technological standards only. 
Policies occasionally aim at stimulating competition, and search processes inside
the target group. In order to be successful in this  direction it is necessary, that
regulation does not determine the target groups behaviour completely (in this case,
innovation is not necessary), but to remain flexible. That is in particular a goal of
the so called 2nd and 3rd generation of environmental policies.
Different  policy  instruments  are  needed for  each stage  of  the  development  of
innovations  (Jacob and Jänicke  1998).  In  early  stages,  supportive  measures  are
required, and it is necessary to protect innovations from sometimes overwhelming
market forces, until learning costs have been refinanced and production is scaled
up. In later stages of development, it is more important to support the diffusion of
environmental  technologies by discriminating the competing old technology,  by
giving recommendation to adopt to the new technology or by making the new
technology even obligatory. 
Firms or other target groups are rarely influenced by a single policy measure only,
but  they  are  in  a  most  often  subject  of  a  complex  and  hybrid  regulatory
framework.  Thereby,  the  effectiveness  of  policy  measures  depends  to  a  large
degree on the institutional, societal and economic context. E.g. a label is effective
only if the environmental awareness is high, regulation depend on the capacity for
monitoring  and  enforcement,  etc.  This  may  limit  also  the  transfer  of  policy
instruments from one country to another.
The aspect  of  institutional  fit  is  in particular  crucial  regarding  the adoption  of
European policies in the Member States. When European policy innovations are
implemented  by  the  Member  States,  the  wide  range  of  different  regulatory
traditions affects the effects of a policy. E.g. the effects of Right to Know acts vary
considerable among the Member States. Comparable mechanisms can be expected
when it comes to the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements. 
There are many different typologies that classify the different approaches of envi-
ronmental policies, e.g. the distinction of reactive, receptive, constructive and pro-ac-
tive approaches by Vellinga and Herb (1999) or  a comparable typology  of  Jänicke
(1984) who distinguishes measures aiming at repair, end of pipe, ecological moderni-
sation  or  structural  change.  Binder  (1999)  adds  to  this  list  the  possibility  of
abandoning economic growth at least as a theoretical possibility to reduce the envi-
ronmental  burden. In the following the strategies for end-of-pipe technologies,  for
environmental innovations as well as their international diffusion and green industrial
policies are analysed using the above depicted framework to estimate their respective
degree of political difficultness and the scope of change that can be achieved.  
End of Pipe Policies 
Initially,  environmental  policies  in  industrialised  countries  largely  focused  on a
clean-up and end-of-pipe approach, because this leaves the core activities of enter-
prises unchanged, their resistance is not that severe, and therefore this type of policies
are easier to be adopted and implemented. 
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This type of policies rely to a large degree on command-and-control measures, that
are imposed on the enterprises by (national) governmental actors. For the enactment
of the underlying regulations, the environmental agencies are most important in the
government. Other departments may be in opposition against the environmental stan-
dards, because they safeguard the economic interests of the target groups. Environ-
mental NGOs are of little importance, they may act as watchdogs or as proponents of
stricter standards. 
Other levels of government than the national level are hardly of importance. For
some environmental pollutants which have a long range dispersal, there are internatio-
nal regime set up (like OSPAR or the LRTP) that lead finally also to stricter national
policies than they would have been enacted if there had been unilateral action only.
The subnational level has some role to play in the implementation of the regulation
and the monitoring of the compliance. However, in this mode of regulation, the nati-
on state remains to be the most important driver. 
The policy style is likely to be confrontational, since EOP measures do impose
additional costs to the enterprises. The interests of the target group is likely to be rat-
her homogenous in opposition against this type of regulations. 
End of pipe measures do require the monitoring and control of the compliance of
the regulations. Therefore the costs of regulation can be considerably, administrative
capacities have to be build up. Empirically, the costs for the target group are almost
neglectible,  apart  from  few  branches  and  enterprises  for  which  standards  were
imposed that lead to considerable requirements for investment. 
The deficits  of  this  policies  and the technologies  that  are  favoured by this  ap-
proach are well known: often, they tend to shift problems from one media to another
only, rather than solving them, they are unnecessary expensive, while more encom-
passing solutions bear even the potential of cost savings, and for many problems end-
of-pipe  technologies  are not  available e.g.  climate change or  land use  degradation
(Binder 1999). Furthermore, once investments in end of pipe technologies have been
undertaken, technological trajectories originate from this.  Investments in integrated
technologies cannot be expected until the investments are depreciated. 
Largely, end of pipe policies do follow a traditional regulatory mode with a single
regulator on the one side and a defined target group on the other side. The trends of
governance, new actors, new instruments and shifts in the level of governance are of
none or minor importance.
Innovation oriented environmental policies
Technological  environmental  innovations,  i.e.  new processes  and  products  that
have a smaller burden on the environment than the comparable existing technologies,
are expected to overcome at least some of the shortcomings of end of pipe technolo-
gies. The scope of policies that contribute to such a modernisation is much broader.
It challenges the core processes and the products of enterprises. Unlike in the case of
end-of-pipe regulations, the requirements cannot be met by adding a division of spe-
cialists. It requires R&D efforts by the enterprises, and it interferes with the central
operations of enterprises. However, there is also a considerable market potential for
technologies with higher efficiency. 
There is a lack of investment in the R&D of environmental innovations because of
the double externality of the profit  that can be achieved by environmental innova-
tions. Firstly, as for any R&D activities, there are spill over effects and secondly be-
cause the improvements in environmental quality are a public good the level of invest-
ments in R&D is lower than the economic optimum (Carraro 2000; Rennings 2000).  
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Therefore,  the innovation and diffusion of environmental technologies depends
largely on public regulation. This has been also underlined by empirical studies on en-
vironmental innovations  (see Weale 1992; Klemmer, Lehr et al. 1999; Jänicke, Blaze-
jczak et al. 2000). Based on the evaluation of innovation processes policy recommen-
dations  were  derived  in  such  studies.  They  encompass  the  “multi-impulse
hypotheses” (Blazejczak, Edler et al. 1999) “design criteria” for environmental policies
(Norberg-Bohm  1999)  or  proposals  for  a  “strategic  niche  management”  (Kemp,
Schot et al. 1998). 
The set of instruments for innovation oriented approaches are much broader com-
pared to the command and control regulations that are imposed for end of pipe tech-
nologies. These type of instruments still play a role when it comes to technology for-
cing by which a certain standard is set obligatory at a certain future date. Most schol-
ars, however, call for economic, persuasive or self regulatory instruments in order to
stimulate successfully the development and diffusion of environmental  innovations
because such instruments leave some room for manoeuvre for the target group. Of
particular  importance  are  R&D subsidies  in order  to  support  the development  of
technologies. 
Many studies reveal, that innovation effects cannot be ascribed to single instru-
ments only. While in one case a particular instrument e.g. a product label, successfully
stimulates innovations that are introduced into the market, the same policy instrument
is not successful in other countries or sectors. Policy instruments are a necessary con-
dition for innovation, but on their own, they are not sufficient. 
The wide range of instruments that are applied hints to the fact that unlike in the
case of end of pipe policies, there are much more governmental agencies involved in
enacting and enforcing this polices than the environmental departments only. It is ty-
pically the ministries  for the environment, for  R&D/innovation and the respective
sectoral ministry (agriculture, industry, transport, energy, etc.). Successful innovation
oriented environmental polices require the integration of policies of different govern-
mental  agencies.  However,  initially  policies  of  the  different  departments  are  frag-
mented, because of their diverging objectives.
It is still the level of the nation state that is most important for innovation oriented
approaches,  although  their  competences  are  challenged  by  Europeanisation  and
globalisation. It remains largely the nation state that frames the national innovation
systems and that is able and legitimated to enact policies that direct the innovation ac-
tivities towards a greening (s.a. Hübner and Nill 2001).  
The policy style is often not confrontative but co-operative. However, the effec-
tiveness of voluntary or persuasive instruments depends to a large degree on credible
long-term commitments  and on the  (perceived)  readiness  to  implement  regulatory
measures in case of failure. The target group is more likely to be fragmented than in
the case of end-of-pipe policies. Whenever an innovator enters the stage, that is able
to demonstrate the technical and economic feasibility of environmental innovations,
the rest of the branch comes under political pressure to legitimise the ongoing utilisa-
tion of the old technologies. 
The importance of long-term and credible policy objectives for innovation pro-
cesses and by the above discussed growing importance of self regulatory and persuasi-
ve instruments, environmental NGOs may play a more significant role. Many policy
instruments, in particular persuasive instruments are available to private actors as well.
NGOs contribute to the development of objectives, communicating problems, moni-
toring  the  achievement  of  targets,  thereby  partially  overtaking  governmental  func-
tions.  Growingly,  there are private-private alliances between NGOs and firms that
have the potential to influence environmental policy making to a large degree (Jacob
and Jörgens 2001). However, these resources are hardly utilised strategically in the po-
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licy process and empirically the role of NGO actions seems to be limited compared to
initiatives of governmental actors. 
Finally, innovation oriented environmental policies do require a longer time hori-
zon than end of pipe policies. The time span from invention via market introduction
to diffusion takes – depending on the technological sector at stake – often several
years, sometimes even a decade. 
Strategies for the stimulation of innovations vary regarding the degree of difficult-
ness depending on the scope of the required change. If technologies are available and
if they demonstrated their technical and economic feasibility the task is primarily to
support their diffusion. Resistance of the target group can be expected only if the af-
fected industries prefer to use their previous technologies for a longer period of time.
If the required technologies are not yet on the market or only at high costs, there are
two possibilities: Regulators may choose to set standards for a future date (technology
forcing) (which is likely to evoke resistance by the target group or other governmental
agencies) or they can subsidise the development and marketing of the environmental
innovations (which may require considerable financial resources).  Empirically it can
be shown, that environmental policies more often support the diffusion of existing
technologies,  rather than requesting the development of new technologies (Conrad
1998, Jacob 1999). Policies are also easier to be adopted, if there are international ex-
amples for such policy measures. The examples of pioneering countries are often used
to legitimise planned policies. 
If  environmental  innovations  are  not  a  causal,  sustained  solution,  the  environ-
mental  relief  might  be  compensated  by subsequent  growth processes.  These  facts
were labelled already in the late 1970s as the "dilemma of the N curve" (Jänicke 1979:
111). This dilemma applies not only to clean-up environmental protection (end-of-
pipe treatment)  but also to efficiency improvements. For example, Japanese indus-
tries, between 1973 and 1985, succeeded in saving energy and raw materials in a re-
markable way but  the high industrial  growth in those  days  simply  devaluated this
effect (Jänicke, Binder et al. 1997). The overall growth rate must thus always be ac-
companied  by  equivalent  progress  in  (compensatory)  technology  providing  envi-
ronmental  relief. This "hare and tortoise-dilemma" of ecological modernization is even
tightened if there are losers of modernisation: If it is not the polluting industry itself
which finds new opportunities in environmental friendly products, the sector often
seeks for new sales opportunities for the old product.  For example, the successful
campaigns of environmentalists against using chlorine in applications free to the envi-
ronment lead to a considerable reduction in production and consumption, but this
has been compensated by the expansion of chlorine uses in other areas (Jacob 2001).
Furthermore, an innovation oriented environmental policy is limited by the nature of
the underlying problem: For urgent hazardous problems it is not adequate to wait for
the polluters to innovate. Other problems, such as land use or the loss of biodiversity
are not solvable by technologies at all (Jänicke and Jacob 2002). 
Finally,  an innovation oriented environmental  policy is  limited to those  sectors
where the target group has sufficient capacities to fulfil the expectations of environ-
mental policy. It requires a sector that is able to perform R&D efforts and that has
the ability to diversify into less harmful activities. 
To  conclude,  innovation  oriented  strategies  bear  many  features  of  the  above
mentioned trends of governance: New instruments are experimented with, new actors
gain importance and, to a minor degree, other levels of policy making than the nation
states become relevant. It remains, however, largely a task of national governmental
actors to adopt and enforce such measures. 
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The diffusion of environmental innovations 
A strategy aiming at the stimulation of innovation should not be terminated after
the market introduction of an environmental innovation. An encompassing moderni-
sation requires both, innovations, that go beyond incremental innovations, but also
their internationally widespread application. Since environmental innovations depend
largely on regulatory measures, their international diffusion is frequently accompanied
by the diffusion of the related policies. 
There is a close interlink between the international diffusion of technological inno-
vations and the spread of policies in support of these technologies. This is because
policy makers seeking continuously for solutions that can be adopted also in their
own countries and the example of other, pioneering countries is used to legitimise
their national activities. Sometimes, the diffusion is already anticipated by the target
group and therefore the technological standards are adopted if a country that is per-
ceived as frontrunner in a particular field of policy making adopts respective policy
measures (e.g. the exhaust gas standards that were enacted in California lead to R&D
activities by many manufactures around the globe, or the Swedish prohibition of use
of cadmium in the 1970s led to a substitution in all over Europe, without having the
same legal requirements). The diffusion of technological and policy innovations is also
supported by the fact that they often refer to global environmental needs: Since many
environmental problems occur in great many countries at the same time, or are even
globally in their nature they enjoy right at the outset a market perspective beyond na-
tional markets. 
Recent comparative research on the spread of environmental policy among coun-
tries  reveals  an  international  convergence  in  the  development  of  national  policy
patterns  (Kern,  Jörgens  et  al.  2000;  Kern  2000;  Jörgens  1996;  Tews,  Busch  et  al.
2003). The diffusion of innovations in environmental policy takes place both directly
from one country to another, i.e. by way of imitative policy learning or "lesson dra-
wing" (Rose 1993) and by way of international institutions (e.g. international regime),
organisations (OECD, UNEP, World Bank, Greenpeace), or expert-networks (e.g. the
International Network of Green Planners) (s.a. Jörgens 2003). 
Initially, strategies that aim at utilising the mechanism of internationalisation build
on the same set of instruments as any other technology based policy. It has to be
noted, however, that there are differences in the international spread of instruments
according to the type of policy innovation and the type of the underlying problem.
Policies supporting marketable technologies e.g. by improvements in efficiency, are
more likely to diffuse than those policies requesting e.g. EOP technologies that bear
additional costs. Pioneering national environmental policy is more likely to diffuse, if
it refers to environmental problems, which are highly visible and which are on the in-
ternational  agenda,  e.g.  climate  change.  Furthermore,  distributive  instruments  (e.g.
subsidies) or informational instruments are more likely to diffuse compared to regula-
tory  instruments  (e.g.  command  and  control)  or  re-distributive  policies  (like  eco-
taxes). 
Empirically, there are considerable differences in the rate of adaptation of environ-
mental technologies and their  related policies among the different countries.  Some
countries  are earlier  in introducing technologies  and the penetration  of  markets  is
more encompassing than in others. If their innovations are subsequently adopted in
other countries, they can be analysed as lead markets (Beise 1999; Beise 2001). 
The history of environmental protection is rich in examples for lead markets (Bei-
se, Blazejczak et al. 2003): it encompasses the legally enforced introduction of catalytic
converters for automobiles in the United States, desulphurization technologies in Ja-
pan, the Danish support for wind energy or the CFC free refrigerator in Germany.
Another impressive example is the global diffusion of chlorine-free paper, from the
political activities by Greenpeace and the EPA in the United States, by way of the in-
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troduction  of  chlorine-free  paper  whitener  in  Scandinavian  countries  and  various
Greenpeace campaigns in Germany and Austria,  right through to effective political
market intervention in Southeast Asian countries like Thailand (Mol and Sonnenfeld
2000). The latter case shows that political action that stimulates internationally suc-
cessful innovations is not limited to governmental agencies only, but that this functi-
on at least regarding the process of setting environmental objectives may also be ta-
ken over by environmentalists.
From the analysis of these examples it can be inferred that the successful establis-
hment of lead markets depends largely on the attainment of the image as a pioneer in
environmental policy making. These countries are able to frame the expectations of
industries on future regulations sometimes even globally. Furthermore, lead countries
often dispose on competitive branches that are able to innovate and are that are alrea-
dy leading the technological development. Lead countries are able to raise the often
considerable funds that are required to develop and to introduce innovative technolo-
gies. 
Regarding the actors involved, international agents are of greater importance than
in the  types  of  strategies  discussed  so  far.  International  organisations  such as  the
OECD, the European Commission or UN agencies are continuously searching for
best practices in both environmental policy making as well as environmental techno-
logies in order to support their international diffusion. The negotiation in internatio-
nal regime often serve as an arena for pioneering countries that are able to spread
their innovations by this (Jänicke 2002). Occasionally, multinational enterprises aim at
levelling out different standards and they contributing to the spread of technologies as
well as regulation in order to achieve this. Environmental NGOs support the interna-
tional diffusion, their demands for an adoption of environmental friendlier technolo-
gies is additionally legitimated by the example of frontrunners. It has to be noted ho-
wever, that the demonstration of the feasibility on the national level seems to be of
greater importance compared to the transfer activities of often rather weak internatio-
nal actors. 
The limits of strategies are very much alike the above mentioned approaches for
an ecological modernisation. Additional actors in particular from the international le-
vel are more important for these policies, however they do not substitute the national
governmental  policies.  It  is  unlikely  that  those  innovations  diffuse  easily,  that  are
lacking a win-win potential, e.g. structural solutions which primarily aim at abolishing
polluting industries. However, the potential for such strategies is still under-utilised.
Green industrial policy
Given the shortcomings of strategies of ecological modernisation it is called for
even more far reaching approaches that  go at the dispense of polluting industries.
Green industrial policy is an economic policy that aims at reducing the environmental
burden of industrial production by reducing the size of the most polluting sectors (in-
ter-sectoral structural change). Green industrial policy is based on the assumption that
the main share of the environmental burden in industrialised countries is caused by
few industrial sectors, in particular the extraction of natural resources, energy produc-
tion, production of metals, production of mineral products, chemical industry and the
production of pulp and paper (Binder 2001). 
It requires a shift not only in environmental and innovation policies but also in the
economic  and  regional  policies  of  a  country.  Unlike  approaches  of  innovation
oriented environmental policies that aims to identify win-win opportunities at least in
the long term, by stimulating marketable and competitive technologies, an approach at
the dispense of polluting industries generates losers. To be effective, a green industrial
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policy needs to have a long-term focus and to be closely interlinked with other policy
domains, notably economic policy and regional planning. In general, there should also
be some mechanism to deal with, and possibly even to compensate for, the losers of
structural change, which will require close links to social and welfare policies (see for
example Jänicke, Binder et al. 1997; Binder, Jänicke et al. 2001). 
There are few cases in which a green industrial policy has been developed at the
expense of highly polluting sectors (Jänicke,  Mönch et al. 2000).  Examples are the
phase-out  of  Japan’s  primary production  of  aluminium or  the political  strategy of
minimising oil  consumption after the explosion in oil  prices  in the early  1970s in
many western industrialised countries. Another example is the German government’s
decision to phase out the use of nuclear power and their agreement with industry on a
long-term plan to shutdown nuclear power stations. Other cases, namely the phasing
out of coal mining in the Netherlands or of crude steel  production in Luxemburg
were not driven by environmental objectives although there has been a considerable
environmental relief. In many sectors, pure economic rationales have led to the re-
lative reduction of highly polluting industries, such as coal or steel (at times even an
absolute reduction); in some cases, this decline even ran against actual industrial poli-
cies that governments had enacted to support old industries through subsidies and
state protectionism. Hence, there is a considerable potential for environmental relief if
this “autonomous” industrial restructuring is even supported by more progressive in-
dustrial policies rather than the often defensive and structurally conservative approa-
ches that is primarily influenced by the vested interests of the affected industries. The
basic industries still benefit from industrial policies more than sunrise industries re-
garding subsidies and protectionism (Binder, Jänicke et al. 2001). 
Up to now, there is little research on the economic and political conditions for
success of a shift of policies that support a decline of heavily polluting industries and
support cleaner branches. It is called for a broad integration of different governmental
agencies, in particular of the environment and industry, as well as the different levels
of policy making from the regional to the national level. 
Due to the manifold issues that have to be addressed, different types of instru-
ments have to be applied, covering regulative and economic environmental policy in-
struments, all kinds of measures of industrial policies, regional planning and social po-
licies to compensate possible losers of structural change and R&D/innovation poli-
cies in order to identify other business opportunities. Due to the nature of the policy
problem,  it  is  unlikely  that  persuasive  or  self  regulatory  instruments  are  of  great
importance for the management of structural  change.  The sheer magnitude of  the
problem also makes it unlikely that the losers can be bought out by distributive instru-
ments. 
Hence, considerable resistance against these policies can be expected, and the few
examples for a purposeful industrial restructuring underline this assumption. The po-
licy style is confrontational rather than consensus seeking. 
In respect of non-governmental actors trade unions are important, but it is unlike-
ly that they are promoting a green industrial policies which potentially bear disadvan-
tages for their sector and therefore workplaces. Environmental NGOs played some
important role in the restructuring of the Chemical Industries since the late 1980s (Ja-
cob 2001) or in the case of energy industries in Germany with the abolishing of nucle-
ar  power  and  the  incorporation  of  environmental  objectives  in  energy  policies
(Piening 2001; Foljanty-Jost and Jacob 2004). The sectors that are subject of green in-
dustrial policies are often dominated by multinational companies, the goods that are
produced by them are subject of international trade and the according trade agree-
ments. By this, national strategies are somewhat hampered, however, the national le-
vel of policy making remains the most important. 
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To conclude, the proposals, as well as the few empirical cases for a green industrial
policy follow largely traditional modes of governance, both in respect of the actors in-
volved, instruments that are chosen and the level of governance. 
Governance for Industrial Transformation
The scope for policies that are able to influence and to transform systems as un-
derstood in the research on Industrial Transformation is even broader than the above
described policies. A system in the parlance of IT encompasses the value chains of se-
veral  branches,  as  well  as  the  consumers,  international  trade  and the  institutional
setting on all level of governance from local to international. 
Some might argue, that things are complicated enough already, that policy makers
hesitate to adopt ambitious polices already in face of the huge demands of an encom-
passing ecological modernization, not to mention the requirements of a green indus-
trial policy. 
However, the broadening of the scope bears additional chances as well. E.g. the
perspective on the value chains rather than on the polluting branches might help to
identify the “weakest” part of this chain: It can be assessed which branch might have
gate keeper functions, which are able to innovate, whose interests are affected by the
change and who are the most powerful actors. Accordingly policies can be adapted. 
Based on this considerations, the playing ground for the involvement of non go-
vernmental actors and of other levels than the national level of policy making, as well
as the introduction of new policy instruments can be seen from a different angle: If
policy makers currently are not able to impose the required strict regulations, or to set
the prices right – what other points for intervention can be found? 
The contributions to the 2003 Berlin Conference addressing this issue in manifold
directions.  The papers  in  the panel  sessions  A (multi-actor  and multi-level  gover-
nance) mainly ask for the appropriate level of governance: Is it the nation state that is
likely to bring forward the necessary changes? What contributions can be expected by
the European level and what can be expected by international agreements? What is
the interplay between the different levels of policy making – are the different policies
coherent? Several papers deal with the question, if regional initiatives are likely to be
successful or if local and regional actors are helpless facing the overwhelming forces
of economic development and the global nature of environmental change. 
The panel sessions B (transition strategies) are dealing with the question of how
transition processes might be organized. What are the possibilities and obstacles to in-
fluence technological regimes? The development of transition strategies is impelled by
the Dutch government for different sectors – in how far are these efforts likely to be
successful? Are they limited to the specific political context and culture of the Nether-
lands? What actors are likely to promote transition strategies, what instruments are
available to bring forward the desired changes? A special focus is given to the questi-
on at what point of  time interventions  are most  likely to be successful.  It  will  be
discussed, if early phases of transition processes can be effectively influenced by R&D
policies. Other contributions analyse, in how far political cycles and business cycles
might be adapted to each other, thereby making interventions more effectively and ef-
ficiently. 
Contributions in panel sessions C (sustainable business) analyse the conditions for
action in the various sectors. Special focus is given to water, energy and agriculture. It
will be analysed in how far voluntary actions by business actors can be expected and
what instruments are likely to stimulate corporate responsibilities. In how far are these
persuasive,  self  regulatory  instruments  also  available  to  non-state  actors?  Are  the
emerging business-NGO partnerships likely to promote changes? 
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The panel sessions D (technologies for a sustainability transformation) contribute
to the informational basis for policies and consumer behavior. What lessons can be
drawn from past  developments?  Is  it  possible  to model future  economic develop-
ments  based on this  past  experiences? What methods are available to  forecast  the
technological development and to adapt policies accordingly? What are the determi-
nants of consumer behavior and how could these be influenced? 
Finally, the panel sessions E (new generations of instruments) discusses if the new
generation of instruments that are currently adopted in many countries  around the
world are contributing to the undertaking of Industrial Transformation. Several pa-
pers evaluate the effectiveness of environmental managements systems that have been
introduced some years ago. What are the possibilities for governmental policies to set
right the prices? What persuasive and informational instruments are in practice to sti-
mulate voluntary action; what kind of opportunities and impediments can be obser-
ved in their application? It has to be investigated if the trend to more flexible instru-
ments with a low degree of determination is symbolic policy only or if they contribute
to substantial outcomes. 
A cross cutting issue of the conference is the question in how far the experiences
with new actors, new instruments and the incorporation of new levels of government
are likely to be applicable in Southern countries as well. Are policy innovations of this
kind limited to the rich industrialized countries only, given the often poor financial,
economic and administrative resources in less developed countries? Or just the oppo-
site: Are new instruments, new actors or the incorporation of the international and
subnational level able to level out this deficits? To make a fruitful discussion possible
in this respect we avoided to put papers together in a separate panel session, but ins-
tead we distributed this contributions on problems in developing countries in the va-
rious sessions. 
The 2003 Berlin Conference shall not be the final effort in strengthening research
activities facing the urgent need for an encompassing Industrial Transformation. It
aims at stimulating the international and interdisciplinary debate on this issues. Hope-
fully, many new research projects and co-operations will follow out of this meeting. 
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1. Introduction
Until the 1960’s the post war economic growth was considered a great achieve-
ment of modern societies, as it was able to assure stability and welfare. The end of
1960s, however, brought criticisms of economic growth for what was seen as its dark-
er side. The 1972 Report to the Club of Rome was a warning to the world about fatal
effects of continuous exponential economic growth and its consequences: increasing
pollution, overexploitation of renewable resources, exhaustion of non-renewable re-
sources (Meadows 1972). A heated debate over economic growth and the environ-
ment was started between the supporters, who considered economic growth good for
the environment and the antagonists, according to whom economic growth was the
root cause of the environmental degradation and for that reason should be reduced or
even reversed. As a result, in the late 1980s theoretical investigation of the relation-
ship between economic growth and environment was started, many computer models
and future forecasting were developed, but the debate could not be put to rest due to
a lack of environmental data as well as differing opinions and values about what is a
sustainable future. The first empirical studies were carried out only in 1990 and they
revealed the existence of an inverted U curve relating use of energy and materials with
income, the so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) (Panayotou 1997). The
curve was consistent with the observation that in some of the developed countries en-
vironmental  pressure  has  been reduced while  economic  growth  has  continued.  In
1992 the World Bank published a report (World Bank 1992) suggesting the possibility
of delinking economic growth from its environmental burden (de Bruijn, 1999). 1992
was also a year of the Rio Earth Summit, during which the countries of the OECD
committed themselves to sustainable development and since May 2001 the decoupling
of environmental pressures from economic growth became one of the main object-
ives of the OECD Environmental Strategy for the First Decade of the 21st century
(OECD, 2002).
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Since the first environmental movements of the 1960s the OECD countries have
been successful in using regulatory instruments to reduce pollution and overexploita-
tion of natural resources. Technology advances made it possible to increase life ex-
pectancy, improve resource use, reduce pollution and better understand how life sup-
port systems operate at a global level. All OECD countries have developed a portfolio
of environmental policies and many socio-economic imbalances have been addressed
especially in more environmentally aware countries. The report by Azar (Azar et al.,
2002) on the past trends and prospects for the future decoupling indicates that there
has been some decoupling of  some emissions in  some developed countries. Part of the
explanation being the shift of some industries from developed to developing coun-
tries. However, according to Johnson (Johnson 2002, 26) “…despite all the elegant
rhetoric that surrounds discussions about sustainable development, we are far from
heaving made significant progress toward that goal”. One would wonder why.
This chapter analyses the complexity of global environmental problems (section 2)
and the difficulties with solving them in a traditional way (section 3). In section 4 we
propose a transformation of production and consumption systems as a way to ap-
proach global environmental problems and we present foundations of the Industrial
Transformation  project  of the  International  Human Dimensions  Programme.  The
name of the project is clarified in section 5. Section 6 presents a short overview of the
current knowledge on societal transformations and in section 7 we look into different
messages  that  Industrial  Transformation  carries  around  the  world.  We  close  the
chapter with a concluding section 8.
2. Complexity of global environmental problems
When we take a closer
look at the Environmental
Kuznets  Curve  as
presented  by  the  World
Bank we discover that  in-
deed it is true but only for
local  environmental  pro-
blems such as air contami-
nation  or  water  pollution
in  the  cities  (Vellinga
2002).  The  empirical  evi-
dence  (Azar  et  all  2002)
confirms  that  indeed  gro-
wing income levels can be
combined  with  improve-
ment  of  local  environ-
mental  quality  (Figure  1).
This  is  probably  for  two
reasons:  firstly,  because
people  take  action  based
on health impact observa-
tions  and  secondly:  be-
cause  costs  and  benefits
play  out  at  the  same
(local/national)  level  and
within  one  generation.
Therefore as income levels
Figure  1:  Local  Average  Income  Levels  and  Environ-
mental Quality.
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go up and as local environmental/health problems become manifest, there is a driver
and there are financial means to introduce technologies and regulations (incentives
and institutions) that reduce pollution and protect the health of the population. Many
cities and many countries in the industrialized part of the world have gone through
this curve. However many cities in developing countries are still in the upward part of
the curve and they suffer from multiple problems, not only environmental. 
When we talk about environmental problems that are manifest at a regional level,
such as acidification and water quantity/quality issues at the scale of river catchments,
there is less evidence that people successfully address these problems as income levels
go up. One reason is that upstream and upwind industrial and agricultural activities
benefit from the ability to pollute and overuse environmental resources such as water
and air, while downstream and downwind, people and nations experience the negative
impacts. Another reason for continued environmental degradation as income levels
go up, is the time delay between the act of polluting and the effect of pollution down-
stream. There are some examples of regions and environmental problems where the
curve has been pulled downward but this is not a general empirical finding. For most
regions of the world the jury is still out.
Similar curves drawn for global environmental problems such as climate change
and loss of species and habitats do not resemble Environmental Kuznets Curves at
all. Empirical data illustrate that there is no income related levelling off point when we
look at the relation between income and emissions of greenhouse gasses (given the
predominant  use  of
fossil  fuels).  The
OECD  list  of  red
lights  (problems  that
have worsened in the
past,  or  are  expected
to  do  so  in  the
future),  next  to  the
greenhouse  gas
emissions,  also  inclu-
des:  decline  in  tropi-
cal  forest  coverage,
overfishing  and  loss
of biodiversity (Envi-
ronmental Outlook, 2001). Environmental problems at this level are challenging be-
cause income levels correlate with energy use and present day energy use is coupled
with CO2 emissions. Similarly, the space and resources we use for our activities (hou-
sing, transport, food and also recreation) grows linearly with income projections going
up; this is at the expense of natural habitats. There is also no direct correlation with
human health impacts so the sense of urgency to address these issues is generally low.
Finally those who could take first actions – the developed and richer countries - are
the least vulnerable to the effects of global environmental change and they do not feel
immediate urgency to take any action.  Indeed, a critical feature of  global  environ-
mental change is the time scale of biophysical response: climate responds to changes
in the concentration of greenhouse gasses at a time scale in the order of decades to
centuries and more. 
Global environmental change is thus so very difficult to approach in the traditional
way in which environmental problems have been addressed so far because the activi-
ties that cause these problems (energy use, food production, mobility) are deeply em-
bedded in our cultures. The global environmental problems often originate from dif-
ferent sources, are characterised by a great number of stakeholders and their interests
and are marked by large uncertainties. They are also urgent and require action before
the effects actually become visible. 
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3. How have we solved environmental problems so far?
Let’s analyse trends in societal response to environmental problems over the last
50 years. Figure 4 presents a number of stages in societal response to environmental
problems. In most of the OECD countries environmental policies were initiated in
the period between 1960 and 1970. The first set of policies can be characterized as
predominantly reactive: policies driven by visible negative effects such as massive fish
killing in polluted rivers and health problems related to air  pollution and chemical
waste. The response can be characterized as “end of pipe”, implemented by technical
specialists. An important philosophy was keeping the cost down. In response to the
oil crises in the 1970s, these policies were complemented with ideas about efficiency
gains in the production process. This required the involvement of managers. Optimi-
sation of resource use became the major driving philosophy. 
From, say 1990 onward, new approaches can be recognized where environmental
concerns are transformed into opportunities for developing and selling new products.
The driving philosophy for such strategies is acceleration: developing new markets ba-
sed on environmental performance and green image. A major question is: will the ap-
proach focused on green products be powerful enough to limit global environmental
change to acceptable proportions. The answer is: probably not. Green products are
only marketable when they fit in the larger physical and institutional framework. A hy-
drogen  car  needs  an  infrastructure  with  hydrogen  service  stations,  and  renewable
energies can only compete in a market where the price of fossil fuel use reflects all en-
vironmental cost. There are plenty of technologies available or within reach for clean
production, such as zero emission power plants and zero emission cars and ecological
and/or low input farming systems. Still they do not easily enter the market for two
reasons: one - they may not fit in the present energy, transport, food production and
consumption systems, which are “locked-in” with status quo interests including edu-
cation, research, infrastructure and not in the least commercial interests; and two - the
incentive structure through its historical development favours the present system of
sharing private and public costs (in any fiscal, property, international trade and liability
system of rules and regulations some cost are internalised in the price of production
and consumption while other cost are born by the public, e.g. health cost, or future
generations, e.g. climate change or other species e.g. loss of biodiversity ).
reactive receptive constructive pro-active
End-of-pipe     Process       Product System
Specialists   Managers       Sector Society





A)   response phase   C) main actors 
B) focus of attention  D) driving philosophy 
Figure  4:  Development  stages  in  corporate  and  societal  response  (adapted  from
Winsemius and Guntram 1992 and Vellinga and Herb, 1999)
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4. Transformation – a panaceum?
Global environmental change will test, in an unprecedented way, the capacity of
the human species to manage their activities in a pro-active manner, especially when
we want to combine growing income levels with a significant reduction in the impact
of human activities on global life support systems. Such an approach will have to fo-
cus on systems and systems change. A system being defined as a chain of production,
distribution, consumption and disposal activities including the incentives that shape
the system (i.e. property, liability and fiscal laws and regulations). Given the complexi-
ty of such chains and given the need for a pro-active approach such system changes
will require the involvement of society as a whole and they will require an inspiring
vision to mobilize all participants (see Figure 4). It is clear that such visions are likely
to compete with one another, which can slow down the change, but this is not ne-
cessarily counter productive as competition is a driving force in itself. Furthermore, a
change to more sustainable systems is only partially a matter of technology. Econo-
mic, socio-cultural and institutional change plays an equally important role. In fact,
transformation can only be successful  when the technological  change is  inherently
coupled with a societal change.
These considerations and a wide international, multidisciplinary consultation pro-
vided foundations for the creation of the Industrial Transformation project (IT) of
the International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change
(IHDP). The overarching goal of the IT research is threefold: 
• To understand complex society-environment interactions;
• To identify driving forces for change;
• To explore development trajectories that have significantly smaller burden on the
environment.
The IHDP-IT programme is based on the assumption that important changes in
production and consumption systems will be required in order to meet the needs and
aspirations of a growing world population while using environmental resources in a
sustainable manner. This type of research has to be of a multi-disciplinary character.
Industrial Transformation therefore builds on the foundations of a range of social
science disciplines including economics,  sociology,  psychology, human ecology, an-
thropology, political science, geography, and history, as well as on the foundations of
natural sciences such as physics,  chemistry, biology, and technological sciences. To
provide a framework for the co-operation required between various disciplines, a ma-
trix was developed (Figure 5).  The rows reflect the disciplinary research fields that
each has a certain tradition (outlined in Vellinga 1999a), while the columns describe a
set of human activities aimed at meeting specific human needs. Through this multi-
disciplinary approach, the Industrial Transformation Project strives to build on exis-
ting pillars of research and draw from expert communities while developing new rese-
arch topics and radical approaches.
Figure 5: Tentative Framework for Industrial Transformation Research with research
fields/disciplinary approaches in the rows and human needs/activities in the columns
(Vellinga 1999b)
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5. Why Industrial Transformation? 
The word Industrial in the name of the project was selected to describe and indicate
the need for a transformation of ALL human activities defined as a chain of interrela-
ted economic activities  aimed at providing a specific need for  a society.  Industrial
Transformation was defined analogously to Industrial Metabolism and hence refers to
all  processes  reflecting  economic  activity  instead  of  those  of  the  industrial  sector
alone. Industrial Transformation could also be called Societal Transformation but this
word is confusing as it emphasizes changing norms, values and attitudes instead of
transforming inputs into outputs (de Bruijn 1999). Looking at the history of how so-
cieties moved from agricultural to an industrial mode of subsistence, one could argue
that many countries  are past  the  industrialization  process  and therefore  Industrial
Transformation is over,  but this is not what IT refers to. Current societies including
the so-called post-industrial world are strongly based on the production of goods and
services in ways that have a massive effect on environment (e.g. the energy and food
sector as well as tourism and the health care sector). Industrial Transformation is the-
refore  about  transforming  production  and  consumption  based  societies  towards
sustainability. 
6. From chaos to convergence
Since launching of the IT Science Plan in the early 2000, a number of relevant
research initiatives have been developed worldwide, many of which were supported
by the IHDP IT programme. The aim of these activities has been firstly to better un-
derstand the complex society – environment interaction  and the process  of  socio-
technological transformations; secondly to use this understanding to inform policies
and strategies to realize purposive transitions; and thirdly to better understand the dif-
ferent messages that Industrial Transformation carries throughout the world.
For example, the research group focussing on innovation theories based at Twente
and Maastricht (The Netherlands) developed a “multilevel perspective on transitions”
to help us understand dynamics of transformations. They distinguish three levels: ni-
che, regime and landscape (Geels 2002): 
• Niche:  denoting  a  space  where  individuals,  based  on  existing  knowledge  and
capabilities  develop  new  technologies  or  concepts  that  are  geared  towards
problems of existing regimes.  Niches  provide space  for  learning processes  and
development  of  social  networks,  which  support  innovations.  Innovations
generated at this level are usually radical.
• Socio-technical regime: accounting for stability of existing technological development.
Regimes refer to rules that enable and constrain activities within communities. If
innovations are generated at the regime level- they are mainly incremental.
• Socio-technical landscape: encompassing the wider context of a regime in the form of
socio-cultural and normative values, economic and broad political processes. The
context of landscape is very difficult to change and if it does change, it takes much
longer than in the case of regimes. (Geels, 2002).
A niche-based approach to sustainable  development – the Strategic  Niche Ma-
nagement that has been developed in conjunction with the multilevel perspective on
system innovation advocates a deliberate stimulation and protection of the novel so-
cio-technical  niches  to  seed  a  transformation  of  the  technological  niches  towards
sustainability (Kemp, Schot, Hoogma 1998). 
These  findings  gave  foundations  to  a  new approach  –  transition  management
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which has been defined as an anticipatory form of multi-level governance that uses
collective, normative visions as starting point for formulating long-term, collective in-
novation strategies (Rotmans et al 2003). This managerial approach advocates an evo-
lutionary  way of  steering instead of  command-and-control  governance. It  suggests
that a transition takes place through a sequence of the following stages: a pre-develop-
ment phase where there is very little visible change at the systems-level but a great
deal of experimentation at the individual level; a take-off phase where the process of
change starts to build up and the state of the system begins to shift because of diffe-
rent  reinforcing innovations  or  surprises;  an acceleration phase in which structural
changes occur in a visible way through an accumulation and implementation of socio-
cultural, economic, ecological and institutional changes; and a stabilization phase whe-
re the speed of societal change decreases and a new dynamic equilibrium is reached.
Critics  of  the  approaches  and  taxonomy  described  above  indicate  that  indeed
traditional  innovation  may be  explained  in  the  terms  niche  innovation.  However,
changes required to reverse the trend of growing global environmental pressures are
likely  to  be  triggered  only  by  institutional  changes  at  the  level  of  “regimes”  or
“landscapes”. It is claimed that addressing energy, food and transportation systems
and their effects on the global environment requires changes in the existing internatio-
nal incentive structure for these activities. Such changes should include some kind of
internalisation  of  external  cost  of  environmental  resource  use  e.g.  through  taxes
and/or through the allocation of resource use quota systems and the introduction of
tradable resource  use rights.  The critics  argue, however,  that  niche innovation can
only come about after relevant changes have been made in the international “level
playing field” (in evolutionary economics this is called the “selection environment”).
In  terms  of  transformation  management:  stimulation  of  niche  innovation  is  only
worthwhile when incentives at global scale are adjusted simultaneously (assuming the
systems addressed are embedded in global markets).
Berkhout  and Smith (2004) propose  a taxonomy listing four  different  types of
transitions:  path  dependent,  reorientation  of  trajectories,  emergent  transitions  and
purposive transitions, each with its own pace and features. Berkhout argues that the
normatively driven purposive transformations (such as those triggered by the desire to
avoid irreversible damage to life support systems like climate, biodiversity and the wa-
ter cycle) do not fit  the typical model as described by Geels (Geels 2002) and the
others mentioned above. 
Historical analysis of technological innovations leads also to the conclusion that
most innovation tends to be of an incremental nature but broad transitions do occur
(Elzen  2003).  Taking  into  account  the  fact  that  these  transitions  have  not  been
planned and that  there  was  no consensual  vision  about  where the  societies  could
transform to (either  in more or less  sustainable directions)  the main challenge for
research remains in gaining a better understanding of the dynamics of transitions so as
to  be  able  to  suggest  possibilities  for  inducing  and  stimulating  the  occurrence  of
transitions. It seems likely, however, that purposive transitions, taking place on mainly
environmental  grounds,  will  have different characteristics,  may be more costly and
therefore more difficult to implement (van de Kerkhof & Wieczorek 2003).
The road towards sustainability through the decoupling of economic development
from its environmental burden proves to pose many challenges. There are many areas
of human needs that need to be addressed such as food, fresh water, health, shelter,
mobility and energy, to name only a few. There are also many dimensions in which
sustainability needs to be achieved, including e.g., technical, socio-economic, cultural
or  spatial  aspects.  Achieving sustainability  in  the broad sense  therefore appears  to
require a multitude of changes that have been referred to by analysts from different
disciplinary backgrounds using a variety of concepts. System innovation, regime transforma-
tion, industrial transformation, technological transition, socio-economic paradigm shift are some of
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the best known (Elzen 2003). 
The review of research carried out since the launching of the IT Science Plan in
2000 illustrates that transition research is still in its infancy with different schools of
thought claiming the term (Vellinga & Wieczorek 2003a). This is mainly due to diffe-
rent disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches to research and different attitudes
regarding normative and non-normative aspects of research. Despite this variety of
terms and the lack of well-established definition for a transformation,  there is still
convergence and  a growing set  of  characteristic  features  of  a  transformation  that
scientists do agree about. They agree that:
• A Transformation is a major but gradual and long-term change in the way societal
functions are fulfilled.
• Technological change is crucial in bringing about the change but its introduction is
inherently coupled with high-level socio-cultural and institutional changes.
• Transformations  involve  a  wide  range  of  actors,  including  firms,  consumers,
NGOs, knowledge producers and governments.
• They are not caused by a change in a single factor but are the result of the interplay
of many factors and actors that influence each other but they may also have their
own trajectories of development. 
The insights developed thus far also allow making policy suggestions that can in-
spire current  attempts to define and implement various forms of transition policy.
The challenge to realize transitions towards sustainability in a variety of domains can
only be fruitfully tackled when near-future attempts to induce them are carried out in
close interaction with work on furthering the understanding of the dynamic of transi-
tions. 
7. Understanding geographical differences
When studying historical transformations with the aim to fuel the policy process
and envisage pathways towards sustainability, it is of utmost importance to take ac-
count of regional differences within the framework of global interconnectedness. This
is not only due to various levels of economic development, but also because of diffe-
rent climatic conditions and topography and often very different cultural and socio-
political patterns. For example, the challenge for the OECD countries is to continue
economic development while reducing environmental burden (de-coupling of econo-
mic growth from its  environmental  burden).  For  the  South  Asian region  a single
challenge  cannot  be  defined  since  differences  among  and  within  the  countries  in
terms of production and consumption are too large to allow for such a simplification.
The rapid change to natural gas busses in New Delhi or growth of kilowatts produced
by decentralized renewable energy systems in India could serve as good examples of
change for many OECD countries. But at the same time, the South Asian region is
home to the largest number of poor and nearly half of the two billion people without
access to energy (Wieczorek and Vellinga 2003b). 
On the  other  hand,  the  industrializing  East  Asian mega-cities  undergo  a rapid
transformation due to massive economic growth in the last few decades. This growth
has been accompanied by increases in per capita income and significant declines in
poverty and child mortality but also by tremendous increases in air and water polluti-
on, resource degradation and escalating energy use. It has been widely recognized that
this is due to policies failures and institutional weakness. On the other hand, evidence
shows that incremental improvements in environmental regulatory policy were often
overridden by the scale effects of increased production, consumption and resource
use. Given this urban-industrial growth, the challenge for this region is therefore to
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shift to patterns of economic development that are significantly less energy, resource
and pollution intensive (Angel 2000).
8. Conclusions
Global environmental change problems such as climate change, the loss of biodi-
versity and the overexploitation of water resources require major changes of the way
energy, food,  transport  and water needs are met. In view of these global environ-
mental problems and their irreversibility, there is an urgent need to explore develop-
ment trajectories and implement strategies that have a significantly smaller burden on
the global environment.
The activities  causing global  environmental  change such as the production and
consumption of (fossil fuels) energy, transport, food and water are deeply embedded
in our societies. Therefore traditional command-and-control policy measures will not
suffice in bringing about the required changes. System innovation offers a more pro-
mising approach. It advocates a reconsideration and innovation of the entire chain of
production and consumption as well as the institutional and political structures that
shape relations between the two.
The international community has developed a number of research concepts and
tools to address the enormous challenge of global environmental change. There is a
consensus that effective research approaches should include the analyses of technolo-
gical, socio-economic and institutional change. Such multidisciplinary approaches are
generally presented under the name of industrial transformation research.
Industrial Transformation research as described and promoted by the Internatio-
nal Human Dimensions Programme (Vellinga and Herb 1999) brings the various rese-
arch approaches together. This programme plays an important role in the generation
and sharing of the knowledge required to initiate and guide international, regional, na-
tional and local efforts towards more sustainable production and consumption pro-
cesses. The character of the most urgent global environmental problems legitimises
the focus on the transformation of production and consumption of energy, transport,
food and water and the technical, institutional and societal elements that shape these
systems.
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SECTION A: Multi-Actor and Multi-Level Governance
Network Failures - 
How Realistic is Durable Cooperation 
in Global Governance?
Wolfgang Meyer/Katrin Baltes
Centre for Evaluation (CEval) at Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany
Introduction
The inclusion of  civil-society in policy-formation and –execution has  been dis-
cussed as a new strategy for global management of natural resources in the spirit of
“sustainable development”. If such a policy network is about to be build, the main
question to be answered is, whether the planned network structure is able to guaran-
tee durable cooperation for global governance or not. We want to answer this ques-
tion from a theoretical point of view within this chapter. Three steps will be made in
doing so:
Chapter 2 is a brief overview on social change and its influences on the manage-
ment of natural resources. The central thesis is that modernisation process forces social actors
to cooperation in multi-actor multi-level policy networks by revealing more and more the limit-
ations of the dominant coordination modes “market” and “hierarchy”. Furthermore,
globalisation transfers the task of natural resource management from national to glob-
al level of policy. As a result, the guiding principle of sustainable development and its
additional  requests for  social  integration on time-, territorial-  and target-dimension
even increases the coordination problems associated with this task and the demand
for multi-actor multi-level policy networks. Thus, policy networks are not only an out-
come of social change but also a goal for global policy following the principles of sus-
tainable development. 
In chapter 3, some general remarks on network theory will be made to describe the
functionality of multi-actor multi-level networks as institutions for governance. The
key elements of networks as coordination mechanism and some findings on the pre-
conditions of self-regulation will be presented.
In chapter 4, we discuss the chance to implement multi-actor multi-level networks
on global level that promise to be an improvement to actual processes of global gov-
ernance. The focus is set on “network failures” that hinder the coordination function
of this regulative mode. They have to be handled by proper political institutions for to
ensure functionality. Some examples for the needed mechanism on a global level will
be given at last.
Finally, the central findings of this chapter will be summarised in chapter 5 and
used to answer the question how realistic durable cooperation in policy networks is.
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 The Global Problem of Resource Management
As far as human beings’ ability to produce goods for their own needs increased,
the  usage of natural resources becomes more and more an important variable in socio-
economic development.  During the last  century, the rising demand for production
proofed the insufficiency of natural resources available. Hence, the need for rational
resource management has been recognised and it is becoming more and more a global
task. Moreover, the importance of effective and efficient management emerged due to
growing complexity of production. As a result of rationalisation and differentiation
processes, the division of labour between different social actors revealed also the sig-
nificance to coordinate individual action for reaching common goals. 
This coordination of action between individual and/or collective actors occurs within
the existing socio-cultural structures of a politically defined territory and is therefore
embedded in social structures and processes of a given society (cf. Granovetter 1985).
Moreover, it influences societies’ capability of social integration (cf. Friedrichs & Jagodz-
inski 1999) and is therefore one of the most important sources for developing a sense
of community (cf. Tönnies 1988).  Vice versa, this sense of community is the source of
“positive solidarity” (cf. Durkheim 1992: 166ff.) which always includes cooperation and
is strongly associated with an  active forming  of  society  by political  interventions producing
“positive integration” (cf. Münch 2000: 206ff.). 
According to Parsons (1985: 26ff.), the key function of polity is the protection of soci-
etal community and to ensure social integration as a permanent process by executing
common norms and collective action. Social institutions within the political system (e.g.
the principles of free election) are safeguards for this development. Hence, policies are
cooperation processes to (re)produce social integration by using different modes for
coordination of action within a given society. The formation of nation states in the 19th
century (cf. Eisenstadt & Rokkan 1973, Tilly & Ardant 1975) and the emergence of
democratic political systems to govern these unities have been up to now the most in-
fluencing and path-making result of social integration processes. Today, nation states
and its governments are dominant actors not only within its own national context but
also on the international political stage. 
Coordination of Action through Market Exchange
Within capitalistic societies,  market  exchange has become the most important co-
ordination principle and each kind of social action is more or less subordinated to this
code.  Hence, the prior function of social institutions in modern market societies is the
protection of free trade and fair competition from egoistic manipulation of one or the
other actor involved in this interaction. Beyond question, this kind of coordination
and its supporting social institutions, like for instance the democratic welfare state, in-
creased not only the “wealth of the nations” but also the welfare of its citizens. Glob-
ally seen, the economical dynamics are still unbroken, although the centres of growth
shifted from the western states (North America and Western Europe) to other re-
gions (especially East Asia). The ecologically determined global “limits of growth” (cf.
Meadows 1972), heavily discussed as one outcome of the rising exploitation of natural
resources in the seventies of the last century, are obviously not yet reached.
However, this does not mean that critical judgements on the problem solving ca-
pacities for ecological questions of the existing economical and political order, done
by ecologists during public debates in Western Europe and the USA in the 1970s and
1980s (for an short overview see Meyer & Martinuzzi 2000), are per se wrong. While
the discussion on basic conflicts between ecology and economy seems to be over-
come (cf.  for the development of  public debates on ecology in the western hemi-
sphere, especially in Germany see Huber 2001: 274ff.),  some key problems for co-
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ordination of action, directly associated with market regulation principles, still remains
unsolved (for an overview see Diekmann & Preisendörfer 2001: 77ff.). 
To put the focus on only one topic here, the phenomenon described by Hardin
(1968) as the “tragedy of the commons” seems to be well suited. If several different actors
share a common resource, the risk of abuse is given on behalf of individual strategies
to maximize personal benefits. Each actor tries to minimize investments for preserva-
tion of common resources while simultaneously he or she wants to get the most out
of this resources for own advantages. As far as costs and benefits of common re-
sources  can not  be individually  allocated,  this  problem of exploitation  can not  be
solved by market exchange. From the view of economic theory, common natural re-
sources are highly demanded public goods which are not supplied on private market
and due to this can not be traded – the reason for market failure (see for further details
for instance Buchanan 1999). Moreover, the benefits of global public goods – like most
natural resources – reach across boarders and sometimes even about generations (for
the discussion on global public goods at the World Summit 2002 in Johannesburg see
Gardiner & Le Goulven 2002). In other words: the globalisation of ecological risks
even increases  the  public  good problem associated with  environmental  topics  (cf.
Beck 1986).
Several strategies to overcome market failures and to integrate ecological topics
into the economical system have been discussed in the last decades. In general, some
economists  suggested state intervention for public goods to adjust  market  failures
(among the classical theorists especially Pigou 1998). A very popular example is the
recommendation of taxes for a radical reform of international monetary system (cf.
Tobin 1978), which became one of the main demands of attac, the first global social
movement (cf. Grefe, Greffrath & Schumann 2002: 73ff.). In global environmental
policy, the international emission trade system, probably the most important outcome
of the “Kyoto Protocol” (cf. UN 1992, 1997), can be seen as another measure within
this way of thinking. On national level, several trials to include ecological costs into
the national accounting systems have been made by statistical offices (cf. for Germany
Stahmer 1989; Cansier & Richter 1995; Rademacher & Stahmer1997). Finally, some
efforts on the level of firms to include ecological aspects in cost management and
controlling systems can be found (cf. Müller-Wenk 1978, for an overview Grießham-
mer & Eberle 1996). All these strategies aim on inclusion of environmental costs into
economical system and to avoid externalities by measures of  state regulation (even the
creation of property rights like in the case of emission trade is finally dependent on
state activities).
Regulation of Action through Nation States
This sets the focus on regulation systems of the nation state and its ability to solve
environmental problems. In a global historical view, the implementation of environmental
policy within the political system can be described as a story of success: between the
late 60s and the beginning of the 90s of the last century, successively all OECD-coun-
tries established national environmental authorities and developed a more or less elab-
orated environmental regulation system, including national plans, laws and legislations
on certain  environmental  issues  (Kern,  Jörgens  & Jänicke 2000;  2001).  Moreover,
comparable institutions have been implemented both on supra-national (e.g. within
the European Union, cf. Jeppesen 2002) and regional level (for German communes
see Kern & Wegener 2002). Finally, the World Summit 1992 in Rio de Janeiro estab-
lished environmental protection as a global policy and 178 nation states ratified the
“Agenda 21” as a common political strategy. 
34   Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference
In difference to the successful institutional implementation, the effects of national en-
vironmental policies are at least ambivalent. While some remarkable outcomes of political
programs  with sometimes  impressive  impacts  on the ecological  system can be re-
ferred to (e.g. the progresses in East Germany cf. Stockmann, Meyer et al 2001: 65ff.),
many basic trends – especially those concerning the usage of natural resources – are
still leading in the wrong direction (as mentioned for example by the Federal Environ-
mental Agency in Germany cf. UBA 2002: 4ff.). In most cases, executive problems asso-
ciated with the political measures used, can be blamed for poor regulative effects of
national environmental policy (cf. Mayntz 1978, Gawel 1999, Wilson 2002). Especially
the acceptance of state regulation within the stakeholder groups is an important prob-
lem – not only in environmental policy. 
Due to social change, the decision-making capability of national governments is
nowadays  challenged  from two sides.  As Hanf  & O’Toole  (1992:166)  mentioned,
„modern governance  is  characterised  by  decision  systems  in  which territorial  and
functional differentiation desegregate effective problem-solving capacity into a collec-
tion of sub-systems of actors with specialised tasks and limited competence and re-
sources”. Therefore, differentiation as an outcome of modernization increases the de-
mand for  co-ordination between state and non-state organisations within the national frame-
work (cf. Mayntz 1994, 1996). Moreover, the inclusion of lobby groups with different
member interests into policy forming processes often raise the problem to find a com-
monly shared solution and their power to influence government might even hinder
any decision at all (or at least its implementation). The political discussions on health
reforms in Germany can be used as an example (see Bandelow 1998; 1999; 2003a, b;
Gerlinger 2003): several working sessions including members of all political parties as
well as a great variety of non-state organisations (e.g. general medical council, pharma-
ceutical industry, health insurance companies, pharmacies etc.) developed a solution,
which had been publicly blamed for its “bias” preferring some pressure groups’ in-
terests. Furthermore, the activities of several of the non-state groups involved have to
be described as a blockade to strongly needed reforms. To sum it up: it is becoming
more and more difficult for national governments to find proper solutions to societal
problems and to make decisions that will be executed by civil society forces in the way
they are supposed to. 
Supplementing this intra-national development globalisation processes with its raising
number of trans-national linkages in the economical as well as in the political system
face the steering ability of centralized national governments  from an inter-national
perspective (cf. Zürn 1998, Beck 1999, Prakash & Hart 2001). Hence, globalisation as
another outcome of modernization increases the demand for  co-ordination between na-
tional organisations – concerning both state and non-state actors – on a trans-national
policy level. The well-known problems of the European Union to find common posi-
tions and the inability of the United Nations to develop shared political strategies (ac-
tual examples reach from the climate change policy to the Iraq war) need not to be
further outlined here.
Following  these  argumentations,  state  failures primarily  occur  as  a  result  of
coordination problems between autonomous actors which are at least partly not an
constitutive element of the national political system. Nevertheless, the nation state is
forced to cooperate because it has lost the ability to develop proper solutions and to im-
pose the execution of its will. Modern democratic states are “weak states” (and they
are still getting weaker) because they have to share power with civil society actors and
international cooperation both in the political and the economical system. A return to
pure national state governance (as some nationalist movements demand) is not pos-
sible and would lead to economical and political disasters. Therefore, both state and
non-state actors are doomed to cooperation within  multi-actor and multi-level policy net-
works - provided that they are interested to avoid political blockades leading certainly
to ecological and economical ruin. 
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Sustainable Development as a New Challenge for Social Integration
Additionally,  the  use  of  sustainable  development as  a  guiding  principle  makes  the
whole thing even more complicated. Since the World Commission on Environment
and Development published the famous “Brundtland-report” in 1987, sustainable de-
velopment is defined as a development ‘that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (World Com-
mission 1987: 8). Although most authors refer to the Brundtland-definition of “sus-
tainable development”, specification problems associated with this definition are still
unsolved in the initiated scientific discourse. To give an example, the debate on “weak
vs. strong” sustainability should be mentioned here. Nevertheless, the integration of
ecological,  economical  and social  targets  has  been unfolded as  another  commonly
shared aspect of sustainable development (cf. Minsch 1993). On the political arena,
especially the World Summit in Rio de Janeiro 1992 and the Agenda 21 were import-
ant milestones on the new pathway of global policy. Although a lot of too optimistic
expectations had been disappointed, this kick-off led to a bunch of activities on glob-
al,  national,  and local level of  politics  since than. Moreover,  the Rio-slogan “think
global – act local” emphasises the spirit of global integration which is still lasting in
some of these activities. 
By summing up these aspects, sustainable development can be recognised as a (de-
manded) social integration process on three different dimensions (Meyer 2002: 12):
• Time integration: As mentioned in the Brundtland-definition, sustainability should
be the integration of needs between different generations of human beings. This means incor-
poration on the time-dimension, with the demand to include a long-term perspective
into nowadays political decisions.
• Territorial integration: Following the spirit of Rio, local action for sustainable devel-
opment has to be framed by national regulations, which itself have to be harmon-
ized with global agreements. Therefore, decision systems integrating several territ-
orial levels of political action have to be developed within the political system.
• Target integration: Finally, the scientific debate revealed the importance of target in-
tegration because sustainable development needs to be supported by different so-
cial groups with diverse interests. The integration of ecological, economical, and social tar-
gets offers the possibility to include environmental and social aspects in business
decisions and  vice  versa to legitimate business action from a social and environ-
mental policy view (cf. Minsch 1993:9).
According to the coordination problems described above, these three requests for
social integration dramatically increases the need for cooperation of state and non-
state actors on different policy levels – and the problems associated with these co-
operation, which have to be solved by political action and institution building. Time in-
tegration implies a lack of information about the needs of future generations and the risks
of optional pathways in consideration. These uncertainties open the floor for ideolo-
gies and political discussions which can not be decided by rational arguments or cost-
benefits  analysis.  The fruitless  scientific  debate on “weak vs.  strong” sustainability
may only be the opening act for a new century of ideological battles within the politic-
al system.  Territorial integration implies intensive communication processes between local, re-
gional, national and supra-national levels of policy making, assuring a fair democratic
representation  of  all  interests  involved.  The European  integration  process  and its
problems to build up appropriate institutions ensuring adequate representation of in-
terests, powerful translation of decisions into common action and support on the loc-
al level gives a first impression on the assumable difficulties. Finally,  target integration
implies new modes of coordination of political action, due to the increasing number of corpor-
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ate actors which have to be involved in problem solving and therefore also in policy
making. As a result, the political system has to open itself for non-political actors,
while non-state actors  have to allow political  interventions  in their own sphere of
influence. 
Therefore, multi-actor and multi-level networks are not only a “must” because of
modernisation process but also a common goal of global policy in the spirit of sus-
tainable development.  This  specific  mode of  coordination  implies  some particular
characteristics  and problems (compared to other  coordination modes)  that  will  be
analysed from a theoretical point of view in the next chapter. 
Is Network Governance the Solution?
Depending on the perspective of scientific discipline, the use of ‘network’ as an
analytical concept varies considerably. Even if the focus is set on social sciences, sev-
eral  different  understandings  of  the term can be found:  among others  economists
analyse the interrelationship of formally independent enterprises, innovation research
recognise networks both as important sources for developing innovations and tools
for spreading innovations throughout a given social system, and in the view of organ-
isation theory network is a hybrid mode of coordination between the poles “market”
and “hierarchy” (for an overview on social network research see Weyer 2000). Here,
only the last viewpoint is of certain interest because it refers directly to the steering
capacities  and problems of  networks  (see especially  the contributions  in Sydow &
Windeler 2000). 
The discussion on the  dichotomy of  “market” and “hierarchy” as coordination principles
first  occurred  within economics.  Basing on the pioneering  work  of  Ronald Coase
(1937), transaction cost theory set the focus on coordination principles for explaining
organisational forms and the existence of firms (cf. Williamson 1975): under certain
conditions  (especially  the  costs  of  transaction),  bureaucratic  organisation  (e.g.  in
firms) is in favour to market transaction, probably leading to an integration of these
transactions into hierarchical organised framework. Further research on these issues
revealed the importance of mixed or hybrid organisational forms between “market”
and “hierarchy”. To describe these forms, the term “network” had been introduced
and some authors emphasize the specifics of this coordination mechanisms in differ-
ence to “market”  and “hierarchy”,  justifying  the classification  as  an own type (cf.
Powell 1990).  
In  political science,  the network approach has been introduced in several different
theoretical contexts and used both as a quantitative or a qualitative analysis tool (for
an overview see Börzel 1997). For a consensual, minimal definition, Börzel (1997: 1)
suggested the understanding of policy network “as a set of relatively stable relationships
which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors,
who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to
pursue  these  shared  interests  acknowledging  that  co-operation  is  the  best  way  to
achieve common goals”. 
Therefore, the policy network approach offers a broad range of analytical utilities
and research on governance represents only a small part within this context. Nevertheless,
in the past decade a respectable amount of theoretical reflections and empirical stud-
ies on multi-actor networks and its contribution to governance had been published
(c.f.  Marin  & Mayntz  1991;  Jordan  & Schubert  1992;  Börzel  1997;  Rhodes  1997;
Marsh 1998; Koob 1999; Knill 2000; Dinter 2001; Hajer & Wagenaar 2003). As parti-
cipants of such kinds of inter-organisational co-operations several different state-or-
ganisations (national and local government, legislative and administration, federal and
regional agencies etc.) and non-state-organisations (multi-national, small and medium-
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sized enterprises, non-profit organisations, interest groups and associations etc.) have
been recognised in empirical analysis  on various policy fields at the local, regional,
national and international level of policy making (e.g. from a comparative perspective
for  health  policy  Banting  & Corbett  2002;  for  public  policy  in  United  Kingdom
Richards  & Smith  2002;  further  examples  can  be  found  in  the  work  of  the  Max
Planck-Institute in Cologne cf. Mayntz & Scharpf 1995a; Mayntz 2003). 
Network Regulation and Coordination of Action
As a short summary, the following four key elements of “network regulation” can be
identified (cf. Meyer 2003): 
• Trust: Collective action is only possible, if trust in the reliability of each member
to act in a co-operative way can be guaranteed (cf. Knill 2000: 119ff.). Cheating
will destroy the cooperation (only Charlie Brown will try to kick the ball again)
and break up the network.
• Durability:  To produce trust,  to  avoid cheating and to overcome “prisoner  di-
lemma”-situations, continuous (or as a minimum repeated) interaction between
same actors is necessary (cf. the considerations of game theory Ordeshook 2003,
especially on the importance of repeated interaction Axelrod 1984). Therefore,
networks have to be stable constellations of actors at least to a certain extent and
over a recognizable time period.
• Strategic  Dependency:  Continuous  interaction  between  formally  independent  and
voluntary participating actors leads to “strategic dependency” (Streeck & Schmit-
ter  1996:  137f.)  due  to  shared  production  of  common goods.  Therefore,  the
scope of action for each actor in every decision situation is reduced to cooperat-
ive alternatives because egoistic behaviour risks future support of partners. 
• Institutionalisation: Especially for balancing power disparities between members (cf.
Bachmann 2000: 108ff.) network rules have to be developed. Such an institutional
framework regulates the modalities of participation, the process of decision-mak-
ing, the distribution of commonly produced benefits and the possibility of access
and exit to network (cf. Mayntz & Scharpf 1995b: 19ff.). 
Problems of network coordination are to a certain extent identical with general prob-
lems of collective action: Neither the “invisible hand” of market exchange nor the threat-
ening force of sanctions in hierarchical power relations is primarily relevant in this
context. In contrary, “trust” as the central regulation principle has to be reproduced in
every single cooperation situation and cheating is always possible. Hence, actors have
to invest in network maintenance by waiving individual benefits with respect of the com-
mon output or the individual benefits of others with the expectation of comparable
behaviour of the other actors now or in future situations. As far as social institutions
controlling interactions are missing, the only potential sanction for a single actor is to
leave  the  network  (and  this  also  the  only  threatening  force  to  push  its  own will
through). From a theoretical viewpoint, this will happen if individual costs to maintain
cooperation exceeds the benefits of collective action. Although positive experiences in
repeated  interaction  will  increase  trust,  the  risk  of  cheating  still  exists.  Moreover,
cheating is the best option, if expected benefits of further collective action are sup-
posed to be lower than individual benefits available in the concrete situation. These
are the well-known problems of  collective action and theoretical  considerations  as
well as experimental research have shown that sufficient institutions and measures are
needed to avoid bargaining dilemmas and egoistic behaviour (Olson 2000, Heckelman
& Olson 2003). Therefore, only social institutions regulating network activities like
formal agreements and rules make the difference to repeated collective action that is
not able to ensure stability of the interaction system by itself.
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The implementation of  network rules lead also to some kind of restrictions. They
might, for instance, limit the exit opinion making an agreement on periods of notice.
Comparable to rules within organisations, such network rules need to be developed,
controlled and reformulated over time (cf. on the life history of organisational rules
Schulz & Beck 2002). This might lead to some kind of closure of the network and
probably even run into a process of organisation building. Especially for continuing
cooperation including a clear-cut division of labour and a big number of members,
hierarchic organisation has definitely advantages compared with networks (cf. Schi-
mank  2002:  30ff.).  Therefore,  with  increasing  intensity  and  length  of  cooperation
and/or number of members a shift from network to organisation (probably in form
of associations) has to be assumed. Even private-public partnerships in policy net-
works can be formalised in some kind of association. To sum it up: networks are instable
constructions which are tending either to disintegration or to establish formal organisa-
tion. As far as policy networks shall be long-lasting modes to coordinate individual ac-
tion, they are in need of suitable social institutions ensuring the durability of the regulation mech-
anism network itself (this argument is quite similar to the problems of institutional
framing of market exchange mentioned in chapter 2).
Governance through Policy Networks
From the viewpoint of  decision-making,  non-hierarchical forms have some visible
advantages, especially in complex social environments. They have the capability pro-
ducing more effective solutions because they are able to process more relevant in-
formation, to take a greater variety of values into account rising the acceptance of de-
cisions by stakeholders, and to be more flexible in reaction on changing situations in-
creasing the adaptability of solutions (cf. Scharpf 1993). Due to this, policy networks
are creating innovative answers on complex questions and they are regarding the pos-
sibilities of execution. For doing so, they need to include all relevant interests in the
decision-making process  and to balance these interests  during the negotiations.  In
other words: policy networks have to beware their openness and flexibility to discuss innovat-
ive suggestions, to develop balanced and practicable solutions, and to force execution
in a  changing  social  environment.  Social  institutions  to  regulate network activities
have to guarantee this.
Three different types of governance through policy networks can be distinguished regard-
ing the position of nation state within the decision-making process:
• Neo-corporatist governance: Any kind of direct collaboration of public authorities and
private corporate actors in form of institutionalised negotiations can be subsumed
in this category, as long as the power of decision lies still in the hand of national
government. Although network negotiations between state and non-state actors
might be open and equal, the administrative decision process remains untouched
and the output of negotiations might be changed in further steps on its way to le-
gislation. Especially strong interventionist states in Western Europe (among oth-
ers Austria, Germany and Sweden) developed such kinds of institutions. A recent
and obviously not very successful example in Germany had been the “Bündnis
für Arbeit” (“cooperation for employment”; for further information on neo-cor-
poratist institutions in the German labour market system sees Schroeder 2001).
• Multi-level governance: Following the principles of federalism, several different levels
of policy-making (local, regional, national, and supra-national) are institutionally
linked in a shared decision-making process. Within such kind of multi-level sys-
tems, the nation state is only one actor among others and it has to take the de-
cisions (or at least a right to a say) of sub- and supra-national committees into ac-
count. The European Union is probably the most popular example for such a
kind of institutionalised multi-level governance (cf. Marks et. al. 1996; although
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several nation states – among others the USA and Germany – are organised in a
comparable way). From an institutional perspective, the integration of civil society
in the political arrangements of the EU is still very poor. However, the discussion
on a better inclusion of civil society in European governance has been recently
started  with  a  “white  paper”  (cf.  Commission  of  the  European  Communities
2001). 
• Self-regulation (“governance without government”): Two different kinds of self-regulation
through policy-networks should be mentioned here. On one hand, self-regulation
is the dominant coordination mode of international institutions like the United
Nations (cf. Rosenau & Czempiel 1992). Under these circumstances nation states
are actors with more or less equal rights and governance is the direct outcome of
negotiations.  On  the  other  hand,  self-regulation  describes  policy  networks
without any political authorities  involved in the decision process.  In this  case,
private organisations overtake regulatory functions and act in public interest  as
so-called “private governments”  (cf.  Mayntz 2003,  Streeck & Schmitter  1985).
The nation state is not involved in decision-making and its role is reduced to legal
framing of civil-society institutions. 
The enormous amount  of  empirical  literature  on governance in these different
types and its differentiated and sometime even contradictory results can not be men-
tioned in detail here. Only some of the main determinants for durability and effective-
ness of network governance will be presented, following an actual summary of find-
ings by Mayntz (2003). 
• First – and most important in the context here – one has to recognise the need of a
“strong” (nation) state to ensure the functionality of self-regulation:  “If self-regulation re-
mains ineffective, the state can step in and regulate by direct intervention… Self-
regulation in the context of modern governance is always regulated self-regula-
tion” (Mayntz 2003: 4). Thus, policy-networks often act “in the shadow of hier-
archy” and powerful political authorities as “guardians of public welfare” are pre-
conditions  for  effective  self-regulation.  If  such  kind  of  control  mechanism is
missing (most probably in international relations), effective governance through
self-regulated policy networks proves to be very difficult.
• A second precondition of effective governance in multi-actor constellations, men-
tioned by Renate Mayntz, is “the existence of a strong, functionally differentiated, and
well-organized  civil  society” (Mayntz  2003:  5).  Therefore,  most  important  parts  of
civil-society and policy-networks are corporate actors with professional commu-
nication management which are able to integrate and aggregate the particular interests of
citizens and to represent them for opinion-building within policy network as well as to produce
common social responsibility and to organise collective action of its members in the sense of net-
work decisions (cf. Meyer 2003). 
• Finally, a “common identity” of corporate actors involved in network management is
needed to (re)produce social responsibility not only in the network but also in the
memberships  of  the  participating civil-society actors.  Without  at  least  a  crude
feeling of being “all in the same boat”, the willingness to cooperate and to waive
claims on common resources will not exist. Therefore, extensive communication
both between and within network actors for developing a shared “sense of com-
munity”  and  to  enable  social  integration  independently  from  nation  state  is
needed.
This short summary on research findings on policy network governance reveals
the importance of strong corporate actors with an extraordinary sense for common identity and the
importance of appropriate institutions and rules to regulate the network itself. To ensure the func-
tionality of self-regulation, the threat of (state) intervention is needed. Representation
of civil society’s interests is only possible within a system of professional interest or-
ganisations which are able to communicate the positions of their clients.  Vice  versa
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they  have to transmit  social  responsibility  from policy network to their  members.
Policy networks are costly and demanding regulative modes with high requests for the participating
corporate actors as well as for the institutional framework.
Network Failures and its Institutional Consequences 
Obviously, the preconditions to ensure functionality and durability of policy net-
works mentioned in the last chapter are not given in a global perspective. The claims of
social integration associated with the concept of sustainable development even in-
creases the difficulties. There are at least three special problems facing global governance
through multi-actor multi-level networks:
• Competence for Governance: If policy networks should be able to solve problems, they
require the power to make decisions. Therefore, a transfer of this power from na-
tion  states  to  multi-actor  policy  networks  is  needed.  Moreover,  in  multi-level
policy networks a division of decision-making competences between the levels is
essential. Hence, global reorganisation of power division is a premise for decision-
making competence of multi-actor multi-level policy networks in the spirit of sustain-
able development. Additionally, the possibilities to include new options and ex-
pertise for developing proper solutions have to be guaranteed, if those who de-
cide should get  problem-solving competence. As a result, the policy networks have to
be open for any kind of consultation and the entry of new civil-society actors. In
a global view, this requires an enormous amount of flexibility and information
processing within the network structure. The concept of sustainable development
even requests more: if the needs of future generations have to be taken into ac-
count the results of rational long-term planning has to be integrated as basis of
decision-making.  Hence,  long-term  planning  competence on  a  global  level  of  gov-
ernance means the transfer  of  information on complex and hardly predictable
topics that have to be scientifically monitored and appropriate estimated.
• Communication within corporate actors: If private corporate actors and interest groups
are getting involved in political decision-making and policy formation at least to a
certain extent, they have to manage internal “bottom-up” and “top-down”-com-
munication processes in a professional way. “Bottom-up”-communication refers
to the problem of “representation of interests”. Due to democratic principles,  each
member of the electorate must have the same right and possibility to get his or
her interests represented by delegates within the political system (cf. Dahl 1998).
In civil-society organisations, delegates get elected by members of the organisation.
As far as membership is voluntary, members are not identical with the “clients”,
which should be represented by the organisation. Hence, legitimation of delegates
is limited to a more or less large part of the group they should represent. Increas-
ing heterogeneity of this “clients” group as well as a rising number of organisa-
tion members lead to more difficulties for its representation through one single
organisation. At least, it is a challenge for internal communication, especially with-
in civil-society actors (cf. Meyer 2003). Obviously, these problems can be found
more often on the global than on the local level of politics and global actors have
more problems to handle them. “Top-down”-communication within corporate
actors involved in political negotiations is needed to ensure internal support for
the resulting decisions of these negotiations. In other words, “corporate social  re-
sponsibility” must be produced by communication tools within the participating or-
ganisations.  Therefore, the problem of involving civil-society actors in political
decision-making is  for them connected with intra-organisational conflicts between
social and member responsibility. If delegates from non-state organisations agree with
common network decisions that provoke the members of their organisation, they
might be voted out at the next election. If they try to push the opinion of their
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organisation  through the  network  decision  process,  they  risk  a  breakdown of
negotiations.  Hence,  the  delegates  have  to  transfer  responsibility  for  public  goods
among the members of their organisation. If the national state shall be replaced in
his  function  as  a  “guardian  of  public  welfare”,  each  civil-society  organisation
included in the political decision-making process has to internalise this task within
its existing organisational and communicational structure. Again the problem rises
with heterogeneity and number of people that have to be involved in this internal
communication process.
• Global Coordination of Action: The number of independent and equally righted act-
ors involved in decision-making increases the complexity and reduces the chance
to find a commonly accepted solution. On global level with the claim of total in-
tegration of all interests either the number of actors in  multi-actor coordination ex-
ceeds or only delegates of organisations on an exorbitant high level of aggregation
can be involved in decision-making. However, limiting the quantity of negotiators
by constant number of interests to be represented on one level of negotiations
only shifts the problem to delegation and aggregation of interests on a lower level.
Again the number of levels linked together in multi-level coordination increases com-
plexity and reduces the possibility of a common statement. The more different in-
terests should be involved in one decision process the higher the number either
of actors within negotiations or levels of negotiation. Following the claims of sus-
tainable development both numbers of actors and levels have to be maximised to
include the interests of the whole world.
The  mentioned  problems  of  global  governance  through  multi-actor  multi-level
network are not primarily associated with the coordination mechanism “network” but
with the  inclusion of  civil-society  into  (global)  decision-making processes.  Moreover,  most of
theses aspects are even well-known as coordination difficulties of political actors in
global policy and the inclusion of civil-society only increases these troubles to a cer-
tain extent and on some specific dimensions (e.g. the principles of democratic repres-
entation and legitimation, see Sørensen 2002 for more details on the implications of
network governance for democratic theory). The existing institutionalised system of
global politics is far away from being an effective measure for global governance. The
limits of United Nations steering competence have been most recently revealed by the
Iraq crisis – and even the more elaborated political institutions of the European Uni-
on failed to produce a common European position and to avoid different policies of
their member states. As far as, on one hand, the inclusion of civil-society and the es-
tablishment of multi-actor multi-level networks are not per se solutions for these prob-
lems, they are, on the other hand, not definitely reasons for a significant increase of
trouble under all circumstances. Whether multi-actor multi-level networks are able to
improve global governance or not, is an open question that have to be answered with
respect to the institutionalisation of its coordination mode.
Specific Problems of Network Coordination
A transfer of power from the United Nations to self-regulating civil-society net-
works may open the floor for more effective institutional solutions, but it will be con-
fronted with the demands of effective network governance that are:
• Institutions that are able to subsidize the nation state as a “guardian of public
welfare”
• Strong corporate actors representing civil-society in a proper way and being able
to organise collective action of its members
• A common global identity overcoming cultural differences and national egoism.
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Unfortunately, even if one is able to fit these requirements, there are still a couple
of problems remaining, which are inseparably linked with the regulation mode “net-
work”. These “network failures” are associated with its structural elements. Due to the
“hybrid” structure of “network” coordination, including both characteristic elements
of “market” and “hierarchy”, these poles have some forces of attraction destabilising
the network mode: 
• Production of Trust (Openness vs. Oligarchy): The main advantage of “network as a co-
operation mechanism compared with “hierarchy” is its openness for new members
and ideas. While formal organisations are “closed shops” with an own corporate
identity, “networks” are flexible constructions being able to adapt much better to
changes in their social environment. However, openness is not only a precondi-
tion for innovation but also a threat to trust. As far as repeated interaction within
a network is needed to develop trust into the behaviour of others, free entrance
and exit of members makes this production of trust at least more difficult. The
main source for “trust” is, as mentioned above, the positive experience of cooperation.
People who worked together several times and demonstrated each other the will-
ingness (and ability) to produce common benefits instead of maximizing individu-
al outcomes prefer this proved partnership for cooperation. This “team-building”
process may also lead to some kind of closure against third parties supposed to
hinder successful cooperation. In other words, “mistrust in others” is often a result
of “trust in companions”. Following the argumentation of Scharpf (1996: 518), such
a dichotomy of  “insiders” and “outsiders”,  companions and competitors,  as  a
radical  cognitive  simplification  is  needed to  reduce complexity  of  cooperation
situations. Therefore, the production of trust within a given network can cause
enclosure. Moreover, following Michels (1987), this is a “must” because of the
“iron law of oligarchy”. Due to the extensive communication in policy networks, the
interpersonal relationship between delegates even may lead to estrangement from
the organisation they are representing and result in clique-building. Thus, trust is
important for the stabilisation of network negotiations but it is also a source for
oligarchic tendencies that excludes even the members of corporate actors from
network benefits.
• Durability of the Network (Integration vs. Disintegration): The relationship between sta-
bility and change in networks is unclear both from theoretical and empirical per-
spective. On one hand, networks need to be stabilized for ensuring the develop-
ment of trust between participants. As a result, network members as well as form-
al and informal rules of interaction have to remain more or less constant over
time because any change would challenge the balance needed for successful co-
operation. On the other hand, to protect the network both from internal and ex-
ternal takeovers,  an institutionalisation process  with on-going changes of rules
and agreements is necessary. Furthermore,  modernisation process  demands for
the possibility to include new actors. “Networks” as regulative modes seem to be
fragile constructions, tending towards bureaucratic closure (“hierarchy”) or dis-
persal of cooperation (“market”). Therefore, the capability of “network” coopera-
tion for social integration seems to be limited to a certain extent. The positive ability
of networks to integrate new members and ideas endangers the existence of the
network itself. Innovation networks (e.g. in industry or in research) have, in most
cases, an institutionalised limitation of existence. In contrary, policy networks are
seldom defined as periodical constructs. As durable solutions, networks have the
risk to be transformed to organisation or to an oligarchy.
• Strategic  Dependency  (positive  vs.  negative  coordination):  Scharpf  (1996:  512ff.)  distin-
guished two different modes of self-coordination of actors that can be interpreted
as contrary modes of strategic dependency. While positive coordination points on the
goal to maximize the common output of activities,  negative coordination emphasise
the minimal consensus to avoid individual disadvantages as a result of common
activities.  Following Scharpf  (1996:  523),  perfect  correspondence between net-
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work members is improbable due to the increasing variability of interdependence
relations. Moreover, one can assume that some actors who have to cooperate for
successful  positive  coordination  in  a  specific  coordination  situation  are  not
members of the network. The capability for positive coordination is restricted by
the chance to produce homogenous interests within the network and, addition-
ally, by the chance to include external actors into cooperation that are commonly
needed in specific cases. In other words, positive coordination leads to strategic
dependency of actors that can be described as internal homogenisation of interests and
instrumentalisation of social integration with respect to shared network interests (collective ego-
ism).  In contrary, negative coordination stresses the individual interests of each
actor and therefore the heterogeneity of interests within the network. According
to this coordination mode, agreements with “significant  others” are needed to
minimise  the threat  for  individual action.  If  this  significant  others  are  not yet
members of the network, they have to be integrated for egoistic reasons of single
members  despite  the  integration  problems  resulting  for  network  community.
Thus, negative coordination leads to strategic dependency of actors that can be
described as internal heterogenisation of interests and instrumentalisation of social integration
with respect to individual actor interests (individual egoism). 
• Institutionalisation  of  rules  (network  restrictions  vs.  individual  freedom):  As  mentioned
above, network institutions and rules are needed to stabilise networks and to pro-
duce trust as its key coordination mechanism. Therefore, the institutional framing
of networks is of prior evidence not only for its functionality as a coordination
mode but also for its capacity for social integration. From the perspective of act-
ors, formalisation of inter-actor relationships within networks requires self-com-
mitment and results in some restrictions of his or her individual freedom to act. As far as
corporate actors are involved, the increasing demand of network institutions may
even lead to incorporation and is therefore a threat for the independent existence
of the own organisation. Therefore, the institutionalisation process of networks can result
in building a new formal organisation that is – from the perspective of network – the
most extreme form of social integration of actors and institutionalisation of co-
ordination. At this severe end of scale, the networks itself as well as its corporate
actors lose their existence and shift to another form of coordination of action.
Below this level, social integration of corporate actors within network is guaran-
teed by social  norms,  juristic  proceedings  and contractual  commitments.  Such
kind of “integration by constitution” can be called political integration and is associ-
ated with the problem of legitimisation of common norms by the members of the
unit (cf. Fuchs 1999: 167ff.). For corporate participants of networks, legitimisa-
tion of network institution and rules is a product of a social process that occurs
within the organisation. Moreover, social integration is of course also an import-
ant task for corporate actors, which have to ensure the support for their own tar-
get by their members. As far as network rules are limitations of corporate actors’
activities  and the  network goals  are not  absolutely  identical  with actors’  goals,
some problems for internal integration have to be assumed under the condition
of free choice for membership. In other words: the capacity for social integration of cor-
porate actors is dependent of the degree of freedom to act for its own targets. The absence of
network rules maximises this capacity but also leads to disintegration of the net-
work (approach towards “market”).
Additionally to this general “network failures”, at least one other aspect has to be
mentioned for governance through policy networks:
• Governance  through  networks  (effectiveness  vs.  efficiency  of  decision-making):  Despite  the
question, whether multi-actor policy networks are effective modes for decision-
making  and  problem-solving,  they  are  for  sure  not  very  efficient  compared  to
“market” and “hierarchy”. While competition at the “market” proofed to be an
effective and efficient way to co-ordinate exchanges of goods and services, bureau-
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cratic rationality in hierarchies offers an optimised way to handle routine tasks fast
(assuring  a  minimum  of  communication  and  coordination  expenses)  and
productive (assuring the involvement of exact those actors needed to produce the
common good).  Compared  to  these  co-ordination  modes,  “network”  is  rather
inefficient because of the amount of informal and non-task-related communicati-
on (necessary for the production of “trust). Furthermore, effectiveness of coordi-
nation  is  as  well  associated  with  communication:  a  growing  number  of  actors
require higher expenses for communication to reach an identical solution. Under
given  circumstances  (actors  involved,  interest  constellation,  decision-problem,
etc.), a rise in effectiveness call for more or intensified communication. As far as
communication is the most important factor of costs in this coordination mode,
an increasing effectiveness may generally result in decreasing efficiency and vice versa.
Consequences for Network Institutions
Following these theoretical considerations, some consequences for network insti-
tutions can be derived. The functionality of institutions has to be controlled by a third
party that is not directly involved in network negotiations or dependent on one of the
actors. This party has to act as “guardian of public welfare” protecting common in-
terests both against individual and collective egoism of network members. It has to
guarantee the right to participate (and equal chances in doing so) of each relevant (de-
fining this is probably the most difficult part of this task) stakeholder organisation to
avoid oligarchic tendencies. Furthermore, for the protection of trustful interrelation-
ship of network members, sanctions for cheating and effective measures for punish-
ment have to be developed to shun “free-rider” behaviour. The functional relation of
this instance is comparable to the relation of political system and jurisdiction.
A common identity of network members and shared responsibility for network
decisions must be assured to support integration processes. Additionally, adaptation
to changing social environments and rational rules development is necessary. As far as
stabilisation of the network as coordination mode is seen as one of the most import-
ant tasks  for institutional  regulation,  two aspects  of  communication  within the  network
have to be mentioned. First, purposeful communication between members is needed
to ensure progress in negotiations and to attain common goals. Second, the imple-
mentation of observation and evaluation of changes in social environment of the net-
work is necessary regarding adaptation and integration of improvement. For internal
management of negotiations as well as for monitoring external development, at least
one  specialist  and  independent  unit  within  the  network  structure must  be  implemented
overtaking these “administration” tasks. Institutions have to guarantee a clear-cut as-
signment of responsibilities for this “network office”. 
Probably the most difficult mission is the regulation of inter-actor dependencies
within the network. Balancing power differences and establishing mediation capacities
for conflict management are at least some of the tasks that are difficult to handle for
people  or  organisations  who  are  involved  in  network  relations  and  negotiations.
Therefore, institutions have to regulate the inclusion of  external experts of mediation if
they are needed for optimizing communication between network actors. Moreover, it
is an important task to avoid inequalities within the network relations. Although the
“third party” is able to control the misuse of power, the task of social intervention
should not be given in the same hands. Not every conflict situation is in need of a
“court” but requires “fire brigades” to get the things under control again.
Finally, the development of network rules is neither a task of “network office” nor
of the “third party”, it still remains an important duty for network actors and their ne-
gotiations. However, for more effective work a special “rules committee” has to be im-
plemented and the integration of delegates from outside the network may be useful to
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optimise communication between the network and external actors.  This last aspect
points on the problem of closure: openness can only be ensured by external forces
involved in rules development.
These four aspects are only first hints about the institutional framework guarantee-
ing the functionality of multi-actor multi-level policy networks for global governance
of sustainable development.  For sure, a more systematic analysis  of existing policy
networks is needed to develop a theoretical model of network regulation in this con-
text. Nevertheless, social institutions governing policy networks have to cause poor
attention for implementing new functional solutions for global resource management
and sustainable development governance.
Conclusions
„Sustainable Development“ as a guiding principle offers an answer to the pressing
question how natural resources should be globally managed. This solution requests
• the consideration of the needs of future generations for time integration,
• the linkage of policies on all kind of levels for territorial integration, and 
• the inclusion of civil-society actors for target integration.
In other words, “sustainable development” is the still utopian idea of “one world”
solving its problems in free political discourse, including all people and giving them
equal rights  to  decide with respect to the needs of  their  children and by acknow-
ledging claims of the ecological system.
From a political point of view, such kind of global governance can not be realised
without fundamental changes in the recent political system that is dominated by na-
tion states and their particular interests. The demanded inclusion of civil-society act-
ors  on global level will result in multi-actor multi-level policy networks. Moreover,
these networks are not supposed to be only “think-tanks” for policy formation, leav-
ing  decision-making  within  existing  political  structures  and  legislative  processes.
Global governance in the spirit of “sustainable development” implies the transfer of
power for decision-making from national  governments to global multi-actor multi-
level policy networks. This step is needed to integrate the growing executive power of
civil-society actors and to use it for problem-solving.
This chapter discussed how realistic such kind of durable cooperation in global
governance is. By doing so, four key elements of policy networks have been derived
from theoretical literature on coordination of action. According to this, cooperation
in networks can be described by
• production of trust between network actors to ensure collective action,
• durability of network constellation to enable the production of trust,
• strategic  dependency  between  formally  independent  actors  guiding  individual
action towards common goals, and
• institutionalisation  of  cooperation  by  developing  rules  to  protect  the  network
against external takeover or individual egoism.
A lot of empirical work on the praxis of various kinds of policy networks can be
found. As a result,  some preconditions for self-regulation through policy networks
have to be mentioned:
• Strong  nation  state  is  needed  as  “guardian  of  public  welfare”,  enabling   self-
regulation of the civil-society “in the shadow of hierarchy”;
• Strong  civil-society  organisations  are  also  needed,  ensuring  the  integration,
aggregation and representation of particular interests as well as the production of
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social responsibility and the organisation of collective action within its own sphere
of influence;
• A common identity of all actors involved in network management is needed to
ensure general acceptance and willingness to cooperate with each other.
According to these aspects, several problems for global governance through multi-
actor multi-level networks have to be assumed. Some of the difficulties are directly as-
sociated with the global level of governance and therefore well-known in international
politics.  The  inclusion  of  civil-society  actors increases  these  difficulties  in  some special
parts. We referred to:
• Problem-solving competence requires the inclusion of varying civil-society actors
with  different  perspectives  and  innovative  ideas.  This  –  in  addition  with  the
demand for long-term planning - increases the amount of information that has to
be processed;
• Internal  communication  within  corporate  actors  involved  in  policy  network  is
challenged both by the duty of representing the interests of its clients and the task
to  transfer  responsibility  for  network  decisions  and  activities  to  its  members.
Obviously, there are inequalities of capacities between actors (and their territorial
origins);
• The increasing number  of  actors  involved in network  negotiations  hinders  the
possibility  to  find commonly  acceptable solutions  and a limitation  of  actors  in
multi-level structures  raises  new problems for aggregation of heterogeneous in-
terests on the lower level.
Even more relevant are specific “network failures”, comparable to the problems of
handling externalities described as “market failures” or the limitation of execution as
one key element of “state failures”. We emphasised the dualistic pressures from both
“market” and “hierarchy” on the coordination principle “network” as the main source
of “network failures” that can be associated with the key elements of network regu-
lation mentioned above:
• Closure tendencies of networks are leading to “organisation-building” if they are
not counterbalanced by measures to protect openness. Additionally, openness may
result in dissolution of network structure in direction of “competitive market” if
trials for stabilisation fail;
• Networks – as any mechanism to coordinate action of various actors – produce
social integration that stabilises their social structure. While “trust in companions”
goes along with “mistrust  in others”,  it  may lead to durable exclusion of  non-
members;
• Maximisation  of  common  outcome  requires  “positive  coordination”  between
actors and leads to “collective egoism”. In contrary,  maximisation of individual
benefits is in need of “negative coordination”;
• Finally,  network  regulation by appropriate  institutions  and rules  has to balance
formalisation  for  ensuring  cooperation  and the  individual  freedom to act.  The
more formalised rules exist, the less freedom remains for single actors – and vice
versa.
According to this, we described four key elements of institutions to regulate multi-
actor multi-level networks:
Considering these institutional ideas being only first  hints that have not shown
empirical evidence, the lack of proper institutions has to be seen as the most import-
ant reason why durable cooperation in multi-actor multi-level networks needed for
global governance to manage national resources still seems to be not very realistic.
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• A “third  party” replacing nation states  in its  function as a “guardian of  public
welfare”, controlling the functionality of networks and its rules;
• A  “network  office”  managing  the  communication  within  network  actors  and
observing external development to ensure adaptation to social environment;
• The “inclusion of external experts” at special points for mediation of conflicts, for
development  of  the  relations  between  single  actors  and  for  optimizing  com-
munication between actors within the network;
• A “rules committee” with the power to develop new network rules and institutions
for to optimize communication between the network and external actors as well as
to give them the possibility to participate within the network.
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1. Introduction
Industrial transformation research seeks to understand complex society-environ-
ment interactions. It aims at identifying driving forces for change as well as develo-
ping possible trajectories towards a sustainable future. Meeting the needs and aspira-
tions  of  a  growing  world  population  while  using  environmental  resources  in  a
sustainable manner will require not only better process efficiency and greener pro-
ducts, but also rather a range of new institutions to manage the profound challenges
ahead.  The  emerging  trend  of  private  governance,  and,  more  specifically,  the
formation of rule-setting NGO-business partnerships, may be interpreted as such a
necessary institution for industrial transformation.
As far as rule-making is concerned, studies in global environmental politics have
primarily  focused  on  international  regimes  and  organisations  designed  to  address
trans-boundary problems. Only recently have non-state actors and their influence on
the international political process become a major topic of environmental policy rese-
arch (Arts 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Reinalda and Verbeek 2001; Raustiala 1997;
Rowlands 2001; Tamiotti and Finger 2001; Weiss 1996). Although scholars have stu-
died in detail the role and function of different non-state actors in agenda-setting, lob-
bying governments,  and implementing international  agreements,  still  rather  little  is
known about rule-making by private institutional arrangements that do not emanate
from or primarily address the international political system.
Until very recently, the debate about non-state actors and their new roles in envir-
onmental governance has been limited to public-private partnerships and global pu-
blic  policy  networks  (Börzel  and  Risse  Forthcoming;  Witte,  Reinicke,  and Benner
2000). It has neglected far reaching institutionalisations among private actors without
the involvement of governments, government agencies or intergovernmental organi-
sations. But it is precisely this evolving trend that poses new questions with respect to
some fundamental political concepts, such as public interest, authority, and legitimacy.
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The emerging private institutions are no longer primarily concerned with influ-
encing the international policy cycle, but increasingly begin to agree upon, implement,
and monitor different forms of self-regulation, including general codes of conduct,
management standards, and certified product labels. As a result, the impact of private
actors on global politics has changed as well. They have developed from being an in-
tervening variable of the international system to establishing rules that exist mainly
outside of it. Consequently, private authority is considered to be different from public
authority, because the latter derives mainly from the possibility of coercion, whereas
the former is based on persuasion. As a result, private authority most likely takes the
form of market or moral authority (Hall and Biersteker 2002; Hall 1997). As Cutler,
Haufler and Porter conclude, “[a]uthority involves a surrendering of individual judge-
ment, an acceptance of its dictates based not on the merits of any particular pronoun-
cement but on a belief in the rightness of the authority itself” (Cutler, Haufler, and
Porter 1999b: 334).
The chapter attempts to draw a preliminary picture of private rule-making and its
functions in the field of environmental politics by developing a conceptual framework
of private transnational governance institutions. It captures the essence of new forms
of  self-regulation  and  co-regulation  by  analysing  them  as  mechanisms  of  global
governance different from more traditional international or hybrid public-private regi-
mes. The different functions of private governance institutions are assessed by taking
a close look at one of the most prominent private rule-making bodies, the Forest Ste-
wardship Council (FSC).
2. The Concept of Private Governance Institutions
The  attempt  to  develop  a  concept  to  capture  empirical  phenomena  of  trans-
sovereign global politics in general and private rule-making in particular is grounded
on theoretical considerations often referred to as ‘global governance debate’ or even
‘global governance theory’. Therefore, it is necessary to first mark the conceptual and
empirical  boundaries  of this  debate before further  clarifying what a private gover-
nance institution is and how it can help making more sense of many current phe-
nomena in global environmental politics.
Modes of Global Governance
Recent debates about the growing political influence of non-state actors, multiple
interconnected policy levels, and new functional mechanisms of steering beyond the
nation-state,  can all  be subsumed under the headline of  global  governance.  Although
there is neither an uncontested definition of global governance, nor a common under-
standing of what the term refers to in terms of structure and processes, the aforemen-
tioned and highly controversial debate highlights some empirical observations that go
beyond traditional accounts of international relations, especially in the field of enviro-
nmental politics.
Global governance is generally believed to encompass different systems of rule on
different levels of human activity as an organising social principle beyond hierarchical
steering and the sovereign authority of nation-states. As James Rosenau notes, “global
governance is the sum of myriad - literally millions of - control mechanisms driven by
different histories, goals, structures, and processes” (1997: 27). It therefore includes
“the activities of governments, but it also includes the many channels through which
‘commands’ flow in the form of goals framed, directives issued, and policies pursued”
(Rosenau 1995: 14). What follows from this perception are two different ‘geographies’
of global governance. One being considerably wide, encompassing those actions of
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states  and non-state  actors  on the  international  level  that  involve non-hierarchical
modes of steering, like intergovernmental or inter-organisational bargaining, and the
other being more restricted,  only including non-hierarchical  modes  that  involve at
least  one  non-state  actor,  such  as  global  public  policy  networks.  I  take  a  middle
ground, arguing that different modes and actor-constellations are positioned along a
continuum from more traditional inter-state negotiations, which already involve non-
state actors in the process of rule-making, to hybrid public-private partnerships, and
fully private co-operations, institutions, and organisations.
These modes of governance differ according to the purpose and actor-constellati-
on involved. Public forms of governance include the provision of services and imple-
mentation of international norms through comprehensive or issue specific internatio-
nal organisations, as well as rule-making in international  negotiations. Public actor-
constellations therefore may include international organisations, governments and go-
vernment agencies. Hybrid forms of governance are often labelled with the general
term public-private partnership (PPP), but include many distinct cooperative arrange-
ments between public and private actors, involving governments, government agen-
cies, subnational political authorities, international organisations, transnational corpor-
ations, global advocacy networks, and non-profit organisations. The third mode of
governance is purely private in nature, involving firms, business associations, advoca-
cy  networks,  think  tanks,  and  non-profit  organisations  in  the  establishment  and
maintenance of global public goods through service provision, rule-making and its im-
plementation.
Private Policy-Making in Global (Environmental) Governance
Partnership between various non-profit organisations, transnational corporations
or global interest associations is not an entirely new phenomenon. But the fact that
these co-operations often lead to independent institutions and organisations that app-
ly new forms of governance, and thus bypass traditional ways of political influence,
makes it a noteworthy phenomenon. To further clarify the concept of private gover-
nance institutions in environmental politics, I discuss various approaches to private
policy-making in the following section. The focus is on how the concept of private
governance  institutions  draws  upon  or  departs  from  three  prominent  concepts
addressing  private  governance,  namely  private  sector  international  regimes,  private
organisations, and certification institutions.
The term private sector international regimes was first established in the field of indus-
trial relations and commercial activity to denote institutionalised responses to state or
market failure. As Virginia Haufler argues, a “mis-match between markets and politics
in terms of governance” is responded to by the construction of private international
regimes in many industry sectors (2000: 122). These private inter-firm regimes, under-
stood as formal and informal norms, principles, rules, and decision-making proced-
ures exercise a “form of self-regulation or rule-setting in the absence of an overarch-
ing global political regime” (Haufler 2000: ibid). Whereas the traditional debate on in-
ternational regimes, by definition, has focused on the cooperation of states only, the
concept of private inter-firm regimes broadens this narrow view to incorporate form-
al and informal institutions that are the source of governance for an economic issue
area as a whole (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999a: 13). Private inter-firm regimes dif-
fer from other forms of cooperative business-arrangements, such as industry associa-
tions, production alliances, and cartels, in terms of the breadth of their activity, often
incorporating  less  institutionalised  forms  within  their  scope  (Cutler  2002:  28-29).
Consequently, private governance institutions incorporate private regimes within their
scope, focusing explicitly on the rule-making function of these social institutions, but
going beyond transnational business as the main driver of institutionalisation.
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The second concept competing with private governance institutions, private organi-
sations,  starts  from the assumption that  the failure of  states  and markets  to  create
stable environments for commercial and social transactions leads to the establishment
of  alternative  governance  mechanisms  through  private  organisations  (Ronit  and
Schneider 1999: 244), an argument resembling much of the theorised causes for the
construction of private regimes. According to Ronit and Schneider, private organisat-
ions include inter alia the following: multi-national corporations, business associations,
federations of trade unions, standardising associations, learned societies, think tanks,
religious orders, sporting organisations and environmental groups (2000: 1). But re-
search has been largely limited to global business  actors,  such as the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manu-
facturers  Association (IFPMA) or  the Ecological  and Toxicological  Association of
Dyes and Organic Pigments Manufacturers (ETAD) (Ronit and Schneider 1999).
In sum, the concept of private organisations aims at developing a “new and all-en-
compassing theory which integrates all private actors active in global politics,” (Ronit
and Schneider 2000: 7) not only focusing on those actors participating in the global
policy cycle, but also incorporating organisations that assume responsibility for pro-
blem-solving through standard setting and self-regulation. Although the concept of
private organisations is a substantive step forward towards understanding the com-
plex structure and nature of private actors in global politics and remedies much of the
conceptual impreciseness of the frequently used term ‘non-governmental organisati-
on’, it still falls short of capturing the diversity of institutional settings and procedures
that characterise private rule-making in the field of global governance.
In contrast, the proposed concept of private governance institutions differs from
the  concept  of  private  organisations  in  five  distinctive  ways:  first,  it  includes  less
formalised co-operations not qualifying as an independent organisation; second, it fo-
cuses on rule-making institutions only, thus excluding sufficiently debated issues of
non-state  actors’  involvement  in  policy-making  or  rule-implementation  on  the  in-
ternational level; third, it highlights alternative actor-constellations within institutions
and organisations; forth, it acknowledges the network character of many institutions;
and fifth, it overcomes sharp distinctions between the profit and non-profit sector of
society, focusing on their joint efforts to create and sustain global public goods ins-
tead.
The third  rival  concept to  private governance  institutions,  certification  institutions,
contains  two principal  components:  first,  a set  of  voluntary  norms  and rules;  and
second, a reporting or monitoring mechanism (Garcia-Johnson 2001). Certification
institutions are not typologised according to the actors and interests involved, as in
the case of private governance institutions, but according to a more instrumental ap-
proach that highlights the distinct way of ensuring verification. Ideal types range from
first-party certification, wherein organisations generate rules internally and report con-
formance themselves, to second-party certification, wherein firms and organisations
work together to generate rules and report compliance, and third-party certification,
wherein independent bodies set the standards and others report conformance (Gar-
cia-Johnson 2001: 2). Although the concept of certification institutions adds to out
general understanding of private governance by stressing the importance of reporting
and compliance management, it does not offer a comprehensive concept of private-
rule-making as a mechanism of global governance for two reasons: first, the concept
of certification institutions emphasises the verification of compliance at the cost of
the standard setting process; second, the concept does not distinguish the institutions
according to the distinct societal actors involved in its formation and maintenance.
Turning back to the initial aim of clarifying the concept of private governance in-
stitutions with respect to other approaches proposed in the literature, a comprehensi-
ve definition can be offered, which covers different types of institutions as well as dif-
56   Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference
ferent instrumental approaches. Accordingly, a private transnational governance in-
stitution is  a self-coordinated network of  two or more private actors  operating in
more than one country (involving the non-profit and/or the profit sector of society),
engaging in the establishment, implementation and monitoring of voluntary norms
and rules  (general  codes of conduct,  management  standards  or labels)  directed to-
wards  a specific  issue area, not being primarily  profit-orientated.  Nevertheless,  the
market provides the mechanism through which authority is, at least partially, allocated
to distinct private institutions. It is the consumer, producer, trader, and retailer who
legitimise a certain rule-making system.
NGO-Business Cooperation as a Private Governance Institution
Multi-stakeholder partnerships represent the most challenging type of private rule-
making because they involve both the logic of the market and that of civil society. As
a result, they align types of non-state actors that are perceived as strongly antagonistic.
As Murphy and Coleman notice, 
“‘[p]artnership’ is not the first word that usually comes to mind when one thinks
about business and NGOs. Over the past three decades, most relationships between
the commercial sector and civil society have been founded on conflict” (2000: 207).
The term partnership has predominantly referred to profit-making relationships bet-
ween individuals,  but  in  recent  years  gained  prominence  as  a  more  general  inter-
organisational idea, including relations between various transnational actors, interna-
tional organisations and states. Two events are generally believed to have triggered the
transformation from confrontational strategies to those of partnership in the field of
environmental  politics,  namely  the  public  debate  about  Shell’s  involvement  in  the
Ogoni case in southern Nigeria and the disposal of the Brent Spar offshore oilrig.
After widespread public protest and consumer boycott, Shell’s Chief Executive Offi-
cer Herkstroter highlighted the positive aspects of the Greenpeace campaign, and a
partnership approach in general:
“We took decisions, which in retrospect were mistakes. We now realise that alone
we  could  never  have  hoped  to  reach  the  right  approach  -  that  we  should  have
discussed them in a more open and frank way with others in order reach acceptable
solutions… In essence, we were somewhat slow in understanding that environmental
groups, consumer groups and so on were tending to acquire authority” (Heap 2000:
3). 
In more general terms, the concept of partnership refers to four important aspects
that  apply  for  local  and  global  co-operations,  whether  public-private  or  private-
private. First, partnerships have shared goals that are beyond profit-making, thus ex-
cluding purely market-coordinated relations or other private interactions to maximize
profit. Second, partnerships can involve actors from different sectors of society; third,
they have institutionalised relationships; and fourth, partnerships engage in rule-ma-
king and/or implementation, facilitating outcomes that would not be possible in ab-
sence  of  the  specific  partnership  (Harding  1990;  Kouwenhoven  1993;  McQuaid
2000). Critical scholars have pointed to the fact that the term partnership represents a
policy paradigm (Richter 2003: 9) based on the assumption of trust, shared benefits,
and an underlying win-win situation, concealing the fundamentally different goals and
power resources of the actors involved. This paper uses the concept of partnership as
a value neutral term, equivalent with co-operation.
It is the concept of green alliances that addresses these unusual partnerships with re-
spect to the idea of policy arrangements. The term policy arrangement “refers to the
temporary stabilisation of the content and organisation of a policy domain,” including
policy programmes and discourses as content, and actors and their coalitions as or-
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ganisations (Arts 2002: 4). These policy arrangements are influenced by the macro-
societal process of reflexive modernization (Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994) that ef-
fects the policy domain at the meso-level and forces actors to adopt to the changing
environment. The debate about green alliances, defined as “collaborative partnerships
between environmental NGOs and business that pursue mutually beneficial ecological
goals” (Arts  2002: 2) highlights  four important  elements  of  ‘private environmental
policy arrangements’ (Arts 2002: 4) that are relevant in the context of private-private
governance institutions: the specific form that coalitions take, the internal power rela-
tions, the ‘rules of the game’ and dominant discourses (Arts and Tatenhove 2000).
In  sum,  the  discussion  of  green alliances  leads  to  a  valuable  understanding  of
transnational NGO-business partnerships as a distinct type of private governance in-
stitutions. Accordingly, cooperative arrangements between different sectors of society
qualify as a private environmental governance institution, when they (a) aim at regu-
lating a specific environmental issue area by voluntary norms and rules, including en-
vironmental management standards, labels and general codes of conduct, (b) can be
considered a self-organising network of at least two transnational private actors, (c)
represent  both  the  profit  and  non-profit  logic,  and  (d)  reach  some  degree  of
institutional permanence over time.
3. Do Private Governance Institutions Matter? The Case of the Forest Steward-
ship Council (FSC)
Although, by definition, governance institutions are involved in the establishment
of  voluntary  norms,  rules  and standards,  they perform a wide range of  additional
functions, from facilitating a solution to a wide range of different interests to broke-
ring knowledge, to constituting a learning network of individual and organisational ac-
tors.
Making the Rules
The idea of  rule-making seems self-evident  in most  domestic  and international
contexts, but if we talk about rule-making by private institutions on the global scale,
what do we refer to? From the perspective of regime theory, rules occur as four diffe-
rent types: (1) principles (beliefs of fact and causation); (2) norms (rights and obliga-
tions); (3) regulations (pre- or proscriptions for action); (4) procedures (decision-ma-
king rules) (Krasner 1983: 2). Principles and norms provide the basic characteristics of
an institution, whereas regulations and procedures may change without altering the
substantial content of a regime. To capture this important difference, some scholars
have argued for distinguishing between constitutive rules on the one hand, and regu-
lative rules on the other (Arts 2003; Giddens 1984). As a result, a change in the con-
stitutive rules is understood to alter the institution as a whole, whereas a change in the
regulative rules only implies a transformation of existing procedural, structural or sub-
stantive  rules,  such  as  a  tightening  of  certain  product  standards  or  introducing
additional aspects of environmental management.
Accordingly, standard setting in the context of private governance institutions is
conceptualised as the act of agreeing on regulative rules. Standard setting, as opposed
to the more general process of establishing and maintaining constitutive regulations, is
consequently defined as the making of voluntary, expertise-based structural, procedu-
ral or substantive regulation (Kerwer 2002: 298). Standards can take the form of ma-
nagement schemes, labels or general codes of conduct. Although private standards are
voluntary in nature, some degree of compliance is necessary to qualify as private regu-
lation.
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In sum, the concept of rule-making by private institutions includes both constitut-
ive and regulative rules. But whereas the former are considered to be an important
prerequisite for enhanced cooperation between different actors, the latter are unders-
tood as the functional output of governance institutions. Private standards in global
environmental politics therefore include product as well as process standards. They
are applied above the national level and, as voluntary regulations, include management
standards, codes of conduct as well as labels. But regulative rules set by private gover-
nance institutions in the field of environmental politics not only contain prescriptions
of behaviour directed towards the environment. They also define who accounts for
the compliance with management standards, codes of conduct or labels, and under
what rules. As discussed in section two, governance institutions employ three basic ty-
pes of reporting compliance with their voluntary standards: first-party reporting (self-
assessment), second-party reporting (joint assessment), and third-party reporting (in-
dependent assessment).
To better illustrate the rule-making function of private governance institutions, I
now turn to the FSC as an empirical example of a multi-stakeholder partnership wi-
thin the wider context of global environmental governance and industrial transforma-
tion. The Forest Stewardship Council was founded in 1993 by a general assembly of
interested parties in Toronto, Canada. Among the 126 participants from 26 countries
were concerned individuals and representatives from a wide range of organisations,
including WWF, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, retailers, trade unions, and indige-
nous interest groups. Although consultations among forest producers, retailers, and
environmental and social interest groups had been going on since 1990, it was not un-
til 1994 that the founding members  of  FSC agreed upon the “FSC Standards  and
Principles,” the substantive basis of FSC’s work with regards to definition and imple-
mentation of sustainable forestry (FSC 2000).
The General Assembly (GA), a tripartite body that represents business, social, and
environmental interests within three chambers, governs the FSC. Each chamber has
equal  voting  power;  internally  they  have  a  50% quorum  for  north  and  south  re-
presentation as well as a limitation of individual votes to 10% of the respective cham-
ber. The GA elects a board of directors that mirrors the principal governance struc-
ture. Each chamber sends three members to the board for a three-year term. The re-
presentation of northern  and southern countries  alternates  between four  and five,
changing every three years. The board decides on all issues of major importance, from
approving national representatives and initiatives of the FSC, to allocating the annual
budget, to approving new standards. The operational work of the FSC is handled by
the FSC international secretariat located in Bonn, Germany, and supervised by the
Executive Director who is appointed by the board. Whereas the day to day operations
of the FSC are in the responsibility of the international secretariat and its executive di-
rector and questions of major importance are decided by the board of directors, only
the general assembly is authorised to change the fundamental “standards and princip-
les” as well as the statutes of the FSC.
As a private institution, the FSC produces three different basic types of standards,
which constitute the regulative outcome of the institution. First, global forest manage-
ment standards that form the basis for national and regional standards development;
second, chain of custody standards prescribing  detailed rules along the production
chain; and third, standards for accreditation. The standards are developed and drafted
by the standards and policies unit within the international secretariat and later appro-
ved by the board of directors. The standard setting procedure involves consultations
with all relevant stakeholders. Explicit provision shall be made to ensure “that stake-
holders whose interests are often marginalized are empowered to take a full and active
part in the development of standards” (FSC 2003: §9). Often technical committees are
formed to include the expertise of forest managers and producers along with the nor-
mative guidance of non-profit actors. For example, recent debates about percentage
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based claims included technical experts on paper production and representatives from
environmental NGOs to ensure the technical feasibility of producing paper out of
recycled raw material and FSC certified timber as well as the acceptable decision on
how much the FSC timber must be included in a certain product to carry the FSC
trademark.
But the FSC does not only establish regulative rules on sustainable forestry, but
also substantive ‘rules of the game’, from formal regulations on governance structure,
voting rights, and complaint procedures to informal norms, such as appropriate beha-
viour in conflict situations, style of communication, and self-recognition.
Facilitating a Solution
By bringing together  many different  actors  and interests  within one forum,  by
verifying these commitments, and by providing a model for other actors and other
issue  areas,  the FSC provides  an institutionalised solution to global  environmental
problems.
The FSC provides different types of fora to its members and stakeholders through
which discussion processes are enhanced and consensus on diverse issues can be rea-
ched. The central forum is the general assembly that comes together physically every
three years but is frequently asked to decide on various issues by mail or E-Mail. Next
to the international GA there are currently 31 national initiatives (NI) that provide in-
stitutional space for discussions on the national and regional aspects of standards and
principles, as well as on specific areas of concern. The recent decentralisation of the
FSC’s  geographic  structure  has  resulted  in  the  creation  of  four  regional  offices,
Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia, that organise regular meetings of all national
initiatives within a region, thus enhancing cooperation among national initiatives as
well as among the stakeholder groups and individuals. The fourth type of forum for
close stakeholder contact is provided by expert involvement in the development of
rules and standards. The technical and standard committees for example involve many
relevant interests in the process of standard setting by providing an open-access Inter-
net forum for direct stakeholders and the general public.
Next to providing a forum for discussion and consensus building on technical and
practical aspects of forest certification, the verification of fundamental commitments
is an important prerequisite for providing an institutionalised solution to the forest
problem.  Ensuring  compliance  with  the  forest  management  and  chain of  custody
standards is essential to the effective operation of FSC because transparency, reliabili-
ty, and neutrality constitute the basis of FSC’s credibility. Demands in this respect are
highly divergent. For forest owners and managers it is highly important that FSC en-
forces comparable standards in every country and region, so as not to distort market
competition.  Retailers  are interested in a transparent standard that is easy to com-
municate to consumers, whereas environmental NGOs demand environmentally ac-
curate performance by forest managers and timber producers.
The FSC seems to have found a credible solution to all these different demands
regarding the verification of standard compliance. The central idea is to accredit certi-
fiers on the basis of FSC standards, which then issue certificates to forest manage-
ment  units  or  producers.  The  accreditation  business  unit  of  the  international
secretariat carries out this process of accreditation. Accreditation is defined as “the
procedure by which an accreditation body gives written assurance that a certification
body  conforms  with  the  requirements  of  an  accreditation  system”  (FSC  2002b:
Glossary). The accreditation body conducts and administers the accreditation system
and formally grants accreditation. In case of the FSC, accreditation is proposed in a fi-
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nal accreditation report, which is filed by the accreditation body, and than approved
by the board of FSC.
In sum,  the  mechanism of accrediting independent  certification bodies  ensures
that all major demands of stakeholders regarding constant verification and compliance
management are met. The importance of FSC’s credibility and neutrality is also un-
derscored by the current debate over outsourcing the accreditation business unit to
further enhance its independence from FSC. In addition, an independent accreditation
unit would also meet the ISO requirements for accreditation bodies, another prerequi-
site for enhanced credibility.
The  third  pattern  through  which  the  FSC institutionalises  problem  solving  in
global  environmental  politics  is  providing  a  model  for  successful  cooperation  for
other actors and within different issue areas. Consider the close organisational resem-
blance between the FSC and the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). Both institut-
ions are private-private co-operations between non-profit organisations and business
actors, and are involved in standard setting, accrediting certifiers, and granting labels
for products and production chains. The WWF was a key player in the establishment
of both the FSC and MSC. Already in 1997, WWF and Unilever launched the MSC as
a close private-private partnership. As a result, the governance structure is markedly
different from that of FSC, because both partners decided not to include other stake-
holders  in the negotiations of standards  and principles.  Further,  the MSC is not a
membership organisation, but is governed by a board of trustees appointed by the
two founding institutions.  Stakeholders  are represented in the Stakeholder  Council
along a public interest and a commercial/socio-economic category (Marine Steward-
ship Council 2003).
But nevertheless,  the specific model of stewardship provided by the FSC, com-
bining expert standard setting with independent third-party certification, proves to be
successful in the field of marine resources as well. As a formally independent instituti-
on, the MSC today certifies seven highly valuable fisheries worldwide; 13 are currently
in the process of full assessment. The certification/stewardship model won further
support  in  2001  when,  after  publishing  its  core  standards,  the  Marine  Aquarium
Council (MAC) became the second private governance institution modelled after the
FSC. Although the FSC cannot claim to have invented the idea of environmental and
social certification, its individual success transfers the model of normative standards
setting and economic incentives to other issue areas. As a result, the scale and scope
of private environmental governance increases, whereas traditional forms of public
environmental governance seem to be on the retreat.
In  sum, the FSC can be understood as a solution-facilitator in global environ-
mental politics through three inter-related mechanisms: first, the FSC brings together
many divergent actors in institutionalised fora to negotiate standards and procedures
and to build general consensus on important issues; second, verification of complian-
ce is ensured through an independent third-party mechanism, which raises the FSC’s
acceptance within all  stakeholder camps; third,  the successful  application of expert
standard setting and independent monitoring constitutes a model for other actors and
issue areas, providing a solution beyond the narrow realm of forest politics.
Brokering Knowledge
Next to providing an institutionalised solution to a complex environmental  and
social problem, the FSC acts as a knowledge-broker for many different interests. Most
obvious is the aspect of producing and disseminating information. As I have argued
above, standard setting is, by definition, based on specific expertise. Agreeing on regu-
lative rules in such complicated issue areas as chemical substances or marine biodiver-
Pattberg   61
sity  requires  not  only  substantial  theoretical  knowledge,  but  also  a  great  deal  of
practical experience. These substantive and organisational prerequisites allow private
actors to take a leading role in standard setting, precisely because most public actors
lack the necessary theoretical and practical resources. In contrast to public actors, the
network  character  of  private  governance  institutions  and  the  resulting  close  in-
corporation of relevant experts in the process of rule making produces very detailed
standards,  outperforming  many  international  regulation.  The  aforementioned  FSC
standards and principles for sustainable forestry currently cover more than 43 million
hectares of forest in 73 countries, whereas the intergovernmental negotiation process
under the auspices of the United Nations fell short of producing considerable results.
The very diverse and broad knowledge base that the FSC is able to draw upon can
partially explain this difference. As noted above, a standard setting process usually in-
volves not only technical experts and NGO representatives, but also concerns practi-
tioners and the wider public.  I addition, the specific, decentralised structure of the
FSC makes it easy to integrate local and national knowledge whenever appropriate.
But whereas the FSC has been rather successful in creating information and com-
municating this information to members and stakeholders as well as to specific seg-
ments of the market, FSC’s record is rather weak on influencing public opinion on
the  problem of  deforestation  and forest  degradation  in  general.  This  weakness  in
raising public awareness can mainly be attributed to the specific governance and stake-
holder structure of the FSC, which supports an effective outsourcing of awareness-
raising  campaigns  to  other  actors,  especially  the  environmental  NGOs within  the
FSC. They run regular campaigns on the forest problem and consequently advertise
the FSC as the only viable solution, thus contributing to a rise in the overall knowled-
ge on FSC. But business actors also take over public information functions from FSC,
when, for example, retailers inform their customers about the problems of deforesta-
tion in order to promote themselves as environmentally sensible corporations.
Learning in Networks
The institutional structure of FSC facilitates two types of learning processes. The
first could be described as intra-organisational learning and includes processes of self-
evaluation and resulting organisational restructuring. This topic has been extensively
covered within management science, especially in the literatures on economic history,
industrial economics, and the theory of the firm (Dodgson 1993: 375). Although the
concept of organisational learning is highly contested (Fiol and Lyles 1995) and there
is no commonly accepted definition of what the concept refers to in terms of out-
come and process, I propose the following minimal definition: organisational learning
can be described as the way an organisation builds, supplements, and organises know-
ledge  around  its  activities,  resulting  in  a  change  in  organisational  structures  and
procedures.
One example for organisational learning within the FSC is the self-evaluation pro-
cess conducted by the so-called ‘Change Management Team’ (CMT). Established by
the former executive director Maharaj Muthoo in 2000, the six-member team conduc-
ted numerous interviews with stakeholders and staff members to identify internal and
external  challenges  as  well  as  possible  strategic  directions  of  the  FSC.  The  CMT
presented a report that the board adopted in 2001. It recommended eight steps to en-
sure FSC’s future success in its mission of promoting environmentally appropriate,
socially responsible, and economically viable forest management, such as empowering
national and regional initiatives, improving the recognition of the FSC brand, and mo-
ving the headquarters to an international setting (FSC 2002a). Further priorities to en-
sure a healthy future for the FSC were suggested, inter alia: professionalising the com-
munication activities, separating accreditation and standard setting functions, and se-
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curing an independent financial basis through enhanced fundraising efforts. Many of
these recommendations are currently in practice. For example, FSC’s communication
services have substantially improved since the year 2000, today offering standardised
communication templates, comprehensive fact sheets for quick information as well as
a  more  service-orientated  web  site.  In  addition,  the  strategic  relocation  of  FSC
headquarters to an international setting has been completed with moving to Bonn in
2002  as  well  as  the  envisaged  decentralisation,  which  was  finalised  by  the
establishment of the fourth independent regional centre, located in Africa.
These observations suggest that organisational learning is taking place within the
FSC. Although the described process is quite formalised and was imposed by the FSC
leadership,  organisational  learning  drew on the  many individual  resources  of  staff
members and stakeholders in order to change the organisation’s procedures and prac-
tices in key areas. From this perspective, organisational learning in the case of the FSC
is not only the result of a management decision, but also an outcome of the specific
organisational structure and culture of the FSC, which supports flexible knowledge
production and stakeholder involvement as important prerequisites for effective or-
ganisational learning (Fiol and Lyles 1995: 804-805).
The second type of learning could be labelled inter-organisational learning, invol-
ving very different types of actors. From this perspective, the FSC constitutes the in-
stitutional  core  of  a  wider  learning  network,  including  members,  first  and second
order stakeholders as well as the general public. A learning network can be defined as
an  inter-organisational  network  combining  the  voluntary  efforts  of  autonomous
organisations in order to overcome complex challenges through the formal and in-
formal exchange of knowledge. Such inter-organisational networks are characterised
by three distinct features: first, inter-organisational networks operate as rather abstract
conceptual systems that enable organisations to overcome complex problems; second,
networks evolve around shared visions, purposes, and goals; and third, inter-organisa-
tional networks rest on horizontal organising principles rather than centralised power
(Chisholm 1998:  6).  Learning is  facilitated by these features of inter-organisational
networks for two reasons: first, horizontal structures and the lack of central power are
important prerequisites for the exchange of information within a network; second,
mutual visions and a shared perception of problems and possible solutions  enable
communication between very divergent organisations.
The FSC constitutes a learning network that includes very different organisational
actors. This organisational diversity, both in structure and content, seems to facilitate
effective learning processes. Consider the example of leading retailers of wood pro-
ducts. It was the specific structure of the FSC as a network of local, regional, and
global organisations that has led to successful learning. Only the involvement of local
and regional experts, forest managers, and producers enabled retailers to learn about
the many unnecessary intermediate traders participating in the business.  The result
was a cheaper product for the retailers and at the same time a higher profit margin for
local producers and managers. But network learning processes within the FSC do not
only occur because dissimilar organisations learn about possible win-win situations,
but also because similar organisations learn from dissimilar procedures. The general
assembly and other formal or informal meetings between stakeholders provide op-
portunities for learning that would not exist in absence of the network. Social organi-
sations, such as trade unions or indigenous peoples associations, meet with environ-
mental NGOs to exchange strategies and substantive information. As a result, organi-
sations  often  enrich  their  strategic  toolkit  as  well  as  their  general  organisational
culture. For historic reasons,  the environmental chamber of the FSC has been the
best organised in terms of resource mobilisation, shared visions and resulting policy
motions. But business and social interests are catching up as a direct result of learning
processes within the FSC network.
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In sum, the FSC can be considered a learning institution in two ways: first, the
FSC shows distinct features of intra-organisational learning, mobilising the very diffe-
rent experiences of its staff members and stakeholders and turning them into effective
organisational restructuring; second, the FSC is an inter-organisational learning net-
work of many diverse actors that facilitates effective learning processes exactly be-
cause of the organisational dissimilarity of its members.
4. Conclusion
In this contribution I have argued that we can make sense of many emerging phe-
nomena in global environmental politics by applying the concept of private gover-
nance institutions, to denote changes in both the structure and impact of private poli-
cy-making. The current institutionalisation of cooperation between divergent private
actors, including corporations, environmental non-profits and social interest organisa-
tions, is a noteworthy trend in global politics because the resulting transnational rules
transcend our understanding of international relations. Although some literatures do
address private institutions as important factors in global governance, the phenome-
non still lacks a coherent and encompassing approach, which unifies competing views
to improve our theoretical and empirical knowledge under one conceptual framework.
Therefore, global governance has been introduced as the appropriate lens to ana-
lyse basic trends that separate the study of contemporary global environmental polit-
ics  from more  traditional  accounts  of  international  relations.  Next  to  intergovern-
mental negotiations and public-private partnerships, private actor-constellations take
up the function of rule-making in global environmental politics. In contrast to other,
rival concepts of institutional partnership put forward in the literature, such as private
sector regimes, private organisations or certification institutions, the concept of pri-
vate governance institutions joins together the three key features of the phenomenon
in question: first, the private nature of the respective body, distinguishing it from hy-
brid  private-public  partnerships;  second,  the  distinct  mechanisms  of  rule-making,
clearly excluding forms of rule-implementation or service provision by private actors;
and third, the institutional character, allowing for both highly formalised organisations
and less formalised initiatives. The detailed analysis of the Forest Stewardship Council
has shown that private institutions in global environmental governance perform vari-
ous functions. Next to standard-setting, these functions include: providing an institu-
tionalised solution to global  environmental  problems,  producing and disseminating
knowledge to a wide range of stakeholders, and providing an arena for learning, both
inside the FSC and among a network of independent organisations.
What can be learned from the analysis of private institutions in global environ-
mental politics with respect to the specific questions of the conference and Industrial
Transformation research in general? I believe the following three observations to be
the most important: first, industrial sectors, such as the forestry sector, are currently
being transformed by private actors, with the effect that the ‘rules of the game’ within
one sector no longer necessarily emanate from the international system alone. Second,
important changes to certain production and consumption systems originate from co-
regulation between antagonistic actors, such as transnational corporations and envi-
ronmental organisations. And finally, the market, as one of the principal modes of go-
vernance next to hierarchies and networks, occupies a prominent role in the allocation
of impact and the resulting success of private governance.
Although future research has still to assess the precise impact of private institu-
tions as mechanisms of global governance and their respective effectiveness in solving
environmental  problems,  the results  of this  contribution indicate that the analysed
new private institutionalism in environmental politics could contribute to the much
needed sustainability transition. The perennial question thus is not if private partner-
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ships can help to transform the current industrial system into a sustainable one, but
rather  how  their  valuable  contribution  can  be  integrated  into  a  democratic  and
legitimate governance of global environmental affairs.
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Could Too Little and Too Much 
Turn Out to be Just Right? 
– On The Relevance of Pioneering 
Environmental Policy1
Jürgen Blazejczak
University of Applied Sciences Merseburg, Germany  
Dietmar Edler
German Institute for Economic Research, Germany
1. Introduction
Frequently a national “going-ahead” of environmental policy is proposed, e.g. by
the German Council of Advisers on the Environment (SRU 2001). This request for a
stricter environmental policy is often rationalized by the proposed prospect of advan-
tages for national enterprises,  resulting in higher domestic employment and output
(Porter 1991; Porter, van der Linde 1995). Politicians take up this argument to pro-
mote environmental regulation. An opposing view holds that stricter environmental
policy deteriorates competitiveness and induces capital flight. This position implies a
rational for eco-dumping.
The prospects of an environmental policy designed to improve international com-
petitiveness and welfare of a country have been investigated in the theory of strategic
environmental policy (Fees, Taistra 2001). While a negative effect on national welfare
of a stricter environmental policy can be easily explained, a positive effect seems to be
much less straightforward. Various theoretical models have been developed though,
which show the possibility of welfare increases of stricter environmental policy.
A number of empirical studies - surveyed in Scholz and Stähler 1999 – can be
identified which have looked for evidence of the impacts of environmental policy on
international competitiveness. These studies did not find a strong positive or negative
effect of environmental policy on international competitiveness. The question of whe-
ther environmental policy is actually used in an attempt to improve international com-
petitiveness has remained unresolved, however. This is particularly true for the case of
stricter environmental policy. 
1 We are indebted for helpful comments to Susanne Droege and Klaus Jacob. All remaining
insufficiencies are ours.
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 The present chapter looks for evidence of the existence of pioneering environ-
mental policy, i.e.  strategic environmental policy which is designed stricter than in
other countries in order to gain advantages for national enterprises.. For this purpose
we screen a series of case studies. We find that evidence of pioneering environmental
policy is elusive. We explain this result by the restrictive nature of the conditions for
the success of pioneering environmental policy as identified in different attempts to
find a rational for such policy in economic theory . We show  that these conditions
are actually not given in any of the case studies. We conclude by arguing that pionee-
ring environmental policy may still be welfare enhancing as it may be instrumental to
overcome the well known prisoner’s dilemma in international environmental policy.
In the following section we present a definition of pioneering environmental poli-
cy and propose operational criteria for the presence of such policy. We then list the
criteria for a successful pioneering environmental policy derived from the theoretical
literature. Next we present the evidence from the case studies. Finally we present our
argument for the welfare enhancing effects of pioneering environmental policy. 
2. Definition and Criteria of Pioneering Environmental Policy
Pioneering  environmental  policy  is  understood  to  set  national  environmental
standards in excess of their optimal level.2 Such policy imposes a cost on society. It
has been suggested, however, that this cost is more than offset by advantages gained
by national economic agents on international markets (Porter 1991). 
The state of the environment can be targeted in a multitude of ways. Basically we
can distinguish between non-restrictive  and restrictive  policies.  Among the former
ones are subsidies for environmental  R&D, for example. The latter ones comprise
command and control policies of all kinds as well as environmental taxes and permit
schemes. The debate around pioneering environmental policy relates to the apparent
“puzzle” that more restrictive policies can be advantageous. Therefore we look at re-
strictive policies only.
Detecting pioneering environmental policy is difficult, because the optimal level of
environmental  policy – determined by marginal  costs  and benefits  -  is  usually  not
known. Instead, objectives of environmental  policy are derived from scientific rea-
soning, sometimes modified by cost and distributional considerations. Often environ-
mental policy does not even address the state of the environment directly, but targets
environmental pressures in a way which is only indirectly related to the actual state of
the environment. 
Therefore a precise benchmark for identifying pioneering environmental policy is
not available. Nevertheless we can use a set of criteria to look for the presence of such
policies. For the purpose of the present chapter we look for environmental policies 
• which restrict the use of the natural environment,
• which - in comparison to environmental policy of other countries at the same time
- impose more severe restrictions on agents, thus raising their costs,
• which politicians rationalize by international offsets. 
3. Evidence of Pioneering Environmental Policy 
Looking for empirical evidence of the existence or non-existence of pioneering en-
vironmental policies we screen a series of in-depth case studies. These are part of an
interdisciplinary research project titled  Policy-Frameworks for the Development of Interna-
2 Sometimes such policy is termed excessive environmental policy (Feess, Taistra 2001: p.1).
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tional Markets for Innovations of a Sustainable Economy - from Pilot Markets to Lead Markets3,
which  looks at the conditions for the establishment of lead markets for environmental
friendly innovations. A country (or region) is defined as a lead market for a specific
technological solution 
• if it is the place where this technology is developed and adopted in an early phase
(a pilot market) and
•  if it is in a position to shape the world markets such that this technology diffuses
internationally. 
One focus of the case studies  is the mixture of  policy instruments which has
been  implemented in each country to foster the generation and (international) dif-
fusion  of  specific  technologies.  The technologies  which were more  closely  invest-
igated include4
• technologies with potential to substitute paper by electronic media
• fuel cells for mobile applications
• fuel cells for stationary applications
• technologies for emission reduction in Diesel powered cars
• paints with VOC (Volatile Organic Compounds)-free or VOC-reduced solvents
• technologies for paper recycling
• photovoltaic energy conversion
In the case study which deals with technologies with potential to substitute paper
by electronic media environmental policy instruments do not play any role at all as the
application of these technologies is motivated by non-environmental concerns. There-
fore this is not a case of pioneering environmental policy.
Fuel cells for stationary applications and especially for mobile applications are in
an early stage of product development without any broad commercial market penetra-
tion. It seems to be not yet decided which of the numerous alternative designs may
become dominant in the future. The direct policy instruments involved are therefore
mainly R&D-related. R&D is motivated by future strict clean air requirements. Envi-
ronmental policy instruments thus have more an indirect impact defining the long-
term framework conditions for these technologies. For the time being this does not
restrict  competitiveness  of the national  (local)  industry.  California being the region
with the strictest  regulation with respect to mobile  fuel  cells  is  unlikely to pursuit
strategic objectives as it is not home of a strong automotive industry. 
In the case study about emission reduction in Diesel powered cars,  on the one
hand, a prominent role is taken by clean air regulation in Europe and the US and
market-oriented instruments like fuel taxes and  tax exemptions . On the other hand
technology-forcing  and the strategic behaviour of multinationals are important. The
strategic R&D behaviour of a competitor (Peugeot)  created a technological breakt-
hrough, however, this was not the result of strategic environmental policy. 
The case of paints with VOC-free or -reduced solvents is characterized by a variety
of product -related instruments, ranging from command-and-control, market-oriented
3 The research project is sponsored by the  German Federal Ministry of Education and Re-
search as part of the research program on  Frameworks for  Innovation towards Sustainability
(RIW) (Grant number 07RIW1A). For intermediate results of the project see Beise et. al.
2003. 
4 Beside this a number of a literature based case studies were also screened for information
concerning pioneering environmental policy; the technologies under investigation include
fuel-efficient passenger cars, wind energy, substitutes for CFCs as coolant in refrigerators
for private households, chlorine reduced pulp production, introduction of the catalytic con-
verter for cars and black liquor gasification.
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instruments to labelling and voluntary agreements. The number of internationally ap-
plied instruments has increased significantly since the beginning of the Eighties. The
additional  cost  for users  increase only marginally  as a consequence of  these regu-
lations and a strategic orientation can not be identified. 
The amount of paper recycling is strongly influenced by regulation on waste paper
recovery. While some countries have more restrictive recovery requirements the costs
are mainly borne by private households. Therefore, the competitiveness of firms is
not affected. Also no strategic objectives of environmental policy are presented to ju-
stify the environmental regulation.
The photovoltaic energy conversion case has to be seen in the context of climate
change protection. The promotion of renewable energy is one strategy to reduce CO2-
emissions. Different instruments like R&D-subsidies, environmental taxes and guar-
anteed prices for energy from renewable resources ( so called renewable energy feed
tariffs (REFIT)) are used to increase the installed capacity of this technology. The case
of Japan deserves some closer attention. The commitment to comparably demanding
CO2 reduction goals in the Kyoto protocol could be viewed as imposing more severe
restrictions on domestic actors than on actors in foreign countries. While in Germany
REFIT´s have induced a large increase in wind energy production (and to a lesser ex-
tent of photovoltaic   capacity)5,   Japan has decided to bet on the development of
photovoltaic  energy  conversion.6 Japan  used  a  variety  of  instruments  to  promote
photovoltaics7. Beise 2003 argues that the decision in favour of photovoltaics was to a
large extent motivated by the expectations about the future success potentials for Ja-
panese exporting firms on the world market. Given the already established competit-
ive semiconductor  industry in Japan the future gains on the world market looked
more favourable for photovoltaics than for other equipment markets for the produc-
tion of renewable energy. At least this could be viewed as an example of policy in the
line of strategic environmental policy. Although in this case there exists a clear stra-
tegic orientation of environmental policy, cost increases for domestic companies are
avoided. Instead the cost of this policy is broadly distributed to all taxpayers.










Technologies with potential to
substitute paper by electronic
media
- - -
Fuel cells for mobile applications (X) - -
Fuel cells for stationary applica-
tions
(X) - -
Technologies for emission reduc-
tion in Diesel powered cars
X (X) -




Technologies for paper recycling X (X) -
Photovoltaic energy conversion X (X) X
5 By using this instrument only grid-connected systems were promoted, while there is strong
indication that the world market for photovoltaic systems will be dominated by the demand
for stand-alone/non-grid systems.
6 The natural conditions for wind energy and for photovoltaic in Japan are said to be com-
parable – not favouring one of the two alternative technologies.– From an international
comparative perspective they are not really good for  both technologies. 
7 Governmental and public institutions were urged to install units; photovoltaic systems were
declared as building material opening up tax benefits. See Beise 2003, p. 5
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The table demonstrates that it is difficult to identify examples, in which – com-
pared to other countries at the same time- a stricter regulation is imposed, which ne-
gatively  affects  the costs  of   companies.  Costs  are  usually  broadly  spread over  to
private  households  or  taxpayers.  Indications  of  a  strategic  motivation  of  environ-
mental policy seem to be very rare. 
4. Why Evidence of Pioneering Environmental Policy is Elusive
A rationale for a pioneering environmental policy is given by the Porter hypothesis
(Porter 1990, Porter, van der Linde 1995). It states that environmental regulation does
– regularly - not reduce the profits of firms. Instead it exerts pressure, leading firms to
realize previously undiscovered advantageous innovation opportunities.
At a first glance this proposition seems to suggest that firms systematically over-
look profitable investment opportunities. There is a number of explanations of such
behaviour.8 For example, economic models can produce this  result as second best
outcome in principal-agent constellations under asymmetric information (Holmström,
Tirole 1987). If the cost of compliance is more than offset by cost savings through in-
novation, the environmental policy stimulating such innovation creates a cost advant-
age relative to foreign competitors, but only as long as environmental policy abroad
does not follow.
1. Complete Offsets
If the cost of compliance is more than  offset by cost savings through innovation,
pioneering environmental policy is advantageous as long as  environmental policy ab-
road does not follow.
However, many economists have remained sceptical that this is generally the case
(Palmer, Oates, Portney 1995). Then the question arises if independent of such ineffi-
ciencies a pioneering environmental policies can be successful in increasing the share
of domestic companies in international markets and increase national income and em-
ployment9 (Stähler 1998)10. 
Game theory-founded environmental economics supports the view that under incom-
plete competition strict environmental policy implemented in advance of other coun-
tries – even while increasing costs to regulated companies – can improve the compet-
itiveness  of  domestic  enterprises  under  certain  conditions  (Ecchia,  Mariotti  1994;
Feess,  Muehlheusser  2002  (emphasizing  the  profits  of  suppliers  of  environmental
technologies as a justification for a pioneering environmental policy); Feess, Taistra
2001; Scholz, Stähler 1999; Taistra 2000; Ulph 1996; Ulph, Ulph 1996, Ulph 1999)11.12 
8 Besides plain inefficiency and manager-owner conflicts there may be bounded rationality
leading to local search, incomplete information on the benefits of an innovation, a pris-
oners’ dilemma among firms because of spillovers or asymmetric information of customers.
9 The welfare effects for the national economy comprise producer rent, consumer rent, gov-
ernment revenues and domestic environmental quality. If firms produce for third markets
only, the consumer rent becomes irrelevant from a national perspective.
10 The market share of domestic companies in international markets is an indicator of sectoral
competitiveness. It does not necessarily imply an increased competitiveness of the overall
economy. Using this indicator corresponds to the view of strategic environmental policy as
a form of industrial policy.  See Scholz, Stähler 1999.
11 Under certain conditions maximization of national welfare requires eco dumping instead of
a pioneering environmental policy (Barett 1994).
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Different Mechanisms Are Suggested As Being Able To Explain This Result:
Strict  environmental  policy  can  incite  companies  competing  simultaneously  in
prices on oligopolistic international markets (Bertrand competition) to behave more
aggressively.13 Strict environmental policy increases the costs of domestic firms, firms
increase their prices, and foreign firms react by increasing their prices as well: com-
panies  in  both  countries  move  towards  monopoly.  This  increases  producer  rent.
However,  domestic  overall  welfare  increases  only  if  production  is  sold  to  foreign
countries. 
2. Rent Shifting
We  state  that  pioneering  environmental  policy  may  be  advantageous  under  si-
multaneous   price  competition  on  oligopolistic  international   markets  if  polluting
firms export most of their output.
A strict environmental policy may induce innovations of polluting firms which c.p.
reduce their unit costs.14 Without strict policy the innovation is not a credible strategy.
If the cost advantage of the innovation exceeds the additional costs of the pioneering
policy (higher environmental taxes), firms can choose an aggressive strategy in quant-
ities.  Foreign firms – if not supported by their governments – will then reduce their
production in order to avoid having to accept lower prices. In addition, foreign firms
may reduce their innovation efforts.
3. Strategic Innovation
If innovation is feasible for polluting firms, innovation is a strategic component in
competition, but the innovation is not a credible thread, the scope for the possibility
of a welfare enhancing pioneering environmental policy is expanded to competition
in quantities. Note that a diffusion of the policy could nullify the advantage of the
domestic firms.
A stricter environmental policy chosen in a country may be advantageous if learn-
ing of polluting firms reduces unit costs. If then the environmental policy diffuses to
foreign countries, domestic firms can gain market share. At this moment foreign com-
panies have to adopt the new technology which is initially more expensive, while do-
mestic companies, due to learning, have much lower costs. It is important that foreign
environmental policy neither follows too early, i.e. before learning has become effect-
ive, nor too late, in which case domestic enterprises will bear higher costs than their
foreign competitors over an extended period.15
12 This corresponds to a general result of game theory: restricting the options of a player can
be advantageous if this influences the decisions of other players in a way favourable for this
player.
13 Contrary  to Barret  1994 Feess  and Taistra  2001 suggest  that pioneering environmental
policy may be justified under Cournot competition if polluting industries are export-ori-
ented.
14 A similar effect arises if pollution is an inferior input, i.e. emissions decrease with output.
This is the case if there are economies of scale in abatement. Greaker 2003 shows that the
environmental agency then should choose excessive standards if two firms simultaneously
compete in quantities.
15 There must also be some uncertainty about the following of the foreign environmental
policy, because otherwise foreign firms anticipate the following and adopt the innovation
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4. Learning
A pioneering environmental policy can increase welfare if domestic polluting firms
display learning effects and  a diffusion of the environmental policy is induced not to
early and not to late. 
If  a domestic industry producing clean technologies (or tradable services) exists
which displays increasing economies of scale,  e.g.  through learning effects,  the au-
thorities may set strict standards in order to increase the domestic demand for clean
technologies.16 This  happens  if  the  reduction  in  output  of  the  polluting  industry
through higher standards is less important than the increase in avoidance effort per
unit of output. Unit costs of the industry producing clean technology decreases and it
can gain profits from selling its products to foreign polluting firms. A similar argu-
ment holds if the technology can be effectively protected by patents. These gains are
higher  if  the  strict  policy  is  also  introduced  in  the  foreign  country.  If  there  are
spillovers, foreign firms could benefit from a second mover advantage. In order to be
welfare  enhancing,  foreign  demand for  output  of  the  domestic  polluting  industry
which has to bear the higher cost of strict regulation must have a low price elasticity. 
5. Advantage for Environmental Industry
A pioneering policy is justified by welfare gains if strict environmental policy increa-
ses the demand for clean technology produced by a domestic industry which displays
increasing economies of scale or is able to protect its innovation by patents, and if
this industry can export its products to foreign markets while the export performance
of polluting firms is not impeded.
There is a number of general considerations which cast doubt on the relevance of
the hypothesis that a pioneering environmental policy enhances national welfare. In
particular, firms could relocate if environmental policy is tightened. Also, for innovati-
on they could seek international co-operation. Then advantages can not be attributed
to one nation only. Similarly, if multinational firms are affected, it is difficult to see
how welfare of a nation is affected. In addition, it is generally assumed that in reaction
to a pioneering environmental policy counter measures are not taken in other coun-
tries.
We conclude that there are a number of models in which a pioneering environ-
mental policy - while increasing costs to regulated companies – can enhance domestic
welfare. However, the conditions under which this holds are rather restrictive. Gene-
rally, precise information on whether these conditions are given is not available. Some
conditions  are  even ambiguous:  sometimes  a  diffusion  of  environmental  policy to
foreign countries is required, sometimes it is harmful. This may explain the hesitation
of governments to actually implement pioneering environmental policies.
From a more general perspective some of the necessary prerequisites for engaging
in pioneering environmental policy seem to be potentially present in the case studies.  
immediately.
16 It is important that increased demand leads to innovations of domestic firms which can sub-
sequently be exported. This is the core of the Lead Market Hypothesis. See Beise et al.
2003.
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About 40 items, organized in a  common analytical framework, are used to charac-
terize the specifics of each of the case studies. Broader dimensions which were used
for characterization include
• involved actors
• characteristics of the underlying environmental problem
• types of policy instruments
• country and market specifics
• characteristics of innovation
• impact and characteristics of (environmental) policy measures
Looking for factors which have been identified frequently in the case studies as
being relevant it can be noticed that 
• integration into the world market and 
• technological competence 
of the lead market countries are viewed as decisive factors in most cases. The rel-
evance of technological competence is underlined by the fact that the demonstration
effect of a domestic application of new technologies is considered as important for
the international diffusion of the innovation. It should be noted, however, that addi-
tional incentives for exporting do not play any important role for the policy measures
identified in the case studies.17  
At the same time countries with lead market potential often have the image of en-
vironmental frontrunners.  The international diffusion of environmental regulation,
e.g. the diffusion of specific instruments between countries, from a frontrunner coun-
try to followers, has also been identified as a common pattern in many case studies. 
While at a more general level the conditions for pioneering environmental policy
seem to be potentially present in many case studies, a closer look shows that this ac-
tually often not the case. 
If we look at the possible (theoretical) mechanisms which make strategic envir-





5. advantage for environmental industry
the first four mechanism relate to advantages for polluting firms (as adoptors of
enforced new environmental technologies) and only the last mechanism relates to the
technology producing industry.  
However, in almost all of the case studies the relevant mechanism which could
possibly create an advantage for domestic firms is an internationally successful  en-
vironmental industry.
17 Due to WTO rules direct incentives for exporting are generally problematic, so that direct
measures might be avoided, perhaps sometimes substituted for by softer forms of indirect
measures.
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Table 2: Potentially Advantageous Economic Mechanisms 
Cases Mechanisms
Technologies with potential to substitute paper by
electronic media
not applicable
Fuel cells for mobile applications Environmental Industry
Fuel cells for stationary applications Environmental Industry 
Technologies for emission reduction in Diesel
powered cars
Environmental Industry 
Paints with VOC (Volatile Organic Compounds)-
free or VOC-reduced solvents Environmental Industry
and/or learning
Technologies for paper recycling Environmental Industry 
and/or learning 
Photovoltaic energy conversion Environmental Industry 
Above we have identified theoretically  the conditions  for  an environmental  in-
dustry  to  be  successful  in  international  markets  and  in  overcompensating  disad-
vantages for the regulated polluting industries:
• the existence of a domestic environmental industry18
• increasing economies of scale or patent protection as prerequisite for international
competitiveness of the environmental industry
• chances to export to foreign markets induced e.g. by  policy diffusion
• unimpeded competitiveness of polluting firms.
The following table demonstrates that it is doubtful that all necessary conditions –
as required by theoretical models – are satisfied  simultaneously. Therefore politicians
can not be sure that pioneering environmental regulation will benefit domestic com-
panies.  In addition it should be noted that multinational enterprises are involved in all
cases under consideration and that their  presence makes the idea of national advant-
ages by means of pioneering environmental policy ambiguous.
18 In two cases (clean air regulation for mobile fuel cells applications in California, regulation
on VOC-free paints) strict regulation is enacted without the existence of a (strong) domest-
ic industry.
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Technologies with potential to
substitute paper by electronic
media
n.a. n.a n.a n.a
Fuel cells for mobile 
applications
- ? -




reduction in Diesel powered cars
? ?











5. Can Pioneering Environmental Policy Still Be Welfare Enhancing?
The conditions under which strategic environmental policy benefits national eco-
nomic agents through the mechanisms described above are rather restrictive and the-
refore unlikely to hold. Still such policy could be welfare enhancing.
In case of international or global environmental problems a country which max-
imizes national welfare has an incentive to set lower environmental  standards than
would be rational from an international perspective. Part of the damages arise abroad,
i.e.  they are external effects  from the perspective of that country. Equivalently the
situation may be characterized as a prisoners’ dilemma in which it is rational for each
country not to participate in any effort to solve the problem. In such situations the
nationally efficient level of environmental standards is low or even zero. 19 
Coordinated policies of a number of nations could make all of them better off, ju-
stifying environmental standards stricter than the nationally efficient level. It may be
difficult to agree on cooperative standards, however, as any one nation which goes
ahead is likely to be worse off - unless losses are offset by gains from strategic envi-
ronmental policy. Moreover, of individuals behaviour according to the principle of re-
ciprocity has been observed: sometimes individuals behave against their self-interest if
they observe others to do so.  By this behaviour prisoners’ dilemmas can be over-
come to the benefit of all. If nations states “behave” in a similar way alleged advan-
tages from strategic environmental policy would enable politicians to go ahead and in-
cite other nations to follow. Even if the conditions for advantages from strategic envi-
ronmental policy are not fulfilled, society would finally be better off.
19 Other  authors  have  expressed  a  positive  view  of  symbolic  environmental  policy.
Böhringer/Voigt (2003: p.249) conclude from their assessment of the Kyoto-Protocol that
it is almost ineffective and thus represents symbolic policy only. They explain this as an at-
tempt of rational governments interested in their re-election which want to satisfy a public
sensible to climate change. They regard it as a success, however, that climate issues have
thus been put on the international agenda. A similar view is held by Weimann, J., ibid. p.
234. Taistra (2001: p. 257) emphasizes the role of a pioneering policy as a step towards a
later cooperative solution.
Blazejczak/Edler    77
References
Barrett 1994: Barrett, S.: Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade, in: Journ-
al of Public Economics, 54 (3),  1994, 325-338.
Beise 2003: Beise, Marian, The Internatial Adoption of Photovoltaic Energy Conversion –
Is  Japan a Lead Market, mimeo., 2003.
Beise et al. 2003 : Beise, M., Blazejczak, J., Edler, D., Jacob, K., Jänicke, M., Loew, M.,
Petschow, U., Rennings, K.: The Emergence of Lead Markets for Environmental Innovations.
In:  Horbach,  J.,  Huber,  J.,  Schulz,  T.  (Hrsg.),  Nachhaltigkeit  und  Innovation.  Rahmenbe-
dingungen für Umweltinnovationen. München 2003, S. 11-54. 
Böhringer, Voigt 2003: Böhringer, C. / Vogt, C., Das Kioto-Protokoll. Eine Bestandsauf-
nahme aus ökonomischer Sicht. In: Jahrbuch Ökologische Ökonomik Band 3, Marburg 2003,
pp. 237-250.
Ecchia, Mariotti 1994: Ecchia, G. / Mariotti: A Survey on Environmental Policy, Technolo-
gical  Innovation and Strategic Issus, Nota Di Lavoro Fondazione Eni Enrica Mattei  44.94,
1994 Milano.
Feess, Muehlheusser 2002: Feess, E. / Muehlheusser, G.: Strategic Environmental Policy,
Clean Technologies and the Learning Curve, in: Environmental and Resource Economics, 23
(2), Oktober 2002, 149-166. 
Feess, Taistra 2001: Feess, E. / Taistra, G.: Strategische Umweltpolitik – Überblick und
weiterer Forschungsbedarf, in: Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht, 1/2001, 1-19.
Greaker  2003: Greaker,  M., Strategic Environmental  Policy;  Eco-Dumping or a Green-
Strategy? in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 45 (2003), pp. 692-707.
Holmström, Tirole 1987: Holmström, B. R. / Tirole, J.: The Theory of the Firm, in: R. Sch-
malensee / R. Willig: Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 1, 1987 Amsterdam, 61-133.
Nordhaus,  Boyer 2000: Nordhaus,  W. D. / Boyer, J.,  Warming the World.  MIT Press:
Cambridge, London 2000.
Palmer, Oates, Portney 1995: Palmer, K.L., Oates, W.E., Portney, P.R., Tightening Envir-
onmental Standards:  The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost Paradigm? In: Journal of Economic
Perspectives, vol. 9 no. 4 1995, pp. 119-132.
Porter 1990: Porter, M. E.: The Competitive Advantage of Nations, in: Harvard Business
Review, March-April, 1990, 74-87.
Porter 1991: Porter, M.E.: America’s Green Strategy. In: Scientific American 264 (1991),
p.168.
Porter, van der Linde 1995: Porter, M. E. / van der Linde, C.: Toward a New Conception
of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9,
1995, 97-118.
Scholz, Stähler 1999: Scholz, C.M., Stähler, F.: Unilateral Environmental Policy and Inter-
national Competitiveness. Kieler Studien 299. Tübingen 1999.
Stähler 1998: Stähler, F.: Competitiveness and Environmental Policies in Strategic Environ-
mental Policy Models, Kiel Working Paper No. 858 1998.
SRU 2002: Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen: Für eine neue Vorreiterrolle. Umwelt-
gutachten 2002. Stuttgart 2002.
Taistra 2000: Taistra, G.: Die Porter-Hypothese zur Umweltpolitik, Wiesbaden 2000.
 Ulph 1996: Ulph, A.: Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade – The Role
of Market Conduct, in: Carraro, C. / Katasoulacos, Y. / Xepapadeas, A.: Environmental Policy
and Market Structure, Dordrecht 1996, 99-127.
78   Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference
Ulph, Ulph 1996: Ulph, A. / Ulph, D.:  Trade, Strategic  Innovation and Environmental
Policy and Market Structure, in: Carraro, C. / Katasoulacos, Y. / Xepapadeas, A.: Environ-
mental Policy and Market Structure, Dordrecht 1996, 181-208.
Ulph 1999: Ulph, A.: Trade and the Environment - Selected Essays.  Cheltenham 1999.
In: Klaus Jacob, Manfred Binder and Anna Wieczorek (eds.). 2004. Governance for Industrial 
Transformation. Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental
Change, Environmental Policy Research Centre: Berlin. pp. 79 - 95.
Local Sustainability Measurements and Determinants:
Investigating Industrial Stress, Economic 
Performance and Local Governance at Piracicaba
Basin (Brazil). 
Tania Braga, Irina Mikhailova
Centro de Desenvolvimento e Planejamento Regional - CEDEPLAR/UFMG, Brazil
Introduction
The chapter focuses on measurements and determinants of local sustainability in
the  Piracicaba  river  basin  in  Brazil.  In  particular,  we  investigate  industrial  stress,
economic  performance and local environmental  governance as the main drivers in
achieving or preventing this sustainability.
The investigations and measurements  of the main drivers of local sustainability
have a significant impact on industrial transformation research, as it helps to identify
the local patterns of economic activities, environmental burdens and governance. It
can also provide local stakeholders with tools to identify critical trends and institutio-
nal and political barriers that affect local efforts to promote industrial transformation.
Our aim is to apply and test methodologies that measure the different dimensions
of the sustainability, facing the challenges of aggregating and producing comparable
data from many different sources, produced at different scales, collected at different
periods and which vary in coverage. In this perspective, this chapter can be seen as
part of a broader effort to provide better quality data and statistical analyses for local
environmental  decision-making.  Quality data is  crucial  to industrial  transformation.
Despite the increasing efforts towards industrial transformation, the understanding of
the relationships  between society,  economic  activities  and the environment  usually
rely on very little information. The provision of firm and reliable information to sup-
port decision-making has been a major challenge for a good assessment of the efforts
to reduce environmental burdens coming from economic activities. 
Piracicaba Basin has been chosen for the numerous possibilities it presents for the
analysis and study of sustainability drivers. The Basin has a large protected area within
Brazil's  Atlantic  Forest.  It  has the most  important  iron-steel industrial  complex in
Latin America, mining areas exploited both industrially and on small-scale basis, an
expanding Japanese-Brazilian cellulose industrial  complex, enormous areas of euca-
lyptus monoculture plantations, and a rapid growing urban system that includes major
regional urban centers. 
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The first part of the chapter seeks to track progress toward local sustainability in the
26 municipalities of the basin through the construction of a set of local sustainability
indexes. These indexes combine measures of environmental quality, human welfare,
institutional capacity and local governance, industrial stress,  urbanization stress and
agricultural stress. By comparing the performance of the 26 localities in each of these
different aspects of sustainability, we measure the degree of local sustainability in a
comprehensive  and synthetic  way.  The  sustainability  index set  also  allows  for  the
measurement of  the local governance driver. The results show a clear trade-off bet-
ween environmental quality and economic performance in the Piracicaba basin, indi-
cating an urgent need of industrial transformation.
The second part of the chapter attempts to measure the industrial stress driver
within  the  studied  area  according  to  different  methodologies.  We  measure  the
environmental  stress  posed  by  the  major  industrial  plants  in  the  area  through
modeling water effluents emission and water consumption. 
The concluding part of the chapter brings together data from the first and second
parts  to statistically investigate three major drivers  of environmental change at the
studied area: industrial stress, economic performance and local environmental gover-
nance. 
Piracicaba Basin: The Studied Area
The Piracicaba Basin was chosen as the study area due to the numerous possibili-
ties  it  presents  for  the  analysis  and  study  of  key  environmental  problems  and
sustainability drivers. 
The Piracicaba Basin has the most important iron-steel industrial complex in Latin
America with iron and gold mining areas, exploited both industrially (iron and gold)
and  on  small-scale  basis  (gold),  an  expanding  Japanese-Brazilian  pulp  industrial
complex, enormous areas of eucalyptus monoculture plantations, and a rapid growing
urban system that includes major regional urban centers. 
The Basin has a large protected area of Brazil's Atlantic Forest, the Parque Esta-
dual do Rio Doce - PERD, which is the biggest preserved rainforest area in Minas
Gerais State. PERD has 35.976 hectares and is the richest Brazilian Atlantic Forest
Park in both biodiversity and presence of endemic species (PAULA et all, 1997)   
In this way, the Piracicaba basin is a rich mosaic of environmental problems, con-
centrating on a relative small area (see figure 1) a highly significant mix of economic
activities  with a strong  potential  of  environmental  impact.  The rapid urbanization
process and the perspectives of expansion of the local industrial plants magnify the
scenario described above. 
Figure 1: Localization of study area
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The main urban center at Piracicaba Basin is the “Steel Valley”, a metropolitan re-
gion composed by 4 municipalities: Ipatinga, Timóteo, Coronel Fabriciano and San-
tana do Paraíso. Ipatinga and Timóteo are the industrial core of “Steel Valley”, hos-
ting two iron-stell plants - Usiminas and Acesita, respectively. Coronel Fabriciano is a
rapidly growing commercial center. Santana do Paraíso, the only municipality at the
“Steel Valley” with relevant rural activities, functions as a displacement area, receiving
industrial and urban solid waste for treatment and disposal.
João Monlevade and Itabira are also important urban centers; the former hosts an
iron-steel plant – Belgo Mineira – and the later hosts an important iron mining com-
plex – Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (the biggest mining company in Brazil). 
Caratinga and Nova Era are traditional commercial centers that hosts small-scale
industrial plants. Marliéria and Santa Bárbara have a large share of their area protected
for  environmental  reasons  (Parque  Estadual  do Rio  Doce and Parque  do Caraça,
respectively).  The  other  municipalities  are  small  towns  with  agriculture  activities,
mainly the monoculture of Eucaliptus to provide Cenibra, a pulp plant located near
the “Steel Valley”, with raw material.
Cenibra is one of the largest producers of short-fiber bleached Eucalyptus pulp in
Brazil. Founded on 1973 as a Brazil-Japan joint project, under the stock control of
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) – at that time a Brazilian Government owned
company  -  and  Japan  Brazil  Paper  and  Pulp  Resources  Development  Company
(JBP)1. In 2001, after the privatization of CVRD, JBP took the 100% ownership of
Cenibra. Cenibra is located in the county of Belo Oriente, near the “Steel Valley”. Its
annual output reaches 800 thousand tons. From this total, over 90% is directed to the
foreign  market,  serving  mainly  Japan,  Europe,  the  United States,  as  well  as  other
countries in Latin America and Asia.
Usiminas is one of the leading Brazilian steel companies, producing and commer-
cializing flat steel products, like heavy plates (low-carbon and low-alloy steels), hot-
rolled steels, cold-rolled steels and coated steels. Founded in 1962, the company was
controlled by Brazilian Federal  government  since 1991 when it  was privatized.  Its
annual output reaches 4,080,000 tons of steel. 
Acesita and Belgo Mineira are controlled by Arcelor,  an European steel-making
group with the world highest steel production. Acesita, the sole manufacturer of flat
stainless steels in South America, also produces carbon and micro-alloyed steels and
also silicon steels. Founded in 1944, it was owned by the Brazilian Federal Govern-
ment until its privatization in 1992. The present capacity is 850,000 tons of steel per
year. Belgo Mineira was founded in 1923. The present capacity is 1,200,000 tons of
steel per year. 
 
3. Tracking progress towards local sustainability 
This section seeks to track progress toward local sustainability in the 26 localities
of the Piracicaba basin through a set of sustainability indexes and indicators, which
combines measures of environmental quality, human wellbeing, local governance and
environmental stress. We use the indexes to compare the relative performance of the
26 localities in the different aspects of sustainability and measure the degree of local
sustainability in a comprehensive and synthetic way (BRAGA et all, 2003). 
1 JBP was is controlled by the Japanese companies Oji Paper Co., Itochu Corporation and
Japanese Bank for International Cooperation.
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The river is seen as a life witness of the environmental quality in its basin and as the
main methodological tool to integrate and compare information from multiple sources
under different methodologies and disciplinary approaches.
The index set combines 36 variables, rolled up into 14 indicators and 4 core inde-
xes:  the  Environmental  Quality  Index,  the  Human Wellbeing  Index the  Environ-
mental Stress Index and the Local Governance Index. The variables and indicators
were chosen  through an extensive  literature  review,  combined with assessment  of
available data and conclusions drawn from previous experiences of environmental in-
dex building. In particular, we draw inspiration from the sustainability matrix of the
“Biodiversity, Population and Economy” research project (PAULA et all, 1997) and
from the ESI - Environmental Sustainability Index (ENVIRONMENTAL, 2002).  
The indexes and indicators presented are a relative measure of local sustainability.
Due to the lack of scientific knowledge to specify precisely what levels of environ-
mental  quality  are  good  enough  to  be  sustainable,  we were  not  able  to  establish
benchmarks for all variables, which is why the index was built as a comparative mea-
sure between the municipalities at the studied area.
The Environmental Quality Index measure the quality of the environmental system
by taking the water quality at selected points at the Piracicaba River as a proxy of the
health of the local ecosystem. It includes both a biological index that measures the
diversity  of  fish  and  inland  water  plankton  and  a  physical-chemical  index  that
measures  parameters  as  dissolved  oxygen,  electrical  conductivity,  temperature,
suspended solids, phosphorous concentration, turbidity, among others. As the varia-
bles for  this  index, we used data produced by BARBOSA (1997)  and BARBOSA
(2002) through extensive field research at few points along Piracicaba River.  
The Human Wellbeing Index measures the life quality within the municipality re-
lating it to indicators of health, education, income, security and housing quality. The
Environmental Stress Index measures the burdens posed to the local environment by
industry, agriculture and urbanization. The Political Institutional Capacity Index mea-
sures local capacity to respond to sustainability challenges through the strength of its
institutions and the quality and accountability of its decision-making processes. The
variables  used in these indexes  were  calculated by  aggregating information  from a
wide  range  of  data  sources  as  the  Brazilian  Census  Bureau,  the  National  Health
Agency Database,  the Local  Governance  Database,  electricity  companies,  environ-
mental state agencies and local governments. 
The variables were chosen observing three main criteria: i) relevance - extent to
which the variable corresponds to the phenomenon; ii) meaning for local context -
extent  to  which  the  variable's  main  drive  remains  under  local  responsibility;  iii)
availability - coverage and recency of data. Proxies were applied when direct measures
of  the phenomenon were not  available.  We statistically  tested the set  of  variables,
through bivariate correlation and principal  component analyses.  At that point,  few
variables  were dropped out  of  the  indicators.  Table 1 show the variables  used to
compose the indicators and core indexes.
We make the variables comparable, by trimming the tails of the variable distribu-
tion and converting them to a standardized value (z-scores). We tested the theoretical
choices of the variables for each indicator through principal component analyses (we
find a value for the second component over 0.70 for all indicators). The indexes were
calculated by taking the unweighted average of the indicators converted from the z-
score scale to a standard normal percentile scale.
We calculated the indexes for year-base 1991 and for year-base 2000. The Human
Wellbeing Index and the Environmental Stress Index were built for the 26 munici-
palities for both year-base. The Political and Institutional Capacity Index was build for
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the 26 municipalities for 2000, but was not build for 1991 because of insufficient data.
The  Environmental  Quality  was  build  for  9  municipalities  in  1991  and  for  4
municipalities for 2000, according to data availability, as it depends on extensive field
research and collection and analyses of  water samples  at selected points  along the
river. 
Considering their key role on measuring the drivers of sustainability and identify-
ing relationships  that are crucial to industrial  transformation, we now have a close
look at the Environmental Stress Index and the local governance index. 
The Environmental  Stress Index measures the pressures posed on the environ-
ment by human activities, covering both pollution and exploitation. It ranks localities
at the studied area by the potential burden they pose on the adjoining environment,
focusing on pollution potential, speed of growth and degree of concentration of pol-
luting activities. 
Our aim with the Environmental Stress Index was to build a comprehensive and
sensible pressure index using publicly available data. In order to do so, we had to use
proxies to measure most of the indicators due to the lack of direct and reliable data on
pollution and exploitation levels for the whole basin. 
We took energy efficiency as a proxy for industrial stress. Consumption of energy
is (in many cases) the main source of atmospheric emissions from industry. We can
also  assume that  companies that  are more efficient  on the use of  energy also use
cleaner technologies. 
To measure agricultural stress we combined data on growth of agricultural land
with data  on  density  of  agricultural  land  (SAWYER,  2000),  energy  efficiency  and
conversion of natural forest into planted forest. Increasing agricultural land is a major
driver of land conversion and ecosystem losses, putting strong pressure on the re-
gional environment. 
We took household density and population growth, vehicles  per capita and dome-
stic  energy  consumption  as  proxies  for  the urban pressure.  Vehicles are the  main
source of atmospheric pollution in urban areas, energy consumption is a good proxy
for general consumption level, while household density and population growth have a
direct correlation with urbanization degree and pressure on adjoining areas for land
conversion.
We used a vegetation indicator as an inverse measure of environmental stress, sin-
ce localities with higher vegetation shares are less vulnerable to the negative effects of
anthropogenic pressure.  
The  Local  Governance  Index  measures  the  local  capacity  to  respond  to
sustainability challenges through the strength of its institutions and the quality and
accountability of its decision-making processes. It ranks localities at the studied area
by the effectiveness of their governance patterns. 
Our aim with the Local Governance Index was to use publicly available data (Na-
tional Census on Sub-national Governance - IBGE) to build a comprehensive and
sensible governance index that takes in to account two main trends – the broadening
of the spectrum of actors involved on the decision making process and the gaining of
importance of the local level on the policy making process. 
We took “fiscal autonomy” and “electoral weight” as proxies for political autono-
my. Fiscal autonomy is seen as the proportion of locally based revenue to the revenue
coming through federal/state transfers. It is a key driver of the overall political power
of  a  sub-national  level  in  a  federal  country.  It  influences  the  degree  of  political
independence relative to the higher levels of power - the Union and the State. The
electoral weight is seen as the ratio of voters to the total population. It is also a de-
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terminant factor of power of the local government, as a locality with a high electoral
weigh can influence the elections for the upper levels of power by helping to elect
candidates committed to local interests.
“Staff qualification”, “information systems” and “participation in the public policy
decision  making process”  are  the  proxies  for  Institutional  Capacity.  The first  two
measure the quality of the human resources and the information technology resources
of each local government. The third ranks localities according to the effectiveness of
participation in the public policy decision making process by evaluating the broadness
of  the spectrum of actors  involved in the processes and the existence of decision
making  tools  (as  participatory  budget  and  policy  funds  managed  by  community
boards).
“Participation  in  the  environmental  policy  decision  making process”  and “area
under legal protection” were taken as proxies for Environmental Governance. The
former rank localities according to the effectiveness of participation in the environ-
mental policy decision making process. It does that by evaluating the broadness of the
spectrum of actors involved in the processes and the existence of decision making
tools  as local  environmental  funds managed by community boards.  The later rank
localities according to the actual municipal area under legal environmental protection
(given through local legislation).  
“Environmental NGOs”, “electoral participation” and “press” were taken as pro-
xies for the Capacity of Debate. The environmental NGOs indicator ranks localities
according  to the  number  of  nationally  accredited environmental  NGOs with local
branches per capita. The electoral participation indicator measures the proportion of
registered voters that actually voted at the most recent municipal elections. The press
indicator ranks localities according to the number of local newspapers and radio sta-
tions per capita. 
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Wellbeing Municipal Human Development Index – Health
Municipal Human Development Index – Education
Income Municipal Human Development Index – Income
Environmental Stress
Vegetation Land covered by natural forest*







Density of agricultural land
Growth of agricultural land
Energy efficiency*
Conversion of natural forest in to planted forest








Participation in public policy decision making process
Environmental Governance
Participation in environmental policy decision making




Press (newspapers and radios)
Note: * inverse variables – the highest the variable value, the lowest the indicator.
We present the results of the calculations of the four core indexes for the years
1991 and 2000 in Tables 2 and 3, grouping municipalities through cluster analyses.
These  results  are  also mapped in  Figure  2. Although the results  have being fairly
consistent, the index set is considered as an open project, subject to further review
and methodological refinement. 
The cluster analyses allow us to identify a sole group with a clear development
pattern. Cluster 1 shows a clear unsustainable pattern, combining high human well-
being, high environmental stress and strong local governance. The municipalities on
this cluster are the industrial cities at the region, showing that economic performance
and industrial stress are major drivers of environmental sustainability in the region
and showing an urgent need of industrial transformation.







Coronel Fabriciano 0.69 0.39 0.88 1
Ipatinga 0.73 0.68 0.00 1
Itabira 0.64 0.48 0.66 1
João Monlevade 0.83 0.76 0.64 1
Timóteo 0.81 0.58 0.88 1
Antônio Dias 0.42 0.23 - 2
Barão de Cocais 0.66 - 0.09 2
Bela Vista de Minas 0.51 0.31 - 2
Belo Oriente 0.53 0.40 1.00 2
Dionísio 0.57 0.27 - 2
Jaguaraçu 0.54 0.29 - 2
Mesquita 0.39 0.18 -- 2
Rio Piracicaba 0.62 0.23 2
Santa Bárbara 0.67 0.41 0.93 2
São Gonçalo Rio Abaixo 0.50 0.35 - 2
Bom Jesus do Amparo 0.33 0.39 - 3
Bom Jesus do Galho 0.35 0.35 - 3
Caratinga 0.41 0.22 - 3
Córrego Novo 0.49 0.39 - 3
Iapu 0.44 0.23 - 3
Marliéria 0.39 0.31 - 3
Nova Era 0.49 0.62 0.66 3
São Domingos do Prata 0.53 0.23 - 3
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Table 3: Human Wellbeing Index, Environmental Pressure Index, 











Barão de Cocais 0.67 0.65 0.00 0.52 1
Ipatinga 0.64 0.66 0.22 0.87 1
Itabira 0.66 0.72 0.36 0.80 1
João Monlevade 0.85 0.65 - 0.72 1
Timóteo 0.68 0.67 - 0.80 1
Bela Vista de Minas 0.66 0.31 - 0.34 2
Caratinga 0.51 0.42 - 0.62 2
Coronel Fabriciano 0.67 0.35 - 0.53 2
Entre Folhas 0.53 0.44 - 0.43 2
Nova Era 0.76 0.53 - 0.47 2
Rio Piracicaba 0.66 0.46 - 0.37 2
Santa Bárbara 0.69 0.41 1.00 0.75 2
São Domingos do Prata 0.62 0.37 - 0.40 2
Bom Jesus do Amparo 0.44 0.45 - 0.38 3
Bom Jesus do Galho 0.36 0.33 - 0.32 3
Córrego Novo 0.45 0.24 - 0.26 3
Dionísio 0.44 0.42 - 0.34 3
Iapu 0.54 0.45 - 0.30 3
Ipaba 0.46 0.32 - 0.14 3
Jaguaraçu 0.48 0.44 - 0.27 3
Marliéria 0.60 0.51 - 0.31 3
Mesquita 0.37 0.32 - 0.16 3
Santana do Paraíso 0.50 0.64 - 0.19 3
São Gonçalo do Rio
Abaixo 0.43 0.35 - 0.21 3
Antônio Dias 0.22 0.52 - 0.39 4
Belo Oriente 0.20 0.49 0.50 0.55 4
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Figures 3 and 4 compare the performance of the 26 municipalities on the Envi-
ronmental Pressure and Human Wellbeing indexes by adapting to the studied reality
the sustainability barometer proposed by PRESCOTT-ALLEN (1995). The horizontal
axe shows the human system and the vertical axe the environmental system. We chose
the  Environmental  Pressure  Index  instead  of  the  Environmental  Quality  Index  to
compose the environmental axe since it was built for all municipalities in both year-base,
allowing a broad comparison.
Figure 2: Sustainability indexes, Piracicaba Basin, 1991 (left) and 2000 (right)
Note: Human Wellbeing Index, Environmental Stress Index and Political  and Institutional Capacity
Index, from the top to the bottom.
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Results  once again clearly  show a trade-off  between environmental  quality  and
human wellbeing at Piracicaba basin. The municipalities that rank higher in the Hu-
man Wellbeing Index were the same to rank higher in the Environmental Pressure
Index, what indicates that increasing human wellbeing in the region was achieved by
relaying on a high degree of burden on the environmental system. Nevertheless, a few
municipalities  were  able  to  break  the  link  between  environmental  burden  and
economic development, achieving a more balanced performance and suggesting that it
is possible to face and overcome the trade-off and pursue a more sustainable path.   
Measuring industrial stress
The aim of this section is to measure industrial stress at Piracicaba Basin. We do it
by modeling the environmental damage caused by the four main industrial plants at
the region and estimating the economic cost of these damages. 
Industrial stress is a major hurdle to the achievement of sustainability at Piracicaba
Basin, as demonstrated in section 3. The study region is specialized on primary trans-
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formation of raw natural resources – pulp and steel industries - and these industrial
activities are not only resource intensive, but also energy and water intensive. 
The pulp industry is a capital, energy, water and resource-intensive industrial sec-
tor.  The  iron-steel  industry  is  a  capital  and  resource-intensive  industrial  sector.
Depending on technological pattern adopted, iron-steel plants can also be energy and
water-intensive. Water intensive industries are the ones in which more than 15 per
cent of the activity’s total water intake is consumed. The iron-steel plants at Piracicaba
basin fall in to this consumption range, being water-intensive. Both industrial sectors
contribute to various emissions to air, especially sulphur dioxide (pulp and iron-steel),
nitrogen oxides (pulp) and particles (iron-steel) and have historically been the source
of acute air pollution problems.
We understand environmental damage as the losses on human wellbeing, ecosys-
tem health and man-made capital resulting from environmental degradation caused by
over-exploitation of the environmental services for productive purposes. The cost of
environmental  damage can be considered as the economic  value of  potential pro-
duction or revenue that was not realized due to environmental damage, or as the eco-
nomic value of the negative changes in the environmental quality. 
Although incurring some degree of environmental damage is almost inevitable, gi-
ven the particular characteristics of our economic system and current technological
standards, a measure of the degree of current damage and its economic value is a po-
werful tool to identify critical trends and help the development of better management
processes.
Measurement the extent and degree of environmental damage is not an easy task
and  there  is  no  consensual  methodology  to  do  it.  In  this  chapter  we  used  the
Environmental  Resources  Consumption  Method  (KHACHATUROV,  1993;
MIKHAILOVA, 2002). 
Given  the  difficulty  to  measure  all  the  losses  associated  with  environmental
damage, most of the current efforts on environmental damage measurement focus on
particular aspects of specific productive activities as proxies of the overall damage. In
this chapter we measure the damage on the water media caused by the four major
industrial plants - Cenibra, Usiminas, Acesita and Belgo Mineira - as a proxy of the
environmental damage at the Piracicaba Basin. We then use the results to estimate the
economic cost of the damage.
The Environmental Resources Consumption method estimates the environmental
damage by modeling  the consumption  of  environmental  resources  needed for  the
absorption or dispersion of the pollutants and bring the concentration levels back to a
baseline level. For example, it is possible to model the volume of pure air needed to
dilute the atmospheric emissions of a industrial plant and bring it back to a baseline
(for  example,  the  maximum  level  of  concentration  allowed  by  environmental
legislation). The amount of air that was consumed, or used, to reach the maximum
level of concentration is a proxy of the atmospheric damaged caused by the industrial
plant. In the same way, it is possible to model the hydrological environmental damage.
In this in case it is necessary to estimate the volume of water needed to dilute the







Ei – emission of pollutant i, in year/ton;
Pmax.i – maximum level of concentration, in ton/m3;
D – environmental damage, in m3.
90   Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference
The first step was estimating the yearly volumes of water effluents of main pollu-
tants for the four firms using available data. In the case of the Cenibra - Table 3 - we
used data on water effluents published by the company. For the iron-steel plants -
Table 4 – there is no published data on water effluents, which is why we used estima-
ted data produced by RIO PIRACICABA (2003) using the methodology developed
by PAULA et all (1997). 
The  second  step  was  estimating  the  amount  of  water  needed  to  dilute  the
emissions in order to reach the maximum concentrations allowed by legislation using
data from tables 4, 5 and 6. The results are on tables 7 and 8.
Table 9 show the estimated costs of the environmental damage using as water va-
lue the effective water costs on water supply incurred by the studied firms - R$ 2,118
per m3, charged by Copasa, the state owned water supplier at Minas Gerais State2.  
Table 4: Emissions of water pollutants, Cenibra (year/ton)
Pollutant 1999 2000 2001




Phenols 15.70 8.20 7.90
Data source: RELATÓRIO AMBIENTAL CENIBRA, 2001 
Table 5: Emissions of water pollutants, Usiminas, Acesita, Belgo - 2000 (year/ton)
Pollutant Usiminas Belgo Acesita
Total Suspended Solids 39139 4967 8341
Phenols 67 0.05 1
Cyanide 29 6 3
Ammonium 167 3 4
Fluoride 21 15 6
Heavy oils 1549 205 781
Data source: RIO PIRACICABA (2003)
Table 6: Maximum concentration allowed by environmental legislation
Pollutants Maximum concentration allowed by environ-
mental legislation (mg/l)






Data source: PAULA et all (1997).
Table 7: Water resources needed to dilute Cenibra emissions (hundreds m3/year)
Pollutant 1999 2000 2001
Total Suspended Solids 49620 38180 25090
Chlorinated halogenated organics (AOX) 13580 9160 8560
Phenols 7850 41000 39500
Total water consumption  141700 88340 73150
Data source: table 4
2 R$ is the Brazilian Currency (Reais). In November 2003 the exchange rate was R$ 2,9 for 1
US Dollar.
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Table 8: Water resources needed to dilute Usiminas, Acesita, Belgo emissions
(hundreds m3/year), 2000
Pollutant Usiminas Belgo Acesita
Total Suspended Solids 652300 82800 139000
Phenols 335000 250 5000
Cyanide 145000 30000 15000
Ammonium 33400 600 800
Fluorides 2100 1500 600
Heavy oils 77400 10200 39000
Total 1245200 125350 199400
Data source: table 5
Table 9: Economic Cost of Environmental Damage, 2000
Water resources needed to dilute
emissions (million m3/year)






Data source: tables 6, 7 and 8.
The economic cost of environmental damage of the studied firms is very high.
Taking Cenibra, the firm with the lowest cost, as an example, the cost of environ-
mental damage on water media is very close to the average net profits of the company
in the past three years (R$ 229 million in 2000, R$ 92 million in 2001 and R$ 120
million in 2002)3. Taking Usiminas, the firm with the highest cost, as an example, the
cost  of  environmental  damage is  close  to the company average revenue (R$ 2395
million in 2000, R$ 2942 million in 2001)4. These results indicate a clearly unsustaina-
ble pattern and a need for industrial transformation. 
Table 10 show data on water intakes, water consumption and water efficiency for
the three iron-steel plants. We used two different measures for water efficiency: water
efficiency 1 is measured as ton of iron-steel produced per unit of water intakes, while
water  efficiency  2  is  measured  as  ton  of  iron-steel  produced  per  unit  of  water
consumed. 














Belgo 326169 326126 100000 3.26 3.26
Usiminas 5140800 1079568 340000 15.12 3.18
Acesita 1080000 356400 70830 15.24 5.03
Data source: RAVISK (2002). 
The pattern observed for water intakes and water consumption is similar to the
one observed for environmental damage. Usiminas is much more intensive on water
consumption and water intakes then the other two. The difference here is that for
water intakes Acesita is much more intensive than Belgo, while they perform more
similarly for water consumption and environmental damage.
3 Data available at www.cenibra.com.br
4 Data available at www.usiminas.com.br
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It is interesting to stress the fact that Belgo uses 100% of the water they take in
from the Piracicaba river, recycling and making it return to the production process,
while Usiminas and Acesita use respectively 21% and 33% of the water they take in,
releasing  most  of  it  back  to  the  river  (RAVISK,  2002).  The  water  Usiminas  and
Acesita give back to the river, used for cooling purposes during the production pro-
cess, has a higher temperature then the river, causing disturbances to the river's envi-
ronmental health and losses on aquatic biodiversity (PAULA et all, 1997). 
The fact described above has a great impact on water efficiency and we can clearly
see two different patterns. Water efficiency 2 (consumption) shows a pattern where
Belgo  shines  compared  to  Usiminas  and  Acesita,  being  much  more  efficient.  A
different pattern can be observed for Water efficiency 1 (intakes), where Usiminas is
the most  efficient,  performing  very close  to Belgo,  and Acesita  has a poorer  per-
formance. 
Within the iron-steel plants, Belgo presents the lowest stress levels according to all
indicators, as shown in table 11.  
Table 11: Industrial stress 
Cenibra Usiminas Belgo Acesita
Environmental damage (water, thou-
sands of m3)
73.150 1.245.200 125.300 199.400
Water consumption  (thousands m3) - 1080 326 356
Water efficiency 1 [intakes]
(m3/tons)
- 3.18 3.26 5.03
Water efficiency 2 [consumption]
(m3/tons)
- 15.12 3.26 15.24
Cost of environmental damage (R$
thousands/year)
154.930 2.637.330 265.390 422.330
Environmental Stress Index (host
municipality)
0,49 0,66 0,65 0,67
5. Drivers of environmental change
As a conclusion, we statistically investigated three major drivers to environmental
change in the investigated area: industrial stress, economic performance and local en-
vironmental governance. 
The relationship between sustainability and economic performance lies at the heart
of major political debates and are of key importance to the environmental decision-
making process.  On the one hand,  economic performance is a source of environ-
mental stress and there are significant trade-offs between environmental performance
and economic  performance.  On the  other  hand,  sustainability,  at  least  at  national
level,  seems  to  benefit  from  improvements  in  economic  development.  Industrial
stress is seen as a major barrier to achieving sustainability. Governance, at least at na-
tional level, is pointed out as a major driver of sustainability, since strong and demo-
cratic institutions are seen as necessary conditions to move towards sustainable paths.
(Environmental, 2002; Esty and Porter, 2002; Dasgupta et all, 1995).
These three can also be considered important drivers of industrial transformation.
The existence of a high industrial stress is itself the main reason for industrial trans-
formation5. A positive and growing economic performance is seen as a condition for
industrial  transformation as it  means that economic resources  will  be available for
5 Industrial transformation is defined as a change in the system of economic activities that is
able  to  break  the  links  between  economic  activities  and  environmental  burden  (Jacob,
2003). We also consider it to be the transformations needed to invert the existing trade-offs
between industrial growth and environmental sustainability and allow the two to coexist.
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technological  changes  and  environmental  protection.  Good  governance  has  been
stressed by the literature as one of the main conditions to achieve industrial trans-
formation.    
In order to explore empirically the relationships between local sustainability, local
governance, industrial stress and economic performance for the investigated area, we
statistically tested the correlations between them through linear regression and biva-
riate correlation. We use selected variables in the index set in section 3 and the mea-
sures  of  industrial  stress  in  section  4  to  quantify  the  drivers  and  the  degree  of
sustainability. 
We took the inverse of  the Environmental  Stress  Index calculated on part  3 -
henceforth called Environmental Quality - as a proxy for local sustainability. The in-
verse of the “industrial stress indicator” calculated on part 3 - henceforth called Re-
ducing Industrial Stress - was taken as a proxy for industrial stress. We took average
household income and municipal gross product as proxies for economic performan-
ce. We took the Local Governance Index and the environmental governance indicator
calculated in part 3 as proxies of local environmental governance. 
The results show significant positive correlations, except for the case of municipal
gross product and reducing industrial stress. 
Table 12: Correlations
Variables Bivariate correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Municipal Gross Product (1) 1.00 0.648 0.671 0.445 -0.463 -0.332
Average household income
(2)
0.648 1.00 0.841 0.704 -0.575 -0.538
Local governance (3) 0.671 0.841 1.00 0.843 -0.625 -0.502
Environmental governance
(4)
0.445 0.704 0.843 1.00 -0.543 -0.503
Environmental quality (5) -0.463 -0.575 -0.625 -0.543 1.00 0.809
Reducing Industrial Stress (6) -0.332 -0.538 -0.502 -0.503 0.809 1.00
Note: correlations between 0.4 - 0.5 are significant at 0.01 level; correlations higher 0.5 are significant at 0.05
level.
Clearly, economic performance can be considered a significant positive driver of
local governance, suggesting a strong relationship between economic power and poli-
tical power and institutional strength. 
Economic  performance  can  also  be  considered  a significant  negative  driver  of
sustainability, mainly when we took the relative wealth variable - average household
income  as  the  economic  performance  measurement,  showing  once  again  the  un-
sustainable development pattern at Piracicaba Basin being characterized by a strong
trade-off between economic performance and environmental quality. 
The evidence of a significant negative correlation between local governance and
sustainability is quite surprising, but it can be statistically understood if we consider
the strong correlation between governance and economic performance. There are two
possible reasons for this negative correlation. The first one is that, as governance is a
driver of sustainability in the long term, the correlation currently observed is due to a
temporal gap and would possibly change in the future. The second one is that even
when the local authorities  succeed on improving governance tools,  the power that
comes from that is used rather to foster economic performance than to support the
improvement of environmental quality.  
The regression lines on figures 5 and 6 provide an interesting perspective on how
each locality performs. At figure 5, the regression line shows a political and institutio-
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nal strength above and a political and institutional weakness bellow. At figure 6, the
regression line shows more sustainable path above and a less sustainable path bellow. 
Nevertheless,  the  wide  variations  in  environmental  quality  among  localities  at
similar levels of relative wealth and the absence of a continuous relationship over the
entire range of  income show that  the relationship between economic development
and sustainability, although existent, is neither obvious nor definite.
Figure 5: Relation between Local Governance and Average household income
Figure 6: Relation between Environmental Quality and Average household income
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Innovation Systems and Policy-Making Processes 
for the Transition to Sustainability
Tim Foxon, Zen Makuch, Macarena Mata and Peter Pearson
Environmental Policy and Management Group, Dept. of Environmental Science and Technology, Imperial
College London, U.K
1. Introduction
The interactions  between ‘technological systems’  and ‘institutional  systems’  and
the innovation processes occurring within them are a key factor in transitions to more
sustainable socio-natural systems. Such transitions will be greatly influenced by how
policies and regulatory frameworks (within the policy-making process) affect innova-
tion in these systems, and, in turn, how innovation processes affect policy and gov-
ernance frameworks. This chapter describes initial results from a research project be-
ing undertaken by the authors, under the UK ESRC Sustainable Technologies Pro-
gramme, which is investigating the interaction between the policy-making process and
the innovation process. The project is undertaking theoretical and empirical analyses
of the interactions between policy-making processes and innovation systems in two
case study areas - low carbon innovation in the UK and alternative technologies for energy sources
in vehicles at the EU policy level. From these analyses, together with experience of direct
involvement  in  producing  policy  advice  for  these  two  areas,  a  set  of  process
guidelines will be developed for improving sustainable innovation policy processes,
contributing  to  the  design  of  a  better  mix  of  policy  instruments  for  promoting
innovation towards sustainability. 
Section 2 of the chapter develops a framework for analysing interactions between
innovation systems and policy-making processes, based on the interactions between
technological systems and institutional systems. Section 3 reviews recent theoretical
and empirical work describing innovation as a systemic, dynamic, non-linear process.
Section 4 describes recent work which points to an improved rationale for sustainable
innovation policy, based on ideas from innovation systems theory. Section 5 describes
initial  findings from the two project case studies,  drawing out the implications for
sustainable  innovation  policy  processes.  Section  6  concludes  by  presenting  some
emerging hypotheses, which draw on the previous theoretical and empirical work, for
improving policy-making processes for promoting sustainable innovation.
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2. A Framework for Analysing Interaction Between Innovation Systems and
Policy-Making Processes
Until very recently, in the UK and many other countries, innovation policy and
sustainability policy have been pursued separately. This is now changing as a result of
greater understanding of innovation processes and recognition of their  importance
for sustainability. Recent theoretical and empirical advances paint a richer picture of
innovation as a systemic, dynamic, non-linear process, involving a diverse range of
actors,  giving  rise  to  both  positive  and  negative  feedback  (see  e.g.  Kemp,  1997;
Grubler, 1998; Hemmelskamp et al., 2000; and Foxon, 2003 for a review). The new
picture emphasises the roles of knowledge flows between actors; expectations about
future technology, market and policy developments; political and regulatory risk; and
the institutional structures that affect incentives and barriers. A similarly complex pic-
ture exists of the paradigms, principles and frameworks underlying the policy-making
process (see Majone, 1989; Kingdon, 1995; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998; John,
1998).
We are developing a framework for analysing the interaction between innovation
systems and policy-making processes. This framework draws on previous work in-
vestigating the relation between environmental policy and innovation (Kemp  et  al.,
2000;  Ashford,  2000;  Janicke  et  al.,  2000),  but  develops  a  more  explicitly  systems
based approach. There are two elements to the framework. The first element (see Figure
1) shows the broad overview of the transition from the current socio-natural system
to a more sustainable one. The socio-natural system is composed of a number of in-
teracting sub-systems. This study focuses on two of these subsystems -‘technological
systems’ and ‘institutional systems’ - and their interactions. 
The  second element (see Figure 2) provides the methodological framework for the
project. It illustrates two key interacting subsystems of institutional and technological
systems, which may be involved in the transition of these systems towards greater
sustainability. These are the ‘policy-making process’, within institutional systems, and
‘sustainable  innovation  systems’,  within  technological  systems.  The  policy-making
process may create opportunities for the innovation of technologies towards sustain-
ability, by influencing the rate and direction of innovation. The sustainable innovation
system may provide potential scope for improved policy targets and measures. For
example, stringent targets for technology performance to meet certain social or envir-
onmental standards may be set if it is believed that the innovation system can deliver
technologies meeting those targets. 
This dynamic interaction between policy-making processes and sustainable innova-
tion systems gives rise, at any point, to a particular mix of policy instruments for pro-
moting sustainable innovation. As these instruments are implemented and experience
of their effectiveness gathered and assessed, this feeds back – more or less effectively
- into the further development of these processes and systems.
There are two parallel aspects to the analysis using this framework:
• The theoretical analysis of each process and the interactions between them.
• The empirical analysis of the two case studies - low carbon technologies, focussing on
UK innovation systems and policy processes, and alternative energy sources in vehicles,
focussing  on  policy-making  and  implementation  processes,  institutions  and
innovation at the EU level.
The case study analysis is drawing on stakeholder experience, through workshops
and interviews. A report on the first stakeholder workshop, held in January 2003, is
available on the Sustainable Technologies Programme web site (Foxon  et al., 2003);
the second workshop on ‘Improving policy-making for sustainable innovation: Learn-
ing from experience’ was held in October 2003, with stakeholders from the business,
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policy-making,  NGO  and  academic  communities.  A  third  workshop,  which  will
explore a set of guidelines for developing better policy mixes, was held in June 2004.
Figure 1: Overview of the transition towards a sustainable socio-natural system
Current socio-natural system
Institutional sub-systems Technological sub-systems
Other sub-systems: cultural settings, 





Other sub-systems: cultural settings, 
human and natural resources
Socio-natural system for sustainability
TRANSITION PROCESS
Figure  2:  Interaction  of  the  policy-making  process  and  the  sustainable  innovation  system  within  the
institutional and technological systems
Institutional system
Policy-making process: development 












Development stages, actors, 
networks, drivers, barriers
Mix of policy instruments for 
sustainable innovation
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3. Understanding Innovation Processes
From the theoretical and empirical analysis undertaken so far in the project, we
draw out a broad message that policy making, in the UK and at the EU level, has
failed to take into account fully the complexity and dynamic nature of innovation pro-
cesses.  A range of recent work has enhanced our understanding of the richness of
the  innovation  process,  in  relation  to  tackling  environmental  problems  (see  e.g.
Kemp, 1997; Grubler,  1998; Hemmelskamp  et al., 2000; and Foxon, 2003 for a re-
view), but, as described in Section 4, this understanding is not yet widely reflected in
the rationale for or design of policy instruments.
The Innovation Chain
Rather  than  being  categorised  as  a  one-way,  linear  flow  from  R&D  to  new
products, innovation is now seen as a process of matching technical possibilities to
market opportunities, involving multiple interactions and types of learning (Freeman
and Soete, 1997). There are a number of clearly identifiable stages (shown in Figure 3)
in the development of new technology: R&D, demonstration, pre-commercial (large
scale  demonstration),  supported  commercial  (under  generic  support  schemes)  and
commercial (Carbon Trust, 2002; Foxon et al., 2004). However, knowledge flows in
both directions,  for  example,  as  information  from early  market  applications  feeds
back into further product research. This means that the conventional drivers of techno-
logy push, from R&D, and market pull, from customer demand, can be reinforced or in-
hibited by  feedbacks between different stages and by the influence of  framework condi-
tions,  such as government  policy and availability of risk capital.  Thus,  the dynamic
nature  of  the innovation  process  is  emphasised,  with feedbacks  between different
stages, which can either amplify or inhibit the basic technology push and market pull
drivers.
The ‘Chain Linked’ Model
An early attempt to represent the systems feedbacks within the innovation process
was made by Kline and Rosenberg (1986) in their ‘chain linked’ model. This was used
as the conceptual framework in an influential report by the OECD (1992) on ‘Tech-
Figure 3: Stages of the innovation chain (Source: adapted from Carbon Trust (2002)
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nology and the Economy: The Key Relationships’.  This model represents the feed-
back loops between: (i) research; (ii) the existing body of scientific and technological
knowledge; (iii) the potential market; (iv) invention; and (v) the various steps in the
production process. The model is shown in Figure 4.
Figure  4:  An interactive  model  of  the  innovation  process:  The  chain-linked  model
(Source: Kline and Rosenberg (1986))
Figure 4 combines two different types of interaction. The first (in the lower part of
the model) relates to the processes occurring within a given firm (or a network of
firms acting together). The second expresses some of the relationships between the
individual firm and the wider science and technology system within which it operates. 
At the level of the firm, the innovation chain is represented as a process that starts
from the  recognition  of  a  potential  market  opportunity  together  with  a  potential
design for a new product or process to meet that opportunity. Building on existing
scientific or technological knowledge and, where necessary, research to add to that
knowledge, an ‘analytic design’ is produced. This leads to development, production
and marketing, but there are feedbacks between each stage and, crucially, feedbacks
between the product users and the design and production phases. A key feature is the
uncertainty  and  unpredictable  nature  of  both  technological  capabilities  and  user
needs.
National Innovation Systems
To apply this type of model, researchers initially focussed on individual and com-
parative analyses of the innovation systems in different countries, across a range of
technologies,  as it  was argued that key institutional  drivers  would be found at the
national level.
The concept  of  a ‘national  system of innovation’  was first  developed by Chris
Freeman, working at SPRU, in a pioneering study of the then successful Japanese eco-
nomy in the late 1980s. Freeman (1988) defined a national system of innovation as
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teractions initiate, import,  modify and diffuse new technologies.” Freeman stressed
the positive role of government, working closely with industry and the science base,
to create a  vision and provide  long-term support for the development and marketing of
the most advanced technologies; the integrated approach to R&D, design, procurement,
production and marketing within large firms; and the high level of general  education
and scientific culture, combined with thorough practical training and frequent up-dat-
ing in industry. 
Two major studies in the early 1990s by Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993) ana-
lysed national innovation systems in more detail. Lundvall (1992) defined a national
system of innovation as constituted by “the elements and relationships which interact
in the production, diffusion and use of new, and economically useful, knowledge …
either located within or rooted inside the borders of a nation state.” He stressed the
role of interactions between users and producers, facilitating a flow of information and
knowledge linking technological capabilities to user needs. Because of the fundament-
al  uncertainty of innovation,  these interactions  go beyond pure market mechanisms,
and rely on mutual trust and mutually respected codes of behaviour. 
Nelson and collaborators (1993) conducted a major empirical study and comparis-
on of the national innovation systems of 15 countries. They concluded that “to a con-
siderable extent, differences in innovation systems reflect differences in economic and
political circumstances and priorities between countries.” Again, these differences re-
flected the differences in the institutional sub-systems between different countries, in-
cluding systems of university research and training and industrial R&D, financial insti-
tutions,  management  skills,  public  infrastructure  and national  monetary,  fiscal  and
trade policies.
The concept of national innovation systems has been taken forward and used ex-
tensively by the OECD (2002), following these early studies. The innovation process
is seen as characterised by the different actors and institutions (small and large firms,
users, governmental and regulatory bodies, universities, and research bodies), the in-
teractions and flows of knowledge, funding and influence between them, and the in-
centives for innovation created by the institutional set-up. 
Based  on  a  review of  innovation  systems  approaches,  Johnson  and  Jacobsson
(2001) identified a set of basic functions that need to be served in a technological in-
novation system, if a new industry surrounding that technology is to develop success-
fully. The five basic functions to be served in a technological system are identified as:
• To create and diffuse ‘new’ knowledge;
• To guide the direction of the search process among users and suppliers of technology, i.e.
influence the direction in which actors deploy their resources (including providing
recognition of growth potential, expectations of development, and choice of spe-
cific design configurations);
• To supply resources, including capital, competencies and other resources;
• To create positive external economies through the exchange of information, knowledge
and vision;
• To facilitate the formation of markets.
Applying this approach to renewable energy technologies, Johnson and Jacobsson
(2001) identify a number of mechanisms that induce or block the development of ef-
fective functions for particular technology systems. Inducement mechanisms may include
government policy (e.g. R&D funding, investment subsidies, tax incentives), ease of
firm entry, and feedback from market formation, and blocking mechanisms may include
uncertainty, lack of support, poor connectivity of networks, opposing behaviour of
established firms, and disincentives created by other government policies.
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4. Rationale for Sustainable Innovation Policy
In this section, we argue that the above picture of innovation as a dynamic, sys-
temic process has considerable implications for policy making that aims to promote
more sustainable innovation.
The traditional economic argument for policy measures relating to sustainable in-
novation has been based on correcting for two principal market failures:
a) Firstly, because knowledge can easily be copied once it has been created, innovat-
ors cannot appropriate the full benefits of their investment in the creation of that
knowledge, i.e. social returns to innovation exceed private returns, giving rise to a
disincentive for private firms to undertake socially efficient levels of innovation
(Arrow, 1962). This positive externality is the underlying rationale for public sup-
port for research and development (R&D) and for measures such as patent sys-
tems. 
b) Secondly, the existence of negative externalities,  for example, unpriced environ-
mental impacts. This provides the rationale for economic instruments to internal-
ise those externalities, such as environmental taxes or emissions trading schemes.
These arguments and measures remain valid, but we argue that they are insuffi-
cient, because they are explicitly or implicitly based on a conceptual framework with
an inadequate representation of the innovation process. This sees innovation as a uni-
directional process, with more R&D at one end naturally leading to more commercial-
isation of new products at the other end, with information about technical possibilit-
ies and user needs being easily available. Thus, these two types of intervention focus
on the two ends of the innovation chain, shown in Figure 3, correcting for perceived
market failures at the R&D and commercialisation stages, but neglecting the complex-
ity of the innovation process, including the motivations of actors involved in the pro-
cess.
Applying the concept of innovation systems, a number of authors have argued for
the need to move to a notion of ‘systems failure’ as a rationale for policy interven-
tions.  For  example,  Edquist  (1994,  2001)  argues  that,  because of  the evolutionary
characteristics of innovation processes, a simple notion of ‘market failure’ as a com-
parison between conditions in the real world and an ideal or optimal system is no
longer valid. Instead, he advocates concrete empirical and comparative analyses, using
innovation  systems  concepts,  to  identify  systems failures  that  can be rectified.  He
identifies two conditions that must be fulfilled for public intervention to be justified
in a market economy:
1) a problem must exist, i.e. a situation in which market mechanisms and firms fail to
achieve socially-defined objectives;
2) the state and its agencies must also have the ability to solve or mitigate the prob-
lem (i.e. the issue of potential government and bureaucratic failure must be ad-
dressed).
Smith (1991) and Metcalfe (2002) also stress that policy making should take an ad-
aptive approach, and look for design and formulation of institutional arrangements
that  promote  business  experiments  and generate  a  greater  connectedness  between
organisations  generating  knowledge,  e.g.  universities,  and  those  applying  such
knowledge, e.g. firms.
Previous work by the authors and collaborators (Anderson et al., 2001; Gross and
Foxon, 2003) has set out the case for appropriate levels of  direct policy support for
innovation to achieve environmental ends, including market development policies and
financial incentives, as well as support for R&D.  The case is based on four interre-
lated arguments: The problem of time lags; Risks and uncertainties of costs and benefits; Value of
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creating options; Positive externalities of innovation. For example, in the energy sector in ad-
dition to measures such as emissions taxes and pollution abatement regulation, the
case is made for supporting innovation directly, so that environmental problems can
be solved sooner, realising economic benefits given by option values and positive ex-
ternalities. 
These ideas can be used to inform debates about appropriate levels and mechan-
isms for policy support for more sustainable innovation, including conditions under
which technologies should no longer receive support, i.e. ‘exit strategies’. However,
they do not provide simple formulas, and need to be supplemented by empirical data,
and judgements about social acceptability of different technology and policy options,
in order to be put into practice.
5. Some Lessons from the Case Studies
This section describes initial findings from the two case studies for our research
project on ‘Policy drivers and barriers for sustainable innovation’.
(1) Low Carbon Innovation in the UK
The first case study is analysing the innovation of low carbon technologies in the
UK, focussing on renewable energy technologies. A complex mix of policies has aris-
en in recent years to support the development of renewable technologies, principally
for electricity generation. A target of 10% of electricity to be generated from renew-
ables by 2010 was put in place in 2001, together with a specific policy instrument de-
signed to achieve this – the Renewables Obligation (DTI, 2003). This is an obligation
on electricity suppliers to supply an annually increasing proportion of electricity gen-
erated from renewable sources, reaching 10% by 2010. This has a number of interest-
ing features: 
• It is a long-term measure: remaining in place, at a minimum 10% level, until 2026;
• It  has  an  additional  economic  incentive:  Renewables  Obligation  Certificates
(ROCs) are tradable, as a means of satisfying the obligation;
• There is a ‘buy-out price’: instead of achieving their targets, suppliers can choose
to  pay  the  buy-out  price of  3  p/kWh,  with  the  funds  being recycled to other
suppliers who have met their obligation.
Other relevant measures include a short-term programme of capital grants for off-
shore wind, biomass energy crops and solar PV; support for renewables R&D; ex-
emption of  renewable  electricity  and good quality  CHP from the Climate Change
Levy (business energy tax); and a strategic framework for support of offshore wind,
including licencing arrangements.
However, concerns have been expressed that current and foreseeable levels of in-
vestment will not be sufficient to reach the 10% target by 2010. In particular, many in
the  renewables  industry  argue  that,  in  order  to  secure  long-term power  purchase
agreements  with  electricity  suppliers  at  rates  justifying  investment,  a  renewable
generation target of 20% by 2020 is needed (Renewable Energy Report, 2003). This is
despite the recent Energy White Paper (DTI, 2003), which set an ‘aspiration’ of  re-
newable generation of 20% by 2020, together with a long-term goal of reducing the
UK’s CO2 emissions by 60% by 2050. Such political aspirations are not regarded as
sufficiently  ‘bankable’  by  the  investment  community  (Grubb,  2003).  In  partial  re-
sponse to these concerns, the UK government announced, in December 2003, that
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the level of the Obligation would be further increased in annual steps beyond 2010 to
a level of 15% by 2015.
The case study is also drawing on work by the authors and colleagues for the UK
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (ICEPT/E4tech, 2003; Foxon et al., 2004),
which analysed current UK innovation systems for  six  new and renewable energy
technologies. This work combined expert knowledge and interviews with stakeholders
who are active in these innovation systems. The study identified systems failures in
moving technologies along the innovation chain at two key stages, and made recom-
mendations for overcoming these failures: 
a. Moving from demonstration to pre-commercialisation: There are obstacles to companies
seeking to move from the first one or two demonstration projects to more substantial
(though  still  small  scale)  levels  of  deployment.  The  incentives  offered  by  generic
measures, such as the Renewables Obligation, cannot attract investment into techno-
logies that are in their early stages of development, and so are high risk, high cost and
confined to small niches. These problems may be addressed as follows:
• Policy incentives to create early niche markets are needed, for example, through
dedicated capital grants or a ‘feed-in’ price premium. Costs per unit may be high,
but the total numbers installed and total costs, are small.
• Encouragement is needed for the involvement of larger players with the finance
and skills base to fund and support larger scale installations. 
• Technologies  which  fail  to  make  it  over  this  gap  in  a  reasonable  time  period
should no longer attract R&D support.
b. Moving from pre-commercial to supported commercial: Several types of risk are hindering
the large-scale deployment of  pre-commercial  technologies  (such as  offshore  wind
and biomass).  Other energy policy measures associated with liberalization are often
focussed on maximising short-run (price) competition. In the electricity generation in-
dustry, the resulting fierce market competition has led to price falls, very low profit
margins  for  some producers,  and increased  risk  for  long-term investment.  At  the
same time, the rewards, in terms of potential markets, may not be large enough to in-
centivise long-term investment, particularly where the future market relies on regulat-
ory measures to internalise externalities, which are seen as subject to political risk, as
policy priorities or governments change:
• The potential for policy incentives to improve risk/reward ratios should be invest-
igated. This may mean additional funds, e.g. larger capital grants. However, there is
scope for regulation to provide for much larger potential long term rewards, such
that the private sector is prepared to bear a more early stage risk.
Expectations of the continuity or durability of policy frameworks are exceedingly
important. In order to attract sustained investment, rewards from the full range of in-
struments must be seen to be stable over a sufficiently long timeframe. Innovation
succeeds through the ‘perseverance’ of innovators, and perseverance is also required
in policy. It is important that a shared vision for the future of each area of technology
between government, industry and the research community is developed.
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Within a strategic approach, key priorities should be to ensure:
• Perseverance  of  policy  frameworks  –  policy  measures  to  support  innovation
should be stable over the long-term and be insulated from short  term political
changes.
• Regulatory consistency and synergy – measures should add to the functioning of
innovation support as a strategic whole, by augmenting and not disrupting existing
measures. 
• Continuity of policy measures – measures should ‘join up’ across the stages of the
innovation  chain,  so  that  a  successfully  performing  technology  can  progress
smoothly  towards  commercialisation  in  self-sustaining  markets,  which  exist
without policy support.
However, it is recognised that there will always be a tension between the creation
of stable policy frameworks and the need for policy learning, which arises as experi-
ence is gained in the implementation of policies, and the potential is created for new
ways of achieving policy ends by the development of novel techniques and technolo-
gies. 
These issues are being further investigated in the case study, including analysis of
the policy-making processes which gave rise to the current mix of instruments to pro-
mote renewables innovation in the UK.
(2) EU Directives Relating to Alternative Energy Sources in Vehicles
The second case study examines at the EU-level the role of policy-making pro-
cesses, policy frameworks (e.g. integrated product policy), and policy assessment pro-
cedures (e.g. extended impact assessment, comitology, regulatory impact assessment) in promoting
or  inhibiting  innovation  of  more  sustainable  technologies  and  techniques.  The
particular focus is on alternative energy sources for vehicles, and the main regulatory
instruments  considered  are  the  Batteries  Directive  and  the  End-of-Life  Vehicles
(ELV) Directive. 
If sustainable innovation policy is an ultimate goal, then:
• The policy-making process (including policy frameworks and assessment proce-
dures) should have the goal of “sustainable innovation” itself in-built. This is part-
ly achieved by considering the interaction between the policy-making process and
innovation systems, and analysing the different ‘windows of opportunity’ in which
they interact and can influence each other. A main objective of the second case
study is to investigate whether this is indeed the case as regards  European Com-
munity environmental policy-making processes.
• A mix of policy instruments combining legislation (command-and-control), eco-
nomic  instruments  and voluntary  agreements  needs  to  be considered,  within a
more integrated strategic framework. It is submitted that instrument mixes are a
key  means  of  moving  the  sustainable  innovation  agenda  forward,  and  that
European Community institutions are sensing that stakeholder responsibility is an
important way of achieving this.
The Integrated Product Policy (IPP) framework at EU-level is an example of a
more integrated, systemic policy framework, aiming to improve environmental per-
formance at all phases of a product’s life cycle. It seeks to establish principles and
boundaries  within  which  product  policies  would  be  designed  and  implemented.
However, many of the proposals in the Green Paper have been eliminated or made
not  legally-binding  in  the  final  IPP  Communication  adopted  by  the  European
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Commission (EC, 2003). The case study is analysing the causes and consequences of
this,  particularly,  the extent to which the promotion of  sustainable  innovation has
been attenuated, especially in relation to the Batteries and ELV Directives.
The Extended Impact Assessment  (ExIA) methodology is  a new policy assess-
ment procedure, and the Batteries Directive will be the first legislative instrument to
which it will be applied. This is in line with the Commission and the Council’s Better
Regulation Action Plan (EC, 2002).  The case study will  examine the  potential  for
ExIA to advance environmental protection and sustainable innovation, as it seeks to
marry cost-benefit  analysis,  social impacts and environmental  impact assessment in
novel ways.
The systemic nature of the innovation process requires a combination of policy in-
struments that will deal with a range of different aspects, in order to achieve environ-
mental protection targets. There are at least two ways that a mix of instruments aimed
at one policy goal might evolve:
a) Through a conscious decision of DG Environment,  a group of  policy analysts
could deliberately construct a strategy for promoting, for example, new technolo-
gies in alternative energy vehicles, by drawing upon a large number of disparate in-
dividual initiatives, which when taken collectively, all aim at promoting these tech-
nologies.
b) Combining command-and-control instruments, economic instruments and volun-
tary  agreements  within  a  single  legislative  framework.  This  alternative  comes
closest to approximating a mix of instruments at the European Community level
to date.
At present, the Batteries Directive (91/157/EEC) is in the midst of a European
Commission-led consultation process (BDC, 2002). This consultation process is of
particular interest because:
a) It is entirely possible that in part, a combination or mix of instruments will be
agreed for  implementing  the  revised  Directive,  including voluntary  instruments
(e.g. legally-binding new waste stream monitoring techniques and technologies, as
well as collection targets to be implemented by firms), economic instruments (e.g.
a charging system to determine battery company contributions to the scheme) and
more  traditional  command-and-control  measures  (e.g.  to  punish  free  riders  or
non-compliant parties).
b) There are two key principles that the revised Batteries Directive will codify, which
are in direct interest of sustainable innovation: the substitution principle and the produ-
cer responsibility principle.
The choice and balance of instruments will have an effect on sustainable innova-
tion.  For  example,  a  ban on cadmium (being considered  under  the  new revision)
would temporarily end European companies’ electric car production, as nickel-cadmi-
um  (NiCd)  is  the  only  battery  technology  in  European  mass  produced  electric
vehicles. This could have at least two effects on alternative energy vehicle production
compared to other technologically locked-in internal combustion engine and lead-acid
battery production. In the short and medium term, locked-in technology market share
will  not  significantly  fall,  and  electric  vehicle  demand  may  not  be  stimulated.
However, a vacuum in the electric vehicle market may provide a stimulus for emer-
ging technologies,  including other battery technologies  (e.g.,  lithium ion and nickel
metal hydride) and fuel cells, to press ahead more rapidly. 
The substitution principle is arguably the single greatest legally binding mechanism
in the service of sustainable innovation policy as promulgated by the European Com-
munity. If applied in a flexible manner, this principle allows for regulators to effect-
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ively phase out and ban certain locked-in technologies and techniques in the service of
environmental protection provided that such a decision is based on sound science. It
is anticipated that this principle will be applied to battery chemistries with dangerous
substances in favour of emerging technologies. In relation to the key role of stake-
holders, it is noteworthy that the Battery Directive consultations have not, so far, fea-
tured any lobby or stakeholder group that is seen to be acting in the interest of sus-
tainable innovation.
The objective of the End of Life Vehicles Directive (2000/53/EC) is to prevent
waste from vehicles and to foster reuse, recycling and recovery as alternatives to the
disposal of vehicle-based waste, hence removing 8-9 million tones of waste annually.
Though it is not directly articulated, the Directive features the substitution principle,
as it seeks a prohibition on the use of certain substances (lead, mercury, cadmium and
hexavalent chromium) in existing vehicle technologies to the extent that this is per-
mitted by scientific and technical progress. Hence, more environmentally sustainable
technologies and techniques must be invented to allow substitution of these materials
at the car design stage, the so-called “conception phase”.
The  Directive  also  serves  sustainable  innovation  policy  by  suggesting  that  the
design and production of new vehicles must take account of dismantling, reuse, recyc-
ling and recovery of vehicles, their components and parts. This provides the ideal op-
portunity  for  the car industry  to  implement the European  Commission’s  evolving
policy on integrated product policy so that design stage decisions are consistent with
the highest standards of waste management strategy and implementation.
This case study will further analyse and draw out the implications of these findings
for the development of sustainable innovation policy processes.
6. Conclusion: Emerging Hypotheses for Sustainable Innovation Policy
Drawing on the above theoretical and empirical research, and other current work
in this area (Rennings  et al., 2004; Zundel and Satorius, 2004), we now conclude the
chapter  by  outlining  some emerging  hypotheses  relating  to  sustainable  innovation
policy-making. 
(1) Policy-making in this area would be enhanced by taking into account the richness and complexity
of innovation processes.
Policy design and implementation needs to reflect the systemic, dynamic nature of
the innovation process. Consequently, greater understanding of how innovation sys-
tems actually work is needed, relating to: the actors involved and the flows of know-
ledge and influence  between them; the  drivers  and barriers for innovation; and the
ways in which current systems fail to promote movement of more sustainable techno-
logies along the innovation chain. Policies may then be designed to address these ‘sys-
tems failures’, which will include but are not limited to conventional market failures.
(2) Effective policy-making requires a long-term strategic framework. 
The transition to more sustainable socio-natural systems is likely to require signi-
ficant re-orientation of investment away from resource- and pollution- intensive in-
dustries  and technologies  and towards  the  innovation  and diffusion  of  more  sus-
tainable technologies. In order to achieve this re-orientation, technology developers
and investors need clear expectations that markets for technologies with appropriate
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attributes are likely to exist and that policy measures to support the transition will be
stable  over  the  long  term.  This  implies  the  need for  a  long-term strategic  policy
framework, in order to improve coherence of policy measures, ensure continuity and
perseverance of policies over a longer time frame, and improve expectations of stabil-
ity. Such a framework would also need to make clear when support would be with-
drawn from technologies, either because they have failed to make sufficient progress
towards  commercialisation,  or,  preferably,  because  they  can have successfully  pro-
gressed to the stage of being competitive without further public support. 
The Dutch ‘Transition Management’ model (Kemp and Loorbach, 2003) provides
an example  of  such a long-term strategic  framework,  in  which policy-makers  and
stakeholders from industry, NGOs and wider society work together to:
• define a vision for the long-term future of an industry or sector;
• agree strategic goals for the medium term;
• set out transition paths or ‘route maps’ for how these might be achieved;
• agree support for the initial steps or ‘learning experiments’ along these paths.
Such a model  would need to be adapted to fit  the circumstances  of  particular
countries, institutions and industries. 
(3) The details of the design and implementation of policy instruments can have a significant impact
on the resulting pattern of incentives for innovation.
Many current unsustainable technological systems have benefited from long peri-
ods of increasing returns to adoption, for both the technologies, leading to reduced
costs  and  improved  performance,  and  in  the  institutional  structures  of  standards,
rules and laws supporting them. This may result in ‘lock-in’ of these systems, because
of the difficulties of entry faced by potential new competitors. Hence, the standard
policy prescriptions of support for R&D and internalising externalities, though im-
portant, are unlikely to be enough in themselves to promote transitions to more sus-
tainable systems. Specific support for the innovation of more sustainable technologies
in the early stages of their development is likely to be needed. One good, through
controversial, example is the support of renewable energy technologies, in Germany
and other countries, through a ‘feed-in’ law, which guarantees a premium market price
for electricity generated from these sources. In addition, the implementation of meas-
ures to internalise environmental externalities associated with less sustainable techno-
logies may exert critical influences on promoting or inhibiting more sustainable in-
novation. For example, in setting tradable permit schemes to internalise the environ-
mental costs of emissions, the extent to which permits are ‘grandfathered’ to existing
polluters, rather than auctioned, can make a significant difference to the pattern of in-
centives.
(4) There may exist ‘windows of opportunity’ for policy-makers to positively influence the innovation
process.
Policy-making processes are systemic and dynamic, and exhibit ‘path dependency’,
i.e. subsequent policy choices may depend on the historical path of development of
policies and so on previous choices made. One consequence of this is that there may
exist particular and limited ‘windows of opportunity’ for policy-making to influence
innovation  processes  (David,  1987;  Perez  and  Soete,  1988;  Kingdon,  1998;  Nill,
2003), e.g. in the early stages of technology and policy development, or under particu-
larly  favourable  economic  conditions.  In  the  European  Community  context,  the
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determination of the European Parliament’s legislative programme, the determination
of  annual  policy  programme  goals  by  the  European  Commission  and  the  devel-
opment  of  Green Papers  may serve as early windows.   At a later  stage, Directive
drafting consultations and the tabling of initiatives before the European Parliament’s
Environment Committee offer strategic opportunities to influence the promotion of
sustainable innovation.
(5) Effective sustainable innovation policy is likely to feature a coherent and integrated mix of in-
struments, combining a variety of instrument types.
Given the market driven nature of sustainable innovation policy, the integration of
a mix of instruments based in part on their sensitivity to market considerations (i.e.
economic instruments, voluntary agreements, eco-labels, investment strategies, envir-
onmental management systems and innovation network concepts) with sustainable in-
novation policymaking activities seems likely to be appropriate. The variety in this mix
might usefully complement more traditional forms of command and control regula-
tion.  This could be achieved through a series of policy initiatives or through the es-
tablishment of an umbrella (legislative) instrument that features a combined mix of
policy instruments.
(6) At the institutional level, there is a need to achieve greater consistency in policy interventions to-
wards sustainable innovation.
This consistency might be achieved if European Community policy filters and pro-
cedures such as integrated product policy, extended impact assessment, regulatory im-
pact assessment, comitology, co-decision, co-operation were to feature a check on the
development of policy instruments to ensure that they maintain and advance sustain-
able  innovation  as  a  policy  goal.  Until  these  policy  filters  and procedures  are  re-
formed, this may require actions such as the formation of a special Unit charged with
monitoring and addressing policy disfunctions that detract from sustainable innova-
tion. Such a Unit might also seek to promote the integration of sustainable innovation
policy development among the European Commission Directorates General.
(7) There may be a role for stakeholders and ‘enablers’ to advance sustainable innovation throughout
the policy-making and implementation process.
Stakeholder consultation processes and policy development procedures that fea-
ture significant multi-stakeholder dialogue and foster a sense of common ownership
of policies are likely to be appropriate and effective. This kind of approach might as-
sist in correcting the environmental policy problems of locked-in technologies (where
substitution is desirable) and the observable lack of a represented “innovation” con-
stituency  with the  political  capital  to  advance sustainable  innovation  as  a strategic
policy goal.  Furthermore, multi-stakeholder “enablers” could play a key role in foster-
ing policy uptake within the sustainable innovation system through direct interaction
with innovators.
(8) In a dynamic setting, a learning approach to policy-making may help to produce a better mix of
policies that is not predicated on the achievement of an ideal, ‘optimal’ policy choice.
Given the limited ability of policy-makers to gather and process all the relevant in-
formation (‘bounded rationality’),  and the inherent uncertainties of innovation pro-
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cesses, there seems little likelihood of developing ‘optimal’ solutions. In addition, the
path dependency of policy making and the interaction between policies further in-
creases the complexity of the task. This suggests the potential value of moving to a
‘learning approach’ to policy-making, situated within a stable strategic framework, e.g.
by designing periodic “policy self-correction” mechanisms to address circumstances
where  the  unintended  consequences  of  policy  choices  outweigh  their  benefits,  or
novel techniques and technologies enable new ways of achieving policy ends. 
These  hypotheses  will  be subjected to further  investigation  and analysis  in the
course of developing the project case studies and formulating and testing the final
guidelines for improving sustainable innovation policy processes.
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United Kingdom
Introduction
In  recent  years,  the  analytical  lens  in  innovation  and  environment  studies  has
tended  to  pull  back  from  firm-level  processes  of  cleaner  technology  innovation.
Studies have refocused on wider, linked processes that green the systems of social and
technological  practice  by  which  we satisfy  our  needs  for  housing,  mobility,  food,
communications, leisure, and so forth.  These ‘socio-technical regimes’ have become
the focal unit of analysis, and the challenge is to transform them into more sustainable
configurations (Berkhout, 2002).
The new focus on regimes places earlier analytical concerns in a broader context,
recognising that  firms and technologies are embedded within wider social systems.
Some of the reasons cleaner technology is not diffusing rapidly through firms, for
example, relate to the overarching structure of markets, patterns of final consumer
demand,  institutional  and  regulatory  systems  and  inadequate  infrastructures  for
change.  On issues such as these, firms have limited room for unilateral manoeuvre.
However, the new focus is motivated by an additional assumption, that only radical
changes at the regime level can deliver sustainable development (Rotmans and Kemp,
2001).  The new focus seeks to understand and guide ‘systems innovation’ in order to
facilitate not only greener firms, but more sustainable practices from all participants in
any given socio-technical regime.
In transforming  the industrial  sustainability  agenda in this  way,  the governance
challenge becomes more ambitious and more demanding.  We have argued elsewhere
that  approaches  to  sustainable  systems  innovation  have  hitherto  been  somewhat
restricted.  Despite  the breadth of the concept,  there is  a tendency to treat  regime
transformation  as  a  monolithic  process,  independent  of  important  differences  in
context (Berkhout, Smith and Stirling, 2003).   We also argue that existing approaches
tend to be too descriptive and structural, leaving room for greater analysis of agency as
a  means  to  more  informed,  deliberate  and  effective  processes  of  regime
transformation.  In short, if we are to engage both analytically and normatively with
the  complexities  of  governing  sustainable  systems  innovation,  there  is  a  need for
more explicit and detailed conceptual tools.  In this chapter we propose as a heuristic,
a systematic framework for understanding different transition contexts and associated
governance implications.  Our specific objectives are threefold:
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1. To encourage greater attention to agency in our understandings of transitions in
socio-technical regimes.
2. To distinguish more clearly between different elements in the context for regime
transition: the articulation of selection pressures, and the adaptive capacity available to
facilitate regime transformation.
3. Recognition  of  these  different  contextual  elements  is  likely  to  affect  both
descriptive understandings and normative recommendations.  We aim to explore
some  of  the  resulting  practical  implications  for  the  governance  of  sustainable
technology strategies.
With  this  particular  interest  in  governance,  we  address  the  crucial  question  of
agency  by  introducing  the  notion  of  regime  membership.  This  recognises  that
technological regimes are not unitary entities, but involve the active co-ordination of
lower  order  agency  on  the  part  of  institutions,  networks  and  actors  as  regime
‘members’ in their own right (see also Jacobsson and Johnson, 2001). This given, our
model of regime transformation is then a function of three factors. First, the degree
to  which  the  selection  pressures  bearing  upon  a  regime  are  articulated  towards  a
particular direction of transformation on the part of regime members. We argue that
without this articulation of selection pressures the conditions for systems innovation
do not exist. Second, the degree to which the resources required for effective regime
transformation  (factor  endowments,  capabilities,  positioning)  are  available  either
within or beyond the members of the incumbent regime. Third, the degree to which
the  response  to these  pressures  is  co-ordinated  in  a  coherent  fashion  across  regime
members. It is these latter two elements (the ability to co-ordinate responses and the
availability of resources), that we identify as the ‘adaptive capacity’ available for regime
transition (Berkhout, Smith and Stirling, 2003).  In the end, the particular form and
direction of regime transformation – and the associated modes of governance– will
depend on the ‘transition context’: a function of the availability of resources and how
they are coordinated.
The analytical framework presented here is preliminary, speculative and heuristic.
The chapter  is  organised  around each of  the  objectives  above.   The next  section
discusses  the  regime concept  at  greater  length and,  in particular,  the networks  of
actors,  institutions and processes by which regimes are reproduced.   After  this  we
discuss  the  origins  of  change  for  socio-technical  regimes.   We  suggest  that
transformation processes can be organised according to whether they contribute to
the articulation of selection pressures (exerting a demand for change), or whether they
contribute to the availability of adaptive capacity (resourcing a co-ordinated response
to  selection  pressures).   Governance  of  regime transitions  involves  modifying  the
balance  of  selection  pressures  and  adaptive  capacities.   It  follows  from  this  that
different  patterns  of  transformation can take place, depending upon the prevailing
transition  context.   We introduce  a  simple  typology  to  help  map  such  transition
contexts and guide the analysis of governance for regime transition.
Mapping Socio-Technical Regimes – an Agency-Based Approach
Socio-technical  regimes  are  relatively  stable  configurations  of  institutions,
techniques and artefacts – as well as rules, practices and networks – that determine
the ‘normal’ development and use of technology in order to fulfil socially-determined
functions.  Regimes thus embody strongly held convictions and interests concerning
particular  technological  practices  and  the  best  ways  in  which  these  might  be
improved.  Modern agriculture, for example, has evolved along a trajectory in which
increased factor productivity has been the goal, measured in terms similar to industrial
productivity.  This regime has consequently focused on mechanisation, specialisation
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and  increased  inputs  of  energy  and  chemicals  that  have  boosted  massively  the
agricultural  output  per  unit  of  labour.   In  the  meantime,  an  alternative
conceptualisation  of  agricultural  goals  has  struggled  to  gain  limited  acceptance.
Organic farming was originally pushed by a small group of dissenting voices around
the  same time that  the principles  of  modern agriculture  were  being embedded in
government policy in the industrialised world in the 1930s and 1940s (Conford, 2001).
Organic farming focuses on output per unit land area, usually favouring mixed farms,
and is concerned with nurturing soil fertility through the relatively closed cycling of
materials.  It is only now beginning to reach the status of a substantial niche socio-
technical activity (in the sense that there is a robust network of actors and institutions
supporting the organic approach to agriculture).
But  this  sketch points  up some of  the  problems  with employing a concept  as
broad as the technological regime.  It begs a number of questions: Where do we draw
the boundaries of the regime?  What constitutes the membership of a regime?  In
what sense can regimes be seen as competing? Is the source of selection pressures on
regimes other competing regimes, or do they stem from broader societal factors? In
this section we take as a starting point the behaviour of agents that constitute regimes.
Socio-technical regimes and their empirical application
In the established literature, the term ‘regime’ is used as a short-hand for a series
of complex, nested real world phenomena, embodying natural and artificial physical
elements, as well as social, economic, cultural and cognitive attributes.  Regimes exist
across  different  empirical  scales,  and  can  be  seen  as  constituting  the  social  and
economic functions which they serve.1  At a relatively high level of aggregation, the
electricity generating regime is widely dominated by social rules and practices relating
to  centralised,  large  scale  (usually  thermal)  power  technology  and  high  voltage
alternating  current  grid  infrastructures.   Consumption  patterns  and  supportive
institutional  arrangements  are  built  around  and  reinforce  this  pattern  of  energy
utilisation.  This has been the ‘normal’ way of producing electricity in industrialised
countries for at least eight decades.  However, at the lower level of aggregation of
individual power technologies,  the electricity generating regime as a whole spans a
variety  of  nested subordinate  regimes,  such as  that  based on the  coal-fired  steam
turbine, the nuclear fuel cycle, large scale hydroelectricity or gas-fired combined cycle
turbine systems. At this level, even within the emerging niche for renewable generated
electricity, we may identify an incipient regime dominated by 3-bladed, horizontal axis
megawatt-scale  wind  turbine  operating  in  grid  connected  clusters  and  supported
through public policy.  This has become the normal way of generating power from
the wind, and a network of actor practices has developed around this dominant mode
of wind energy utilisation.2  However, recent developments to promote distributed
solar  energy  utilisation  through  PV  installations  integrated  into  the  structure  of
buildings is another example of a new and quite distinct pattern, nested within the
wider incipient renewable regime, itself a relatively small part of  the encompassing
electricity regime as a whole. Conversely, the electricity regime itself may be seen as
nested within a global energy regime organised primarily around the extraction, global
transport and thermal combustion of fossil fuels. 
1 New technologies often precede the definition of the functions they will serve. To give a
contemporary  example,  the  function  of  mobile  digital  photography  is  currently  being
defined.
2 This is in contrast to the vertical axis designs favoured by some governments at the early
stages of modern wind energy innovation, and also in contrast to off-grid, smaller wind
energy concepts advocated by others (Gipe, 1995).
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The relative status of these particular power technology regimes (e.g. in terms of
market  share  or  future  expectations  by  investors)  will  have  an  influence  on
developments in the energy regime at higher levels of aggregation.  Some of these
‘regime’  examples  (i.e.  wind  and  PV)  actually  represent  only  niche  practices  and
concepts when looked at from the higher perspective of the electricity regime as a
whole, since they enjoy neither the institutional nor the market dominance that is a
defining feature of the regime concept.  Clearly, there is a need carefully to distinguish
in any given context between what constitutes the ‘nested’ and the ‘spanning’ regime,
and to  be  quite  precise  in the  empirical  application  of  the  concept  of  the  socio-
technical regime.
Membership of socio-technical regimes
The  present  focus  on  the  governance  of  technological  transitions  requires  an
explicit focus on the role of agency both within and beyond the regime. In particular,
there  is  a  need  to  think  systematically  about  the  empirical  boundaries  and  inter-
relationships bearing on regimes at different levels.  At root, socio-technical regimes
are produced and reproduced by networks  of  state,  civil  society and market-based
actors and institutions.  Take, for example, the regime that supplies water to urban
and suburban areas of Europe.  In this case, the regime rules and practices relate to a
centralised system of water supply through pipes, meeting statutory quality standards,
and funded by the regulated charges made to households and other end users.  This is
reproduced  by  a  network  of  water  companies,  capital  equipment  suppliers,
manufacturers  of biological  and chemical  treatments,  economic  and environmental
regulators,  households  and  other  water  users,  consumer  groups,  government
ministries, trade and professional associations, education and training establishments,
and so on.  All of these actors contribute in some form or other to the operation of
the regime by which water reaches the taps of households and firms. As such, all may
be considered, to some extent, to constitute ‘members’ of the water supply regime.
It is clear that the regime is not a homogenous, clearly-bounded entity. However,
as this water example illustrates, the question of regime membership is itself complex
and problematic.  Many members are to some extent also actors in regimes other than
water supply. In the specific context of water, some regime members are more tightly
networked  together  than  others.   That  is,  the  exercise  of  their  agency  in  the
functioning  of  the  regime  is  more  intensive than  others,  and  their  interests  and
objectives tend to be more influential on the direction taken by the regime.  Clearly,
water utility companies are key actors in the practical functioning and evolution of the
water regime.  They operate key technologies and they make key investment decisions.
Households might also appear to be intensively involved, in the sense that practices at
household level create the daily demand for water. Households are also the primary
source of revenue for water supply companies.  But household involvement is mainly
passive.  Households are ‘price takers’, rarely engaged directly in shaping the rules and
operation of the water supply regime.  Their influence is most evident in the guise of
aggregate  demand  projections,  constructed  by  the  water  companies  and  others  in
managing  the  regime  and  planning  change.3  Government  agencies  play  a  more
formative  role  in  the  operation  and  development  of  the  water  regime  by  setting
standards and procedures for planning, safety, quality and pricing. They can therefore
be seen as more directly involved in constituting the regime than households.  In this
3 Some sociologists argue  that  we need to deconstruct  this passive consumer demand in
order to understand water regime transformation (Hand et al., 2003).  Changing lifestyles
and technologies in the home, for instance, must be problematised, according to this view,
and brought into regime development in a much more active capacity.  The benefits of
efficient washing machines can be lost if offset by patterns of consumption (e.g. popular
conceptions of cleanliness) that lead to households washing smaller loads more frequently.
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way, it is clear how institutions and their inter-relationships reflect and reinforce the
exercise of  agency on the part  of  different  actors  in any particular regime, and so
condition the degree of regime membership.  
The  discussion  so  far  argues  that  one  way  of  delineating  network  boundaries
empirically  is  by  analysing  the  degree  to  which  different  actors  contribute  to  the
functions  that  reproduce  a  regime.   We see  that  regime membership  is  a  relative
notion and can be independent of the frequency of economic and other transactions.
Those actors who contribute intensively will be core members of the regime.  Those
actors whose involvement is less intensive will be peripheral members of the regime.
Typically no single core member embodies all the elements needed to constitute or
reproduce a  regime.   Although  several  members  may  be  necessary  to  the  proper
functioning of the regime, none alone are sufficient. The crucial determining factor in
the effective operation and development of the regime lies not simply in the agency of
the  individual  core  members,  but  in  the  norms  and  procedures  governing  their
structured relationships and interdependencies.4
The recognition of these structured relationships highlights the arena within which
the strategic exercise of agency is played out. The role of strategic competition between
core members of a regime is vividly illustrated in the field of public health. Here,
governments  are  dependent  on  pharmaceutical  and  biomedical  industries  as  key
components in the incumbent socio-technical regime.  These industries are in turn
dependent on government for licenses to market products and services and, in some
countries, also as a major purchaser.  The operation and development of this regime,
thus depends on the effective interplay of these interdependencies.  Strategic games
emerge around issues such as the prioritisation of different public health objectives,
the allocation of resources to contending research and development options, and the
regulation  of  associated  safety  issues,  pricing  structures  and  intellectual  property
rights.   The  development  of  the  regime  as  a  whole  is  played  out  through  active
interplay  –  and  sometimes  highly  adversarial  negotiation  –  between  core  regime
members such as government departments and industry associations. The influence
of others,  such as regulators,  patient groups,  the medical profession in this  highly
charged  arena  depends  on  how  intensively  they  contribute  to  ‘normal’  regime
functioning.
This issue of strategic interaction within the regime – and the differential levels of
agency enjoyed by core and peripheral regime members – is especially acute in the
construction of the ‘guiding visions’ which characterise, rationalise and reproduce the
developmental trajectory taken by a regime (van de Ven et al, 1989; Rosenberg, 1994;
Kemp and Rotmans, 2001; Berkhout et al, 2003).  Different core members will have
different ideas and interests bearing on regime development, will exert varying degrees
of influence on the construction of these guiding visions and deploy their resources
strategically to those ends.    By analogy with the idea of ‘appreciative systems’  in
policy analysis (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992), strategic interactions reflecting the agency
of  individual  actors  (rather  than  the  regime  as  a  whole)  can  exercise  a  crucial
conditioning influence on these visions.
At  times  when the  normal  functioning  of  the  regime is  problematic  or  under
stress, peripheral members or outsider actors may be able to intervene with their ideas
to greater  effect.   Under  such circumstances,  criticisms of  regime effectiveness  or
function appear more reasonable, and debate can be fruitfully opened up.  At other
times, when regimes are not under such stress, then such opening up is more difficult.
Indeed, the way regimes service socio-technical functions can serve to close down the
scope for  alternative  configurations.   Regime stress  is  brought  about  through the
4 Note that this idea is borrowed from the power-dependency theory that lies at the heart of
policy  network  analysis  in  political  science  (see  Benson,  1980 and  Marsh  and  Rhodes,
1992).
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greater articulation of challenging selection pressures, but which are often weak and
incoherent.   Sometimes,  however,  the intensity,  salience and articulation of certain
pressures  (e.g.  the  declining  profitability  in  the  current  way  of  doing  things,  or
growing public alarm at the social  consequences)  induces stress  in the regime and
opens  up  windows  of  opportunity  for  non-members  of  the  regime  to  intervene.
These occasions are rare.
Socio-technical regimes as social structures
Given  the  interactions  and  interdependencies  of  regime  members,  it  is
unsurprising that the literature tends to stress the stability of socio-technical regimes
and the rarity of systems innovations (Sahal, 1985).  Regime inertia means that regime
members tend not to look at familiar problems in a new light or to innovate according
to a new vision and rules.  Indeed, core regime members often resist change that is
considered  to  threaten  the  benefits  they  receive  from the  status  quo (Christiansen,
1997).   Regimes  consequently  tend  to  channel  their  own  development  along
technological trajectories that are path dependent, and which tend to transform the
regime  very  slowly  through  an  accumulation  of  incremental  changes.   This  is
compounded by the way regimes become increasingly institutionalised, in the sense
that social systems like the science system, finance, legislation,  training,  technology
standards, market structures and so forth, tend to entrench regime development by
becoming enrolled in its reproduction.  The difficulty of realigning such institutions
with promising new niches can be a major impediment to their breakthrough into the
mainstream (Perez, 1983).  Infrastructures supportive of the incumbent regime, and
the co-evolution of interdependencies with other regimes (e.g. suburban housing and
the private  motor  car),  can act  to lock regime development  deeper  into historical
trajectories.
As with many ‘structural’ accounts, the problem with this regime picture is that it
says little about the conditions under which change occurs, or about the switches that
may occur  between regimes.   Any ambitions  towards  transition  management,  say,
whilst rightly recognising the many structural features of regimes, will also need to
analyse and seek out sites of agency within and outside these structures.
Regime  shifts  or  successions  clearly  have  occurred  in  the  past.   Who  knows,
perhaps  one  day  an  organic  food  regime may  displace  the  trajectory  of  intensive
agriculture that has dominated these last decades.  Perhaps the energy regime will be
transformed by wide-scale adoption of distributed renewable energy systems oriented
towards the provision of efficient energy services, rather than maximising bulk sales
of energy units.   The point,  however, is  that we need to understand how regimes
come to be replaced or radically transformed if we are to sense the likelihood of such
scenarios.  We need to analyse the processes that enable the exercise of agency in such
regimes.   In  particular,  we need to be  clear  about  precisely  how,  and under what
conditions, networks of actors both within and outside the regime can successfully
affect a process of deliberate, purposive change.
Socio-Technical Transformations
Despite their relative stability,  regimes change.  Given the breadth of empirical
scope, the variety of regime members, and the structural characteristics of regimes,
radical  changes  are  likely  to  proceed  through  a  complex  and  unique  history  of
interrelated events.  In cutting into such complexity it is helpful to have a relatively
straightforward heuristic to fall back upon, in order to help organise one’s thinking.
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With this aim in mind, we adopt a quasi-evolutionary perspective on the fundamental
processes that shape regime transformations.
A quasi-evolutionary model of regime transformation
We understand regime change to be a function of two processes.
1. Shifting selection pressures bearing upon the regime.
2. The coordination of resources available inside and outside the regime to adapt to
these pressures.
The governance of regime transformation can be organised through intervention
in  these  two  realms.  It  may  seek  to  address  the  form,  intensity,  articulation  or
orientation  of  the  selection  pressures  that  act  on  target  regimes.  Alternatively  (or
complementarily) it may address the quality and distribution of adaptive capabilities,
including  the  capacity  to  mount  a  co-ordinated  response  and  the  availability  or
resources (such as finance, legitimacy or competence) to support these responses.  In
this  sense,  policies  such  as  environmental  taxation,  negotiated  agreements,  and
regulations  seek  to  promote  more  sustainable  configurations  through  favourable
modifications to the selection pressures felt by a regime.  Broadly speaking, this is
‘back-end’ governance that  operates  through regulatory or fiscal  systems.   Policies
such as R,D&D, environmental management systems, foresight exercises, and capital
allowance grants,  on the  other  hand,  tend more  towards  the  reshaping  of  regime
adaptive capacity.  This ‘front end’ governance intervenes in the innovation system, in
a way advocated by Constructive Technology Assessment.  We now elaborate each of
these approaches in turn.
The articulation of selection pressures
Conventional economic analysis for the governance of transitions towards more
sustainable  technology,  tends  to  focus  on those  forms  of  pressure  which operate
visibly  at  the  level  of  the firm,  such  as  pricing,  competition,  contracts,  taxes  and
charges, regulations, standards, liability, profitability, skills and knowledge.  Analysis at
the level of the socio-technical regime, on the other hand, includes such factors, but
goes beyond them to consider  less  economically visible  pressures  emanating from
internal institutional structures, changes in broad political economic ‘landscapes’,  or
wider socio-cultural trends.  These can be directed at specific regimes, such as the
anti-nuclear  movement.   Or  they  can  be  more  general,  like  the  ebb  and flow of
environmentalism as a popular concern in society.  Trade associations and industry
lobbies are just as involved in the public realm as environmental NGOs in pushing
for different patterns of future development.  In the energy sector again, for instance,
many different actors are promoting visions for a ‘hydrogen economy’ (Rifkin, 2002).
Such activity is significant because it has some bearing upon public policy processes,
discussions  about  long-term  strategies  in  industry,  areas  of  interest  to  venture
capitalists, and so forth.  In short, debates in the wider civil society serve to frame the
functional reproduction of socio-technical regimes.
Other  pressures  can  derive  from  social  change,  which  is  not  targeted  at  any
specific regime, but which can bring about selection pressures on regimes.  Examples
might include demographic shifts, such as the aging populations of some European
countries,  or economic migration.  Another might be the rise of consumer culture
based on the individualistic definition and satisfaction of needs, channelled through
an expanding consumption of commodities (Leiss, 1978).  A further example might
lie in the rise of a neo-liberal model of globalisation with more mobile capital and the
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deregulation  of  markets.   All  these  features  of  the  wider  political  and  economic
‘landscape’ can create important selection pressures for technological regimes.  Often
these pressures are weak and incoherent, but at other times they become stronger and
more coherently articulated.
The examples of selection pressure introduced above operate at a relatively high
empirical  level:  the changing ideology of  political  and economic elites;  the cultural
deepening of consumerism; a greening of public attitudes to consumption, and so on.
Of course,  incumbent regimes face competitive pressures  from other  regimes too.
This is the more conventional sense in which firms are understood to be involved in
systems  innovation.   The  coal-fired  power  technology  regime  has  been  under
increasing pressure  from the  combined cycle gas  turbine regime,  for  instance.   In
other cases, pressures might ‘bubble up’ from below, from innovative niches that are
not yet so established as to constitute a regime.  The transition management approach
to  governing  regime  transformation  recommends  this  strategy:  the  purposeful
creation and temporary protection of desirable, niche alternatives which can then be
used to seed regime changes (Rotmans and Kemp, 2001).
Without  at  least  some form of  internal  or  external  pressure  in  the  broad  and
diverse  senses  discussed  above,  it  is  unlikely  that  substantive  change  to  the
developmental trajectory will result. However, selection pressures of the kind used as
illustrations  above  are  pervasive  in  post-industrial  societies.   There  is  typically  no
shortage  of  such pressures  – of  one sort  or  another  –  acting  on a regime,  many
pushing in opposing directions.  In practice, it is therefore not the existence of such
pressures that is decisive. Instead, it is what we term the  articulation  of pressures for
any given regime transformation. This comprises two elements.
First, there is the extent to which selection pressures are oriented coherently in a
particular direction. As suggested, different pressures may often act incoherently to
promote different forms of response, and so may tend to ‘cancel out’. An example
might  be  the  conflicting  influences  on  the  development  of  renewable  electricity
generation in UK energy during the 1990s exerted by falling consumer prices on the
one hand, and Government financial  support  on the other.  Another  might be the
conflicting pressures acting on the global prospects for genetically modified crops, as
embodied in strongly positive government and industry commitments in the USA and
certain other major exporting markets, contrasted with intense consumer resistance
and wider institutional opposition in important import markets such as Europe and
Japan.
The second element in  effective articulation lies  in the processes  which render
these pressures explicit and translate them into a form that prompts and enables a
response by the regime. Here, climate change can be offered as an example.  It has
taken many years for a scientific consensus to emerge (IPCC, 2001a and 2001b).  This
scientific  consensus  stands  at  the  base  of  international  agreement  to  cut  carbon
emissions has been reached, and signatory nations are developing their own policies
and taking action to move towards lower carbon regimes.  This process of identifying,
translating  and  highlighting  an  environmental  pressure  is  essential  to  its  effective
articulation with socio-technical regimes such as those in the electricity supply and
private  and  freight  transport.  Elsewhere  we  have  discussed  some  other  less  well
recognised modes of articulation, and their associated pressures (see Berkhout, Smith
and  Stirling,  2003).   Table  1  reproduces  a  range  of  different  types  of  selection
pressure,  and  for  each  illustrates  some  governance  processes  through  which  they
might be articulated for the regimes in question.
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Articulation  processes  happen  through  coalitions  of  resource  interdependent
actors acting within and beyond established institutions of governance.  They may or
may not include regime members.  Proactive industry leaders may, for example, push
the  case  for  changes  within  regimes.   As  with  the  delineation  of  regimes,  so  the
identification of articulation processes is an empirical task.  Whichever ways selection
pressures become articulated, they only form one half of the regime transformation
equation.   The  other  factor  is  the  capacity  available  either  within  the  incumbent
regime or outside it, to respond adaptively to that pressure.
Adaptive Capacity in Regime Transformation
Some regimes  have the capacity to respond more readily to selection pressures
than others.  We refer to this feature as the adaptive capacity of a regime.  One way of
characterising  regime  adaptive  capacity  is  with  reference  to  five  ‘functions’  that
contribute  to the reproduction  of  technological  systems (Jacobsson and Johnsson,
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novel socio-technical








Measures that support the niche, such as:
Grants to create organic food niches.
Establishing organic growing training
programmes.
Niche market creation (e.g. public
procurement, green consumerism).
An innovation that seeds a
transformation in a ‘spanning’
regime.
The impact of high-levels
of wind turbine capacity
on the structure and
operation of the
electricity system.
Measures to support expansion in the
nested regime, such as:
Price supports for wind energy.
Strategic investments in infrastructure
changes suited to wind energy.
Environmental NGO campaigns for wind
expansion.
The spur to innovation felt
through competition from
another socio-technical regime
serving the same or over-





coal; gas; oil; nuclear; and
renewables.
Measures which promote technological or
resource diversity, such as:
Incentives to support a balanced portfolio
of energy technologies and systems.
A regulatory framework for fair
competition between regimes, within
environmental constraints.
The competition between
different ‘visions’ for the
future held by a variety of
social actors, some of whom
are more directly embedded
within the regime than others;
and the different power
resources they have to pursue
these visions.
Current contention over






Measures for civic debate, such as:
Broadening participation in the framing of
chemical regulatory decisions.
Introducing contentious visions into
processes of policy negotiation.
Local protests against chemical
establishments.
The generation of changes in
the social landscape that put
the regime in tension.
The liberalisation of
energy markets in the
EU.
Measures to understand the implications
for regimes, such as:
Monitoring social trends.
Foresight exercises.
Dissatisfaction with the poor fit of the
regime with modern life.
Politically-motivated debates






foods in the EU.
Measures that create informed debate,
such as: 
Public participation in policy agenda
setting (e.g. identifying which regimes are
effected by debates).
Dissenting voices.
A well resourced, educated, vibrant civil
society
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2001).5   These functions are reproduced in Table 2.  The better able regime members
are to carry out these regime functions, the better the regime as a whole will be able to
respond  to  selection  pressures.  Regimes  can  be  seen  as  being  reproduced  along
trajectories that are in part determined by selection pressures being applied to them.
The more intensive or threatening these pressures, the greater will be the resources
devoted to defending the regime. This might be one understanding, for instance, of
current  efforts  within  the  electricity  supply  regime  to  respond  to  climate  change
concerns by establishing techniques for the sequestering and environmental disposal
of carbon from fossil fuel power stations.
We draw a distinction between capability and capacity.  Capability is qualitative,
and relates to the precise way regime functions are fulfilled.  Capacity is more of a
quantitative  term.   Adaptive  capacity  is  about  how  much  of  any  given  adaptive
capability one can bring into play.  The regime membership might, for example, guide
search directions (a capability) but in only limited areas at any given time (a capacity
constraint).  All else being equal, the more adaptive regimes would be those whose
membership  is  able  most  effectively  to  reproduce  the  regime  in  the  context  of
5 The technological system concept is very similar to the socio-technical regime concept.
Table 2: How different governance activities contribute to adaptive capacity.
Adaptive capability functions Example Governance contribution to
that function
Creation of new knowledge: the main
source of variety in technological
systems. 




Education and training policy.
Influence over the direction of search
processes among users and suppliers of
technology: the articulation of
supply and demand is seen as
critical to the perceived costs and
benefits of regime switching.
The way a growing coalition
of actors are building
expectations for a future
hydrogen economy, and
how this influences research
and industrial agendas.
High-level foresight exercises.
Organisation of conferences with
prestigious business speakers.
Environmental lobbying which
weakens faith in incumbent
regime and raises the profile of
others.
Supply of resources: These include
capital, competences and input
materials as well as political
resources that support the
legitimacy of a regime.
Ability to bring together the
finance, technology, and
fuel supply infrastructure to
roll out local biomass
energy businesses at more
and more rural locations.
Public underwriting of risks and
soft loans.
Grants (public and private).
Secondment of expertise to new
initiatives.
Creation of positive external economies:
This is a pivotal characteristic.
An example is the formation of
socio-technical networks that
provide ‘spill-over’ effects by
reducing uncertainty, reducing the
cost of information, accessing
tacit knowledge and sharing costs.
The entry of a large
industrial investor into a
hitherto niche activity, such
as biomass energy, boosting
the status of the niche (e.g.
credit rating with financiers,
interest from other firms).
Or, the way development of
wider biomass supply
infrastructures makes it
easier for new biomass
energy firms to enter the
market.
Public pressures on companies to
seek out more responsible
corporate activities.
Publicity about the success of a
growing niche.





Formation of markets: Innovations
rarely find ready-made markets,
which therefore need to be
stimulated or created afresh.
Market formation is related to the
marketing efforts of firms, as well
as the regulatory and other
influences on the shape of
markets.
PV technology has
developed through a series
of niche markets, such as
satellites, remote power
supply, calculators, parking




Fiscal policy (impacts for relative
prices).
Adapted from Jacobsson and Johnson, 2001
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selection pressures.  Over time, we would normally expect more adaptive regimes to
succeed and those with less adaptive capacity to be subsumed or substituted.  
However, it may be that in some cases it is not the membership of the incumbent
regime itself which proves decisive in providing these functions.  Sometimes, when
the adaptive capability of the regime is weak, it can be outsider groups who build up
the functions that can generate the alternatives needed for change.   For instance, an
important source of change may be innovative niches, which pioneer new ways of
constituting  and  satisfying  a  social  and  economic  demand.   Effective  adaptive
capabilities  can  respond  to  pressures  by  opening  up  novel  niche  practices  as
alternatives to the incumbent regime in some form or other (e.g. new technologies,
new  appraisal  criteria).   Sometimes  it  is  outsiders  that  are  able  to  marshal  the
resources needed to put the alternative vision into effect.  
In  this  way  a  successful  niche  can challenge the  dominance  of  the  incumbent
regime,  and  members  of  the  incumbent  regime  may  struggle  to  seize  the  new
opportunities.   Under such circumstances,  the niche is  exerting selection pressure.
This point warns us not to limit our search for adaptive capacity to the membership
of  the  incumbent  regime.   Indeed,  depending  upon  the  types  of  change  being
articulated by the different selection pressures, the greatest capacity for adaptation and
change may rest in nascent networks of capable actors beyond the membership of the
incumbent regime. 
From  the  perspective  of  the  effective  governance  of  transitions  to  more
sustainable  technologies,  the  focus  of  interest  lies  in  the  potentiality  for  change,
wherever this may arise. In this way, the notion of adaptive capacity transcends the
regime, extending to cover the potentiality provided by hitherto peripheral or external
actors radically to augment or  transform capabilities.  Any empirical  analysis  of  the
networks that uphold or challenge regimes will therefore need to use a wide canvas to
review how actors contribute to regime functions.
Negotiating pressure, coordinating adaptation
Although  the  articulation  of  selection  pressure  and  the  provision  of  adaptive
capacity are conceptually distinct, the actors and institutional settings involved in each
need not  necessarily  be  separate  empirically.   An actor  such  as  an environmental
regulator may simultaneously be intervening to articulate a selection pressure and also
make  efforts  to  help  co-ordinate  the  resources  necessary  for  adaptation.   This
empirical overlapping of the functions fulfilled by different actors is particularly acute
in the contribution to the search direction function of adaptive capacity, since the
articulation of a selection pressure may serve to open up new search directions for
innovation.
The ability to articulate a salient pressure for regime change and / or build up an
influential  adaptive  capability  will  usually  require  interactions  and  resource  flows
between actors,  through  networks  or  coalitions  that  may  or  may not  involve  the
incumbent regime membership.   The facility  with which this  can be achieved will
depend upon each actor’s negotiating position, defined in terms of their own interests
and ideas, the degree to which they have power over others, and the centrality of the
functions they perform (relative to the collection of selection pressures and adaptive
capacities  overall).   Coalitions  of  prime  movers  are  needed,  who  are  ‘technically,
financially  and  politically  so  powerful  that  they  can  strongly  influence  the
development and diffusion process’ (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2003: 5).  The greater the
extent to which pressures for a particular form of change diverge from the norms and
rules of the incumbent regime, the more acute become issues of power.  Even if the
124   Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference
membership is not active in its opposition to change, the regime may nevertheless
present a considerable degree of inertia that must be overcome.
There  are  some  potentially  significant  parallels  here  at  a  fairly  high  level  of
abstraction between the way that socio-technical regimes are conceived and the more
general conceptual ideas of what constitutes governance.  As with the technological
regime, governance itself is exercised through relatively stable sets of norms, rules and
practices that prioritise public issues, take decisions on them, and implement those
decisions.  Governance means something wider than the state (just as regime is wider
than  industrial  sector).  It  looks  beyond  the  ideology,  institutions,  structures  and
instruments  of  the  state  (such  as  ruling  parties,  industry  ministries,  parliamentary
procedures,  environmental  regulators,  public  spending,  policy  instruments,  and  so
on).  The state is embedded within wider networks in civil society and market systems.
Like  regimes,  this  involves  interaction  between  actors  in  networks.   Moreover,
because regimes and governance are both social phenomena, they will also involve
processes of consent, dissent, inclusion, exclusion, and power between the different
actors involved.
It may not always be possible to negotiate and coordinate a powerful coalition for
a clearly envisaged change.  Attempts may meet with partial success.  Indeed it may be
that such deliberate attempts do not emerge at all, in the sense that change occurs
through a process of uncoordinated interactions between shifting, poorly articulated
selection pressures and struggling adaptive capabilities.  Clearly, the context in which
regime transformation arises, both in terms of the nature of the incumbent regimes
and the governance situation, is important for the processes of change that actually
unfold.  In the final section of our chapter, we use our quasi-evolutionary model of
change as the basis for a simple typology of transition contexts.
Transition Contexts
As  the  relative  strength  of  different  selection  pressures  shifts,  and  adaptive
capabilities change, so the transformation process will change too.  Analysis begins
when we relate this context of regime transition to general patterns of transformation.
The  art  for  any  transition  management  project  then  becomes  one  of  recognising
which context prevails at any point in time and space, and which drivers offer the best
leverage for guiding change in a desirable direction at that point.  As we have already
discussed, the articulation of selection pressures is one source of leverage. Building
adaptive capacity is a second lever.
Transition  contexts  can  be  mapped  using  the  two  dimensions  of  change
introduced earlier in this chapter.  The first dimension measures whether change is
envisaged and actively coordinated – either at the level of the regime membership or
on  the  part  of  some higher  level  governance  process  –  in  response  to prevailing
selection pressures, or whether it is the emergent outcome of the normal behaviour of
regime members (involving no new mechanisms of coordination). 6  This dimension
seeks to distinguish between regime transformations that are essentially intended and
deliberate and those that are the unintended and contingent outcomes of historical
processes.  An intended regime transformation would be guided by influential actors
within the regime or by overarching networks of governance arriving at a common
diagnosis concerning shortcomings in an incumbent regime. It would require some
level  of  agreement  on  the  appropriate  prescriptive  measures  and  their  objectives,
given  the  prevailing  selection  pressures  as  they  are  currently  articulated  and
6 In making this distinction between low and high levels of coordination we want to move
beyond  a  simple  planned/market-based  dichotomy,  to  take  account  of  more  complex
processes of the social regulation of technologies that involve not just the state, but also
other social actors including civil society organisations and consumers.
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understood.   Of course,  this  says nothing about the desirability – for instance the
genuine sustainability – of the particular intended measures, objectives or outcomes.
For present purposes, the point is simply that the regime membership itself, might
choose to coordinate adaptive capacities to protect the interests of regime members.
This  dimension  of  co-ordination  is  blind  to  the  merits  of  motives  or  outcomes,
measuring simply the degree of intentionality and co-ordination involved in driving a
given transition. 
The second dimension concerns the degree to which the response to selection
pressure is based on resources available within the regime (or which can be co-opted
by the regime), or depends upon capabilities that are only available outside the regime.
The locus of the capabilities to innovate and adapt is therefore important to the nature
of the transformation process.  If the resources required for transition are available
internally, then change is likely to be more incremental and structural relationships
within the regime are less likely to be overturned. If the capacity to adapt is highly
constrained by the lack of resources internally, then the likelihood of major structural
change increases. The coordination of actors / locus of resources framework gives rise to a
fourfold mapping of transition contexts (see Figure 1).
As discussed in more detail in an earlier paper (Berkhout, Smith and Stirling, 2003)
the  four  quadrants  produced  in  this  framework  represent  schematic  ‘ideal  types’.
Comparisons  and  contrasts  between  the  elements  of  each  transformation  can  be
made against real-world regime transformation processes and our understanding of
the  variety  of  processes  consequently  improved.  As  has  been  suggested  above,
whatever the nature of the selection pressures and the responses to them, the four
transition contexts may all play out operationally at different levels of aggregation.  In
attempting  to  make  more  explicit  the  distinctions  between  possible  transition
contexts, we hope to develop a richer and more robust basis for understanding the
different processes of socio-technical transition and the associated opportunities for
normative policy intervention.
This  typology  lends  itself  to  two types  of  heuristic  use  of  relevance  to  wider
governance  processes  oriented  towards  the  fostering  of  more  sustainable
technologies.  One use is as an analytical device, and the other as a normative tool.
First, in analytical mode, we can take as a starting point that prevailing circumstances
and established governance practices are conditioning a particular ‘default’ transition
context.  The  task  of  analysis  by  means  of  this  heuristic  then  becomes  one  of
identifying the particular  type of transition that is underway. Assuming that the likely
outcome  of  this  transition  is  judged  to  be  desirable  –  in  this  case  in  terms  of
environmental and social sustainability – then governance measures might be oriented
towards  assisting  the  committed  process  of  change in  a  fashion that  is  as  timely,
efficient or socially acceptable as possible.
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The second approach starts  the  other  way around.   This  rests  on an appraisal
process which concludes that a committed prevailing situation is unlikely to yield a
desirable  outcome.  The appraisal  process  must  then identify  some more  desirable
outcome and the heuristic scheme used in normative mode to guide understanding as
to how best to achieve this. In this case, the appropriate governance strategies are not
those that best assist some prevailing process of stasis or change, but those which
best foster the particular transition context identified in appraisal as being appropriate
to  achieving  a  desired  outcome.  So,  for  instance,  if  a  prevailing  situation  of
‘endogenous renewal’ is identified to be oriented towards an unsustainable outcome,
then the aim of governance might be to foster instead a ‘purposive transition’ to a
more radical solution. This is obviously a more challenging mode of usage for any
conceptual scheme, placing greater demands both on the taxonomy and on whatever
governance measures may be deemed applicable.
The normative approach also begs the question,  who is leading the governance
strategy?   As we concluded in  the  preceding  section,  governance  is  the  result  of
interactions  in  policy  networks,  embedded  in  historically-shaped  institutions,  and
lobbied  by  coalitions  of  actors  with  different  views.   In  practice,  the  typology
presented  here  could help each of  these  actors  interpret  the transition  context  in
which a target regime operates.  They could then use this intelligence to inform their
strategy for influencing the governance of that regime.
Having discussed the governance possibilities of transition contexts, it is time to
describe each of them.  A series of stylised examples – emphasising the energy sector
for the purposes of effective comparison – are used here to provide more concrete
illustration.
Endogenous renewal (coordinated response, internal adaptation)
Endogenous  renewal  arises  in  the  context  of  regime  members  (firms,  supply
chains, customers, regulators) making conscious efforts to finds ways of responding
to a perceived competitive threat  to the regime. In the terms of our typology, the
pressure to change the regime is clearly articulated and there is a high coordination of
response, based on resources originating within the regime.  However, as has been
Figure 1: Summary of transition contexts as function of degree of coordination to
selection pressures and locus of adaptive capacity.
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discussed, given that innovative activity is shaped from within the regime itself, it will
tend to be steered by the prevailing interests  and values,  cognitive  structures,  and
problem-solving  routines  of  the  incumbent  regime.  Decisions  over  future
technological  choices  will  be  guided  by  past  experience.  Thus  the  transformation
process will tend to be incremental and path-dependant. Looking back over a long
period of time the transformation can appear  radical,  but it  will  have come about
through an alignment of smaller changes.
An example of this kind of process may be found in the progressive scaling up of
the  thermal  capacity  of  steam-generating  plant  over  the  course  of  the  twentieth
century.  Constituted  by  a  multitude  of  individually  minor  organisational  and
engineering innovations, the result was a radical transformation in the character of the
electricity regime (Hughes, 1987).  Likewise, investment in flue gas desulphurisation
plant as a response to concerns over acid emissions (Boehmer-Christiansen and Skea,
1991), or the development of carbon sequestration techniques might also be taken as
examples of endogenous renewal. In either case, the long-term implications, were the
processes of change to be deep-seated and sustained, would be one of incremental
regime transition.
From a governance perspective, there are both analytic and normative  approaches
– as  defined above – to consider.   In  the first,  analytic  approach,  we understand
governance (the collection of measures identified in Tables 1 and 2) to be content to
enable  and  contribute  to  a  process  of  endogenous  renewal.   The  sustainable
transformation  of  the  regime  is  therefore  likely  to  occur  through  incremental
environmental  performance  improvements  and  an  accumulation  of  marginal
improvements in social equity.
In the second, normative approach to governance, the challenge for a regime that
already  fits  this  endogenous  renewal  type  of  context,  is  to  identify  how  to  steer
transformation  in  a  more  sustainable  direction.   The  regime  membership
demonstrates an ability to coordinate their response to selection pressures.  They also
have the capabilities to adapt successfully in terms of maintaining regime structures
intact.  If the regime is highly adaptable, governance strategies might best be focused
on the coherent articulation of ecologically sustainable and socially equitable selection
pressures.  
Re-orientation of trajectories (uncoordinated response, internal adaptation)
Some  socio-technical  regimes  exhibit  an  intrinsic  property  of  ‘systemness’
(Rosenberg, 1994:216-17) in their processes of change while at the same time being
highly unpredictable.  In these regimes, trajectories of change may be radically altered
by  internal  processes  without  being  associated  with  discontinuities  in  the  actors,
networks and institutions  involved in  the regime.  The stimulus  for  the  radical  re-
orientation  is  a  shock  (from  outside  the  regime  or  within)  impacting  upon  the
technological system. The response, however, is formed within the incumbent regime.
In the electricity sector, an example of this kind of regime change might be seen with
the advent of wide-scale adoption of combined cycle gas turbines, especially in the
UK  (Islas,  1997).  This  radical  transformation  in  the  technical  and  operational
characteristics of generation systems was not widely anticipated or intended, but arose
through the  conjunction  of  a  series  of  uncoordinated  technological  opportunities,
changes in market regulation and obstacles facing alternatives such as coal and nuclear
generation. However, the adoption of gas turbines was managed within the dominant
electricity generation regime, rather than being a development imposed from without.
Analytically speaking, governance that contributes to good adaptability functions
internal to the regime, under situations in which the sustainability challenge is poorly
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articulated  and  responses  uncoordinated,  will  lead  to  regime  transformations  that
reorient trajectories.  Governance measures such as boosting appraisal capabilities, the
innovation  and  adoption  of  cleaner  technologies,  favouring  greener  consumption
within the incumbent regime, and so forth could radically transform the trajectory of
development  of  the  regime.   However,  if  the  selection  pressures  are  poorly-
coordinated,  then  the  reoriented  trajectory  of  development  could  take  off  in  an
unanticipated direction.
Using this transition context in more normative mode, then a governance strategy
for intervention is facing a situation in which the incumbent regime is well furnished
with  the  resources  for  the  committed  process  of  change,  but  where  this  is  not
necessarily  the  case  for  the  particular  orientation  of  change  favoured  in  the
governance  strategy  itself  –  for  which  the  selection  pressures  may be  incoherent.
Thus  the  selection  pressures  will  probably  represent  the  best  place  to  begin
governance strategies: working with the ‘back-end’ of regulatory systems (regulations,
taxes, and so on) to try and create a selection environment that induces the regime to
apply its resources to more sustainable ends.  In effect, this would push the regime
from a reorientation of trajectories context over to an endogenous renewal context,
and  so  regime  transformation  would  ultimately  move  incrementally  towards
sustainability.
Emergent transformation (uncoordinated response, external adaptation)
Many classical regime transitions have an apparently autonomous (though socially-
constructed)  logic.   This  type  of  transformation  in  our  typology  arises  from
uncoordinated  pressures  for  change and responses  formed  beyond the  incumbent
technological regime. The technological cycles described in Kondratiev’s long waves
have this character of emerging from highly complex social and economic processes
that  lead to the  emergence of  technologies  with  pervasive  impacts.   Many of  the
examples used in the technological transitions literature have this form (Christensen,
1997).  Their origin is typically in scientific activity often carried out in universities and
small firms operating outside existing industries (Dosi, 1988).  These transitions can
be observed, but there appears very little basis  ex ante to distinguish between those
alternatives  that  will  ‘catch on’  (Mokyr,  1991:276) and those that will  not.   In the
energy sector, a long term example is provided by the series of ‘energy successions’
governing the dominance of different ‘primary fuels’ running over a period of three
centuries or so from wood, through coal, to oil and gas. Contemporary examples of
these  kinds  of  technologies  with  major  disruptive  potential  include  information
technology and genetically-modification technology in the food and pharmaceuticals
sectors.  The impacts of these technologies have of course been across many different
technological regimes – in this sense it is incorrect to speak of a single transition, but
of  many  parallel  transitions  stimulated  from  a  common  technological  basis  and
shaped by regime-specific configurations of interests and goals.  It is also clear from
the  GM example  that  the environmental  impacts  (as  perceived by  key actors  and
institutions) of these emergent transitions may remain quite uncertain even some way
down the process of path creation.
From  our  governance  perspective,  this  case  pertains  in  an  analytical  sense  to
situations  where  there  is  no  coordinated  response  to  poorly  articulated  selection
pressures.   Key adaptive  functions  are  developed beyond  the  membership  of  the
incumbent regime.   Under such a governance  situation  the transformation will  be
emergent.   Consequently,  it  will  be  difficult  to  anticipate  clearly  what  form  of
sustainable development the transformation will take.
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If taking a more normative perspective, and confronted with a regime exhibiting
the properties that fit this emergent transition context, then the governance challenge
is open.  Governance strategies can be built up which inject greater coherence into the
selection  pressures  and  regime  response.   Alternatively,  or  at  the  same  time,
governance strategies can be pursued which build up the relevant adaptive capabilities.
If key adaptive functions are built up internally, within the regime, then the situation
(analytically  speaking)  will  move  into  the  endogenous  renewal  quadrant,  and
transformation towards sustainability will be incremental.  Should adaptive functions
be developed beyond the incumbent regime, as they were before intervention, then
(analytically  speaking)  the  governance  situation  will  move  towards  the  purposive
transition quadrant, and transformation will fit that process, i.e. potentially following a
process of more radical leap towards sustainability (see below).
Purposive transitions (coordinated response, external adaptation)
While emergent transitions  have an autonomous quality,  we seek to distinguish
these  from  purposive  transitions  which  have  in  some  senses  been  intended  and
pursued to reflect the expectations of a broad and effective set of interests, largely
located outside the regimes in question.  A good example of this type of transition is
the history of  civil  nuclear power in the industrialised world.   Nuclear power was
widely regarded in the 1950s and 1960s as a critical technology with the potential to
generate broad economic and political (military) benefits.  A common narrative was
developed  which  involved  a  series  of  technological  transitions  from uranium fuel
cycles (with the light water reactor as the main conversion technology) to plutonium
fuel cycles (with the fast reactor being the conversion technology). Scientific, policy
and  industrial  interests  were  co-opted  to  this  vision  to  form  a  powerful  interest
grouping which was typically in strong contention with establish interests within the
incumbent socio-technical regime of the electricity system itself. This latter example
shows that this form of transition – imagined, planned and partially executed – does
not necessarily generate social and environmental benefits.
Transition management is the transformation of a socio-technical regime guided
primarily by negotiation between social actors from beyond the regime.  Analytically,
this governance strategy fits the present ideal type purposive transition.  Key to the
transition management project is that these social actors have a greater role in forming
the socio-technical response to the co-ordinated pressure for change. Obviously, this
demand for change has to be mediated by the regime actors. Transition management
is  also  the  outcome  of  a  deliberate  attempt  to  change the  regime  according  to  a
consensus guiding vision (hence selection pressures are highly articulated). Thus,  if
our  schema  is  accurate,  the  transformation  process  is  most  likely  to  be  that  of
purposive transition. 
Of course, as our discussion of governance strategies has indicated, the transition
context for any given socio-technical regime need not be fixed. Contexts may change,
and the proposition in this chapter is that any change in context will influence the
pattern  of  regime  transformation.   It  will  also  alter  the  governance  opportunities
available to different social actors.  The heuristic typology presented here is intended
to help us understand and frame apropriate questions for the regime transformation
processes  in  a  series  of  different  governance  situations  (i.e.  the  kind of  transition
context the governance situation is creating) and / or aid policy-makers intervene in
an informed way under given transition contexts.  The governance of regimes can be
understood as altering the given context of selection pressure and adaptive capacity,
and thereby modifying transformation processes, in terms of pace and/or direction.
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Summary and Conclusions
The currently burgeoning perspective focusing on technological regimes presents a
fresh and potentially  highly fruitful  way of  cutting into the challenge  of  industrial
transformation – promising more profound and pervasive insights than the preceding
approach  focusing  on  the  greening  of  individual  industrial  sectors.   An industrial
sector  focus is concerned primarily  with the firms involved in the production and
supply of certain goods and services.  A regime focus is concerned with the network
of  actors  and  institutions  clustered  around the  fulfilment  of  social  and  economic
functions.  Sectors and regimes nest and overlap – and may be coterminous – but
they are not the same. 
As  a  consequence  of  this,  transformation  is  understood  to  be  change  that  is
mediated  by  the  practices  of  institutionally  embedded  networks of  actors.   Regime
membership rests upon the intensity of involvement of actors in the reproduction of
regime functions.  Change might be sought by a specific coalition of actors, but it will
need to be carried through within networks of actors possessing the wherewithal to
adapt  the  incumbent regime or create alternatives.   By ‘carried  through’  we mean
change will need some coordination and resources between actors.  This will be built upon
active  processes  of support  and / or passive  processes  of  acceptance in  order  to
generate sufficient  consent to put change into practice.  However, not everyone will
agree to change, there will be dissenting voices.  At times, such dissent can make a
useful contribution to the innovation of regimes by opening up search directions and
redefining  the  multiple  criteria  by  which  regime  performance  is  assessed  (beyond
ubiquitous economic criteria).  Regimes, by definition, have a tendency to close down
options and introduce stability.
The legitimate  authority  to  push change through,  or  the resources  available to
build consent, or to raise informed dissent, or even to block change, will depend upon
power  relations  across  the  networks  of  actors  involved.   Governance  processes
provide  an  arena  for  debates  about  how  best  to  ‘manage’  or  modulate  regime
transformation for sustainable development.  We have suggested that governance can
seek to influence or even guide regime transformation in a number of ways.  These
are summarised in general terms in the ‘decision tree’ scheme in Figure 2.  We stress
that  this  diagram is  intended only  as a  summary  of  the  argument,  and we would
caution against any inclination to use it in a mechanistic, unreflective fashion.
In  particular,  we  argue  that  the  task  of  governing  successful  sustainable
technological transformations might be significantly assisted by distinguishing the role
of the articulation of selection pressures acting on the regime and the twofold elements
of adaptive capacity (the provision and coordination of resources for adaptation).  These
two dimensions to the governance of regime transformations form the key axes along
which  can  be  plotted  different  transition  contexts.   In  this  chapter  we  have  put
forward the hypothesis that the processes and outcomes of a regime transformation
depend  upon  the  transition  context  prevailing  at  that  time.   Contexts  in  which
selection  pressures  are  highly  coordinated  will  go  through  a  different  process  of
change compared to those  situations  where  selection pressures  are  uncoordinated.
Moreover,  if  the  functions  that  contribute  to  adaptive  capacity  are  found
predominantly  within  the  incumbent  regime,  then  transformation  will  differ  from
contexts  in  which  such  functions  derive  primarily  from  beyond  the  regime
membership.   Endogenous  renewal,  reorientation  of  trajectories,  emergent
transformation and purposive transition are four ideal types of transformation that
unfold under these different transition contexts. 
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In any given instance, these particular forms of transition – like the substantive
technological  options  themselves  –  may variously  be  seen  in  different  quarters  as
desirable or undesirable objectives. Such judgements will be arrived at in any given
case by active political deliberation. The role of a heuristic scheme such as this, is to
reveal the variety of structural choices with which governance debates are faced and
so  help  prompt  fruitful  questions  and  shape  possible  responses.  The  essence  of
sustainability lies in the recognition of agency in social choices about technological
futures. It is by focusing directly on the challenges posed by different contexts for the
Figure 2: A Heuristic Decision Tree for Normative Governance of Regime
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transformation  of  technological  regimes,  that  we may hope to do a better  job of
fulfilling the pressing social and environmental imperatives of sustainability. 
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Time Strategies for an Innovation Oriented
Environmental Policy1
Stefan Zundel
University of Applied Sciences Lausitz, Senftenberg, Germany
1. Introduction
Environmentally friendly innovations have attracted public interest, because they
are  subject  to  far  reaching  expectations.  They  should  deliver  double  or  triple  di-
vidends not only  in terms of ecological progress but also in terms of economic suc-
cess and jobs. A main driver of that debate is  the hope that environmentally friendly
innovation will lower the economic burden posed on society in cases of transition
from an unsustainable path of technological development to a more sustainable one.
The following approach is inspired by the idea that the timing of political measures
is an especially important condition for the success or failure of environmental policy
in  bringing  forth  environmentally-friendly  innovations.  The  basic  hypothesis  is
simple: political impulses at the wrong time either barely bring about a worthwhile  ef-
fect , or else they cost much money and time to cause a real change in economic beha-
viour. At the right time, even weak political initiatives can stimulate external environ-
mentally-friendly innovations. We label such unstable phases of technological devel-
opment as windows of opportunities.
To provide  a first impression of this hyprothesis’ meaning  in the second section
of this chapter,  an example of a transition based on  the set of  case studies from
SUSTIME project is presented. The case of chlor-alkali-electrolysis was selected be-
cause this example allows a comparison of different kinds of policies (Germany and
Japan) and thus illustrates successful and  unsuccessful examples of time strategies. 
1 This paper is an extract from  the  SUSTIME research project: “Innovation, Time, Sustain-
ability - Time dependent Strategies in order to disseminate Ecological Innovations” funded
by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research of Germany. Participants of this project
included the author,  Georg Erdmann, Jan Nill, Rene Kemp and Christian Sartorius. The
author  is very grateful for their comments on  earlier versions of this paper. All  responsib-
ility for  errors lies with the author. 
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Obviously there is a close link between the hypothesis above and the descrip-
tion of innovation processes by evolutionary economics. According to evolution-
ary economics, there are two types of innovation - incremental and radical. There
are stable periods and revolutionary periods consistently in technical change. In
the  latter  periods,  the  field  of  technological  inquiry  changes  quite  dramatically
when there is a change in a technological paradigm, e.g. the engineering consensus
of the relevant problems and approaches for solving them. Such periods are win-
dows of opportunity for changing the direction of technological progress in quite
a considerable way. The evolutionary framework underlying our concept of time
strategies is described in the third section of this chapter.
The selection environment of technologies includes not only economic factors
but socio-cultural and political factors, too. In the fourth section, the selection en-
vironment is broadened  using the notion of co-evolution of different social sub-
systems. 
The concept of a window of opportunity in time is crucial for our concept of
time strategies. One might get the impression that time strategies of environmental
policy are restricted by  using a time window. On the contrary, governments often
can contribute in preparing these  windows. Sometimes it is even possible for gov-
ernments to open a window of opportunity; such an attempt is labelled as techno-
logy forcing in literature. In the fifth section, time strategies of this kind are invest-
igated in more detail. 
Due to  knowledge restrictions governments usually must  face, the steering
philosophy behind the concept of time strategies can not be a “press the button,
get a particular result” approach. Since there is a close link between the concept of
time strategies and the concept of transition management a few remarks concern-
ing this connection in the last section conclude the chapter.
2. An Example – the Chlor-Alkali Electrolysis
One  case study  in the SUSTIME project   was  chlor-alkali  electrolysis  (for
more  details  see  Sartorius  2004).  Basically  three  technological  possibilities  for
chlor-alkali-electrolysis  are available:  mercury  technology,  diaphragm technology
and membrane technology. If we delve further into the technical details, we find
that membrane technology is the best one in ecological terms and -  importantly -
also in economic terms. The diffusion of this technology is considerably different
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Figure 1: Diffusion process in Japan and Germany
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The diffusion of membrane technology in Japan has been much faster than in
Germany. To  explain  such a phenomenon, economists usually  look for the eco-
nomic incentives in terms of prices of products and costs of production processes.
If we examine this case more closely, we find that the basic cause underlying this
difference lies in the fact that the relationship between the membrane cell and the
mercury cell process is characterised by the (temporary) lock-in of the established
and the corresponding lock-out of the new technology. Due to the sunk costs as-
sociated with the established technology, the substitute technology can bring  its
economic superiority to bear only after those sunk costs are  very low. This point
was  reached  much earlier in Japan than in Germany. Beyond that, the lack of
growth in chlorine production capacity in the 1980s and 1990s only allowed for a
very limited number of new (membrane-based) plants to be installed.
 Membrane cell technology in Japan took explicit advantage of the role of the
government in first supporting the related R&D and then actively pursuing the
phase-out of the mercury cell technology. In Germany, by contrast, in the search
for a quick, yet incomplete reduction of the mercury emissions, the government
preferred to retro-fit the existing facilities. As a result, this  tended to decrease the
chance of  membrane cell technology in proving its superiority sometime in the fu-
ture.  The dominance  of  the  old path was  supported by a  particular  regulation
scheme.
3. Technological Change in Evolutionary Economics
This above example  can be used for a first generalisation. Obviously technolo-
gical progress has its own momentum. Stable phases exist where we receive more
from the same kind of technological progress. In unstable phases, a transition to
really new technologies,  system innovation or more radical innovations is more
likely to occur.
The distinction between periods of rapid change and periods of slow motion is
well known in evolutionary economics. Technological development is described as
an interplay of radical innovations, sometimes called basis innovations, and incre-
mental innovations.  It  is typically cumulative and patterned,  with new branches
growing from old ones. In order to describe this pattern Dosi has introduced the
notions of “technological paradigm” and “technological trajectories”. (Dosi 1982).
The notion of paradigm is borrowed from Kuhn. Along   the lines of Kuhnian
thinking, Dosi suggests the following definition: “... a technological paradigm can
be defined as a ‘pattern’ for solution of selected techno-economic problems based
on highly selected principles derived from the natural sciences” (Dosi 1988, 224).
The change from one paradigm to another can be labelled as a transition in the
sense of Kemp and Rotmans who defined transition as follows:
“A transition
• is the shift from an initial equilibrium to a new equilibrium
• is characterised by fast and slow developments as a result of interacting pro-
cesses
• involves innovation in an important part of a societal system.” (Kemp/Roth-
mans 2001, 6)
In addition to framing technological development with the  belief  system of
engineers – as  emphasized by the term paradigm used by Dosi - there is a broad
range of factors which stabilise a given trajectory of a techno-economic system.
Literature addresses these factors under the label of increasing returns of adop-
tion.  The most important factors are economies of scale, economies of scope,
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sunk costs, learning effects and network effects (for a more detailed discussion of
these factors see Sartorius/Zundel 2004). 
Basically, economies of scale are due to the fact that the benefit arising from
employment of more sophisticated machinery can more than outweigh its higher
overhead cost if only the quantity of output is high enough. While production fa-
cilities at various output scales can well be based on different technologies, it is im-
portant to note that economies of scale are based on the technologies that exist re-
spectively  at any given point in time; learning does not play a role in this concept.
Accordingly, economies of scale are basically measured on the firm level in terms
of average unit cost as a function of output quantity per unit of time. On the other
hand, , economies of scale have the potential to stabilise monopolistic structures
or, at least, to provide  firms who realise  them with a powerful competitive (cost)
advantage. The latter point turns into a disadvantage for many  kinds of potential
market entrants, but it is particularly relevant for new technologies which, at the
beginning of their life cycle, cannot draw upon  their own or foreign  experiences
with (and thus cannot  make use of)  the advantages of large-scale production.
By taking into consideration a firm’s variety of production outputs, economies
of scope - beyond the mere number of a firm’s distinguishable outputs – can ac-
count for the realisation of synergies between different production lines. This in-
cludes the common use of certain resources, intermediate products, or production
facilities. In any case, it requires a high degree of coordination between the pro-
duction lines within a firm. A prominent example is the coupling of production in
the chemical industry. As in the case of economies of scale, the effect of econom-
ies of scope is two-fold. On  one hand, it leads to and accordingly is measured in
terms of a relative decrease in average production cost, as such representing a sub-
stantial increase in profits or, more generally, wealth. On the other hand, when
compared with economies of scale, the complexity of interactions between existing
production lines makes it even more difficult for a market entrant or a new tech-
nology to become competitive. For this requires that either comparable synergy ef-
fects must  be realised in the first place or the degree of superiority of the new
technology as such must  be high enough to outweigh such synergy effects right
from the beginning. The latter point  represents a major obstacle for the competit-
iveness of a new technology. As such,  a detailed analysis of the interactions giving
rise to  synergy effects  -  in addition to the mere cost  aspects of economies of
scope - is an indispensable part of all attempt to identify a possible techno-eco-
nomic window of opportunity.
Although the first explicit mention  of ‘learning by doing’ goes back to Arrow
(1962), the cost decreasing effect of growing experience in designing, constructing,
and using production facilities (‘learning by using’) has been a  part of common
wisdom in economics since Adam Smith. Unlike the cases of economies of scale
and economies of scope, the cost-decreasing potential of learning by doing and
learning by using is a function of the cumulative output of a given branch of pro-
duction over the entire period of time since its introduction. The learning effects
relevant in this context are equivalent to incremental technical progress and they
are typically expressed as the percentage of cost reduction per doubling of the cu-
mulative production output. While scale effects could, at least in principle, be real-
ised at any point in time, experience effects are the result of an ongoing develop-
mental process.  As a consequence, learning effects provide any new technology
with a large potential for further cost reductions. At the same time, however, they
require every investor into such a technology to subsidise its output until the cost
of the respective product will have become competitive. Depending on the initial
cost difference, this may explain the occasional need for an extensive, long-term
investment effort.
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Investment in a new, process or product-related, technology can cause signific-
ant sunk costs if  this  investment renders useless an old technology prior to its
complete depreciation in the absence of the new technology. Schumpeter refers to
this innovation-induced early depreciation as ‘creative destruction’. Technological
spillovers from other firms employing the same (old) technology significantly con-
tribute to these sunk costs. For every firm that intends or is forced to carry out a
change in its technological regime, sunk costs represent opportunity costs of the
new technology (and, equivalently, negative externalities of the old technology). It
is evident that in such a situation, a firm will substitute a new technology for an
old one only if the return to investment in the new technology outweighs both the
expenditure into the new capital and the sunk costs associated with the old tech-
nology.
While the scale and learning effects described above give rise to positive ex-
ternalities on the supply side, network externalities refer to the fact that the utility
derived by the users from the use of a given technology is positively correlated
with the total number of users. The telephone network is a typical example. Al-
ternatively, a technology can be subject to network externalities if it does not itself
constitute a network, but relies on and is compatible with another technology that
forms the network in its turn. The dependence of the internal combustion engine
on a network of filling stations can serve as an example here.
Increasing returns of adoption do  not last forever. One important reason for
this appears to be that the problem-solving capacity of a dominant technology (the
body of knowledge) is exhausted. Marginal returns within any given technological
paradigm tend to decrease. This has been worked out by Windrum following an
argument by Frencken and Verbart (1998). Windrum writes that “the functional
form of the relationship between learning and the number of adopters is sigmoid.
As the number of contributors increases in the initial phase of its history, so the
problem-solving capacity of the user network supporting that technology increases
exponentially due to gains of the division labour and benefits from arising of new
fields of application. However, there is an upper limit to the problem-solving ca-
pacity  of  a user  network.  As a  technology  paradigm matures,  so  co-ordination
costs start to outweigh the gains derived through further division of labour (…).
The ability to identify and develop new fields of application is similarly limited …”
(Windrum 2003, 302). Therefore increasing returns of adoption are at some point
bounded from above, a necessary but not sufficient condition for technological
change.
Real markets (niches) represent a further important condition because they fa-
cilitate processes of learning (about technology, the market, social acceptance) and
processes of societal embedding (capital formation, setup of distribution, dissem-
ination of knowledge, user-side adaptations to facilitate the adoption, gaining of
user acceptance, removal of regulatory benefits etc.) that are necessary for the fur-
ther development of a new technology or technology system (Kemp/Rip/Schot
2001). They help to create virtuous cycles that allow a new technology to emerge,
by helping the technology to overcome initial barriers of high costs, the non-avail-
ability (or high costs) of complementary technologies and misfits between the new
technology and the external environment during the infancy period of a new tech-
nology when it has not yet benefited from dynamic scale and learning economies.
If  a new technology competes  with old paradigm technologies we label this
competition “old/new”. If  there is a new function which must be fulfilled and
more than one technology is involved, the technology competition is a “new/new”
one. Environmental regulation of pollutants,  for example, can force completely
new technologies without any predecessors. In other words, a new function has to
be established. Examples are filter technologies which cannot be replaced by integ-
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rated technological solutions for technical reasons or because of high opportunity
cost.
Based on this difference, we also can distinguish between two kinds of win-
dows  in  the  techno-economic  system.  Following  the  investigations  of  Kemp
(2001)  concerning  old/new competition  we  can  refer  to  the   first  one  as  an
old/new window. This window is open if the investment cycle of old technologies
comes to an end and new promising technologies are available at that time. Fol-
lowing the investigations of Arthur (1989) and David (1987) referring to new/new
competition, we can refer to the latter one as the “Arthur-David-window”. 
This window comes into being in the early stage of competition between simil-
arly far developed technologies. In principle, the economic competition between
two new technologies is governed by the same forces as the competition between
an established and a new technology. The main difference consists in the points of
departure of the respective races. Due to the positive feedback mechanisms in-
volved, even small differential effects accruing soon after the start of the competi-
tion are more decisive for the outcome of the race than larger effects some time
later. Evidently, time matters more here than in the competition between old and
new technologies.  If  unstable  phases  of  technological  development  arise,  then
even so called “small historical events” (Arthur) can frame the continued  direc-
tion of  technological  development.  This  phenomenon is  often observed in the
software programme market in which many company strategies are based on the
idea of  being  the first to occupy the market and to erect  market entry barriers
through  network effects. The case of Microsoft is a well known example of  such
a strategy. In unstable phases,  appropriate timing is clearly an important  factor
for success.
Stable phases of technological development caused by a combination of small
historical events and feedback mechanisms described above are addressed in the
literature by the notion of path-dependency (Arthur 1994). Path dependent tech-
nological developments can bring about a lock-in of a dominant technology and
correspondingly a lock-out of other possible technological solutions. In cases of
unsustainable development,  lock-ins create a development trap  that  has to be
overcome by environmental policy. Before examining the details of  this problem,
we should touch upon the selection environment outside the economic system.
4. Broadening the Selection Environment
Variation and selection mechanisms of technologies are not restricted to the
economic sphere. The selection mechanisms include not only selection by product
markets. Selection is a “multi-dimensional phenomenon” (Windrum 2003). It in-
cludes selection of visions of future developments by capital markets.  Selection
takes place when new technologies must be adjusted to the existing technologies
with which they must be combined. The existing infrastructure at a given point in
time has  a selective effect; private standards and public regulation work like a fil-
ter. Additionally, social concern and political mechanisms have an impact in the
sense of  a selection  process.  Stability  and instability  in the corresponding  coe-
volving systems can have a great impact on the evolution of given techno-eco-
nomic system. They can both reinforce and  destabilize each other.
 In giving this interplay a more precise meaning, we can simplify and distin-
guish  between three social subsystems only: the techno-economic system, the so-
cio-cultural system and the political system. Each system is partly determined by
its  own dynamics  and partly  by the interaction of  the  systems.  The distinction
 Zundel   139
between stable/unstable has its specific meaning based on the system to which it
refers.
Public concern in the socio-cultural system is a main driver of environmental
policy. We say that the socio-cultural system is stable with respect to the technolo-
gical path in question; this is if the public is indifferent about the sustainability of
this path and no real interest by mass media can be observed. The socio-cultural
system is considered unstable if a growing concern arises in scientific communities
about the ecological performance of the dominant technologies and a public de-
bate can be observed in mass media.
Assigning possible states to the political system is slightly more difficult. Two
features of this system are important: First, the system cannot be completely sep-
arated from society. In democratic societies, policy reacts – as it should – to public
interests. On the other hand, the political system is not completely free in adapting
public interests; it has its own institutional and social momentums. These mechan-
isms operate like a filter and influence whether and to what extent external im-
pulses are picked up by political actors and are transformed into political concepts
and actions. Against this backdrop, a three-part distinction of possible states of the
political system is useful:
• The political system is open if its endogenous mechanisms are stable and do
not impede external impulses for change.
• The  political  system  is  inert  if  its  endogenous  mechanisms  are  stable  and
impede external impulses for change.
• The political system is unstable if its endogenous mechanisms operate in fa-
vour of  an external  impulse  for  change.  We refer  to this  constellation as a
political window of opportunity.
The classical idea of the ideal sequence found in economic textbooks is as fol-
lows: sustainability problem is detected, public awareness arises, pressure is put on
the political system for action, an internalisation concept is implemented in the
economic system, and in the end the sustainability problem is (hopefully) solved.
The sequence starts with an impulse for change in the socio-cultural system and
ends with a successful internalisation in the techno-economic system. One altern-
ate situation is when the impulse for change begins in the socio-cultural system
and brings about changes in the techno-economic system without any political in-
fluence. In this case, public discourse indicates a demand for change, which can be
transferred by smart innovations into private willingness to pay for new and ecolo-
gical better products. The demand for high-quality food or the demand for textiles
not treated with chemicals are examples of this, despite policy support in spread-
ing these products in the meantime. This illustrates that there are many starting
points  for  change  and  the  classical  constellation  described  above  is  only  one
among them.
For the limited space of this chapter it is not possible to describe the factors
which stabilise or destabilise the socio-cultural system and the political system ac-
cording to the techno-economic system (for more details see Nill 2002 and Sar-
torius/Zundel  2004).  However,  it  is  hoped  that  new,  environmentally  friendly
technologies  can arise if  time windows in the techno-economic subsystem,  the
political subsystem and the social system are ordered in an appropriate manner
(see also Nill 2002). This idea is explored in a more systematic way in the follow-
ing section.
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5. Time Strategies
”There is no guarantee that evolution, whether in nature or in the economy,
will be beneficial.“ (Witt 2002, 13) Since there is no balancing mechanism between
problem generating and problem solving abilities of technology progress, keeping
society on sustainable paths will always be a political business, even if one admits
that policy often fails in running that business successfully. The example in section
2 shows that policy can make a difference.
If a given techno-economic system brings about serious impacts on the envir-
onment - that is, it is non-sustainable - we can say that this system is not very well
adapted to the environment in the evolutionary sense. A successful adaptation de-
pends mainly on four different abilities of markets:
• the ability to adopt new insights out of the scientific system (discovery function
of markets)
• the ability to generate a diversity of new promising solutions which are feasible
in a technical sense (research function of markets)
• the  ability  to  improve  feasible  solutions  to  competitive  ones  (development
function of markets), and
• the ability  to select  the best  solutions  among the competing ones (selection
function of markets).
Policy is well advised to use these abilities especially if a particular path of de-
velopment is not sustainable, but these abilities do not automatically work in the
direction of sustainable development. In case of a development trap on an unsus-
tainable path, particular functions of markets  are underdeveloped in relation to
what is needed for a sustainable development; the main target of policy is improv-
ing these abilities for generating new and ecological better solutions. We refer to
this approach as second order sustainability, which is an improvement of particu-
lar abilities of markets depending on time (see Sartorius 2003).
In principle,  second order sustainability  aims at an intelligent use of market
forces: in particular the ability to create new environmental solutions that are low-
cost and the ability to select the best ones through market competition. The rela-
tive importance of these different abilities or functions for new and better paths of
technological developments based over time depend on and vary with the kind of
competition (old/new and new/new) and the status of the techno-economic sys-
tem (stable/unstable). Thus a strategic framework is required to take these distinc-
tions into account.
In order to link strategies to possible combinations of states of different social
subsystems and to develop a taxonomy, we use the idea of a sequence, beginning
with an old path and the discovery that this path is not sustainable and no prom-
ising solutions are available from the outset. The sequence ends when a transition
is completed and one new technology has taken over. It should be emphasised
that it is not  suggested that the complete sequence or a  sequence in exactly that
order must  be carried out. Very often there  are repeated attempts of transition in
reality. It is also possible that government should not interfere, since the autonom-
ous development of the techno-economic system tends itself to be  an unstable
situation. The following table provides a survey of time-critical situations.
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Table 1: Survey of time critical situations
With respect to the notion of window of opportunity we can assign the follow-
ing names to the strategies, described above:
• Window preparation: enhancing diversity and solving development problems in
the pre-market stage (1, 2)
• Window opening: technology forcing (2.a)
• Window utilisation: making a transition easier (3, 3.a, 3.b)
• Window closing: reviving selection function of markets (4)
In the following paragraphs these strategies are explained in more detail.
(1) The first  situation can be characterised by three features: a sustainability
problem linked to the old path is detected, the old path is stable, no techno-eco-
nomic window exists and no promising solutions are available. The main target
needed to improve flexibility of the techno-economic system is stimulating the de-
velopment  of  promising  solutions  mainly by supporting scientific  research and
providing incentives to firms to adopt new scientific ideas. 
(2) If promising solutions are already available we can proceed to the next step.
The second situation is characterised by a stable old path, but now there is at least
one promising solution. The main targets needed to improve the flexibility of the
techno-economic system are creating diversity and stimulating firms to develop at
least one competitive solution, for example by organising learning curves. Govern-
ment should make best use of market forces; here this involves mainly searching
for  new promising  solutions  and  developing  new solutions  until  they  become
competitive  to  some extent.  Expectation  management is  important  for  policies
that  prepare  the emergence of  future  techno-economic  windows.  Weak signals
such as long-term targets also might play a role. Mechanisms may include e.g. the
creation of niches for or the support of new alternatives (strategic niche manage-
ment). Additionally, we must keep in mind that environmental policy requirements
might also hinder window emergence, e.g. delay investment cycles (retrofitting),
thereby increasing sunk costs especially if  end-of-pipe treatment is involved. In
this case transition might be obstructed by environmental policy itself.
No





Quality of alternatives Strategies
1 stable not applicable only theoretical 
alternatives  exist
demonstration of technical 
feasibility
2 (still) stable not applicable promising solutions diversity and development
2a stable not applicable promising solutions handling of political pressure
3 unstable old vs new 
and new vs
new
at least one competitive 
solution
making transition easier and 
avoiding rush selection
3a unstable mainly 
old vs new
one alternative solution is 
competitive, there are other 
promising solutions
making transition easier and 
avoiding new sunk costs
3b unstable mainly 
new vs new
multiple alternative solutions 
are competitive
making transition easier and 
avoiding rush selection
4 stable not applicable transition is completed reviving selection function
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(2a) A situation very similar to (2) arises if strong social or (international) polit-
ical pressure forces the government to open a window using political means under
the conditions that the old path is stable and only promising solutions are avail-
able. This situation is different to that described under (2), because the govern-
ment has to deal with strongly opposing market forces. Although this may be ne-
cessary we must be aware that the danger of add-on-technologies or retrofitting of
existing technologies increases considerably, especially if governments use instru-
ments that stimulate quick fixes. Governments have an incentive to do so if the
political window of opportunity is shorter than the time period required for devel-
oping  more  fundamental  alternative  solutions.  In  addition  to  the  targets  men-
tioned in (2) government must balance the social pressure for  a quick solution
needed for  political support  and the time period needed for  more far-reaching
solutions. 
(3) If more than one solution becomes competitive to some extent, the next
step can be taken. This situation may be generally characterised by the following
features: the old path is unstable or at least a techno-economic window can be an-
ticipated, and there is competition between different new solutions. At least one of
the new solutions is competitive in principle. In short, we face a combination of
new vs. new competition and old vs. new competition. Fundamentally a transition
is now possible and the government’s target might be to facilitate this transition,
for example by abandoning discriminating mechanisms for the new solution.
(3a) In some cases the situation is more complicated than in (3): besides the
competitive solution there are other solutions that are merely promising and have
not  yet  attained  competitiveness.  The  development  of  their  potential  can  be
strongly impeded by simply following the target of transition. If some new solu-
tions can use network effects and early economies of scale, they can gain an ad-
vantage, and cannot  be overtaken by other promising solutions with a possibly
greater potential. In other words, there is a trade-off between diversity and facilit-
ating transition. In this situation the government must keep the window open by
suppressing the selection function of markets until the most promising solutions
have developed their potential. If this is too costly or not feasible and the old vs.
new window can only be used by the more advanced technologies, at least a lock-
in of new solutions must be avoided, e.g. through reservation of niches etc. An ex-
ample is provided by the photovoltaic case study. It is clear that photovoltaic will
not be competitive in the foreseeable future compared with conventional power
plants; it will not be implemented when the conventional power plants have to be
replaced by new power plants. Photovoltaic technology is not a real alternative in
the next window of opportunity.  Despite this, it makes sense to keep this techno-
logical option alive over the next years.
(3b) Sometimes the necessity of a transition is possible due to internal limits of
the old path. As a result, new vs. new dynamics come to the forefront. For policies
which take advantage of, or utilise, these new vs. new techno-economic windows,
“utilise” can also mean “keep the window open” for a sufficiently long time. Polit-
ical responsibility is also high here: environmental policy may act as the “small his-
torical event” within the selection environment important for the increasing re-
turns  models,  e.g.  biases  competition.  This  may reinforce  or  even lock-in  first
mover  advantages.  The  political  exploitation  of  techno-economic  new vs.  new
windows consists mainly in assuring that in an open phase of competition the best
technologies in ecological and economic terms have a  chance of being  selected. 
(4) The key question to be solved now is whether dynamic allocation efficiency
gains can justify the losses of static allocation efficiency by suppressing the selec-
tion function of markets. If no further technological progress of new technologies
can be expected, the main target in this situation is a proper selection of best avail-
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able solutions.  This  sometimes  means that  government  has  to  end all  political
interference in market processes. This step is important because subsidies, protec-
ted markets and other political support create their own momentum; they bring
about sunk costs and create many vested interests when support ends. 
The simplest order may be when windows in all three systems exist simultan-
eously. In contrast, a transition is more difficult if time windows in the social and
the political system do not accompany a techno-economic window. The empirical
findings of our case studies in the SUSTIME project support this idea. In all cases,
we observed favourable conditions in the social and the political system; these are
listed under the heading “window utilisation” and can be regarded as success cases
(for more details see Sartorius/Zundel 2004). 
In  addition,  the  case  studies  demonstrate  that   success  conditions  must  be
complex  depending  on  the  time  strategy  used  and  how  radical  the  transition
should be. Technology forcing by political means in a stable phase of the techno-
economic system is much more demanding than a transition in an unstable phase.
What we learn from our case studies is that technology forcing can only be ex-
ecuted successfully if a sufficient and long term public pressure exists, conditions
in the political system are favourable and promising solutions are available and ad-
opted by influential firms. This coincidence of events seldom occurs, and this is
likely the reason why politically induced radical transitions are seldom observed in
reality. The conditions for incremental changes are far less demanding and this is
perhaps the reason why these changes form the usual pattern of environmental
policy aiming at technology changes. 
The role of promising solutions is very prominent in many case studies. Prom-
ising solutions are often decisive for transition, because the public perception of
promising solutions  brings  about considerable  support  for  political  attempts  in
transition  through new regulation schemes.  A promising solution shows that  a
transition is feasible, sometimes at low costs, and is therefore probably the most
important factor of a politically induced window preparation. These findings com-
pletely correspond with our idea that a transition is more likely to occur when
more alternative solutions are developed.
6. Conclusion
Time strategies are not an academic artefact; timing problems are ubiquitous in
environmental policy. One might think of the phase-out of nuclear power plants
in Germany or of the broad range of political measurements in supporting regen-
erative energy sources. Timing is important in almost  every important case of en-
vironmental policy. . This is not an accident, since path dependent developments
of technological change are also widespread.  Thus environmental policy should be
well advised if political measurements are embedded in  a strategic framework as
described above.
Information is a scarce resource for political actors when choosing an appro-
priate time strategy depending on the state of the techno-economic system. To
time their measures well they must know the state of techno-economic system,
they must distinguish between theoretical ideas, promising solutions and competit-
ive solutions; they must also know whether the potential of a promising solution
has been explored and when public support  of these will  end.  The widespread
opinion in literature is that political actors are not well informed about these fea-
tures  of  technological  development  and we agree with this  opinion.  Obviously
such a knowledge base for policy is far beyond reach. However, what is possible is
pattern prediction in the sense of Hayek (1969); what is certainly impossible are
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prediction of the outcome of technological development. Mainly for that reason
the approach of time strategies must  be understood in the sense of guiding lines
of  a  transition  management,  by  which  political  action  under  the  condition  of
uncertainty is addressed.
By emphasising the limits of knowledge of political actors, many scholars allege
that political actors are free in choosing a generic or a selective approach of tech-
nology or environmental policy, and that they should chose a generic approach
since such a policy is far less demanding based on  knowledge limits. Due to path
dependency, however, even generic measures such as taxes or tradable permits of-
ten end up being selective depending on time of implementation. In a stable phase
generic measures mainly bring about further improvement along the boundaries of
dominant technologies; in an unstable phase generic approaches can - but not al-
ways - bring about more fundamental changes of technological changes. In taking
this for granted, political actors often have no real choice between a generic and a
selective approach. Empirical finding bear out this claim to some extent: almost
every regulation scheme has a technological content discriminating against some
technologies and supporting others. In light of this background, the real question
is how far should - and can - political actors improve their knowledge base, while
admitting that they face severe restrictions in doing so. 
A learning-based adaptive  approach  developed  by the  concept  of  transition
management (Kemp/Romans 2001) might be an appropriate way for handling the
severe knowledge restrictions with which environmental policy is confronted. 
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1. Introduction 
Network-bound  infrastructure  systems  such  as  electricity,  gas,  water  and
telecommunications  currently  undergo transformations  on  multiple  levels  resulting
from  various  sources  of  dynamics.  These  include  changes  of  the  regulatory
framework  - deregulation and liberalization -, changes of the institutional settings and
corporate structures,  e.g. as part of privatization and internationalization strategies,
the introduction of new technologies and the emergence of new practices and cultures
of  use,  for  example  in  the  context  of  mobile  phones  or  the  internet.  These
transformations are of considerable importance for sustainable development because
utility systems are closely intertwined with society and nature. The present chapter
proposes a conceptual approach for analyzing these ongoing transformations in order
to assess the potential for developing sustainable utility services.1
Utility  systems  structure  the  relations  between  society  and  the  natural
environment.  Therefore  socio-technical  transformations  of  these  systems  typically
imply  transformations  of  the  relation  patterns  between  society  and  nature,  also
referred  to  as  social-ecological  transformations  (ISOE  2000).  Utility  systems  are
particularly important, because they enable and structure a large number of activities
in  firms  and  private  households.  Furthermore,  utility  systems  themselves  cause
important environmental  impacts by extracting and transforming natural resources,
directing  material  flows,  the  production  of  toxic  or  radioactive  waste,  emissions,
intervening in local ecosystems etc.
1 The  chapter  is  developed  in  the  context  of  the  project  “Integrated  Microsystems  of
Supply”, a participative foresight project that comprises the analysis of dynamics in the
electricity,  gas,  water  and  telecommunications  sectors,  the  construction  of  scenarios
together  with  representatives  from  different  stakeholder  groups,  an  evaluation  of  the
sustainability potential of the scenarios and the development of strategy options for and
with  different  stakeholders  (www.mikrosysteme.org).  The  project  is  funded  within  the
Socio-ecological Research Programme at the German Federal Ministry for Education and
Research (www.sozial-oekologische-forschung.org)
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Given the high capital intensity and the coupling of technological, institutional and
knowledge  structures  in  these  sectors,  socio-technical  transformations  tend  to  be
relatively slow and strongly path dependent. There are few windows of opportunity
for a departure from the established development paths. Radical changes in market
rules, as the ones that have followed liberalization and resulting structural adaptations,
open up windows of opportunity for developing more sustainable utility sectors. On
the other hand, this situation also exhibits the danger to lock-in new but not more
sustainable structures for the decades to come. 
In  this  chapter  we  propose  an  analytical  framework  for  the  analysis  of
transformations at the level of individual sectors that also takes interactions between
different sectors into account. We will illustrate how this concept can be applied to
analyze transformation processes in the utility sector.2
Transformation processes  result  from dynamics  at  different  levels:  a)  dynamics
located at the meso level of sectors, b) dynamics rising up from the micro level of
corporate and individual actors as utility companies, political actors and consumers,
and specific innovation projects, c) dynamics resulting from processes at the macro
level of broader societal,  technological  or ecological developments.  Moreover,  how
the utilities will look like in the future is dependent on interactions within and across
different action fields such as provision of utility services, the consumption of these
services and the political governance of both.
In order to analyze the transformations  of the utility sectors we start  from the
approach  of  “technological  transitions”,  as  developed  by  Rip,  Kemp,  Schot  and
others (Kemp 1994; Schot et al. 1994; Rip/Kemp 1998; Schot 1998) on the basis of
insights from evolutionary economics and technology studies, and which has recently
been elaborated by Geels (2002a;b).3 However, for our problem at hand, the transition
theory approach has to be extended in three ways:
• A stronger emphasis on non-technical sources of dynamics is needed, particularly
institutional and service innovations.
• Most of the recent work in transition theory has concentrated on changes of single
regimes or on the emergence of new regimes. In order to analyze transformations
in the utility sectors emphasis is needed on the interaction between regimes.4
• A stronger consideration of transformation processes that follow other patterns
than ideal type transitions – a so-called regime shift symbolized by an s-curved
dynamic from one stable configuration to another one – is necessary.
In the following we will first give a brief outline of the multi-level framework of
transition  theory.  We  will  then  present  major  transformation  processes  currently
happening  in  the  utility  sectors  in  general  and  we will  argue  for  the  necessity  to
consider also other transformation processes. Chapter 4 proposes a concept of socio-
technical niches which goes beyond the technological focus. Chapter 5 then sketches
a framework for analyzing multi-regime dynamics and presents potential dynamics in
the utility systems resulting from these interactions. We will sum up in chapter 6 how
transition theory can be fruitfully applied for the analysis of sustainable utility sector
transformation. 
2 However, a thorough empirical analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter. For a more
encompassing analysis see Konrad et al. (2004).
3 For a critique see Berkhout et al. (2003).
4 An extension of transition theory to the analysis of multiple regimes is the aim of a project
recently  started  at  the  University  of  Eindhoven  (see  http://www.tm.tue.nl/
capaciteitsgroep/aw/tech_studies/researchplan_feb2003.pdf).
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2. The Multi-Level Framework
In this chapter we will give a very short overview of central building blocks and
assumptions  of  transition  theory:  the  concept  of  socio-technical  regimes,  the
embeddedness  of  regimes  in  a  multi-level  framework  and  implications  for  socio-
technical change to occur or to be brought about.5
According to Geels (2002b: 14) a socio-technical regime is defined as a socio-technical
configuration, which fulfills a societal function, consisting of artefacts, user practices,
markets and distribution networks, infrastructures, policy, laws, regulation, capital and
finance. Socio-technical regimes are organized around the specific societal function,
which is fulfilled by the socio-technical regime. The concept of regime refers to the
rule-set or grammar which guides, but does not fix, action and cognition, for example
by  providing  search  heuristics  for  problem  solving  and  innovation  or  roles  of
behavior (Kemp et al. 1998: 182). This rule-set may also be called a “semi-coherent
web of rules”, since these rules are coordinated, yet not necessarily perfectly aligned,
so that tensions and frictions within the regime may emerge (Geels 2002b: 106).6 The
interrelations of the elements of a technological regime provide on the one hand a
stabilizing function for the whole complex. Stabilization does not exclude change, but
it gives a direction to change which makes certain changes much more likely than
others and incremental changes more likely than radical changes. On the other hand,
if changes in parts of the regime occur, due to the interrelations further changes may
be induced. 
Technological  transitions are conceptualized as  a  change from one more  or  less
stable  socio-technical  configuration  to  another  (Geels  2002b:  15).  Against  the
background of this conception we define  transformations as major structural changes
not necessarily of, but also in a socio-technical configuration, that is not necessarily a
change of the socio-technical configuration as a whole. If these changes will ultimately
be  part  of  a  larger  transition  process,  is  often  impossible  to  predict  in  advance.
Furthermore, they may not follow a dynamic pattern of a smooth s-curve from one
stable  state  to  another,  but  may  include  other  macro  dynamics,  including  steady
incremental changes, cyclical movements or catastrophic changes. 
The multi-level framework refers to a set of interrelated processes at three levels
(see figure 1). Socio-technical regimes at the meso level correspond largely to the level
of  sectors.  In  contrast  to  incremental  innovations,  which  may  emerge  within
established regimes, radical innovations are typically generated in  niches at the micro
level.  Niches  are  defined as  socio-technical  environments,  for  instance  application
domains, which are characterized by specific selection conditions diverging from the
dominant  regime (Hoogma 2000:  80ff.).7 Niches  are important  for  socio-technical
change, because they provide a space for learning about design specifications, possible
5 For more detailed presentations of the approach see Kemp (1994), Schot (1998), Rip &
Kemp (1998), Kemp et al. (1998), Rip (2000); Geels (2002a; b) and Hoogma et al. (2002).
6 Therefore the concept of regimes refers to a less strictly coordinated entity as a narrow
conception of a system would imply.
7 Two types of niches are distinguished. The first type refers to so-called  technological niches,
which are explicitly built up to provide a protected space for innovations to be tested and
to gain experience. A typical example would be experiments and pilot projects with new
technologies, which do not have to be economically viable, which might still show technical
problems, or which do not have to fully comply with the usual regulatory requirements. In
evolutionary terms this is to say that selection criteria are suspended or weakened or that
the innovation is only partly exposed to the selection criteria (Hoogma 2000: 81f.). Market
niches are also characterized by locally specific selection criteria. However, these are not the
result  of  specific  protection  measures,  but  rather  due  to  specific  characteristics  of  an
application domain and certain user groups, or they have been developed on the basis of a
former technological  niche (Kemp 1994; van den Ende/Kemp 1999; Geels 2002b: 100,
114).
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ways  of  using  and  user  requirements,  new  meanings,  societal  and  environmental
impacts,  production  and  maintenance  and  the  adequate  regulatory  framework
(Hoogma et al. 2002: 28). Furthermore, niches allow for the build-up of supporting
actor-networks.  Major  socio-technical  changes  as  regime shifts  typically  start  from
niches and rely on a dynamic of niches: an expansion of niches, which eventually leads
to the replacement of  the old regime; a technology  may also be implemented in a
succession  of  different  niches  (niche  branching  or  niche-cumulation)  or  the
emergence of a new regime relies on the interaction of multiple niches (Schot 1998;
Geels 2002a; 2002b: 121ff., 326f.). In the process of niche branching the technological
design as well as the application domains may gradually depart from patterns that at
the beginning had been rather similar to the respective regime (Hoogma 2000: 341ff.).
Rather inflexible or slowly changing structures external to a socio-technical regime
are defined as part of the socio-technical  landscape at the macro level. These external
structures  consist  for  example  of  macro  economic  developments,  demographic
trends,  cultural changes, broad political changes or environmental  problems (Geels
2002b: 109). They may have a considerable impact on the transformation dynamics of
a regime, yet they cannot easily be influenced by the regime actors.
Whereas  transition  theory  has  situated  dynamics  largely  as  rising  up  from the
bottom of niches, forcing itself on the predominantly stable regimes and landscape,
Geels (2002b: 104) has rightly criticized this bias towards the novelty following a kind
of heroic “David and Goliath storyline”. A concept of technological transitions must
also consider dynamics at the level of regimes, internal dynamics of certain elements
of regimes as user practices, technology, policy, industry structure, or dynamics at the
landscape level.  Nevertheless,  the interplay  of these internal dynamics may lead to
tensions in the regime, which will open up windows of opportunities for novelties and
thereby may also lead to broader changes.
Before we elaborate on how we think the transition theory approach could be
fruitfully expanded, the next chapter gives a short overview of relevant transformation
processes going on in the utility sectors. As will be shown, changes starting from the
Figure 1: The Multi-level framework (Geels 2002a: 1261)
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landscape level have been just as important as changes at the level of niches – niches
based on technological as well as non-technical innovations (see also chapter 4).
3. Transformation Processes in the Utility Sectors
One of the major changes happening at the landscape level which is common to
all  utility  sectors is  the recent break with regulatory paradigms associated with the
provision of these basic services in industrialized societies. Meanwhile these changes
have had an impact on most sectors at the regime level, as regulatory structures or
organizational forms have been altered in many countries as a consequence of the
new market orders. 
In the course of industrialization, the provision of water and gas, sanitation, public
transport  and  electricity  were  key  factors  for  generating  widespread  welfare  and
setting the basis for other industrial activities to prosper.  Originally in the late 19th
century, these basic services were often provided by private firms.8 However, due to
lack of investment,  ruinous price wars, and the fundamental importance for health
and welfare these sectors got more and more transferred into state owned property or
at  least  into  regulated  monopolies  with  tightly  prescribed  service  levels  and  the
obligation to deliver their service in a non-discriminatory way to all citizens in a given
region.  This understanding of utilities as a basic and taken for granted element of
modern  life  was  unchallenged  and  expanded  over  almost  a  century  in  most
industrialized societies.
During the 1980ies, however, this fundamental consensus began to break up. This
transformation at the level of the landscape had strong ideological origins (Gray 1998)
or served to reorganize power relationships between utility operators and regulating
bodies (Hirsch 1999; Young 2001). Once liberalization, deregulation and privatization
got introduced into the political debate many of the taken for granted elements of the
former utility regimes seemed to be at disposition. The changes at the level of the
landscape were therefore weakening a series of relationships stabilizing the dominant
regimes. The specific  transformations  in the different utility sectors  may, however,
differ quite strongly. Also within sectors in different national markets, as the example
of  the  EU shows,  a  wide  range  of  developments  is  possible.  All  the  sectors  are
affected by the new ideas and the emerging paradigms about the good way to produce
and supply utility services. 
Transition theory may here be fruitfully applied. We shall therefore shortly sketch
in  how far  the  notions  of  landscapes,  regimes  and niches  may help to grasp  the
different transformation processes. We will start from a notion of regimes which is
strongly related to the sector definition of conventional utility services, i.e. electricity,
gas,  drinking  water,  waste  water,  telecommunications  etc  regimes  and  their
transformation.  A high degree of  similarity  exists  between these different  regimes.
They in general deal with a commodity which is produced or generated in specific
geographical  locations  and  is  distributed  across  a  wide  spanning  physical
transportation infrastructure towards the fixed points of consumption spread more or
less evenly in space. Demand is taken as a given external factor to which the provision
of services has to adapt. The distribution infrastructure is thus an important asset and
normally  has  considerably  long  life  times  (20  to  100  years).  As  a  consequence,
turnover  times  are  high  and  the  introduction  of  new  products  and  production
processes is bound to follow strongly entrenched paths. Innovation is therefore rather
slow and of a more incremental type.
This  technological  infrastructure  is  complemented  by  rule  sets  and  institutions
which are (or rather used to be) of comparable durability. Producer associations and
8 For Great Britain see Guy et al. (1999).
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governmental  regulators  determined  the  long  term  development  plans  of  the
construction  and expansion  of  infrastructure  (Hirsch 1999).  Expansion  plans  were
based on long term projections  of past  growth characteristics.  The evaluation and
selection of innovations was managed at the level of working groups in the national
sector associations as a problem of negotiated search for a common way to proceed.
Economic efficiency was of minor importance as investments were financed on the
cost-plus principle.  Consumer preferences played a minor role because of the high
degree of homogeneity by which these services were characterized. Consumers on the
other hand were rarely interested in these services because they often did not directly
consume  electricity  or  gas  but  rather  the  end-use  services  like  light,  heat  or
entertainment.  All these characteristics led to a strong orientation of the actors on
technical  characteristics,  low visibility  and strong path dependencies over  almost  a
century.
The recent  landscape changes  in  the regulatory  paradigms  of  these  sectors  are
complemented by not  less  dramatic  changes  in  fields  like  basic  technologies.  The
former strong reliance on big plants, based on increasing economies of scale is more
and more challenged by new more flexible I&T based alternatives, which increase the
attractiveness  of  customer  specific  appliances.  Therefore,  long  distance  transport
becomes less of a necessity and new decentralized topologies of service production
and  consumption  come  into  reach.  Concomitantly  with  these  new  technological
conditions,  new  use  patterns  emerge.  This  is  most  obvious  in  the  case  of
telecommunication, e.g. newly emerged use patterns of the internet or mobile phones.
Furthermore,  new  service  concepts  are  developed  in  niche  markets,  e.g.  energy
services  such  as  the  operation  of  customer  appliances  or  the  rental  of  efficient
appliances.  Increasingly  mobile  appliances  also  create  new  markets  for  highly
decentralized electricity generation and storage etc. Former generalized concepts such
as the separation between producers and consumers (e.g. in the case of electricity) or
the separation between heat and electricity provision (e.g. in the case of natural gas)
are therefore likely to give way to new constellations, which will increasingly threaten
key stabilizing forces of the established sector regimes. 
However,  an  analysis  of  ongoing  transformation  processes  –  as  in  our  case  –
cannot  know from the beginning,  if  these transformation processes  will  ultimately
lead to  a  shift  of  regimes.  Transformations  may also  be  restricted  to  incremental
changes  or  follow  a  different  dynamic  pattern.  Hence,  for  a  prospective  study  a
broadened perspective is necessary, which considers the dynamics on all three levels
independent  of  the  final  outcome.  Secondly,  it  is  often  impossible  to  decide
beforehand whether or not a specific alternative scenario will be more sustainable or
not. Therefore, we cannot presuppose that a regime shift is the only way to go for.
This calls for an expansion of the analytical focus of transition theory, which so far
focused on radical transformations following largely an s-curve-shaped transition, and
possible paths and dynamics leading to them. Studies have either analyzed historical
regimes  shifts  (Schot  1998;  Geels  2002b),  or  –  as  far  as  current  or  future
transformations are concerned – have chosen a normative perspective, starting from
the  assumption  that  a  sustainable  way  of  fulfilling  certain  societal  functions,  for
example transportation, can only be realized by a radical break with existing regimes
(Kemp 1994; Kemp et al. 1998). 
Transformations do not only happen within the individual  utility  regimes.  One
may expect a high degree of similarity between the processes across different sectors.
Furthermore, the relationship between these sectors is likely to change too. Recently
the concept of internationally operating multi utilities has gained increasing attention.
By offering  bundles  of  services,  utilities  hope to  reap considerable  synergy  in  the
distribution  and create substantial  added value  on the  side  of  consumers.  On the
other side, jointly used, constructed and maintained physical infrastructure could be a
source  of  considerable  cost  savings.  The  conventional  understanding  of  utility
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services and its organizational form is therefore potentially subject to change, as well.
Whether or not these synergies may be reaped is an empirical question. On the local
level,  municipal  utility  companies  have  practiced  the  multi-utility  approach  for
decades,  yet  under  different  conditions.  Given  these  transformation  potentials,
similarities  and synergies,  however,  we have  to  enlarge  the  conventional  focus  of
regime analysis to the interaction between regimes and add to the potential regime
dynamics such processes like regime merging, regime split up or regime cross over.
Summarizing,  we  may  describe  transformation  processes  in  utility  sectors
happening  at  all  three  levels  of  transition  theory:  landscapes,  regimes  and  niches.
These transformations have a potential for radical change. As elaborated above, we
see three major aspects in which processes should be analyzed in more detail in order
to  grasp  the  future  dynamics  of  utility  services:  (i)  the  potential  to  develop  more
decentralized structures for provision and distribution of infrastructure services, (ii) a
strong transformation in the producer-user interface leading to more service oriented
utility  products  and (iii)  the  structure  of  relationships  between the  utility  services.
Future transformations  of the utility sectors  are likely to include one or several of
these  aspects.  The  more  these  transformation  dimensions  will  change,  the  more
radically different will be a future utility system compared to the former one. In order
to be able to discuss these transformations however, some additions to the existing
body of literature on transition processes, regimes, niches and landscapes are needed. 
4. From Technological to Socio-Technical Regimes and Niches
In chapter 2 we presented the concept of socio-technical regimes. This concept of
socio-technical regimes implies a modification to the concept of technological regimes
as it was introduced by Rip, Kemp, Schot and others.  Kemp et al.  (1998: 182, our
italics)  defined it  as  „… the whole  complex  of  scientific  knowledges,  engineering
practices,  production  process  technologies,  product  characteristics,  skills  and
procedures,  and  institutions  and  infrastructures  that  make  up  the  totality  of  a
technology.  A  technological  regime  is  thus  the  technology-specific  context  of  a
technology ...”. In contrast to the notion of socio-technical regimes it puts a certain
technology or technological system at the center, social elements are grouped around
this technological core. We prefer the concept of a socio-technical regime since – by
putting the societal function to the fore – it implicitly avoids the a priori decision that
the societal function fulfilled by a regime is primarily  fulfilled by a technical  core,
which itself is depending on  secondary non-technical context elements. If a regime is
primarily defined by the societal function it fulfills and not by a core technological
system, non-technical elements might just as well be as central as or even more central
than technological elements. In the case of energy, water and telecommunications as
they  are provided for  in industrialized countries  today,  large technical  systems are
indeed central  elements  of  the regimes.  Nevertheless,  at  other  times  and in  other
places, regimes of the provision of water, energy or communications had been and
still  are organized less technology-intensive, yet could still  be described as a socio-
technical regime. 
Starting from this definition of a socio-technical regime we think it necessary to
take one step more and extend the broader socio-technical conception also to the
micro level. 
Just  as  with  technological regimes,  technological  niches  comprise  a  set  of
heterogeneous  elements  centered  around  a  technological  core  of  technological
innovations.  However,  innovations  showing  a  potential  to  change  a  regime  in  a
significant way are not necessarily technological innovations. We therefore propose
the concept of socio-technical niches. 
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Transition  theory  and  literature  on  strategic  niche  management  has  so  far
concentrated on the role of niches for  technological innovations and eventually regime
shifts (Kemp 1994; Schot 1998; Hoogma 2000: 81; Geels 2002b). An exception to this
are Hoogma et al. (2002) and Truffer (2003), who – in the field of private and public
transport  –  analyzed  niche  dynamics  also  for  organizational  innovations  and
innovations related to patterns of use. These innovations included new use patterns of
established technologies or new organizational forms, more precisely institutionalized
forms of ownership and use differing from the dominant regime (car sharing, various
rental concepts), or the organizational coupling of separate regimes. 
We propose to continue in this direction. The core of a niche innovation is not
necessarily a new technology, but might just as well be organizational, product, service
or  institutional  innovations,  which  are  not  applied  on  the  regime  level,  but  only
locally.  Considering  transformation  processes  in  the  utility  regimes  these  are,  for
example, innovations such as performance-contracting of energy services for hospitals
and wellness facilities, new regulatory concepts such as least-cost-planning or green
tariffs  which  have  first  been  introduced  by  some  pioneering  municipalities  or
emission trading schemes first introduced within some big companies. Non-technical
innovations are particularly relevant for the above mentioned transformations in the
dimension of services.9
5. Interaction of Regimes 
Transformation  processes  in  the  utilities  are  not  restricted  to  transformations
concerning  one  regime;  rather  several  regimes  are  involved,  interactions  between
these regimes may contribute  to the transformation dynamics and transformations
may also lead to a shift of regime boundaries. To analyse these dynamics we first have
to consider, where regime boundaries may be identified (5.1). We will then identify
different  types  of  relationships  between regimes  (5.2)  and finally  present  potential
coupled dynamics of a multi-regime system (5.3).
5.1 Delimitation of regimes
When using the concept of regime in the field of utilities the question arises at
which level this concept should be fruitfully applied. Does it refer to sector-specific
regimes as a gas or water regime? Or rather to an overarching utility regime spreading
multiple sectors? Or is it more reasonably applied below the level of sectors, e.g. to
specific socio-technical configurations which have evolved around certain generation
technologies  like  nuclear  or  wind  power?  To  answer  this  question  we  have  to
consider, how regime boundaries may be identified.  We propose to identify regime
boundaries according to the density and strength of couplings between the elements
of socio-technical configurations. 
We  differentiate  between  different  kinds  of  couplings  namely  functional  and
structural  ones.  As  functional  couplings  we  identify  input-output  relationships
between different elements, e.g. parts of the value chain. A further example would be
enabling products or services of one sector for another, e.g. the coupling between the
gas  and electricity sector via a gas turbine  driven power plant or the provision of
telecommunication services for the regulation of power generation technologies. 
9 In parallel to the concept of technological niches, it is useful to distinguish between socio-
technical  niches,  where  selection  criteria  are  explicitly  and  strategically  suspended  or
modified, and niches, where diverging selection criteria are due to given local characteristics
(see Note 7). We will call these protected niches and market niches. The term socio-technical niches
refers to both.
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Structural  couplings  refer  to elements  which are at  the  same time part  of two
overarching  complexes.  These  may  be  jointly  used  material  structures,  as  water
reservoirs  used  for  the  production  of  drinking  water  and  power,  or  jointly  used
transport infrastructures, e.g. powerline cables used for telecommunication services.
Structural  couplings  may  also  exist  at  the  institutional  level.  These  may  be  joint
organisations  as  modern  multi-utilities  or  traditional  municipal  utilities,  joint
professional associations of gas and water as they exist in Germany and Switzerland
or laws and regulations applied to multiple sectors. On a normative level a further
example may be the common conception of a basic service which is provided in an
undifferentiated way to all citizens of a certain region, a public service.
If structures merely show a high degree of similarity between different sectors but
do not actually constitute a common institution, organisation or material artefact we
will not speak of structural couplings but of structural similarities. 
A boundary between two regimes may now be identified if we find relatively dense
and hardly substitutable couplings within a complex of elements, whereas couplings
between these complexes are less  dense and more easily substituted.  Furthermore,
couplings  within  a  regime  will  typically  spread  different  structural  dimensions  as
technologies, institutions or knowledge structures. In addition, as outlined in chapter
2, a regime as a whole has to fulfil a certain societal function.
Under monopoly market conditions the sectors considered here can be described
as five regimes: an electricity, gas, drinking water, sanitation and telecommunication
regime. They are characterised by a high degree of similarity as we expounded already
in chapter 3 and a number of couplings exist between them; however these are less
dense  as  the  ones  within.  Within  these  regimes  specific  and  largely  independent
institutional and technical structures have emerged. These are specific networks and
generation  technologies  and  largely  specific  organisational  structures  –  either  as
independent companies or highly separated organisational structures within a utility
company. The regimes were largely based on different resources,  regulatory bodies
and  laws;  the  provision  of  the  services  was  based  on  specific  knowledge  and
differentiated professional structures. We split up the water sector in a drinking water
and sanitation  regime,  since these  are also largely  based on specific  networks  and
appliances, specific organisational units and professional associations, knowledge and
professional  structures;  also  the  societal  perception  of  these  two  services  differs
substantially.
The concept of a regime may to some extent also fruitfully be applied to the socio-
technical  configurations  which  have  developed  around  specific  generation
technologies,  e.g. in the electricity sector,  if these consist of a densely coupled and
mutually stabilising set of technological, institutional, knowledge and value structures.
However, these are functionally highly – and  so far  in a hardly substitutable way –
coupled to the overarching electricity regime.
Still the delineation of a specific regime may never be made as clear-cut as we may
wish. There may be strong structural couplings at certain points of the value chain
between regimes and other relationships within a specific regime may be in principle
substitutable by alternatives. In the following figure 2 the structure of the different
utility regimes is depicted as we may identify them for the times of monopoly market
regulation. 
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However with ongoing deregulation, utility firms have begun to restructure their
business fields and this may have impacts on the interaction of the formerly separated
regimes.  Some international  utilities  for  instance  began  to  position  themselves  as
multi-utilities  combining several services into combined offerings.  Transformations
may lead to the merging of formerly separated regimes, the splitting into sub-regimes
or the integration of regimes at different levels of the value chain as in the case of
vertical integration. 
For illustration, we may identify two extreme scenarios which still seem realistic.
On the one hand a strong integration of utility services may happen by the way of
emerging new multi-utilities, the creation of overarching market regulators spanning
all  utility  services,  the  joint  planning,  construction,  maintenance  and  use  of
transmission infrastructures and the diffusion of new generators such as gas power
plants. For the water part a strong integration between water provision and the waste
water part seems feasible (figure 3).
Figure 2: Representation of the inner-regime and cross-regime couplings for the case
of monopoly market regulation.
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However,  also  much  more  diversified  developments  may  be  imagined.  The
following figure 4 shows a newly reorganized set  of utility regimes,  which are not
based  on  conventional  media  differences  but  which  rather  follow  technological
imperatives. There might be a new decentralized electricity generation regime, which
is combined with a centralized gas regime. This regime would still  have to rely on
some services of a centralized electricity regime. However, technologies, use patterns,
institutions, knowledge and values might be largely different when the centralized and
the decentralized regime are compared. A similar situation might be imagined for the
water  sector,  if  used  water  is  recycled  within  the  household  or  a  firm  and  the
dependence on a centralized water provision system amounts only to a fraction of the
quantities compared to the current situation. 
Summarizing, we see that in order to discuss the future development alternatives
of utility services, the focus of a single regime system is not sufficient. The changing
relationship between regimes, the mutual influence between regimes becomes a major
driving  force  and  may  be  decisive  also  for  the  sustainability  dimension  of  these
sectors. In the following, we will discuss these interactions on a more systematic level.
5.2 Interactions between regimes
For  the  analysis  of  interactions  between regimes,  which  exert  an  influence  on
transformation processes in the utilities, three types of relations between regimes have
to be taken into account. Each type of relation implies different forms of interactions.
We  will  first  describe  the  three  types  of  relations  and  then  exemplify,  which
transformation dynamics between multiple regimes may result on the basis of these
interactions in the case of utility systems.
Interactions  between  regimes  fulfilling  a  similar  societal  function:  Most  studies  of  the
historical  development  of  regimes  and  regime  shifts  focused  the  competitive
relationship between regimes,  which fulfil  a similar societal  function.  A prominent
example  is  the  interaction  between  private  and  public  transport  competing  for
passenger travel (Kemp 1998; Hoogma et al. 2002). Competition in end user markets
can be seen as a specific form of a structural coupling between two regimes. 
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Interactions  between  regimes  on  the  basis  of  complementary  relations:  Regimes  are
functionally coupled with other regimes. For example utility systems are coupled with
a large number of regimes, which structure the different uses of the utility systems.
These  receiving  systems  may  themselves  be  structured  as  specific  socio-technical
regimes  fulfilling  a  specific  societal  function  such  as  laundry,  body  hygiene,  food
preparation and preservation, room heating and cooling or telephony in the case of
private households or pulp-and-paper-production, aluminium production etc. in the
case of industrial activities.10 The latter types of regimes – in our perspective from the
utility sector, we may call them “use regimes” – often develop in co-evolution with
the utility regimes.11 
Interactions between regimes showing structural similarities: interactions between different
regimes  may  also  take  effect  if  structural  similarities  between  two  regimes  exist.
Interactions may in these cases take the form of transfer  of experiences from one
regime to the other or because structural similarities open up synergies, which may be
reaped by forming new structural couplings. 
The three types of relations are not mutually exclusive. Regimes competing for
certain markets may have important structural similarities as in the case of gas and
electricity.  However,  this  must  not  be,  as  can  be  seen  with  the  more  structurally
diverse  regimes of  public  and private  transport.  Furthermore,  regimes fulfilling  in
some  instances  a  societal  function  competitively  may  fulfil  this  societal  function
complementarily at others (see below).
5.3 Potential transformation dynamics between utility regimes on the basis of
competitive and complementary relations and structural similarities
Interactions between regimes may contribute in two ways to transformations of
regimes:  as  transformation  processes  by interactions  between  regimes  and  as
transformations of the structure of interactions. In the following examples in the field
of utilities for both forms of transformations are given.
Transformation  by  interaction:  firstly  dynamics  in  one  regime  may  trigger  off  or
contribute  to  dynamics  in  other  regimes  mediated by  direct  and  indirect  linkages
between regimes. 
Transformation  of  interaction:  secondly  the  structure  of  couplings  and  interactions
itself may be modified in the course of transformation processes. The result may be
an intensification of the couplings between regimes, which may eventually lead to a
shift  of  regime  boundaries  and  an  integration  of  regimes.  On  the  other  hand,  a
decoupling  of  regimes  or  a  shift  of  couplings,  which  does  not  imply  changes  of
regime boundaries, is possible. The new structure of couplings will then affect further
transformation processes.
5.2.1 Transformations on the basis of structural similarities 
Regimes showing structural similarities are not necessarily coupled in any direct
way.  Nevertheless,  transformation  by  interaction  is  still  possible  if  transfer  of
experiences  or  imitation  takes  place.  This  applies  to  forms  of  regulation,  most
obvious in current tendencies towards liberalisation in all utility sectors, but may also
apply to changes in organisational structures, for example concepts of privatisation or
internal corporate structures, customer management or new service offerings. 
10 For the laundry regime or laundry as a “system of systems” see Shove (2003). The concept
of use regimes for the laundry and other domains has also been applied by Hirschl. et al.
(2002).
11 For the laundry regime see (Orland 1991; Shove 2003), for the co-evolution of electricity
and a number of energy-intensive industries Myllyntaus (1995), for air conditioning Shove
et al. (1998). 
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Structural  similarities  may  furthermore  form  the  basis  for  actualising  potential
synergies.  In  the  case  of  utilities,  we  currently  see  such  efforts  in  the  form  of
integration  or  co-ordination  in  fields  as  customer  management  and  network
operation. Synergies exist here for instance in the parallel or coupled laying of cables
and mains, such as telecommunication cables parallel to gas mains or in sewage canals,
or the co-ordination and integration of maintenance activities for different networks.
In the field of customer management billing, metering and customer services could be
integrated. Synergies are particularly important for structurally similar regimes, since
synergies are more likely here than in other constellations. On the other hand, we may
also find decoupling of  processes,  if former structural  couplings  are found to lack
sufficient synergy at a later point of development.  Generally these interactions are
situated  between specific  elements  of  the  regimes,  e.g.  specific  parts  of  the  value
chain. They do not apply to the regime as a whole. Therefore increasing integration at
one point of the linkages between two regimes may well go along with a decreasing
integration at another.
The realisation of synergies between two or more regimes will easily bring about
structural  changes  in  the  respective  regimes.  These  are  for  example  changes  in
processes, competencies and the organisational structures of companies, which may
further go along with changes of corporate culture. Technological innovations may be
implemented  and  patterns  of  qualification  have  to  be  adapted.  In  Germany  new
training  courses  are  offered  now  that  prepare  for  an  integrated  maintenance  of
networks  (Rothenberger  2003).  These  structural  changes  do  not  necessarily imply
profound changes in the overall regime structure.  However, a dynamic is possible,
where a stronger integration of regimes could induce further changes on the basis of
the  new  structure  of  intensified  interactions.  A  successful  cooperation  in  the
operation of  networks  could pave the way for  the introduction  of  new integrated
generation technologies and thereby a much stronger coupling of regimes. In quite
the same way successful integration of customer management may be a first step in
the direction of new offers of integrated services. An introduction of new integrated
generation technologies and integrated services would most probably result in major
changes in the utility regimes. Dynamics of this kind illustrate why in a prospective
perspective it is difficult  to differentiate between dynamics which do ‘only’ lead to
limited transformations of a regime like the cooperation in the operation of networks
or the integration of customer management and those, which ultimately result in more
profound regime changes.
5.3.2 Transformations on the basis of competitive relations 
Transformations by interactions on the basis of competitive relations could follow
a shift from the use of electricity-driven to gas-driven technologies on the side of the
users – be it via household technology or production machinery – or the other way
round. As long as the shift is only marginal this will probably not affect the regime
structure and the interactions between both. However, in the case of a far reaching
shift from one dominant regime to another, changes in the internal structure as well
as  the structure of  interactions  between regimes  are to be expected. Furthermore,
markets will change and thereby also linkages with regimes fulfilling complementary
functions.
A second type of  transformation would be a shift  from mainly competitive  to
more  complementary  relations  between  two  regimes.  Whereas  regimes  fulfilling  a
similar societal function compete on the one hand for common markets, at the same
time this  opens up a potential  to  fulfill  jointly  a common societal function.  Quite
often regimes competing at one point are functionally coupled at others fulfilling a
certain function complementarily. In the course of a shift from competitive to more
complementary relations new functional couplings are to be expected. In the utility
sector an increasing use of gas as primary energy carrier in electricity generation could
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be an example. A much more radical dynamic in this direction would be a rather tight
coupling  of  electricity,  gas  and  the  sewage  system  in  the  course  of  a  potential
transformation path leading to highly decentralized systems. Here the endpoint could
be the merging of until now fairly separate utility regimes into a common larger utility
regime.
5.3.3 Transformations on the basis of complementary relations
Transformation  processes  on  the  basis  of  complementary  relations  rely  on
functional  couplings.  Partly  these  are  indirect  interactions  between  regimes  via
common complementary regimes, e.g. certain use regimes. This could be an increase
in the gas or electricity consumed because of an increase in the use of hot water, or,
just the other way round, if less water is consumed, because energy is to be saved. A
similar  case  is  an  increase  in  the  use  of  electricity  following  the  spread  of  new
telecommunication  applications  (Huser/Aebischer  2002;  Büllingen/Stamm  2003).12
These use regimes are themselves coupled with other regimes, for example the regime
of room heating and cooling is coupled with the regime of housing. Therefore major
changes in the housing regime may indirectly affect utility regimes. 
As mentioned above, complementary relationships often lead to co-evolutionary
dynamics. Utility regimes and a number of its use regimes, in the private as well as in
the industrial sector, could only develop conjointly as has been illustrated in historical
studies. This type of dynamics typically goes along with a transformation or gradual
emergence of interactions.
An  important  example  may  be  illustrated  by  demand  side  management,  an
orientation of demand following supply,  because this implies a stronger interaction
between utility and use regimes, either based on technical, institutional, knowledge or
value  elements  or  some  combination  of  these.  These  changes  would  imply
considerable changes of the provider-consumer-relationship in the respective utility
regimes (Chappels et al. 2000; Van Vliet 2002). A rather extreme version are concepts
based on the possibility for supply side actors to actively turn on and off consumers
of electricity (Kets et al. 2002). A development in this direction could be a correlative
to an overall development in the direction to a decentralisation of utility systems.
6. Conclusion
In the present chapter, we have shown how transition theory might be fruitfully
applied in order to discuss ongoing transformations in the utility sectors. The analysis
of landscapes, regimes and niches helps to focus on stabilizing forces and to develop
an integrated view of processes spanning consumption, production and regulation in
order  to  identify  future  development  paths,  barriers  and windows of  opportunity.
This step is an important precondition for identifying and assessing more sustainable
futures of these utility sectors. 
However, the concepts as expounded in the literature had to be broadened and
modified  in  some  important  respects:  First,  we  have  enlarged  the  focus  on
technologies  in  order  to  include  broader  socio-technical  transformations.  As  a
consequence niches are not only identified for new technologies but also for other
12 In the case of utility regimes the number of complementary use regimes is fairly large, so
that an analysis of the role of complementary regimes for transformation processes in the
utility regimes has to start by a selection of those complementary regimes that are likely to
have a considerable impact on transformation dynamics of the utility regimes. This could
be  because  of  foreseeable  internal  dynamics  and  a  strong coupling  to the utilities,  e.g.
because  they  consume  an  important  amount  of  the  produced  electricity,  gas,  water  or
telecommunication services.
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innovation  processes  with  a  stronger  focus  on  institutions,  preferences  and
regulations. 
The analysis of current transformation patterns in the utility sectors showed that
non-marginal changes are possible in three domains: (i) a fundamental change in the
technological logic of utility production and distribution. In former times orientation
was  focusing  on  economies  of  scale  coupled  with  capital  intensive  material
infrastructures  connecting  locations  of  production  with locations  of  consumption.
Recent developments show potential for more decentralized and flexible systems of
generation  and  provision.  (ii)  Conjointly  with  market  liberalization  a  fundamental
break  with  user  conceptions  on  the  side  of  the  utilities  may  be  expected.  Thus
customer  and  service  orientation  may  increase  and  gradually  replace  the  former
company logic which is more strongly based on technological necessities than on user
needs.  (iii)  As  a  combination  of  the  first  two  transformations,  interactions  and
relationships between the utility sectors have the potential to change fundamentally.
Therefore the delineation of regimes may undergo quite radical transformation and
this  may  have  substantial  consequences  for  the  environmental  impacts  of  these
economic sectors.
The analysis of the three major realms of change may be undertaken by discussing
processes  at  the  three  levels  of  landscapes,  regimes  and  niches.  However,  the
theoretical  apparatus  has to be further  specified in order to fit  the specific needs.
First,  interactions  between regimes  have  to  be  taken  into  account  and  their  joint
dynamics  have  to  be  analyzed.  We  proposed  a  concept  for  analyzing  these
interactions. Secondly, depending on the degree by which these transformations take
shape  it  will  be  necessary  to  have  a  closer  look  at  various  patterns  of  regime
transformation rather than to exclusively focus on ideal type transitions, leading to the
substitution of a dominant regime by a new one. 
The present  conceptual  analysis  will  be empirically  applied in the  context  of  a
currently running research project in Germany. The goal of this project is to develop
shaping strategies for long-term structural changes in utility sectors.  Therefore it is
necessary to identify possible futures for the utility sectors electricity, gas, water and
telecom in Germany over the next 20 to 25 years. Emphasis is put on transformation
potentials  leading  to  more  sustainable  utility  regimes.  In  this  context,  we  have
developed overarching scenarios  for  the four  sectors  conjointly  with experts  from
utilities,  governments,  consumer  and  environmental  NGOs  and  will  analyze
transformation paths  which could ultimately lead to more sustainable futures.  The
present  theoretically  oriented analysis  will  therefore be brought to fruition  for  the
interpretation of these processes.
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Evaluation of Early Processes
in System Innovation 
A Pilot  Study on the  Transformation of  Dutch  Agriculture  and Food
Chain to Sustainability
A. Faber, G.A. Rood, J.P.M. Ros
RIVM Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency,  Bilthoven, The Netherlands
1. The evaluation of system innovations for sustainable development
Despite many success stories in environmental policy, several quite persistent en-
vironmental problems remain, such as increasing CO2 emissions, loss of biodiversity,
the  disturbance  of  the  nitrogen  cycle  and excess  noise  in our  daily  surroundings.
These persistent problems have appeared to be much harder to tackle with traditional
environmental  policies.  The  Dutch  government  has  introduced  a  new  long-term
strategy to deal with these problems in its  Fourth National  Environmental  Action
Plan:  transition management or the management of system innovations as a policy tool
(VROM, 2001). This policy requires an integrated control of large scale institutional
and technical changes within a context of uncertainty and complexity. 
Such a policy implies a focus on the process of (the preparation of) system innova-
tions, rather than strictly on the goals to be reached. A policy of system innovations
distinguishes what should be done on the short-term in order to reach goals on the
long-term. Management of system innovations does not necessarily mean that the na-
tional government plays the classic hierarchical role of controller. In order to be able
to involve other actors in a society it may well be a fruitful strategy for a government
to act as a facilitator or sometimes a director rather than as an enforcer of new rules.
Transition management aims to provide the new policy instruments to deal with the
persistent environmental problems.
A new policy instrument requires new methods for the monitoring and the evalu-
ation of the effectiveness and the efficiency of this  instrument.  The shift in policy
from a target approach to a system management perspective renders simple measure-
ments obsolete. Gathering physical data and measuring straightforward developments
does not suffice anymore. The monitoring of system innovations in society needs to
involve social processes, to which many actors, institutions and innovations may play
a role. Therefore, it is necessary to involve new parameters such as intentions, actions
taken,  networking,  research  and  development,  first  movers  and  resistance  against
changes.
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In  this  chapter  we present  some methodological  elements  of  this  new type of
monitoring. The transition to a sustainable Dutch agriculture (and food chain) is one
of the main targets in national environmental policy. This case is usded here to illus-
trate our approach.
2. General notions on the management of system innovations 
Transitions or system innovations are often related to large-scale technological re-
gime changes. In a fairly new context this concept is extended to large-scale changes
in society as well. This extension allows for a more integrated analysis, as well as for
policies that go beyond the traditional straight causal lines. System innovations as we
will use it (i.e. as a socio-technical concept) can be defined as “a gradual, continuous
process of structural change within a society of culture” (Rotmans et al, 2001). This
same study states that  “transitions  involve a range of possible  development  paths,
whose direction, scale and speed government policy can influence, but never entirely
control.” 
An important notion on system innovations is the idea that they usually take the
shape of an S-curve, that starts off  from a take off-phase, through an acceleration
phase and to a new stabilisation of the system. Many different smaller dynamics shape
this main path to stabilisation, but they do not all by themselves take the required dir-
ection. Transition management is to a large extent the modulation of all the smaller
dynamics in society in the same and preferred direction. In order to do so, it entails at
least the following important features:
• Goal setting: It is important to have a certain focus, to be able to give direction to
the smaller scale dynamics and innovations. Goal setting is necessary, but goals are
not necessarily fixed.
• Type of management is transformed from hierarchical towards network management,
which  takes  all  relevant  actors  into  account.  This  feature  originates  from  the
notion that direct steering of the large changes implied is not possible, and that the
transition manager should focus on providing the framework and guidance to the
other actors involved. Noteworthy is that some of the classic policy instruments
are still available here, e.g. subsidies, taxation or regulations.
• Some changes involve necessary (technological) pathways afterwards, hence creat-
ing a ‘lock in’. Uncertainties and the management of lock-in have to be incorporated
in transition management.1
• Short-term policies should be placed in a long-term context. This has already been ap-
plied in several policy fields – such as e.g. present-day climate change policy – but
it is not always clear to policy makers what the short term policy consequences are
of setting long term goals. Transition management should take this more into ac-
count.
• System innovations not only go through different time phases, but also take place
at different  scale  levels.  The micro level involves individuals,  the meso level  net-
works, organisations and institutes, the macro level conglomerates, nations and the
wider institutional context. These levels can be taken collectively to form the so-
cio-technical landscape (Geels and Kemp, 2000; Geels, 2002). Policies should take
the appropriate scale into account. 
The management of system innovations covers a wide range of areas for focus of
attention,  from problem perception to the actual realisation of large scale changes.
1 See (among many others) e.g. Dosi (1982), Nelson (1988), Nelson and Winter (1977) on the
Schumpeterian concept of lock-in.
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Many  publications  have  come  forth  dealing  with  the  relevant  aspects  of  system
innovations and their management (see, for example, Boulding, 1970; Rotmans et al,
2000; Geels  and Kemp, 2000;  Rotmans  et  al,  2002; Butter,  2002; Molendijk et al,
2002; Geels, 2002; Spakman et al, 2002). Many of the recent conceptual contributions
have originated in The Netherlands, no doubt promoted by the policy makers that
have put the concept in practice.
In our own contributions to the system innovation concept, we have concentrated
on the development of an evaluation methodology for transition management (see
Spakman et al, 2002; Rood et al, 2002; Van Wijk and Rood, 2002; Ros et al, 2003).
This methodology will be elaborated further in the following chapters.
3. Methodology for the evaluation of system innovations
3.1. The methodology of evaluation
We have developed a framework called ‘arenas in the transition process’ for the
evaluation of controlled system innovations. An ‘arena’ in the framework is defined as
a ‘set of activities with the relevant actors involved’.  These arenas cohere with the
process of system innovations along the theoretical S-curve, so as to basically provide
an analytical framework to assess the activities carried out by the many actors at the
various stages of the system innovation. We distinguish the following six arenas (see
figure 1): 
Arena 1 Problem perception;
Arena 2 Development of future visions;
Arena 3 Research and development;
Arena 4 Pilot projects and first movers;
Arena 5 System changes;
Arena 6 Final institutional polishing of the innovated system.
Noteworthy here is that the arenas are interrelated, not only in a serial, but also in
a parallel process. To carry out a proper evaluation of the activities in each arena, we
need to introduce a certain measure or indicator for these activities for each of the
arenas. This quantification enables us to monitor progress in the system innovation at
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Figure 1: Framework showing the ‘Arenas in the transition process’
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3.2. Elaboration of the six Arenas 
A1  perception 
This Arena shows the level of agreement on (the seriousness of) the problems.
Here already some initial priorities are set with respect to solutions and options for
action. The  perception is based on a broad array of sources, such as scientific know-
ledge, calamities and the sacrifices anyone will have to make in order to accomplish
potential solutions. The perception is often fed by the physical monitoring, but uncer-
tainties are an important source of controversy at this stage.
A2 Development of future visions
Future visions are important to stimulate actors to overcome barriers on the way
to reach a solution of the perceived problem. It is important to reach some agreement
on explicit goals, as this will give direction to later developments of technologies and
institutions. On the other hand, too much detail could hamper the actors in reaching
agreement to the point that it could discourage relevant players by frustrating their
creativity. This suggests finding an optimum between explicitness and level of guid-
ance. Such an optimum depends on the state of the developments in the other arenas;
making strides to the optimum spurs on the players involved, giving them a certain
‘push’ in the attempt to move into subsequent arenas.
A3 Research and development 
A system innovation  needs  new technical  options.  Surveying the  breakthrough
chances for technologies will involve at least some insight in technological develop-
ment, market structure and market chances, along with political backing. Such an as-
sessment is therefore not only based on the characteristics of the technology itself,
but  also  on the  institutional  environment.  Innovation  involves  indicators  such  as
R&D budgets, governmental support, competitiveness, synergy between researchers
and potential users (see eg. Shapiro, 2002). It is key to develop a network of innova-
tions, in order to improve interactions and hence gain momentum.
A4 Pilot projects and first movers
‘First movers’ are players able to combine conscience with the nerve to experiment
(Rogers, 1962). They are usually the actors that are willing to take some risks and con-
sequently will be found at the start of the diffusion process of any new innovation.
Even before these initial processes of diffusion take place, pilot projects will be star-
ted to test  and improve the new technologies.  These experimental  projects  can be
monitored.  To evaluate whether first  movers have taken their position,  setting the
stage for follow-up by the early majority, we can distinguish upcoming niche markets
in agriculture and assess their potential and contribution to the sustainability traject-
ory.
A5 Changing the system 
A key challenge in the process of system innovation is to overcome high barrier of
resistance, that occur between the present and the future systems (see figure 2). This
argument bears much resemblance to that used in the principles of thermodynamics,
i.e. a ‘hill of resistance’ will have to be taken or a high energy input is needed in order
to reach a system of high attractiveness and efficiency. 
To quantify the resistance we use the so-called MEI-model methodology, which was
developed to determine the efficiency of policy instruments (Van Wijk et al, 2001a
and 2001b). The method is based on the driving forces or pressures on an actor in re-
lation to the required targets. Such pressures could be, for example, financial impact,
pressure of policy goals and social pressure. The forces and pressures are determined
using a data mix of facts from various references in literature and from monitoring
programmes, or from expert judgements when facts and measurements are not readily
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available. The separate pressures can each show either positive or negative directions. 
A6 Final institutional polishing of the innovated system
The final phase of system innovation involves the institutional polishing of the
new system. It is natural to include the phase of maintenance here. This arena may
also include several new system participants when compared to the initial situation. 
3.3. The framework
The arena framework as introduced allows for a closer evaluation of the underly-
ing processes of system innovation. It does not necessarily relate to the policy goals of
sustainability, but focuses on the activity of the processes in each stage of the trans-
ition. The methodology allows for the evaluation of other arenas even without first
assessing these future visions. This does not mean that a transition can be organised
without setting goals or elaborating future visions; this is exactly what is evaluated in
the first arena. The overall assessment of a managed system innovation takes all the
arenas into account.
One of the advantages of this approach is that relatively small signs of progress
and activity can be identified. This framework can hence be applied at any stage of the
system innovation. In the next chapter we will illustrate the application of this frame-
work for the third and fourth arenas on the transition to sustainable agriculture. This
should allow the assessment of the R&D and pilot projects phases by showing the
activities of the main participants in these arenas.
4. Application of the evaluation framework
4.1. The R&D Arena on organic agriculture developments
4.1.1. Determinants of the environment for R&D investments
The third Arena of our analytical framework concerns the development and level












Figure  2:  Resistance on the trajectory between the present  system and the future
system.
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the development of new technologies, often in co-evolution with institutional and or-
ganisational changes. A lot of research is done on the economic drivers behind R&D
investments  and  technological  innovation  processes  (e.g.:  Fagerberg,  1988;  Porter,
1990; Kemp, 1995; Stern et al, 2000; Shapiro, 2002; Montalvo Corral, 2002). We will
not  go  too  far  into  the  discussion  on  the  driving  forces  behind  technological
innovation  and R&D,  but  limit  ourselves  to  three  main  framework  determinants:
government policy, market structure and technological stage of development. These
three framework determinants  each incorporate  many characteristics.  Here we will
briefly examine some of these characteristics.
Market structure is a rather fluid concept, but here we limit ourselves to either a
competitive structure or a more co-operative structure. A competitive structure is of-
ten regarded as the best environment for a high level of R&D investments (Shapiro,
2002), even though this leads to a certain level of R&D over-expenditure (Verspagen,
to be published). The competitive market structure uses firm profits as the main in-
centive for investing in innovations. The evolution of a co-operative market structure
requires a director to organise the co-operation; the most obvious director is the gov-
ernment. An important indicator for the relation between innovative power and mar-
ket structure is given by Porter’s Index, which aggregates several indicators according
to the quality of the innovative infrastructure and the quality of public research, as
well as some cluster (or sector) specific indicators (Porter,  1990; Stern et al, 2000).
Porter’s Index is essentially aggregated in three main clusters: private research, public
research, and the (institutional) links between these.
Technological development is represented by a point on the learning curve of a
certain technology.  This curve can be thought of as proceeding from invention to
wide spread application, and usually takes the form of an S, similar to the system in-
novation curve we sketched earlier in this chapter. The R&D phase of a technology
usually comes at a point where applications for a technology take form, hence distin-
guishing the phases of fundamental research and applied research. If a technology or
invention is still far from application, R&D investments may still be very low.
Government policy stems from a reflection upon the role government wants to
play, be it either very liberal or very market oriented. The policy determines the level
of governmental interference. Basically, this interference can focus on market innova-
tions (enhancing private R&D) or at universities and public institutes (enhancing pub-
lic R&D). These options are not mutually excluding and they can be used in addition
to each other.
For the purpose of evaluating Arena 3 in the transition to a sustainable agriculture,
these three framework determinants can be represented collectively by a set of charac-
teristics (see table).
Features for the R&D-lay out Determinants
Technological barriers Determine level of applicability of technology and level
of private investment; they are determined by market
structure (for finance) and technological development
Attention and competence Determine  level  and  direction  of  R&D investments;
they are determined by policy agenda and market struc-
ture
Market position Determines the policy agenda and level of R&D invest-
ments; is determined by market structure, government
policy,  technological  development and position of al-
ternative technologies
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Compatibility  on current techno-
logical regime
Determines whether new technology can be attached to
prevailing technological regime; determined by techno-
logical development and by the position of alternative
technologies
Synergy  between  developers  and
applicators
Determines whether developers and users work togeth-
er proceeding from innovation to diffusion of techno-
logy;  relates  with level  of  technological  development,
market structure and government policy 
Social basis / public support Determines whether technology will be accepted; indic-
ates market position
Government policy Determines level and direction of R&D investments; is
determined by market structure and public support
In earlier work we have designated these features as driving forces behind techno-
logical innovation (Van Schijndel and Ros, 2000), but here it is more appropriate to
represent them as features or characteristics of the R&D lay-out, although they also
influence the following innovations and implementations.  These  characteristics  de-
termine to a great extent the boundaries of the R&D investments, for example, when
a new technology has a low compatibility with reference to the dominant technologic-
al regime, the R&D investments will most likely be inhibited. 
The characteristics and determinants only sketch some of the features of the driv-
ing forces related to R&D investments. In order to be able to make a proper evalu-
ation of the level and direction of R&D, it is necessary to have insight into policy in-
struments, market structure indicators and technological development indicators (see
figure 3). 
This inventory of indicators and instruments can indicate the chances for breakthrough
of a certain technology or technology set. For our further evaluation we will first use
an adaptation of the Porter Index variables. While Porter uses his indicators to char-
acterise the innovative score of a country, we will try to focus them specifically on re-
search for organic agriculture in The Netherlands. These indicators focus on the mar-
ket structure of R&D for organic agriculture. We extent this set with some indicators


































Evaluation of the R&D-arena
Determinants Indicators
Figure 3 Evaluation of R&D-arena
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4.1.2. Choosing the R&D indicators for organic agriculture
In order to evaluate the characteristics of Arena 3 of the transition to an organic
agriculture, we will have to score the R&D indicators in this arena. 
Porter Index
Porter gives several indicators for the innovative structure of a country (Porter,
1990): 
• number of employees in R&D jobs;
• R&D spending;
• openness for international competition;
• expenditure on higher education (% of BBP per capita);
• protection of intellectual property;
• BBP per capita;
• percentage of private R&D finance;
• percentage of R&D performed at universities.
Aggregated, these indicators represent the self-named Porter Index, which can be
used to compare the innovative quality of a country. In order to evaluate the R&D on
organic agriculture, we will have to adapt Porter’s indicators. After focussing some of
the indicators on the topic of organic agriculture, and by deleting the indicators that
are too broad to allow for focusing, a proper set for organic agriculture could now be
the following:
1. budgets and financing of R&D for organic agriculture;
2. private R&D versus public (academic) R&D.
In addition to these indicators, we need an insight in the government policy and
technological development. These are domains are elaborated in the following indicat-
ors:
3. direction of research;
4. number of publications;
5. research networks;
6. policy support for knowledge development and innovations;
7. policy stability.
4.1.3. Evaluation of R&D indicators for organic agriculture
Budgets and funding of R&D for organic agriculture
The overwhelming majority of the research budget on organic agriculture is dis-
tributed  by  the  Dutch  ministry  of  agriculture  (LNV).  The  ministerial  budget  for
organic agricultural research (in the broad sense of the definition of ‘organic’),  for
2003 is about € 13M, which is roughly 90% of the total organic agricultural research
budget. This covers essentially all research of relevance for organic agriculture. The
national research budgets from the Ministry are planned to decrease slightly to € 12M
annually for the coming years. This is quite remarkable, since other budgets on the
stimulation of organic agriculture have been cut back much more dramatically, such as
subsidies for farmers that alter their production methodology to the organic farming
system (RIVM-MNP and Wageningen UR, 2003).
Other major funding bodies in the Netherlands for organic agriculture R&D are
the combined Commodity Boards for dairy products, arable land farming and horti-
culture, which generate around € 1M for R&D on organic agriculture. The EU for its
share  has  allocated funding  for  a major  project  within the  Sixth  Framework  Pro-
gramme on food safety and quality of organic products. Minor budgets are generated
by the provinces and aggregate to several hundreds of thousands euros maximum.
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The fact that most research is financially supported by LNV shows a high policy sup-
port for knowledge development and innovations on organic agriculture.
Well over 90% of the research is performed at the Wageningen Agricultural Re-
search Centre (WUR), the main academic centre in the Netherlands on agricultural
research. WUR has indicated its goal for the very near future to direct 10% of the re-
search funds to organic agriculture. Also, there is a relatively small specialised research
centre  on  organic  agriculture  and  farming,  the  “Louis  Bolk  institute”  (LBI),  with
around  fifty  employees.  Finally,  other  institutes  and  universities  perform  several
minor projects.
Private and public research
Although most of the research on organic agriculture is done at public institutions,
rather than in a market construction, it should be noted that a fair lot of the innovat-
ive structure of organic agriculture may be developed on farms or in a learning-by-do-
ing setting.  Such innovations  can often be generated with (very)  low budgets,  for
which the largest Dutch bank in the agricultural sector, the Rabobank, has introduced
special funding programmes for innovations and for sustainability programmes. 
The private part of the R&D phase mainly concentrates on acquiring know-how
for producers of organic products and for farmers in transition to organic production.
LNV supports the dissemination of knowledge, which in practice is done by organisa-
tions such as Biologica Foundation. A specialised research programme in organic agri-
culture is supported by the WUR (Innovatiecentrum Biologische Landbouw), which concen-
trates on publicly financed research, the stimulation of innovations at farm level and
dissemination of knowledge. Farmer’s  organisations (including the national farmers
and horticulturists  organisation,  LTO) as well  as organisations  like the  Innovation
Support Office in Wageningen also mediate in farm-scale initiatives, although they fo-
cus for the most part on innovations in regular agricultural practice, and much less on
organic agriculture. 
Direction of research
Since most of the R&D on organic agriculture is financially supported by LNV,
the Ministry is to a large extent able to determine the direction of the research. LNV
has  selected  six  bottleneck  issues  for  research  on  organic  farming  (LNV,  2003):
plagues and diseases, mechanic weed control, energy use and nutrient control in horti-
culture, soil and nutrient control, mineralisation of organic fertilisers and labour pro-
ductivity. 
The focus of the research is on primary production, e.g. research for alternative
methods of  pest  control  and fundamental  research on multi-cropping  or soil  pro-
cesses. Research on processes further up the food chain, such as epidemiological ef-
fects, is still in its infancy.
Much emphasis is laid on dissemination of research result, making them available
for use in practice as early in the process as possible. Research is therefore to a large
extent very practical and applied.
Publications
We have compiled a list of all scientific articles on agriculture in 2002 from the Sci-
ence Edition of the Journal Citation Report (JCR, 2002), which added up to 15471
articles from 156 journals. This includes articles within the selected fields of agricul-
tural economics and policy, agricultural engineering, agriculture, dairy and animal sci-
ence, multidisciplinary agriculture and agronomy.2 Dutch institutes contributed to 411
articles, which is 2.66 % of the total of articles.
2 the JCR selection specifically exludes journals from the social sciences, which are collected in
another database. However, some multidisciplinary journals are included here.
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Of this  selection 25 articles  were  selected on the  keywords  ‘organic’,  however,
most of these articles deal with subjects related with organic chemistry. Limiting the
search to ‘organic agriculture’ or ‘organic farming’ yields 5 articles on the topic, which
is 1,2% of all Dutch articles in the agricultural sciences. Two articles were written in
international co-operation.
Research networks
The research network on organic agriculture in the Netherlands is highly determ-
ined by the financial currents and therefore mostly concentrates around the WUR.
The Innovation Centre on Organic Farming, which is supported by WUR, co-ordin-
ates  much  of  the  research  in  the  country.  This  centre  is  allied  to  the  Biologica
Foundation. This foundation includes several co-ordinating organisations as members
and therefore is able to mobilise much support and backing in the organic food chain.
The Louis Bolk Institute (LBI) is an independent research institute. Figure 4 gives an
overview on R&D for organic agriculture in the country. 
Technological development
Technological developments are dependent not only on market developments and
policy structure, but also on the characteristics of technological barriers and compat-
ibility with the present technological regime. It is not always easy to assess these char-
acteristics with proper indicators, but it is possible to make a driving forces analysis,
as can be seen in our short case study on the weeding robot. Since organic agriculture
is very labour intensive (as it refuses to use pesticides), alternative weeding techniques
are a hot topic for research. The weeding robot could be an interesting option here.
This robot is an independent piece of equipment based on GPS techniques, which are
used to distinguish structured patterns on the field (the crops) from unstructured pat-
terns (the weeds). Expectations are that the first prototypes can be tested in about
four years (LEI, 2003), but a full marketing is still considered to be at least ten years
away (Ros et al, 2003). 
The advantages for this technique are that the present weeding alternatives are either
not acceptable in organic agriculture (i.e. chemical weeding), or are too expensive (la-
bour intensive manual weeding). This obviously creates a market for this technique,
Figure 4: network for organic agricultural research in The Netherlands
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although its development is clearly dependent to what extent it can overcome the dis-
advantages of the alternatives. A robot could replace 95% of the manual work and
therefore could be a very attractive technology.
The disadvantage of this robot technique is presently that a fair bit of research is
still necessary before a working model can be presented: the technique is still in its
early development phase. This implies the necessity and a justification for continuous
(public) financing, to ensure further development. At some point this will be taken over
by private parties, once applications can be made and profits of marketing the tech-
nique are within sight. 
Market chances can increase rapidly once stricter environmental standards originat-
ing  from  organic  agriculture  are  applied  more  widely  to  common  agricultural
techniques. If chemical weeding is widely restricted, alternatives like the weeding ro-
bot may become attractive, stretching beyond a much wider market than organic agri-
culture (see Smits and Koole, 2002). This could greatly increase the synergy of develop-
ment, possibly becoming a very important incentive for the development of the weed-
ing robot, since the growth in the national market for organic products has been in-
secure for some years now. If the market remains as small as it is, potential new tech-
niques may not be developed further for such a small market only. However, a di-
lemma can be recognised here, since the hampering growth of the organic production
is at least partially attributed to the shortages in (seasonal) labour. 
Policy stability
An important feature of the strength of the R&D arena lies in policy stability. A
stable policy and market determines to a large extent the expectations of the research
investor. Insight in the  evolution of policy stability for research on organic agriculture
could be quantified in terms of funding fluctuations and in the conditions for fund re-
ceiving parties. For this case study no insight is available yet on this issue.
4.1.4. Conclusion on Arena 3
From the above indicators we conclude the R&D-arena on organic agriculture in
the Netherlands to be fairly active. Funding is relatively high and the research covers
most areas of interest on this field, apart from epidemiological and toxicological stud-
ies on human health issues related to organic food stuffs. 
Although funding and support  is  high, the research network is  relatively small.
One university performs about 90% of all (fundamental)  research and most of the
funding comes from the Ministry of Agriculture. This bears some risks for policy sta-
bility: if a new political course were to decrease (or increase) funding for R&D in or-
ganic agriculture, this would have immediate effects. Policy stability is hence very im-
portant here.
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  an  increasing  interest  from  private  parties  in  the
concept of organic agriculture, which may lead to the creation of new markets and
hence stimulate further innovations in this field. We can tentatively conclude that the
chances for a transition to organic agriculture (which is not necessarily the same as
sustainable agriculture!) is supported by the present R&D level and direction. 
4.2. Arena 4: Development of new forms of agriculture
4.2.1. Niche-markets for new developments
New forms of agricultural practice could prove to be the embryonal shapes of an
innovated and sustainable agricultural system. The so-called first movers (or trendset-
ters), who introduce the new innovations in practice will often apply new concepts.
Some typical new activities in the agricultural sector are agro-tourism, management of
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nature and landscape, and organic agriculture. These new activities can be character-
ised  as  expressions  of  broadening and  deepening the  fundamentals  of  traditional
agricultural practice (Van der Ploeg et al., 2002). These activities create new sources of
income for the farmer, as they extent the farmer’s markets, either by offering a wider
variety of products (broadening, e.g. agro-tourism), or by competing on the basis of
added product quality (deepening, e.g. organic agriculture). Other new activities relate
to a reconstruction of organisation of the agricultural practice, such as the new co-
operative arrangements that seek to re-organise relations with the state and its policy
makers (Van der Ploeg et al., 2002). An appropriate policy in this stage of the system
innovation could relate to strategic niche management, which involves some level of pro-
tection for innovations on sustainability, to ‘mature’ them for later market introduc-
tion (Kemp et al, 1998; Kemp, 2000). 
4.2.2. New initiatives in Dutch agriculture
Several new activities in Dutch agriculture are shown in figure 5, some of which
show turbulent growth rates. One of these is the agricultural protection of landscape
and nature (as a broadening of the agricultural practice), which is growing steadily at
annual rates of up to 20% in terms of area. From the national statistics, we observe
the area under agricultural nature management to be almost twice as large as the num-
ber of farms in this business, suggesting that the first movers are found among the
large farms.
Table: Management of nature and landscape, 1980-2001
1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Agricul. nature management 
(% of total agricul. area)
0.23 0.82 2.06 2.28 2.57 2.88 3.24 3.98 4.55
Annual growth rate (%) 10.7 12.7 12.1 12.5 22.8 14.3
Agricul. nature management 
(% of total number of farms)
1.44 1.88
Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands)
The sales of novel protein foods (NPFs) showed several large increases of over
10% for some years, but this market has now stabilised to just under 1% of the meat
Figure 5: Some niche markets, 1980-2002 (RIVM, 2003)
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market. An innovation that failed to take the market is the gas fuelled pump or heat
pump, which uses methane gas produced by the livestock for heat production. Recov-
ery time for the investment proved too long for most investors.
Organic agriculture shows an increasing number of farms, although their share is
still small: 1.9% of the agriculture area in the Netherlands and 1.7% of the total farms.
Compared with other European countries the Netherlands is average in terms of mar-
ket share, a list that is topped by countries like Denmark, Austria and Switzerland (fig-
ure 6). In these countries the sale of organic products may be well over 60% in some
common supermarkets. This can also be related to the much lower price added for or-
ganic products in these countries, about 20% lower than the European average. In ad-
dition, these countries usually employ a common national labelling system for organic
products, which greatly increases consumer awareness.
The food chain crises  in Western Europe from the mid-nineties and thereafter
have greatly enhanced the policy discussions and social pressure on changes in the set-
up of regular  agricultural  practice  (OECD, 2002).  These  crises have provided new
market chances for alternative agricultural systems and opened markets for organic
products, for example. On the production side of the food chain, dairy farms can be
transformed to organic farms relatively easy. An analysis of driving forces on the first
movers show that arguments for transformation change over time (figure 7). Main
driving forces that play a role for the decisions that first  movers make are: social,
political  and market  pressure,  farm economic evaluation,  familiarity  with the tech-
niques, attitude of the first movers and judicial impulses. The overall (aggregate) pos-
itive force for changing to organic dairy practice arose at the time of crisis in common
agricultural practice in the late nineties. 
Figure 6: Organic agriculture in Europe, by area and consumption level  (Hamm et al.,
2002; Yussefi and Willer, 2003).
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First movers carry out many experiments on broadening and deepening their agri-
cultural  management,  with some niches  successfully  arranged.  However,  compared
with other European countries, the Dutch agricultural sector still realises only a relat-
ively small income from the broadening and deepening of agricultural practice (figure
8).
5. Assessment of evaluation methodology
The evaluation of progress in system innovations is different from traditional en-
vironmental policy evaluation. The latter usually assesses from the perspective of the
policy goals and analyses the efficiency of the policy for reaching those goals. The
evaluation of a system evaluation takes the perspective of the process itself. Such pro-
cesses  usually  involve some broadly described targets  or  future  visions,  much like
‘sustainability’ or ‘open markets’. In order to be able to evaluate the progress towards
Figure  7:  Driving  forces  on  the  first  movers  among  the  dairy  farmers  in  the
transformation to organic agriculture, 1980-2002.
Figure 8:   Income from broadening and deepening of  agricultural  practice in  EU-
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such broad visions, we have developed a methodology that takes the assessment of
the social activity in each phase of the system innovation as a starting point.
In this chapter we have described some elements of this evaluation method, split-
ting the process of system innovations in six characteristic phases, or arenas. These all
have their  own specific  institutional  setting,  as  well  as  social  and political  activity.
Each can be assessed with quantitative or descriptive indicators, as we have shown for
two of the six arenas. The social activities should be included with the choice of indic-
ators. By showing (progress in) the most important indicators for each arena, policy
makers can come to grips with the most important processes and participants in each
phase of the transition process. 
It should be noted that the indicators as such are not indivually indicative for sys-
tem innovations. What makes them specific for system innovations is the clustering in
arenas,  each of  which describes a phase in the process  of system innovation.  The
arena-framework itself is specific for the evaluation of system innovations, as it takes
the the perspective of the different phases of such a system change as a starting point.
This method involves especially the early phases of a transition, which are often ex-
cluded or left  for speculation.  Finally,  it  incorporates a multi-phase approach with
multiple levels of participants, institutions and technologies in one methodology. This
method could therefore be better equipped than classic methods of evaluation, espe-
cially in distinguishing the first movers, fresh initiatives and new innovations. An ex-
tension of the conceptual framework of our methodology, especially on the relation-
ship between the developments in the different arenas and the relationship between
policies and the observed developments, could provide an even more solid evaluation
method.
The case study described in this chapter on two stages in the system innovation
for sustainable  agriculture leaves some room for the assessment  of our evaluation
methodology. However, we cannot yet claim to provide a full insight in the actual assess-
ment of the intended transition to a sustainable agriculture in the Netherlands. This is
largely still due to a lack of data, which we intend to supply in future work. We believe
that this  methodology  can provide  a framework for  the  analysis  of  these  data,  as
shown in the assessment done here in two of the arenas. 
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Introduction
It is common knowledge today that moving towards sustainable development is a
long-term  process  that  requires  major  changes  and  adaptations  in  many  different
realms of society. The approach of transition management has been suggested as a
framework to guide such long-term processes of smooth system transformation to-
wards sustainability. In contrast to other, more technology-oriented attempts to drive
socio-technical change towards sustainability, it is based on the notion of a co-evolu-
tionary and multi-level process of change, involving technological as well  as socio-
economic, organisational and institutional changes.
RTD1 programmes for sustainable development
RTD represent one of the building blocks of any long-term strategy to move to-
wards sustainable development. As a consequence, many research programmes have
been conceptualised and implemented over the past years that explicitly aim at con-
tributing to a move towards sustainable development, both at the level of European
Member States and of the EU. Several programmes even carry the explicit label of
sustainability or sustainable development in their title, while others are rooted in sec-
toral or thematic domains where a re-orientation towards sustainable development is
sought (Whitelegg/Weber, 2002; CEC, 2001).2 However, it is still an unresolved issue
how to design research programmes to enhance their impact with respect to the ob-
jective of a transition path towards sustainable development. What can they realistic-
ally achieve in the context of the national-sectoral innovation system and a national
sustainability strategy?  How should programmes be defined, set up, structured and
implemented to ensure their orientation towards sustainability?
1 RTD = Research and Technology Development Programmes
2 Examples of thematic programmes can be found in areas such as mobility, energy and wa-
ter supply, but also in production technology.
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Many sectoral or thematic programmes share certain characteristics which com-
promise their potential to contribute to transitions to sustainable development:
• Programme definition and the role of research for sustainable development: The
role of sustainable development as a policy objective to be taken into account in
research and technology programmes is not always very well defined, for instance
in terms of an explicit sustainability policy and strategy, from which programme
objectives are derived. The potential role also depends on the wider context of the
national sustainability strategy and the national innovation system.
• Intermediate layer between guiding visions and concrete projects: While there may
still  be widely shared agreement about the overarching objectives of sustainable
development,  it is very difficult to operationalise these at the level of individual
thematic  programmes.  There  may  be  catchy  guiding  concepts  in  place  (e.g.
sustainable mobility),  as well  as specific technologies or socio-technical projects
(e.g. to reduce particle emissions from diesel engines),  but an intermediate level
that bridges generic visions and concrete technologies is often missing. This, ho-
wever, would be a good level to define and specify tasks for research programmes. 
• Operationalisation  of  criteria  for  the  assessment  of  projects:  In  most  cases,
sustainable development represents just one of the programme objectives, next to
their main objective, such as the improvement of competitiveness of industry, the
stimulation of research and development in a certain technology area, etc. Moreo-
ver,  in order to stimulate bottom-up initiatives the work programmes of RTD-
programmes are often defined by broad categories (such as 'efficient process tech-
nologies' or 'renewable resources' in the case of the 'Factory of Tomorrow' pro-
gramme in Austria). Too generic thematic categories of the programme structure
tend to lead to heterogeneous, unconnected, individual projects with little integra-
tion in a transition path. In more operational terms, there is a need to assess indivi-
dual projects with respect to sustainability and a transition path. At programme le-
vel this requires corresponding assessment criteria and mechanisms to be in place
in order to ensure that a transition towards sustainability is seriously taken into ac-
count. 
• Broadening the scope of programmes beyond technology: Many RTD-program-
mes  aiming  at  sustainable  development  still  follow a rather  technology-centred
path,  implicitly  assuming  that  the  development  of  environmental  technologies
alone  is  sufficient  to  trigger  transitions  towards  sustainability.  Accompanying
transformations  at  the  institutional  and  social  level  (as  foreseen  in  most
sustainability strategies) are not taken into account in such programmes, although
the development  of  new technologies cannot  be separated from these changes.
Without a broader perspective on socio-technical transitions it is not possible to
assess the strategic relevance of technical innovations and create conditions where
such  innovations  make  a  significant  contribution  to  policy  aims  such  as
sustainability.
• Specific  difficulties  arise in small  countries  with small  RTD-programmes:  What
difference can comparatively small programmes make with regard to objectives as
broad as sustainability? Is it better to focus on a few priorities, or to promote the
growth of a broad range of small-scale initiatives?
Strategic support for 'Factory of Tomorrow' 
These and similar issues have also been raised in the context of the ongoing Aus-
trian research programme “Factory of Tomorrow”, where several research projects
have been funded over the last years. The programme is faced with a number of spe-
cific difficulties that need to be taken into account in the design of the project. The
overall  funding volume is  comparatively  small,  while  production  represents  a very
broad research domain, even when projects are clustered around a small number of
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sustainability principles as in the case of the programme in question. As we will argue
later in this chapter, the specific conditions of RTD-programmes in general and of the
Austrian 'Factory of Tomorrow' programme in particular represents a challenge for
the concept of transition management in several ways and require a number of adap-
tations and modifications.
The project aims to explore exemplary transition paths at an intermediate level of
transition fields, a level that is geared to the requirements to sustainability-oriented re-
search programmes that need to bridge between highly abstract guiding visions and
very concrete (technology) projects. As such, the results of the project are expected
provide a methodological orientation and – by way of example – explore transition paths
for selected thematic fields that are of potential relevance for the future development of
the programme.In this  chapter,  we will  first  introduce the programme “Factory of
Tomorrow”  and  some  of  the  conceptual  building  blocks  underlying  the  project
approach  and  methodology.  Apart  from  transition  management  itself,  we  will
concentrate  on  the  question  of  operationalising  the  approach  of  transition
management at a level that is geared to the specificities of a research programme in
the  field of  manufacturing.  Subsequently,  we will  present  the  methodology  of  the
project  and  then  introduce  the  three  candidate  transition  fields  to  which  the
methodology shall be applied in the course of the  project. We will end with some
preliminary conclusions and an outlook on what we expect the project to deliver at
the end of its two-year duration.
The programme “Factory of Tomorrow”
“Factory of Tomorrow” is one of the subprogrammes of the Austrian research
and technology programme “Technologies for Sustainable Development” which has
been initiated and financed by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation
and Technology (BMVIT).3 The programme is intended to have an impact on the
Austrian economy and innovation system and to support the structural shift towards
eco-efficient  management  and  a  sustainable  production  system  through  research,
technological development, demonstration and dissemination measures. Beside “Fact-
ory of Tomorrow” two more subprogrammes have been established so far: “Building
of Tomorrow” and “Energy Systems of Tomorrow”.
Towards a sustainable production system
With respect to sustainable development, the programme is based on a number of
“guiding principles of sustainable technology design”:
• Orientation towards benefit and need 
• Efficient use of resources 
• Use of renewable resources 
• Multiple use and recycling 
• Flexibility and adaptability 
• Fault tolerance and risk precaution 
• Securing employment, income and quality of life 
For the subprogramme “Factory of Tomorrow”, these guidelines have additionally
been specified by defining the “Factory of Tomorrow” as a factory aiming at zero-
waste and zero-emission production, producing and providing products and services
of tomorrow by using materials of tomorrow to meet tomorrow's  needs. Thus the
3  www.nachhaltigwirtschaften.at
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thematic priorities of the calls for projects focus on innovative development in the
following fields:
• Sustainable technologies and innovations in production processes 
• Use of renewable raw materials 
• Products and services with consequent focus on the performance and service of
the product
It is interesting to see, how the broader definition of sustainability as laid out in
the seven guiding principles above (including social aspects, albeit in a very general
way) is translated into more specific descriptions at the level of the work programme.
Here one can observe a much stronger focus on technical aspects of materials and the
technical organisation of production processes.
The programme “Technologies for Sustainable Development” is seen as one of
several  activities  providing  first  steps  to  contribute  to  the  aims  of  the  Austrian
Strategy for Sustainable Development (Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, En-
vironment and Water Management, 2002). The subprogramme “Factory of Tomor-
row” is closely related to two out of 20 key objectives of the strategy, namely Successful
Management  through  Eco-efficiency and  Strengthening  Sustainable  Products  and  Services.  The
Austrian Strategy for Sustainable Development aims at increasing resource efficiency
by a factor of 4, while the “Factory of Tomorrow” wants to enforce “Factor 10 Tech-
nologies”. Although these objectives are already challenging, other programmes or re-
search projects on sustainability and sustainable technologies which focus on longer
time horizons (e.g. Weaver et al., 2000; Partidario/Vergragt, 2002) emphasize that in
the long run (20-50 years) a reduction of the environmental burden by a factor of 10
to 50 will be necessary for industrial countries. 
Projects funded by the programme
Within the first two calls of “Factory of Tomorrow” (2000 and 2002) 54 projects
have been funded with a total volume of about Euro 6,5 million. Apart from three ac-
companying measures the projects are subsumed by the programme management un-
der the following topics:
The concept of the programme clearly states that in addition to technology devel-
opment, structural and social innovations will be of great importance. In line with our
earlier observation that the detailed work programme focuses on technology-oriented
categories, also the funded projects tend to deal with rather specific technical issues,
but also structural and management questions are addressed, especially within the pro-
ject areas Management Models and Strategies and Products and Services. 









Use of renewable resources
Products and Services
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A procedural aim of the programme: building networks
The Austrian programme intends to promote the development of “new partner-
ships”, cooperations and networks within the different fields of activity. As in the first
call of “Factory of Tomorrow” 71 and in the second 118 project partners (companies,
institutions and organisations) have been involved in the projects, a contribution to
increased cooperation can be observed at  the level of the individual projects.  It is
however more difficult to establish links and exchange between the projects.  Here
again, the great heterogeneity of the domain of manufacturing compared to issues like
energy  systems  or  sustainable  households  comes  into  play.  The  “Factory  of
Tomorrow” programme is confronted with a higher diversity  of groups of actors,
research and  policy  fields.  Moreover,  common topics,  problems  or  visions  which
provide  the  potential  of  interaction  or  integration  are  more  difficult  to  identify.
Therefore,  it  is  much  more  difficult  (but  at  the  same  time  also  very  useful!)  to
establish a common platform and vision of the field than, for instance, in the sister
programme “Buildings of Tomorrow” where a number of accompanying measures
promote the interaction of the funded projects.4 
In  a  way “Factory of  Tomorrow” is  designed with intentions  which have also
guided the Dutch programme  Sustainable Technology Development,  where Weaver et al.,
2000, point out that policy programmes should try to shift the balance of R&D ef-
forts of firms and technology developers toward long-term issues, focus their atten-
tion on the long-term challenge of sustainability and increase the success rate of their
innovation efforts, especially by facilitating the networking process and helping net-
work members to reach some agreement on problem definitions, visions of possible
futures and expectations. However, as our short analysis of the programme structure
of  “Factory  of  Tomorrow”  demonstrates,  the  operationalisation  of  long-term
strategies for structural and social change (as implicated in the underlying sustainabil-
ity principles) and their integration into detailed work programmes still represents a
major challenge.
Managing transitions to sustainable development 
The basic question of our accompanying project to the “Factory of Tomorrow”
programme is, whether the concept of transition management could be of help in the
process of updating and upgrading the programme and embed the projects in long-
term oriented  transition  strategies  to  sustainable  production-consumption systems.
Before outlining our ideas to modify the transition management approach in a way
that makes it more useful for the specific circumstances of the programme, let us first
present some of the basic principles of transition management.
Transitions: What they are and why they are important
Over the last years the expectations with respect to the role of innovation in soci-
ety have gone beyond the traditional growth objectives and now include several long-
term issues which are often subsumed under the notion of sustainable development.
This implies that innovation policy is increasingly required to develop capabilities that
enable society to address long-term issues and challenges such as climate change, agri-
culture, mobility, water management, the health systems reform, etc., and to induce
corresponding  shifts  in  the  technological  regime  that  determines  innovation  pro-
cesses.5 Mainly originating from Dutch debates,  the concept of transition manage-
4 For example, see the OEKOinFORM project - a platform for the exchange of information,
which integrates about 60 projects concerning ecological buildings.
5 In Kemp/Schot/Hoogma (1998) a technological regime is defined as “the whole complex
of scientific  knowledge,  engineering practices,  production process technologies,  product
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ment  has  been  developed  as  a  framework  for  long-term  strategies  in  innovation
policy-making with a view to long-term transitions towards sustainable development.6
The ability to manage transitions is regarded as an additional key capability that raises
specific requirements with respect to innovation policy and its governance.
Several  examples  of transitions  are known from past  history.  For  instance,  the
move from a coal-based energy supply system to a gas-based system, or from an in-
dustrial to a service economy can be interpreted as transition phenomena. Usually,
transitions are long-term processes that can stretch over several decades,7 and they are
characterised by a co-evolution of  institutional  settings,  markets,  technologies,  cul-
tures, behavioural patterns and policy-making and policy. Often, individual niches are
at the origin of regime shifts and further on of changes in the socio-technical land-
scape in the wider sense.8 The interactions and interdependencies between these dif-
ferent  realms  give  rise  to  irreversibilities  that  stabilise  and reinforce  the  transition
path. 
The policy perspective: From transitions to transition management
From a policy perspective, the understanding of past transitions raises two ques-
tions, namely a) in how far can comprehensive and goal-oriented transformation pro-
cesses be influenced and guided in a desirable direction at all (i.e. in the direction of
sustainable development), and b) what role can and should government actually play
in this process. 
It is well known that the uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity of future develop-
ments prevent any attempt to plan the future in a linear fashion. Consequently, trans-
ition management is not about the central planning and realisation of future develop-
ment paths but implies the conscious implementation of structures and collective pro-
cesses for governing long-term transitions in a goal-oriented and adaptive manner. It
is a multi-level and multi-actor learning process in society that aims to integrate the
distributed intelligence9 of the actors involved in order to improve the co-ordination
and  coherence  of  their  behaviour.  In  particular,  experimentation  and  bottom-up
learning processes are regarded as key elements of transition management in order to
maintain the adaptive capacity of an innovation system. Shared problem perceptions,
common guiding visions and overarching strategies  contribute to orienting the de-
cisions of the different actors towards common goals. 
Policy, and innovation policy in particular, is supposed to provide the necessary
framework conditions to enable such collective learning and co-ordination to happen.
This requires first of all to stimulate processes of anticipating and formulating long-
term perspectives that can serve as an orientation and focusing device for the range of
actors involved. Secondly, there is a need to monitor continuously the policy actions
taken  and  to  adjust  them  to  the  evolving  visions  of  the  future  (see  Figure  2).
Moreover,  conflicts  of interest  may emerge where government action is needed to
mediate between the parties involved. Finally, given the pivotal role played by experi-
mentation, innovation policy can support a transition process by supporting socio-
technical experiments that are geared towards the societal goals striven for.
characteristics, skills and procedures, established user needs, regulatory requirements, insti-
tutions and infrastructures”.
6 See Rotmans/Kemp/van Asselt (2001) and Kemp/Rotmans (2003)
7 Transition processes  can  thus  be  interpreted  as  comparatively  smooth transformations,
whereas terms like rupture, revolutions or breaks imply a rather fast and abrupt type of
transformation process.
8 See for further details Geels/Kemp (2000) and for an extensive case-study Geels (2002)
9 See Kuhlmann (2001) for a detailed introduction to the concept of distributed intelligence.
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Three levels of transition management
The key difficulty of transition management is to ensure the link between open
and collective learning and innovation processes on the one hand and the societal
goals  implicit  in  the  transition  concept  on  the  other.  In  order  to  operationalise
abstract goals such as sustainable development in the context of a transition manage-
ment process, it is useful to differentiate three levels of action. First of all,  transition
arenas are defined on the basis of comparatively broad problem areas that reflect basic
functional needs of society (e.g. energy supply, water supply, mobility, etc.). In a trans-
ition  arena,  government  actors,  knowledge  institutes,  businesses  and  NGOs/con-
sumers interact in order to develop the visions and frameworks/paradigms necessary
to guide a transition process. Below this strategic level, innovation networks composed of
representatives  from the same constituencies  formulate specific transition  agendas,
define key projects, and mobilize and expand the network. At the level of the testing
grounds, concrete experiments are developed, implemented and monitored in order to
put the transition agendas into practice and feed the findings back to the other levels
of transition management.
These three levels of transition management reflect also its main phases or ele-
ments:  1)  development  of  long-term  sustainability  visions  and  overarching  joint
strategies, 2) organisation of a multi-actor network, mobilisation of actors and execu-
tion of projects and experiments, and finally 3) monitoring and evaluation as inputs to
the collective learning process.
Transferring transition management to other contexts
It  is  still  an open question in how far  transition management,  which has been
mainly developed in the Dutch context, can actually be transferred and adapted to
other countries. It is at least a matter of debate whether so-called “best practices” of
policy learning in innovation and technology policy can be sensibly transferred and
adapted from one country to another. Political cultures and institutional settings are
recognised today as important factors determining how policy learning actually takes
place and how coherent an innovation policy can actually be developed and imple-
mented. 
The challenge to adapt transition management to RTD-programmes
As outlined above, transition management is a very comprehensive approach to
shaping societal transformations. It provides a number of generic building blocks for
Current Policy; short term goals, per period 
Transition management: aimed at realizing long term sustainability goals 
over a number of  periods 
Figure 2: Transition management offers a long term perspective for formulating short
term policies
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policy strategy. However, RTD programmes, such as “Factory of Tomorrow” tend to
address very specific projects and technologies. One of the crucial challenges of ap-
plying transition management approaches to such RTD programmes appears to be
the identification of appropriate intermediate levels  of analysis (and policy!),  which
link broadly defined functional transition fields with specific technologies and techno-
logical research issues. For such intermediate levels useful conceptual building blocks
are still lacking in the transition management discussion.
More specifically, the adaptations suggested for the use of transition management
approaches to support the “Factory of Tomorrow” programme are as follows:
• Extending the application of the transition management concept to new thematic domains, here
production-consumption systems.
So far transition perspectives have been applied mainly to infrastructure domains,
such as energy supply, water management and transport. The domain of producti-
on is more heterogeneous than these other domains and thus poses specific diffi-
culties. We would thus like to test the usefulness of the approach to more diverse
contexts such as production.
• Building a conceptual bridge between highly general macroscopic concepts and very concrete projects
in the field of the programme.
Some relevant research work on the domain of production-consumption systems
has focused mainly on the end-user needs, but not traced the implications back to
individual production processes, which may add further difficulties.
• Assess technologies with respect to their potential contribution to a transition path/scenarios.
It is very difficult to assess individual projects and technologies with respect to
their potential role in wider scenarios that comprise also the needs side of produc-
tion-consumption  systems.  Is  this  a  promising  approach  to  guide  policy  and
programme development?
• Pinpoint additional transition elements for the assessed technologies
Within the framework of a technology research programme, projects at a rather
technical level constitute the majority of the funded projects. Therefore, necessary
changes of the socio-economic context, policy strategies, changes in social practi-
ces etc. to support the diffusion of sustainable technologies in case of the two ex-
amined examples of production-consumption systems will be explored.
• Testing and assessing the transferability of the transition management concept to other socio-cultu-
ral contexts
Transition management as mentioned above has been developed and tested mainly
in the Dutch context, but it promises to be of great use also in other countries.
However, socio-cultural contexts differ, and transition management presupposes
certain conditions for governance and decision-making. In this sense, the project
aims to check whether transition management as a guiding framework can actually
be transferred (and if necessary adapted) to the Austrian context. 
Operationalising transition management for the meso-level of production-con-
sumption systems
When trying to break down the approach of transition management to more spe-
cific domains than “the production consumption system” as such, it is necessary to
specify the transition fields that shall be addressed in more detail by a research pro-
gramme. As a starting point,  we take the observation that  production is meant to
serve certain “needs”. The fulfilment of these needs is ensured by systems of produc-
tion and consumption, i.e. socio-technical systems that range from the provision of
raw materials  (including recycling)  to  service concepts  and products  for  final  con-
sumption.10 The closer you get to the needs side of this chain, the more prominent are
10 See for instance the EU-funded project SusHouse where final needs in the realm of the
household have been analysed and explored (Vergragt, 2000; Green/Vergragt, 2002). 
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the social practices and routines of the users for defining this stage. In earlier phases,
technical design practices are an important social component, while technical consid-
erations play an important role throughout the entire chain.
When looking at production-consumption systems in a more differentiated way,
we can thus start with the delimitation of three levels of analysis:
• Needs areas: Final needs of end-users or consumers can be met in different ways.
By concentrating on satisfying these final needs, it  is  possible  to overcome the
conventional  product  orientation  and  think  about  alternative  ways  of  meeting
needs by providing the necessary services and/or products. For instance, the final
need of “mobility” cannot only be met by individual car ownership, but also by
means of new service approaches such as car-sharing, door-to-door mobility ser-
vices, etc. Often these alternative concepts are embedded in wider “visions” or
“Leitbilder” that capture both these new services and the changes in social, regula-
tory  or  organisational  practices  required.  “Sustainable  mobility”,  “sustainable
household”, “factory of the future” or “green chemistry” are examples in case, of-
ten  expressed  even  in  terms  of  concrete  performance  targets.  However,  these
visions remain at a fairly abstract level. In general, the concept of needs areas can
also be applied to other levels of a production-consumption system, i.e. also in-
termediate users (not only end users or consumers) can define a needs area to be
addressed by a research programme.
• Transition  fields:  More  specific  than  the  broad-ranging  needs  areas,  transition
fields  represent  the  areas  where  systemic  solutions  for  meeting  needs  are  de-
veloped. Transition fields are formed by technologies, actors and their objectives,
and they can be interpreted as arenas, where systemic solutions for ensuring the
provision  of  certain functionalities  evolve.  In  other  words,  it  is  at  the level  of
transition fields, where specific technologies are tied together with and embedded
in social and organisational practices in order to offer an alternative solution for
providing a functionality needed. Transition fields are thus an intermediate system-
ic level, at which the integration of individual technology projects into the provi-
sion of needs-oriented products and services takes place, guided by an orientation
towards long-term sustainability.11 For instance, in the case of sustainable mobility,
the introduction of an intermodal and integrated mobility service is an example of
a transition field. Real-time travel information could be another example, as well as
on-line  or  mobile  booking.  As  an  example  of  an  intermediate  transition  field,
vehicle maintenance services could be mentioned. 
• Individual technology projects: The practice of research programmes shows that
the  individual  projects  often  focus  on  specific  technologies,  without  particular
attention to final needs or social context. In other words, they tend to be conduc-
ted in a rather isolated way and need to be integrated and adapted at the level of
the transition fields. In other words, these specific technical solutions need to be
contextualised at the level of transition fields in order to diffuse more widely. In
principle, an individual technology can be applied in different transition fields to
meet different functionalities, and correspondingly a functionality can be realised
by using different individual technologies. For instance, travel information can be
provided in real-time to your mobile phone using GSM, but it can also be trans-
mitted by means of local information terminals or by phone services. Integrated
11 In principle, transition fields can be categorised in several different ways. They can be de-
scribed in terms of different functionalities they address, in terms of policy arenas or in
terms of networks or industrial branches. Especially in the case of manufacturing a sectoral
differentiation can be useful (at least in some cases) if this is in line with the production-
consumption system under study. “Printing” is an example of a functionality that can be
roughly represented by specific industry branches while “dyeing” is scattered over many in-
dustrial branches and policy arenas. Thus it should be noticed that usefully delimited trans-
ition fields can also be constructed around branches (the paper industry) or resource bases
(biomass use).
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intermodal services can be achieved by standardised integrated ticketing (like in ur-
ban transport “Verbünde”) or by means of an electronic bidding service where pri-
ces may vary according to demand, etc. Obviously, we are particularly interested in
new and innovative technologies that have the potential to contribute to a transiti-
on to sustainable development.
These three levels of analysis build on each other, thus reflecting the idea of a pro-
duction-consumption chain. However, these chains should not be seen in isolation.
Certain functionalities can be useful to serve different needs, just as some technolo-
gies have the potential to be applied for fulfilling different functionalities (Figure 3).
An illustrative example of how transition fields can relate to visions of different
needs areas on the one hand and different specific technologies on the other is given
in the case of polymer coatings with special focus on the application in the automot-
ive industry (Partidario/Vergragt, 2002). They develop long term scenarios (period up
to 2050) that combine visions of new fulfilment of the function of surface protection
and colouring of cars with visions of new ways of providing transport functions. Spe-
cific technological innovations in surface protection and colouring are currently under
way with a scope ranging from incremental process improvements to pollution reduc-
tion at the source, improved coating fitness via a change in raw material (e.g. C to Si
based resins, powder coatings, renewable materials), complete recycling opportunities
and strategies to avoid surface treatment by 100% plastic or metallic cars. These tech-
nological solutions are combined with questions of integration along the supply chain
and management of the product  life cycle,  e.g.  car producers  managing the whole
product life cycle. As regards transport and mobility, needs visions range from busi-
ness as usual with individually owned cars via multimodal transport systems, leasing
and renting to public/shared transportation and the offering of transportation func-
tion instead of automotives with non-polluting alternatives. Here several technical al-
ternatives are currently in the R&D phase that need to be combined in new organisa-
tional systems for mobility service provision.
The importance of “transition fields” as an intermediate analytical level 
From the perspective of a research programme, the transition fields are clearly the
most interesting level of analysis to study. It allows to bridge between needs areas and
images of the future for  certain fields of production and consumption on the one
hand and concrete technology projects of the programme on the other hand. This
bridging of need fulfilment and individual technologies makes transition fields a key
Needs area 1 Needs area 2 Needs area 3
Transition field 1 Transition field 2
Technology 4Technology 3Technology 2Technology 1
builds on 
is used in
Figure 3: Three levels of analysis
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concept to define and select intermediate transition fields as the core of research pro-
grammes strategies geared towards sustainability-oriented transitions. 
Abstract images of the future are available for many domains as well as individual
projects and technologies that are somehow related to these visions. What tends to be
lacking, however, is a useful operationalisation at an intermediate level of analysis ap-
plicable  to  structuring  a  research  programme,  i.e.  a  description  that  is  sufficiently
concrete to relate easily to individual technologies, but at the same time sufficiently
general to be compatible with more abstract visions of the future at the level of needs
areas. Moreover, a transition field within a research programme should be defined as a
sub-field of the production system that is sufficiently coherent and limited in scope to
be able to  operationalise  a  well-defined transition process.  In  order to reduce the
complexity of the scenario development and policy process it appears to be helpful, if
a transition field does not consist of too many actor constituencies and if it relates to
a limited set  of needs areas and technology fields.  A certain homogeneity in these
areas may be an important argument to select or delimit certain functionalities when
demarcating a transition field addressed by a research programme.
Whereas a transition field is characterised in terms of the technologies, organisa-
tional  structures  and actors,  the  notion  of  “functionalities”  is  a  particularly  useful
concept to explain the role played by a transition field for the other two levels of ana-
lysis. As a result of integrating specific technology projects in a social and organisa-
tional context, socio-technical innovations emerge at the level of transition fields that
allow to provide functionalities in an alternative way that serve to satisfy final or inter-
mediate needs. 
Not only for analytical reasons, the level of the transition fields is of crucial im-
portance: Their peculiarity is of special relevance for the sustainability of the whole
production-consumption chain. Changes from one way to fulfil a functionality to an-
other way sometimes can change the overall environmental effect of the need satisfac-
tion much faster and more radical,  than changes in the needs themselves  (societal
needs change relatively slow) or by isolated technological developments (mainly incre-
mental changes). 
Three examples of production-consumption systems
From the broad and heterogeneous domain of production-consumption systems,
three specific transition fields have been selected in order to exemplify our methodo-
logical considerations. For this selection, a number of criteria were applied, partly de-
rived from the requirements of the transition framework and partly inspired by the
clusters of ongoing projects within the programme “Factory of Tomorrow”:12
• Significant innovation potential with respect to a regime shift towards sustainabili-
ty. 
• Associated to the preceding point, existence of a relevant research capacity in Aus-
tria.
• Ecological relevance and connection to the guidelines of sustainable technology
development of the programme.
• Existence of a significant industrial basis or potential for its emergence and cluste-
ring. This criterion serves to ensure that the area selected is of economic relevance.
• Existence of a common “technological regime” to ensure the homogeneity of the
field of investigation.
12 These criteria cannot only be used for selecting the case examples in our project but – at
least in principle - also as selection criteria for project proposal in the programme.
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• Existence  of  other,  complementary  forms  of  research  funding  and  support  in
order to be able to assess the additionality of the programme “Factory of Tomor-
row” with respect to other research and technology policy measures.
• Existence of a relevant number of projects in the programme “Factory of Tomor-
row”, if possible for different segments of the chain.
• Potential to link up with similar transition fields in Europe in order to go beyond
the limited scope of the Austrian market.
• Existence of a lead actor who could at least potentially adopt and carry ahead a
transition agenda.
Moreover, the two transition fields selected should concentrate on different seg-
ments of the production-consumption chain and differ in important characteristics.
The areas chosen are “wood as a structural material”, a transition field largely defined
from  a  resource-based  perspective  and  integrated  within  an  important  industrial
branch in Austria, and “dyeing with renewable materials”, a transition field constituted
around  a  specific  functionality  but  spread  over  several  branches  and  needs  areas.
Striving to define and demarcate these transition fields which will be the basis for fur-
ther scenario development processes shall also help to develop a clearer view on the
characteristics a transition field should fulfil to 
Transition field 1: Renewable structural materials
Within the rather broad functionality of “providing structure” one of the main
sustainability  principles  that  can be applied is  the increased shift  to  renewable re-
sources. Within the potential spectrum of renewable structural materials, we will espe-
cially focus on timber. This means on the level of technologies that we will focus on
technologies which make use of wood to provide structural materials. At the level of
need areas,  timber  is  increasingly used as  structural  material for  buildings  (or  as a
function: providing shelter). We will firstly focus on applications serving these needs,
while further need areas may gain relevance within the scenario process.
The choice of  this  specific  transition field  is  supported by the  following argu-
ments:
• timber as structural/constructive material has been identified by the  Technology
Delphi Austria (ITA, 1998) to be one of 11 potential fields for technological lea-
dership of Austria;
• wood is identified within the Austrian Strategy for Sustainable Development to be
one of the renewable materials  where considerable expansion possibilities  exist,
since only about two thirds of the annual increase of woody biomass is used and
with 47% of the federal surface covered by forest, timber production has a special
importance for Austria;
• there is a significant industrial and research basis in Austria for this topic and clus-
ters have already been established (e.g. timber clusters in the provinces of Salzburg
and Lower Austria);
• the Wood Composites  & Chemistry Competence Centre is  one of  18 Austrian
Competence Centres financed within the technology structural programme K plus
by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology (BM-
VIT);
• within the programme “Factory of Tomorrow” 6 projects relate to wood or tim-
ber (see table 1)
• Wood and wood products is also an important sector of European industry, with
major application potential in a wide range of other industries (e.g. car manufactu-
ring)
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• Although the wood products  industry tends to be dominated by medium-sized
enterprise, cooperation with large users could be a promising model for establis-
hing a lead actor. 
Within the comparatively broad domain of wood production and use, the focus
could also be put on new emerging types of technologies and functionalities, such as
for instance bio-polymers where there is still a major,  but unexplored potential of
particular interest to a forest-rich country like Austria.
Transition field 2: Dyeing – renewable dyes
The functionality of “dyeing”, meaning the colouring of fibrous materials such as
textiles, paper or wood, is performed for the production of many different kinds of
goods.  These  goods  serve  most  different  needs  from  the  protective  and  social
functions of clothing and home textiles to the comfort provided by textile coverings
in cars. 
Applying sustainability principles leads to attempts to re-establish the use of herbal
dyeing substances. The aim is to substitute the common use of synthetic dyes, which
contribute to the proliferation of toxic chemicals in the biosphere. Especially avoiding
allergic reactions to synthetic colouring agents is a very important motivation for such
efforts of substitution. 
Similarly, for the surface treatment with paint and finish, bringing also colour to
our  lives  besides  protecting  many product  surfaces,  organic  substances  have been
used for hundreds of years,  before the bulk production of synthetic coatings from
mineral oil became prevalent. For the substitution of such synthetic coatings with all
their ingredients (solvents, pigments and additives) changes in different production-
consumption systems are needed that differ very much from the ones needed for re-
newable dyeing. For this reason, the two fields of transformation shall be looked at
separately within this exemplary exercise.
At the level of technologies, the promoters of renewable dyes are aiming to reduce
any need to change the way of application, when substituting conventional dyes with
their products. 
The choice of this specific transition field is supported by the following arguments:
• A study of Industriewissenschaftliches Institut on behalf of the Austrian Ministry
of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management (Industriewissen-
schaftliches Institut, 2001) stated the feasibility of a production of renewable dyes
in Austria and promotes consolidated research activities. The report on the prepa-
ration  phase  of  the  programme  “Technologies  for  Sustainable  Development”
(Katter et al., 1999) states a high potential for paint produced on a renewable basis
to enter the market of printing paint. As a conclusion of an expert forum on vege-
table dyes in Germany, Vetter and Biertümpfel stated in 2001, that contemporarily
“in principle, nothing can get in the way of vegetable dyes being used for the co-
louring of textiles, leather, paper and wood. […] That the complete 'break through'
has not occurred – although the production chain is complete from the producer
of vegetable dyes through to the dipper, and despite of all the available applica-
tions – can be blamed only to the fact that so far no important trader of textiles
has ordered naturally dyed products” (Vetter/Biertümpfel, 2001).
• Over the last seven years, a number of well established Austrian research institu-
tions including the University of Innsbruck, the Austrian Ecology Institute and the
Vienna based Universität für Bodenkultur have carried out research on wide range
of issues from the selection of suitable species through to marketing aspects. They
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were  actively  supported  by  the  Bundesanstalt  für  Landtechnik  Wieselburg,  an
agency of the Austrian department for agriculture and environment.
• The production of vegetable dyes is an attractive option for Austrian agriculture,
since there exists wide experience with the production of herbs for medicinal and
food applications. This is comparable in terms of high requirements of quality and
comparatively small quantities. 
• Research agencies and other promoters of vegetable dyes have established strong
ties with some interested commercial partners. Many networks of actors concer-
ned with the use of renewable resources in general have been established over the
last years. The German Forum Färberpflanzen is regularly conveying meetings of
up to 70 people concerned with the production and use of dyeing plants on a two-
year basis. There exist rather mature niche markets in certain fields of application,
such as hand woven carpets (Turkey) and eco-textiles (Germany). 
• The EU is  supporting research projects  on natural dyes with up to 2,5 million
Euro (Vetter/Biertümpfel 2001). Complementary activities are supported within
the programme “Nachwachsende Rohstoffe” of the German government (alloca-
ting grants worth about 25 million Euro annually), including activities for market
penetration. 
• Within the programme “Factory of Tomorrow” two important projects relate di-
rectly to renewable dyes (see table 1). These are very interesting projects in terms
of scope, aim and perspectives (strategic product development and substitution
strategies with regard to different realms of society).
• Renewables dyes is a small market, also in most other European countries. Howe-
ver, the recent developments in Germany point to a potential for exploring a larger
market. Globally, the potential is huge, at least in principle, given the size of the
textile industry.
• For the moment,  there is no clearly identifiable potential  lead actor in Austria.
There are nevertheless a number of firms that could take a lead role if adopting
renewable dyes for their products.
Transition field 3: Biorefinery
A broad range functionalities can be provided by means of products from biore-
fineries, addressing an equally broad range of needs areas. Examples are proteine-rich
components for animal feedstock, lactic acid, certain types of fibres, etc,. The underly-
ing technologies  use   chemical  and biochemical  processes  to  produce a variety  of
products from different types of biomass (oil  seeds, sugar beet, cane sugar,  wood,
grass, etc.). 
In terms of sustainability, the main benefit of biorefineries consists of a reduction
in the use of petrochemicals, entailing often the production of toxic by-products. In
order to have a noteworthy effect, however, biorefinery should not be restricted to
fine chemical products only, but be used also for bulk products.
The arguments for considering this transition field can be described as follows:
• Biorefineries  offer  the  potential  to  produce  flexibly  mass  products  for  large
markets, even if production volumes are today still rather limited. Changing to bio-
refineries would have major impacts on the entire resource supply chain (e.g. agri-
culture)  as well as  competing non-renewable chemical production systems.  The
potential for system innovations and a regime shift is therefore very high.
• Biorefineries are still in an early phase of the their technological life-cycle; first pi-
lot plants are currently being implemented and tested in order to learn more about
the potential for upscaling and economic feasibility. 
• In terms of ecological impacts, a positive net effect is usually expected, but as long
as there are no concrete (pilot) plants in operation, it is hard to make any definitive
judgements. As shown in recent study, green biorefineries can have a number of
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positive impacts with respect to transport, the use of fossil resources, regional em-
bedding and adaptation, and regional income and quality of life (Schidler 2003).
However, large-scale biorefineries could also have adverse effects on local and re-
gional agriculture. 
• In economic terms, green biorefineries look quite promising already, even if the
details depend on a number of framework conditions (e.g. benefits from heat and
power exports) and on the market perspectives for the biorefineries’ products.
• For the moment, the transition field is still quite homogeneous due to the fact that
there are only a few research projects under way and a small number of plants in
operation. The main actors in Austria are already cooperating at regional level, but
there is still a need to establish a network at national level, involving in particular
also additional actors from agricultural and structural policy..
• Apart from the projects conducted in the context of the programme „Factory of
Tomorrow“, research on biorefineries is also conducted at the University of Natu-
ral Resources and Applied Life Sciences in Vienna. However, overall, research ca-
pacity in Austria is very limited.
• Three main technological trajectories for biorefineries can be distinguished.
– LCF-biorefineries (Lignocellulose Feedstock Biorefinery)
– Cereal and corn biorefineries 
– Green Biorefineries, using humid biomass such as grass, lucerne, etc. 
• LCF-biorefineries (Lignocellulose Feedstock Biorefinery)
• Cereal and corn biorefineries 
• Green Biorefineries, using humid biomass such as grass, lucerne, etc. 
• Biorefineries are an issue in several other countries of the EU, notably those with
an important chemical industry and/or agricultural sector. Also the EU is consid-
ering biorefineries and bioenergy in particular as important future technologies.
• For the moment it is still  hard to identify a potential lead actor given the early
stage of development of the field. However, some of the industrial actors involved
in the ongoing projects of the programme “Factory of Tomorrow” could in prin-
ciple take on such a role, 
Overall, biorefineries are a transition field in an early phase of development, but
with good promises for the future. 
The next steps within the project will be a more detailed analysis of the present
situation with respect to the three transition domains in order to select two for which
a transition scenario development process will be launched, as described in the fol-
lowing chapter. 
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Wood-processing employing a s
uperimposition of ultrasonic
vibrations
Development of wood-processing techniques employing
high-frequency ultrasonic vibrations in terms of applications




Characterisation of material 
parameters as basis for innovative 
processing methods and products
made of large dimensioned wood
aiming at economically sustainable
use of Austrian timber resources 
Facing the problem of decreasing demand for large
dimensioned timber, investigations are carried out concerning
certain properties like strength and fibre characteristics. Due
to the data it is possible to create a model about the




Sustainable outdoor use of larch
wood through classification of 
durability by means of innovative
measurement methods 
In this project the utilisation of untreated larch wood is
promoted by means of innovative measuring-technologies.
Optic-spectroscopic measurements are linked to extractive





Wood Plastic Composites – adding
value by splints
Systematic investigation of a new family of materials, which
are produced of waste products of timber industry and
combined with thermoplastic polymers (polyolefines, 5-40%).
This materials provide characteristics similar to timber but




Wood Plastic Composite - Direct
extrusion 
In wood plastic composite extrusion, wood is typically
palletised, compounded or agglomerated. In this project a
new feeding dosing equipment is being developed to allow





Wood Plastic Composites - 
Development of an extrusion tool 
Development of a new generation extrusion tool for a wood
plastic composite. This material will be developed in a second
project an should show a fibre content of 60 – 85%. 
Dyeing TRADEMARK Farb&Stoff 
From an idea to a trade product 
ready for marketing: Plant dyes for
the textile industry.
TradeMark Farb&Stoff is about making the next and, indeed,
crucial step: developing marketable plant dyes for the textile
industry. In the efforts to establish a resource-efficient and
economically interesting product line, residual plant material
from the lumber- and food processing industries is mainly
used.
Dyeing COLOURS & TIES New cooperations between agriculture und industry are
necessary to ensure the utilization of renewable materials.
The project focus is upon natural dyes and their application
in textile industry. The goal of the project is to create a
contact institution which connects various suppliers of
diverse plant materials, takes on the processing, and
standardising of the natural dyes, and makes a product that
can be used by the industry.
Biorefinery Development of foamed products
based on proteins
Goal of the project is the development of a new foamed 
product based on by-products and waste products rich in
protein. Possible applications are mounting parts for thermal
insulation for building materials, parts of furniture, motor
vehicle interiors and bulk good.
Biorefinery Green Biorefinery – separation of
valuable substances from grass silage
juice
Juice from pressed silage grass has a high content of lactate
and free amino acids. The goal of this project is to develop a
technology for the separation of these valuable products.
Biorefinery Green Biorefinery - Primary
Processing and Utilization of Fibres
from Green Biomass
Tests on optimisation of the essential process unit mechanical
fractionation of the primary raw material “green biomass”
into a liquid and a solid – fibres containing – fraction.
Furthermore, lab and pilot scale tests with respect to
technologies and processes for primary processing of the
solid fraction (e.g. technologies for obtaining specified well
defined fibre fractions, reduction of odour etc.). Finally, lab
and pilot scale tests regarding manufacturing of prototype
fibre products (fibreboards and adhesives & fillers for the
construction sector) based on specific well defined fibre
fractions from green biomass as primary raw material.
Table 1: Overview of projects in “Factory of Tomorrow” related to the chosen transition fields
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The scenario methodology
One of the main objectives of the project is to explore future trajectories of trans-
ition fields and associated needs areas in order to assess the potential role to be played
by the technologies funded by the “Factory of Tomorrow” programme and to suggest
possible fields for future research. For that purpose, it is first of all necessary to devel-
op scenarios of future transition paths that capture the levels of needs areas and func-
tionalities. 
In principle, the transition management perspective lends itself to a normative ap-
proach to scenario-building, where, based on a single desirable scenario, a backcasting
methodology is applied to identify a promising future pathway at the levels of needs
areas, transition fields and technologies. However, while such an approach may serve
as a useful orientation and guidance with respect to the direction of change that ought
to be taken, it neglects the fact that the future is inherently open. A future develop-
ment path, even the most desirable one, is contingent on many other factors that are
outside the influence of, for instance, a small country like Austria. A fully exploratory
approach would not be appropriate, either, because it is not amenable to an assess-
ment in terms of sustainability. These considerations show that a simple and straight-
forward application of a normative or an exploratory scenario-building methodology
would not be appropriate in our case. What is needed is instead a combined approach,
allowing to take into account bottom-up exploratory elements (for instance new tech-
nology options, external driving forces) with top-down normative features implied by
the sustainability-orientation of the images of the future drawn. 
Moreover, the project itself has a limited scope and volume. It can therefore not
address all the research fields covered by the programme “Factory of Tomorrow” but
has to  focus  on a subset  of  interesting and relevant  transition  fields.  The lessons
learnt from these selected fields shall nevertheless be instructive for defining research
themes at programme level in the future. It should thus shed some light on the overall
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Figure 4: Schematic overview of the project methodology
   Weber/Leitner/Whitelegg/Oehme/Rohracher/Späth   197
Figure 4 gives an overview of the methodology developed for the project. We sug-
gest  to  apply  a  combined  exploratory  and  normative  approach.  The  initial  phase
serves to identify, specify and select two transition fields to be subject to the scenario
development process.   At this  stage,  also the most relevant needs areas related to
these transition fields will be analysed. Then the actual scenario development process
will be started, aiming to develop first a set of different possible framework scenarios
at the level of needs areas. This step will follow an exploratory method. It is not un-
likely to assume that this will deliver a set of framework scenarios that will differ in
terms of their overall sustainability orientation. This is regarded as a very useful out-
come from a policy perspective, because it allows to discuss further on how to move
towards sustainability even under detrimental conditions. In fact, in view of a general-
ised economic slowdown it is not unlikely that the wider framework conditions for
manufacturing  will  be geared towards  other objectives  than sustainability.  Each of
these framework scenarios will serve as a starting point for specifying at the level of
transition fields the most desirable outcome possible, i.e. “best-case” images of the fu-
ture for the transition fields under the conditions of the different framework scenari-
os.13 These  best-case  images  can then be  characterised in  terms  of  sustainability.14
These  most  desirable,  but  nevertheless  contingent  future  images  then  serve  as  a
normative starting point for studying possible pathways leading to these images. Here,
particular emphasis will be put on barriers, systemic effects and critical events needed
to realise such a pathway. Individual projects and technologies can then be assessed
with respect to their likely contribution to the different transition pathways. As a res-
ult, we get a set of possible and desirable scenarios/images together with the corres-
ponding pathways at the level of transition fields and functionalities. They provide the
foundation for a portfolio-based approach to policy-making (i.e. for foundation for
developing robust and adaptive policy options that allow to deal reasonably well with
different possible futures).
In practice, the methodology can be described in six steps as specified below. It
will be implemented in the course of a series of workshops with participants from rel-
evant projects of the research programme and external experts and stakeholders. In
addition to the initial selection and specification workshop, three workshops are fore-
seen for each of the two transition fields, complemented and prepared by desk re-
search and synthesis work using secondary sources and the results of the workshops.
1. Definition, specification and selection of transition fields: It is essential to have a
clear understanding of  the transition  fields  and how they can be systematically
represented in terms of the three levels of analysis suggested above. In particular,
the needs areas that are related to a transition field need to be identified. 
2. Development of framework scenarios at the level of needs areas: Based on first
sketches of potential framework scenarios, a workshop will be organised to further
explore,  modify,  elaborate and refine them. These  framework scenarios  will  be
strongly based on social, economic and political “driving forces”, but will also take
general  technological  orientations  in  society  into  account.  Obviously,  particular
emphasis will be put on user- and needs-sided aspects. 
3. Development  of  “best  possible” images of the future at  the level  of transition
fields: The framework scenarios are based on an exploratory scenario approach,
and are subsequently used as a frame for specifying “best possible” images of the
future  at  the  level  of  transition  fields.  The  main  difficulty  is  to  integrate  the
13 It is still open for discussion whether we should go for several or just for one normative
scenario. However, even if we develop several, there will be a best one that could serve as a
basis for the transition analogy.
14 The assessment can be conducted along the lines of one of the different approaches for
sustainability assessment, for instance the approach of the Helmholtz-Society project on
Sustainability “Global zukunftsfähige Entwicklung – Perspektiven für Deutschland” (Coen-
en/Grunwald, 2003; Grunwald et al., 2001)
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framework scenarios for different needs areas into the specification of the images
of the future of a transition field. 
4. Assessment of the images of the futures: In terms of a predefined set of criteria,
the images of the future will be characterised with respect to sustainability. This
will  not  be  an  in-depth  evaluation  (which  would go beyond  the  scope  of  the
project), but it should deliver a rough assessment of the desirability of each of the
images,  differentiated  according  to  key  sustainability  dimensions.  What  is
particularly interesting from a transition perspective is the question in how far a
scenario/image implies a potential for a major shift towards sustainability (i.e. a
“regime shift”).
5. Analysing transition pathways: A key question of any scenario analysis is: How do
we get there? What are the requirements and systemic implications the scenario (or
here better images of the future) would raise? At this stage, barriers to diffusion of
new technologies will be analysed as well as missing links or elements to ensure the
realisation of the pathway. This stage will have to build very strongly on inputs
from the workshops. 
6. Policy analysis: As part of the final stage, the role of individual technology projects
with  respect  to  the  transition  pathways  can  be  assessed.  Probably  even  more
interesting will be a look at the implications of the project results for the design of
research programme and policy portfolios  to support  a transition process.  This
will be the topic of a final workshop. 
Conclusions
The  methodology  suggested  builds  a  conceptual  bridge  between highly  general
guiding visions and very concrete projects of a research programmes. It thus allows to
contextualise the projects of the research programme “Factory of the Tomorrow” un-
der the conditions of a set of a longer-term transition perspectives. Moreover, the
transition fields can be studied with respect  to the potential  influence of different
driving forces, framework conditions and systemic effects.  Two transition fields are
selected to test the applicability and usefulness of the approach.. 
The scenario process is expected to stimulate debates about long-term perspect-
ives for the transition fields under study. They serve as an orientation and thus as a
focusing device for the strategies of the actors involved. From a policy perspective,
the project is expected to result in a number of benefits, also beyond the level of an
individual research programme:
• Analysing  and  assessing  transition  fields  offers  the  opportunity  to  identify
promising  future  themes  for  research programmes.  Moreover,  research  themes
would not only be selected on the basis of technological considerations or very
general sustainability  strategies  (renewable materials,  efficiency, etc.),  but also in
terms  of their  possible  impact  on transitions  to a more sustainable  production
system.
• Transition scenarios will help identify critical socio-technical barriers and effects
not  yet  addressed  and  understood  by  current  research  and thus  point  to  new
inroads for future policy.
• In  principle,  transition  scenarios  provide  an  orientation  for  staged  research
strategies  towards sustainability,  ranging from a broad range of exploratory and
more ground-laying research projects to applied research pilot actions.
• Other policy areas than RTD policy often play a crucial role for the success of a
technology  and  the  evolution  of  a  transition  field.  The  transition  perspective
allows  to  define  overarching  transition  strategies  for  the  fields  analysed  and
identify  complementary  .policy  measures  needed  to  enable  and  strengthen  a
transition path.
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• By  developing  different  scenarios  that  combine  exploratory  and  normative
elements, it is possible to underpin the formulation of robust and adaptive policy
strategies,  i.e.  of  strategies  that  are  geared  towards  the  objective  of  sustainable
development, but at the same time allow to get prepared for different uncertain
futures.  
• The scenario building process also serves as a forum to enable interaction between
the different projects of the programme (at least those related to similar transition
fields)  and  other  actors  external  to  the  programme.  The  process  should  thus
facilitate  networking  of  the  programme  participants  and  second-order  learning
effects  by  giving  them  an  opportunity  to  reflect  on  the  contribution  and
conditions required for success of their projects. These networking and learning
processes  should  also  lead  to  a  better  alignment  of  related  projects  and actor
strategies.
In general the broader perspective provided by the transition scenarios of our pro-
ject is expected to open up new perspectives for the process and the content of a next
generation of the “Factory of Tomorrow” programme, based on the objective of initi-
ating  transition  processes  towards  sustainable  development.  Nevertheless,  at  the
present stage only a limited number of transition fields is dealt with in our accompa-
nying project. It would be desirable for the further proceeding of the programme that
the results of the example scenario development processes are convincing enough to
trigger similar processes for other fields. As a first step this would require to draw up
a more comprehensive list of transition fields covering most of the production sector.
These  transition  fields  could  then be  assessed  according  to  the  criteria  presented
above (potential contribution of the area to sustainability; relevance for the Austrian
innovation system, etc.) in order to have consolidated basis for  including the ones
with the biggest potential impact on sustainable production as priority fields into fu-
ture work programmes. Due to their socio- technical character, these transition fields
could help overcome a too technical orientation in many research programmes aiming
at sustainable development. With such a programme design, the consideration of in-
tegrated transition strategies would become an elements  of RTD programmes and
create closer links between technical development, social and organisational changes,
and policy making for sustainability.
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Industrial Transformation 
Between Ecological Modernisation 
and Structural Change
Martin Jänicke
Ecological Modernisation and its economic-technical and political potential
“Ecological modernisation” describes the wide spectrum of possible environment-
al improvements that can be achieved through technical innovations beyond end-of-
pipe approaches (Jänicke 1985, 2000, Hajer 1995, Mol/Sonnenfeld 2000, Young 2000,
Mol 2001).  An environmental  problem,  for  which we have a marketable technical
solution, normally creates less political difficulty than one that requires “negative”, re-
strictive intervention in the established production, consumption, or transport struc-
tures. The concept of ecological modernisation opens up both economic and political
opportunities.
If the innovation is only incremental and its diffusion restricted to niche markets,
the potential of a new technology to bring about environmental improvements is not
fully exploited. Therefore, ecological modernisation as a political strategy essentially
needs to aim at  radical innovations with a maximum of market penetration. Given
the global dimension of most environmental problems, a far-reaching penetration of
the world market is required to realize the full  environmental potential of the new
technology.
Innovations in environment-friendly technologies increasingly tend to stand out by
virtue of the following characteristics:
1. Environment-related  innovation  and  diffusion  processes  are  to  a  large  degree
politically determined (Porter/van der Linde, 1995; Wallace, 1995; Hemmelskamp
et al. 2000, Jänicke/Jacob 2004). Due to market failure, they need political or at
least societal support. Government therefore plays a role in environmental innova-
tions that goes far beyond its role in R&D policy. Markets for environmental in-
novations are usually government-regulated or government-supported markets. In
this context, NGOs such as Greenpeace can also play a market-creating role (e.g.
the CFC-free refrigerator or the 3-liters-per-100-kilometers car). 
2. Innovations  in environment-friendly technology are a strong basis  for  environ-
mental policy, by providing potential win-win solutionsn and hence open up new
opportunities for action.
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3. Environmental  innovations  are  highly  problem-related,  which generally  reduces
the long-term uncertainty of predicting potential demand conditions (as normally
encountered  with  “normal”  consumer  preferences).  Given  the  increase  in  the
world’s population and industrial production and the decrease of the global envir-
onment’s capacity to absorb the effects, the demand for environmental efficiency
is likely to grow, thereby providing innovators with incentives to invest in environ-
mental technologies.
4. Environmental  problems  have  a  world-wide  dimension.  Environment-friendly
technologies, therefore, refer to “future global needs” (Beise, 1999: 3), which are
very important for the creation of lead markets and represent a specific potential
for international diffusion. That is why environment-friendly technologies have a
good chance of meeting worldwide demand on global markets. 
5. Contrary to fears of a competitive “race to the bottom” (Drezner 2001, Volgel
2001, Eliste / Fredricksson 1998), the environmental issue has to a certain degree
become a dimension of the process of technological innovation in general. It has
also become important in the competition for innovation between the highly de-
veloped countries (Jänicke/Jacob 2004). This is in conformity with the high correl-
ation between an ambitious environmental policy and economic competitiveness
(World Economic Forum, 2000). The causal relationship between the two is open
to questions. But there seems to be a third explaining variable: GNP per capita.
High national income means both, high perceived environmental pressure and high
capacity  to  solve  environmental  problems.  The  combination  of  environmental
pressure and capacity seems to be the crucial basis for environmental innovations
and their early adoption in highly developed countries.
These findings explain why e. g. Porter/van der Linde have come to the conclu-
sion, that “(h)ow an industry responds to environmental problems may, in fact, be a
leading indicator of its overall competitiveness...” (Porter/van der Linde 1995). Many
highly developed countries  have formulated their  strategy  for  sustainable  develop-
ments in terms of a policy for innovation. The German red-green government, for ex-
ample, which is in power since 1998, has explicitly adopted a program of “ecological
modernisation”.
Sectoral Environmental Strategies for “Dirty Industries”
The crucial task of environmentally sustainable development is to change policy
sectors in  co-operation with “their” economic clientele. Therefore,  we should turn to
sectoral strategies for polluting branches (“dirty industries”). There are basically two
options for such strategies (beyond end-of-pipe treatment):
• Ecological modernisation of the sector in the sense of technological innovation (e.
g. Japanese Steel industry or the Swedish paper industry)
• Inter-sectoral structural change, i. e. the reduction or even phasing-out of an envir-
onmental intensive industry (e. g. coal mining). Structural change may also may be
understood as intra-sectoral change, if the discussion is about sectors that encom-
pass a broad number of products and process technologies (e. g. change of modal
split  in the transport  sector,  change of energy mix in the energy sector,  or in-
creased organic farming in agriculture).
Ecological modernisation may not be no a sufficient solution where (a) the inher-
ent logic of certain economic sectors or branches is responsible for the intensive use
of environmental resources and (b) adequate technological solutions are not available.
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In this case, structural solutions, i. e. the relative or absolute reduction of a product or
process, may be indispensable. 
To illustrate my argument, I come back to the case of Germany using two differ-
ent examples: one for structural change (the planned phasing out of nuclear energy)
and one for structural rigidity (the structural persistence of lignite coal mining).
Phasing out nuclear energy
Nuclear energy is an industry which – regarding production, transportation and
the final deposition of waste – causes heavy risks for health and the environment. Ex-
cept some incremental technological risk reductions, an adequate technical solution is
so far not available. Therefore, “structural” solutions have been proposed, especially
since  the  Chernobyl  accident.  In  2002,  the  German  “Atom  Energy  Law”  was
amended  to  phase-out  nuclear  energy  (1/3  of  the  power  production)  until  2020
(Mez / Piening 2002).The policy was based on “consensus” which – however - was
not completely voluntary (stick behind the door, increased liability costs, forced inter-
mediate storage installations).  The first  shut down has just  taken place in Stade in
2003. The consensus with the power industry may not survive the present red-green
government.  The  German  case  is  however  not  completely  exotic,  since  other
European countries have also turned away from atomic energy. In the OECD coun-
tries,  the  nuclear  capacity  will  be  –  at  least  up  to  2010  –  lower  than  today
(OECD/NEA 2003). Up to 2010, there is only one nuclear power station proposed
for construction in the EU (Finland). Even France – traditionally the main proponent
of nuclear energy in the EU - has announced its plans to create 7 Gas power stations
and support  another 7 wind parks and other kinds of renewables, while refraining
from the creation of new nuclear power stations (PLATTS 2004). In other words, the
structural solution to the nuclear risk in Germany was party due to favourable frame-
work conditions (costs, liberalisation, public opinion), but can also be understood as a
purposeful strategy of eco-restructuring. The German phase-out policy has had a pos-
itive  side-effect  on  innovations:  The  role  of  renewables  as  substitutes  for  nuclear
power was radically improved. In this case, structural change was a good pre-condi-
tion for innovation and ecological modernisation.
The structural persistence of the German (lignite) coal industry
The German coal-based power industry (RWE, Vattenfal) provides the opposite
example. As long as the elimination of CO2 is no technological option (at least up to
2020),  there is  a fundamental  contradiction  between climate protection and power
production based of the CO2-intensive lignite coal. Due to the stability (in the West)
and even the revival of the lignite coal sector (in the East of Germany), the CO2 emis-
sions of the power industry have increased by 6,4 % since 1999. This was in obvious
contradiction with the ambitious  climate protection policy of  the German govern-
ment. Without this increase, the CO2 reduction would have reached a remarkable 18
% until 2002, while the actual reduction was only around 15,4%. Moreover, in 2004
the  national  implementation  of  EU-emission  trading  directive  was  opposed  by  a
massive,  well-organised  campaign of  the  coal  and power  industry,  which included
demonstrations of workers and mobilisation of the media. The coal and power in-
dustry did not even hesitate to revoke a voluntary agreement on CO2 reduction (45
Mio t. 1998 – 2010) signed only in 2003 by the leading industrial organisation and the
government. Furthermore, the highly incompetitive German hard coal will be happy
to receive some 16 billion € until to 2012. The powerful coal and power industry – a
stronghold of the trade union -  and their supporters in some federal states were also
able to prevent the expansion of CHP and of modern gas power stations. In general,
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they were able to undermine the credibility of the established climate policy and the
pioneer role of Germany. In this case, the structural rigidity of a powerful environ-
ment-intensive  industry  clearly  caused  restrictions  for  ecological  modernisation  in
other parts of the economy. The German case is highly illustrative for the present re-
strictions to climate policy throughout the world (taken countries like the US or Aus-
tralia).  Here, we clearly face a “structural  problem” that cannot  be solved only by
means  of  ecological  modernisation.  The solution  can  only  be found  in  a  sectoral
strategy beyond mere technological improvements. The political difficulty of this un-
dertaking has been demonstrated.
Limits of Ecological Modernisation
The German case  illustrates  that  environmental  innovations  do not  necessarily
lead to structural change. Structural rigidities can even prevent innovation or at least
their diffusion; this could already be learned from the work of Schumpeter. Without
overcoming the structural  resistance of  traditional  environment-intensive branches,
environmental innovations often remain within niche markets.
Sectoral strategies of eco-restructuring are not least relevant where ecological mod-
ernization reaches its limits. Ecological modernisation, as mentioned, relates to tech-
nical, system-compliant solutions to environmental problems (Jänicke 2000). The po-
tential of this technological approach is remarkable - the present energy consumption
of  the world  could be  supplied  by renewable  energies.  But  potentially  marketable
technological solutions to environmental problems are not always available. The so
far unsolved “persistent environmental problems” - namely climate change, but also
land consumption, bio-diversity, threatened species and soil erosion as well as final
storage for nuclear waste – illustrate these limits.
On top of this comes the fact that incremental increases in ecological efficiency
are still no causal, sustained solution. They are easily wiped out by subsequent growth
processes  (e.g.  specific  emission  reductions  subsequently  neutralised  by  increasing
road traffic). These facts were recognized as early as the late 1970s as the “dilemma of
the N curve” (Jänicke, 1979: 111). This up-down-up curve can be observed, when a
problem has to be addressed in the context of growth imperatives and is treated not
as a cause but as a symptom. This dilemma does not only apply to “clean-up” envir-
onmental protection  (end-of-pipe treatment)  but  even to efficiency improvements.
For example between 1973 and 1985, Japanese industries succeeded in saving energy
and raw materials in a remarkable way, but the high industrial growth simply cancelled
the positive effects.
Ecological modernisation therefore  is, despite its impressive potential, not suffi-
cient to ensure long-term environmental stabilisation. This is not only due to its inab-
ility to cope with all environmental problems, but also to a double “hare-and-hedge-
hog dilemma” of ecological modernisation. Firstly, we have the afore-mentioned race
between incremental environmental relief and economic growth, and secondly ecolo-
gical modernisation is confronted with structural limits imposed by “modernisation
losers”: If industries and private households save energy, cut their consumption of
valuable raw materials, or use environmentally less intensive substitutes, all this will
cause losses in the affected (supplying) industrial sectors e. g. mining, raw materials in-
dustry, power generation. However, these old industries, with established structures
of power and influence, nonetheless often succeed in opening up new sales possibilit-
ies. For example, the power sector finds new uses for electricity, which in turn neut-
ralize the above-mentioned efforts to save energy. Similarly, the successful environ-
mental protection campaigns against using chlorine have since been counterbalanced
by the expansion of chlorine uses in other areas. As long as environmentally intensive
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sectors try to counteract ecologically desirable decreases in its production, we must go
on reckoning with an environmental  “N” curve.  Ecological  modernisation  is  thus
severely hampered by the absence of genuine restructuring and by evasive behaviour
on the part of the modernisation losers.  Their reaction is of course all too under-
standable – as long as the adversely affected industries and regions have no alternative
perspectives and change takes place in ways that are not economically and socially ac-
ceptable.
This is why the distinction between the system-compliant and very often success-
ful path of ecological modernisation and the much more difficult, so far often unsuc-
cessful, but indispensable path of ecological restructuring is necessary. Problem-solv-
ing in the form of ecological restructuring affects systems of behaviour which – irre-
spective of technical eco-efficiency improvements – stand out by their high environ-
mental intensity. The distinguishing feature in most structural solutions is that they in-
volve no marketable technologies and thus cannot use the inherent logic of the eco-
nomic system as their driving force. Rather they rely on political-social mechanisms
and capacities being set up over a long time, which require a different and dispropor-
tionately greater effort.
Green Industrial Policy as a Sectoral Strategy
Strategically, ecological industrial policy is above all to foster industrial restructur-
ing  by  means  that  make  it  socially  and  economically  acceptable
(Binder/Petschow/Jänicke 2000). A strategy of eco-restructuring can promote diver-
sification  in other  product  types.  The diversification  even from heavy industry  to
tourism (as in the case of the Preussag AG) has proved to be possible.  Industrial
policy can also support reductions in production capacity where these are economic-
ally acceptable. It can also provide social cushioning, retraining as well as conversion
and reorganisation assistance. The change is optimal if investment cycles are used for
the transition to environmentally more applied products or processes. It makes a fun-
damental cost difference whether the transition follows this normal path of change or
whether it is caused by sudden political interventions demanded by an alarmed public.
Of course, industrial policy could also use alarming events as policy windows (wheth-
er anomalies, accidents, illnesses) if restrictions cannot be overcome otherwise. The
best way would be to use this option as an argument during “negotiations in the shad-
ow of hierarchy” (Scharpf 1991). A more general approach to achieve environment-
ally friendly structural change could be the reduction of environmentally harmful sub-
sidies.  As the OECD has shown,  “the economic sectors  with the largest  share of
global subsidies – agriculture / fisheries, transport, and energy, which account for 81
% of world’s subsidies – are also those most responsible for  greenhouse gas emis-
sions, air pollution, and water pollution” (OECD-Observer 238, 2003, 39). Experi-
ence shows that even reduction of environmentally harmful subsidies requires intens-
ive stakeholder dialogues. Structural change through industrial policy can be recom-
mended especially in those sectors that face both ecological and economic crisis.
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Box 1: Sectoral Strategies for Environment-intensive Industries
• Sectoral strategies based on environmental policy integration within government:
Political leadership defining the role of the “responsible” policy sectors
• Sectoral dialogues about long-term perspectives on a broadened basis
• “Negotiation in the shadow of hierarchy” providing alternative regulatory options
to negotiations
• Scientific  input  I:  The  contribution  of  the  sector  to  long-term environmental
problems
• Scientific input II:  Long-term economic problems potentially caused by critical
environmental events (e. g. Chernobyl, BSE, weather anomalies)
• Scientific input III: Alternatives, best practice (diversification, successful change
management)
• Long-term investment perspective (investment cycle)
• Compensation of negative social effects of structural change (be “creative” but
prevent destruction!)
• Change Management: Consensus conferences, network management, reporting.
The Dutch concept of “transition management” is of special interest in this con-
text. According to Kemp and Loorbach, “transition management for sustainable de-
velopment consists of deliberate attempts to work toward social, economic, and eco-
logical objectives in a gradual, forward-looking manner in full recognition of system
dynamics and windows of opportunity to effect change. Transition management is
concerned with the normative orientation of socio-economic processes and seeks to
overcome  the  conflict  between  long-term  imperatives  and  short-term  concerns”
(Kemp/Loorbach 2003, 22).
It seems that the most important step in transition management is the common
participative dialogue of sectoral stakeholders on long-term ecological risks, which  at
the same time cause economic risks. The confrontation of the respective sector or
branch with science-based critical information about its future may be crucial. The
German coal based power industry e. g. could be confronted with questions of its
long-term  competitiveness  taken  into  account  the  probability  of  dramatic  climate
events and global pressure from countries suffering from increased poverty caused by
climate change. This dialogue strategy can only be successful if stakeholders are parti-
cipants of an institutionalised, well-managed, iterative process of consensus building
about problems, long-term objectives and short-term steps (Joss 2000).
As mentioned before, this is no easy undertaking compared with ecological mod-
ernisation. But industrial transformation for sustainable development will often only
succeed if it is “walking on two legs”. In many cases, this transition does not seem
“sustainable”  without  structural  solutions  in  the  sense  of  “creative  destruction”
(Schumpeter). But fear of destruction may at the same time be the most important
obstacle to structural change. Governance of structural change should therefore be
“creative”, but not “destructive”.
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1. Introduction
Fossil fuels are the dominant source of energy in the world, contributing about 80
per cent (91,000 TWh)2 of the total primary energy supply and 64 per cent (9,400
TWh) of the electricity generation in 1999. This dominance is associated with clear en-
vironmental and climate challenges. A wider use of renewable energy technology is
seen as one way of meeting these challenges. For instance, the European Union aims
at increasing the share of renewable energy of the supply of electricity from about 14
per cent in 1997 to 22 per cent by 2010 (Lauber, 2002). To obtain, and go beyond this
share, a range of renewable energy technologies need to be diffused.
Large-scale hydropower and combustion of different types of biomass currently
provide the bulk of the energy supplied by renewable energy sources. In 1999, these
supplied  roughly  2,600  TWh  and  12,600  TWh  (160  TWh  of  electricity  (UNDP,
2000))3 of  primary energy respectively (IEA, 2001). In addition to these,  the ‘new’
renewables - wind turbines, solar cells and solar collectors - are now diffusing at a qui-
te rapid rate (see Table 1.1). 
1 This chapter provides a synthesis of work undertaken within the framework of the project
”Shaping and exploiting technological opportunities – the case of the Swedish capital goods
industry’s  venture  into  renewable  energy  technology”.  The  Swedish  Energy  Authority
kindly financed our work, which was undertaken under the auspices of IMIT. Funding was
also received  from Gothenburg  Energy Ltd.  Research Foundation for  one of  our  case
studies.  The study  would have  been impossible  to  undertake  without  this  support  and
without the time generously given to us by a large number of people in Swedish, German
and Dutch firms, research institutes and other organisations. We are also grateful to Jan
Finn, Volkmar Lauber, Ole Jess Olsen and Adrian Smith for useful comments on an earlier
draft.
2 1 watt hour (Wh) equals the energy supplied in one hour by an device with the power ca-
pacity 1 watt (W). 1 kilo watt hour (kWh) = 103 Wh. 1 mega watt hour (MWh) = 106 Wh. 1
giga watt hour (GWh) = 109 Wh. 1 tera watt hour (TWh) = 1012 Wh.
3 This data is for 1998.
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In the 1990s, the global stock of wind turbines increased by an average of 27 per
cent per annum, leading to an electricity supply of about 56 TWh in 2001. The stock
of solar cells grew by 22 per cent per annum in the same period, producing roughly 2
TWh of electricity in 2001 whereas the stock of solar collectors in Europe increased
by 12 per cent per annum supplying about 6 TWh of heat in 2001.
Table 1.1: Diffusion of Some’New’ Renewable Energy Technologies
Stock (gross)i
(2001)




Wind power (World) 25.7 GWa 27 % 56 TWhb
Solar cells (World) 1.7 GWpc 22 % 2 TWhd
Solar collectors (Europe)iiii 11.1 million m2 e 12 % 6 TWhf
i Installed wind power capacity; solar cell shipments/production; solar collector area.
ii ‘Growth in stock’ is an elaboration on ‘Stock’ and is based on the same sources.
iii Wind turbine electricity supply; solar cell electricity supply; solar collector heat supply.
iiii Solar collector diffusion data have not been available on a global level.
Sources: a BTM, 2000, table 2-1; DWTMA, 2001; European Commission, 1997, table 2-2; Kåberger, 1997; Wind Power Monthly,
2002.  b Elaboration on Wind Power Monthly (2002) and EWEA et al. (1999).  c Curry, 1999; Photon International, 2002; PV
News, 1993 & 1997; Rduber & Wettling, 2001 (minimum values). d Assuming that 1 Wp  roughly 1,33 kWh electricity supply. e 
Ekvall et al., 1997; DFS, 2002.  f  Elaboration on DFS (2002), Stryi-Hipp (2000) and Soltherm (2002).
Whereas the share of these technologies in the global energy supply is marginal at
present (less than 0.5% of the 15,000 TWh of electricity generated in the world), their
potential is considerable. There are visions of wind power accounting for ten per cent
of the world’s electricity supply and of solar cells  supplying one per cent by 2020
(EWEA et al., 1999, Greenpeace and EPIA, 2001). The real issue is no longer the
technical potential of these (and other) renewable energy technologies, but how this
potential can be realised and substantially contribute to a transformation of the energy
sector. The purpose of this chapter is to add to the current policy debate by syn-
thesising a number of studies on the development and diffusion of renewable energy
technology in Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands.4 
We would like to point to three features of the energy sector which characterise
the larger context in which we must place any analysis of how policy may manage the
transformation process. First, the energy system is huge. Even with continued high
growth rates over the next two decades, wind and solar power may only begin  to re-
place the stock of conventional energy technologies well after 2020 (see Table 1.2).5
Yet, a transformation of the energy sector post 2020 rests on a range of policy initia-
tives taken today, and, as early as several decades ago. Policy-making must therefore
be conducted with a very long-term perspective.
4 The studies forming the core empirical base of this chapter are Andersson and Jacobsson
(2000), Bergek (2002), Bångens and Sinhart (2002), Jacobsson et al., (2002), Jacobsson and
Johnson (2000), Johnson and Jacobsson (2001a) and Johnson and Jacobsson (2001b).
5 Of course, with a lower increase in total electricity supply (about half of that assumed in
Table 1.2), this point would be reached earlier, in about 2018.
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Second, for several reasons, markets are not easily formed. New technologies of-
ten have a cost disadvantage in comparison to incumbent technologies6 and they may
not offer any direct benefits for the individual buyer or investor (but reduce society’s
costs in terms of e.g. CO2  reduction). In addition, incumbent technologies are often
subsidised. This refers not only to R&D subsidies in the past, which were substantial
(Goldberg, 2000; Norberg-Bohm, 2000; Watson, 1997), but also to other forms of di-
rect subsidies. For instance, UNDP (2000) estimates that ‘conventional’ energy recei-
ved subsidies in the order of 250-300 billion USD yearly in the mid-1990s. Incumbent
technologies  are  also  subsidised  indirectly  as  there  are  various  types  of  negative
external economies associated with the use of conventional energy technologies.7 Alt-
hough the size is difficult to estimate, the European Commission suggests that “the
cost of producing electricity from coal or oil would double…if the external costs such
as damage to the environment and to health were taken into account” (Milborrow,
2002, p.  32).  In defining the incentives  for  investors  in  renewables,  policy makers
must give due consideration to these direct and indirect subsidies to incumbent tech-
nologies.
Third, the proponents of the established energy system often attempt to block the
diffusion of renewables by influencing the institutional framework so that it continues
to be to their advantage. Indeed, the current debate over the future of the energy sys-
tem involves intense lobbying over both policy goals and design of the institutional
framework. Policy-making is, thus, a highly political business.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 contains our analytical framework.
Section 3 identifies the main mechanisms that have induced or blocked the diffusion
of renewables. In section 4, we turn to the dynamics of the emergence and growth of
new technological systems in the energy field. The final section contains a discussion
about lessons for policy.
6 This is much due to the fact that price/performance improvements of a new technology
are closely intertwined with the process of diffusion. In the case of wind turbines, this cost
disadvantage has now largely disappeared.
7 Examples of these are air pollution, which has significant negative effects on health and on
the level of acidification of lakes, emission of carbon dioxide with implications for global
warming and health hazards associatated with mining of uranium, the use of that uranium
in nuclear power plants and in the storage of residues from that process.
Table  1.2:  Estimated Share of the Increase in World Electricity Use of Wind and
Solar Power
2000 2010 2020
Wind power supply increase 8.2 TWh 100 TWh 368 TWh
Total supply 37 TWh 445 TWh 2,967 TWh
Solar cell electricity supply increase 0.3 TWh 3.8 TWh 72 TWh
Total supply 1.7 TWh 17.8 TWh 280 TWh
Total increase wind and solar 8.5 TWh 103 TWh 440 TWh
Electricity use increase 462 TWh 628 TWh 729 TWh
Total use 15,381 TWh 20,873 TWh 27,351 TWh
Share of increase in electricity use 1.8 % 17 % 61 %
This table is based on assumptions and data provided by EWEA et al. (1999) (wind turbines) and Greenpeace and
EPIA (2001) (solar cells). The increase in electricity supply is assumed to be 3.1% per annum until 2010 and then
2.74 % per annum until 2020. The market for wind turbines (annual installed MW) is assumed to increase with 20
% per year until 2003, 30 % until 2010, 20% until 2015 and 10 % until 2019. The market for solar cells is assumed
to increase by roughly 27% per annum 2000-2010 and by roughly 34% per annum 2010-2020.
Sources: Elaboration on EWEA et al. (1999) and Greenpeace and EPIA (2001).
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2. Analytical framework: The evolution of technological systems
As is argued in the broader literature on innovation systems, the innovation and
diffusion process is both an individual and collective act. The determinants of this
process are not only found within individual firms; firms are embedded in innovation
systems  that  guide,  aid  and  constrain  the  individual  actors  within  them.  In  this
manner, technical change becomes endogenous to the economic system.
The process whereby a specific new technology emerges, is improved and diffused
in society may be studied using the concept of a technological system, which is a tech-
nology-specific  innovation  system (Carlsson and Stankiewicz,  1991;  Jacobsson and
Johnson, 2000).8 Due to the technology-specific features of the approach, it is parti-
cularly attractive when the focus of enquiry is competition between emerging techno-
logies  and  incumbent  technologies  (and  between  the  associated  technological
systems).
A technological system is defined as “…network(s) of agents interacting in a speci-
fic technology area under a particular institutional infrastructure for the purpose of
generating, diffusing, and utilizing technology…” (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991, p.
21) and is made up of three main elements:
Actors (and their competencies), which may be firms, e.g. users, suppliers or venture ca-
pitalists, or other organisations. A particularly important actor is a ‘prime mover’ or
system builder (Hughes, 1983), an actor (or set of actors) which is technically, financi-
ally and/or politically so powerful that it can strongly influence the development and
diffusion process. Other notable actors are non-commercial organisations acting as
proponents of specific technologies. Unruh (2000) underlines the existence of a range
of such organisations and the multitude of roles they play:
”…users and professionals operating within a growing technological system can, over
time,  come to recognize collective interests and needs that can be fulfilled  through
establishment of technical… and professional organisations…These institutions create
non-market  forces…through  coalition  building,  voluntary  associations  and  the
emergence of societal norms and customs. Beyond their influence on expectations and
confidence, they can further create powerful political forces to lobby on behalf of a
given technological system.” (p. 823).
Networks  constitute important channels for the transfer of both tacit and explicit
knowledge. These networks may be built around markets and may therefore be con-
ducive to the identification of problems and the development of new technical solu-
tions. They may also be non-market related and conducive to a more general diffusion
of information or to an ability to influence the institutional set-up. Being strongly in-
tegrated into a network increases the resource base of individual actors, in terms of
gaining access to the information and knowledge of other actors. Networks also influ-
ence the perception of what is desirable and possible, i.e. shape the actors’ images of
the future, which then guide the specific decisions of firms and other organisations.
Institutions stipulate  the  norms  and  rules  regulating  interactions  between  actors
(Edquist and Johnson, 1997) and the value base of various segments in society.  The
roles of institutions vary; some influence connectivity in the system whereas others in-
fluence the incentive structure or the structure of demand. Institutions are important
not only for the specific path a technology takes but also to the growth of new indus-
trial  clusters  (Carlsson  and Stankiewicz,  1991;  Edquist  and Johnson,  1997;  Porter,
1998).
8 Several alternative concepts are similar to that of ‘technological system’. In particular we
would like to mention the concepts of ‘industry social system’ (Van de Ven and Garud’,
1989), ‘regime shifts’ (Kemp et al., 1998), ‘socio-technical configurations’ (Geels, 2001) and
‘industrial clusters’ (Porter, 1998). Similar thoughts are also found within the social con-
struction of technology approach (see, e.g., Garud & Karnoe (2001)). 
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A useful way to analyse the workings of a technological system is to focus on how a
number of functions are served in the system (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001a; Rickne,
2000). These functions constitute an intermediate level between the components of a
technological system and its performance. An extensive review of the innovation sys-
tem literature (Johnson, 1998; Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001a) suggests that five basic
functions need to be served in a technological system:9
• The creation and diffusion of ‘new’ knowledge10
• The guidance of the direction of search among users and suppliers of technology. This
function includes guidance with respect both to the growth potential of a new
technology (which may be closely linked to the legitimacy of it) and to the choice
of specific design approaches
• The supply of resources such as capital and competencies 
• The creation of positive external economies, both market and non-market mediated
• The formation of  markets. Since innovations rarely find ready-made markets,  these
may  need  to  be  stimulated  or  even  created.  This  process  may  be  affected  by
governmental actions to clear legislative obstacles  and by various organisations’
measures to legitimise the technology.
These functions are not independent of one another, and changes in one function
may lead to changes in others (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001b). For instance, the crea-
tion of an initial market may act as an inducement mechanism for new entrants that
bring new resources to the technological system. 
There  are  two main reasons  for  analysing  a  technological  system in  functional
terms  as  well  as in  terms  of  its  constituent  components.  First,  we can define the
border  of  the  system,  an inherently  very  difficult  task  (Carlsson  et  al.,  2002),  by
analysing what promotes or hinders the development of these functions (Johnson and
Jacobsson, 2001a). Second, there is no reason to expect a particular system structure
to be related to the performance of a technological system in a clear and unambiguous
way. By arranging our empirical material in terms of functions, we can trace the way
through which, for instance, a particular combination of actors or a specific institu-
tional set-up shapes the generation, diffusion and utilisation of a new technology.
For a transformation of the energy system to take place, new technological sys-
tems with powerful functions need to emerge around a range of new energy technolo-
gies. Whereas our understanding of how new technological systems evolve is limited
(Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997a; Breschi and Malerba, 2001), some insight as to the
roots of and regularities  in the evolution of technological systems may be gleaned
from the literature.
In the literature on product/industry life cycles (see, e.g.  Bonaccorsi  and Giuri
(2000), Klepper (1997), Tushman, Anderson and O'Reilly (1997),  Utterback (1994),
Utterback and Abernathy (1975) and Van de Ven and Garud (1989)),  it  is  usually
possible to identify two main phases in the evolution of a product or an industry – a
formative period and one of market expansion – which differ in terms of the charac-
ter of technical change, the patterns of entry/exit and the rate of market growth.
With respect to the characteristics of the formative period, the literature emphasises
the existence of a range of competing designs, small markets, many entrants and high
uncertainty in terms of technologies, markets and regulations (Afuah and Utterback,
1997; Klepper, 1997; Kemp et al., 1998). We need, however, to go beyond these fea-
9 Not all factors are specific to one technological system; functions may be influenced by
factors that affect other technological systems as well. For instance, taxes may influence the
size of the venture capital industry, which, in turn, affects the ‘supply of resources’ for se-
veral technological systems.
10 The knowledge does not have to be genuinely new. Innovations may come in the form of
new combinations of existing knowledge or in the form of imitation.
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tures and understand the process in which this formative stage emerges, i.e. how all
the constituent components of a technological system emerge and how the five func-
tions begin to gain strength. We will emphasise four features of this process: market
formation,  the entry of firms and other  organisations,  institutional change and the
formation of technology-specific advocacy coalitions (a particular form of network). 
In the formative phase, market formation normally involves exploring niche markets,
markets where the new technology is superior in some dimension(s). These markets
may  be  commercial,  with  somewhat  unusual  selection  criteria  (Levinthal,  1998),
and/or involve a government subsidy. Such ‘protected spaces’ for the new technology
may serve as  ‘nursing markets’  (Ericsson and Maitland,  1989) where learning pro-
cesses can take place, the price/performance of the technology be improved and new
customer preferences be formed. 
This protective space may not be limited to the very first niche markets – the dif-
fusion of a new technology can be seen as an exploration of a whole series of niches
prior  to  reaching  mass  markets,  and  protection  may be  required and awarded by
markets that act as bridges to mass markets (Andersson and Jacobsson, 2000; Geels,
2001). Such ‘bridging markets’ allow for larger volumes of production and a series of
‘secondary innovations,’ in Schmookler’s (1966) terminology, both of which may be
required before the new technology can become a commodity.
The  formation  of  nursing  and  bridging  markets  has  an  importance  that  goes
beyond improving price/performance of the new technology; they generate a ‘space’
for the elements in the technological system to fall in place. In particular, by guiding
the direction of search, these markets provide an incentive for the entry of firms into va-
rious parts of the value chain.
Firm entry may shape new technological systems in three main ways. First, each
new entrant brings knowledge and other resources into the industry. Second, they en-
large the technological system by filling ‘gaps’ (e.g. by becoming specialist suppliers)
or by meeting novel demands (e.g. by developing new applications). In that process, a
division of labour is formed and, associated with this, further knowledge formation is
stimulated  by  specialisation  and  accumulated  experience  (see,  e.g.,  Smith  (1776),
Young (1928) and Maskell (2001)). 
Third,  positive  external  economies may emerge beyond those associated with a
further division of labour – a new entrant may raise the returns for subsequent ent-
rants in additional ways. These external economies, which may be both pecuniary and
non-pecuniary  (Scitovsky,  1954),  include  Marshallian  externalities  (Breschi  and
Lissoni, 2001)11 but go beyond these. They may, for example, come in the form of
passing  of  information  in  networks  or  an  increased availability  of  complementary
resources. Indeed, “[e]ach successful firm … creates a demand for certain intermedia-
ry services such as legal and accounting services. Greater availability of these services
also facilitates the start-up process for subsequent firms, and higher rates of entry of
firms encourage venture capital to enter” (de Fontenay and Carmel, 2001, p. 26). 
New entrants may also play an important role for the process of legitimisation of a
new field:
“The ecological theory of long-term organisational evolution posits that when a new
organisational form appears, such as automobile manufacturing in the late 19th century,
it lacks legitimation or social taken-for-grantedness. Low or absent legimitation implies
that organizing is difficult: capital sources are wary; suppliers and customers need to be
educated; employees may be hard to find and recruit; and in many instances hostile in-
stitutional  rules  must  be  changed.  As  the  form  proliferates,  legitimation  increases.
Initially, when the number of organizations is low, the returns to legitimation of adding
another organization is great.” (Carroll, 1997, p. 126).
11 New entrants may, for instance, strengthen a local labour market for specialists.
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The legitimacy of a new technology and its actors, their access to resources and the
formation of markets is strongly related to the institutional framework. If the frame-
work is not aligned with the new technology, several functions may be blocked. Insti-
tutional change (and by implication its politics) is, therefore, at the heart of the process
whereby new technologies gain ground (Freeman, 1977; Freeman, 1978, Freeman and
Louca, 2002). 
Institutional  change, or alignment,  is  a multifaceted process.  For example, sup-
porting the formation of a new technological system involves a redirection of science
and technology policy in order to generate a range of competing designs. This know-
ledge creation may have to begin well in advance of the emergence of markets, but it
also needs to be sustained throughout the evolution of the system. Institutional align-
ment is, however, also about market regulations, tax policies, value systems etc. that
may be ‘closer’ to the operation of specific firms. In particular, institutional change is
often required to generate markets for new technologies. The change may, for instan-
ce, involve the formation of standards.
The centrality of institutional alignment implies that firms in competing technolo-
gical systems not only compete in the market for goods and services but also to gain
influence over the institutional framework. As Van de Ven and Garud (1989, p. 210)
put it, “…firms compete not only in the marketplace, but also in this political institu-
tional context. Rival firms often cooperate to collectively manipulate the institutional
environment to legitimize and gain access to resources necessary for collective survi-
val….” 12
This is well recognised in the political science literature (see, e.g., Sabatier (1998)
and Smith (2000)),  which argues that policy making takes place in a context where
advocacy coalitions, made up of a range of actors sharing a set of beliefs, compete in in-
fluencing policy in line with those beliefs (Smith, 2000). The political science literature
looks at coalitions in a non-technology specific manner, which is reasonable consider-
ing that the political debate over, say, climate change, is not necessarily focused on
specific technological systems.13 However, for a new technology to gain ground, tech-
nology specific  coalitions need to be formed and to engage themselves in wider political
debates in order to gain influence over institutions and secure institutional alignment.
As a part of this process, advocates of a specific technology need to build support
among broader advocacy coalitions where a particular technology, e.g. solar cells, is
perceived as a solution to wider policy concerns. Hence, the formation of “political
networks”14 with the objective of shaping the institutional set-up is an inherent part of
this formative stage. 
A coalition may include many types of organisations and actors, such as universi-
ties, private and non-commercial associations, media, politicians at different levels and
elements of the state bureaucracy (Feldman and Schreuder, 1996, Porter, 1998). How-
ever, individual firms and related industry associations play an especially important
role in the competition over institutions. Thus, the entry of firms into various parts of
the value chain has yet another consequence for the emergence of a new technological
system: the new entrants allow for the formation or the strengthening15 of a technolo-
gy specific advocacy coalition, which may gain enough strength to influence the insti-
tutional set-up. As earlier mentioned, such entries are dependent on the emergence of
12 Similarly, Davies (1996) underscores the centrality of the political dimension in the compe-
tition between incumbents and contenders in his study of innovations in telecommunica-
tions.
13 We are grateful to Dr. Adrian Smith for pointing this out to us.
14 In the subsequent text, this term will be used synonymously with the term advocacy coali-
tions by which we mean technology specific ones.
15 In the environmental field, wider advocacy coalitions existed before the emergence of spe-
cialised industries supplying e.g. wind turbines and solar cells.
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niche markets. An early formation of markets is, therefore, at the heart of the forma-
tive stage. As Kemp et al. (1998) argue: 
“Without the presence of a niche, system builders would get nowhere…Apart from
demonstrating the  viability  of  a  new technology  and  providing  financial  means  for
further development,  niches help building a constituency  behind a new technology,  and set in
motion  interactive  learning  processes  and  institutional  adaptation…that  are  all-
important for the wider diffusion and development of the new technology” (p. 184, our
emphasis).
The time span involved in a formative phase may be very long. This is underlined
in a recent study of Israel’s ‘Silicon Wadis,’ which began a rapid period of growth in
the 1990s after a history starting in the 1970s (see de Fontenay and Carmel (2001)).
This time span is not unusual; the first commercial major market for steam ships took
about 50 years to materialise (Geels, 2001) and the formative stages of the US techno-
logical  systems  for  computers  and  semiconductors  lasted  for  several  decades
(Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997a). Often, the investments are substantial and seemingly
without success.  Breshanan et al.  (2001) summarise the lessons from a set  of case
studies on the evolution of ICT clusters:
“Another similarity … is the degree of investment, effort and building needed to set up
the background for an innovation cluster’s take off. …it takes years of firm-building
and market-building efforts… sometimes these long-term investments in national or
regional capabilities can grow for a long time in what seems like a low-return mode
before the take off into cluster growth…” (pp. 843-844).
At some point,  however, these investments may have generated a large enough
system which is sufficiently complete for it to be able to ‘change gear’ and begin to
develop in a self-sustaining way (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997b; Porter, 1998). 
A necessary condition for a ‘change in gear’ to take place is that larger markets are
formed – the system needs to get connected to an underlying wave of technological
and market opportunities (Breshanan et al., 2001).16 As it does so, a chain reaction of
positive feedback loops may materialise which involve all the constituent components
and the functions of the technological system.  The linkages between functions may
turn out to be circular, setting in motion a process of cumulative causation. 
Indeed, as pointed out long ago by Myrdal (1957), virtuous circles are central to a
development process. He even suggested that “ the main scientific task is…to analyse
the causal inter-relations within the system itself as it moves under the influence of
outside pushes and pulls and the momentum of its own internal processes” (Myrdal,
1957, p. 18). 
It is, however, not an easy task to unravel these causal interrelationships, and, mo-
reover, to predict how these respond to outside pushes, e.g. policy. Technological sys-
tems are dynamic and unstable, and any change in a component in the system (e.g. a
new entrant or a change in the institutional set-up) may trigger a set of actions and re-
actions in the system (Carlsson et al., 2002). Under what conditions a ‘change in gear’
will take place is, therefore, difficult to predict.
A process of cumulative causation can, however, only be set in motion if the tech-
nological system has gone through a formative period – without it, a response capaci-
ty to the underlying wave will not exist and, indeed, the wave itself may not be there.
But, as Breschi and Malerba (2001) point out, making the required investments in the
formative period is very risky. There are many reasons for expecting that the broader
(not only market) selection environment is biased in favour of incumbent technologi-
cal systems and that a new technological system may consequently develop very slow-
16 For example, some ICT clusters have become successful by linking up to the US market
(Breshanan et al., 2001) whilst the Nordic technological systems in mobile telephony grew
into a second phase with the European GSM standard.
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ly or in a stunted way – a system failure may occur (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997b).
These  reasons  are  found  in  all  components  of  the  technological  system.  For
instance:17 
• Institutions may fail to align themselves to the new technology – this may encom-
pass the regulatory framework or the functioning of the educational and capital
markets.18
• Markets may not be formed due to, for instance, the phenomenon of increasing
returns to adoption, which benefits established technologies, or direct and indirect
subsidies to incumbent technologies.
• (Additional) Firms may not enter due to a lack of markets or because they tend to
build on their existing knowledge base when they search for new opportunities,
which may restrict their search process.
• Networks may fail to aid new technology simply because of poor connectivity bet-
ween actors. The proponents of the new technology may also be organisationally
too  weak to counteract  the  influence on legislation,  public  opinion  etc.  of  the
vested interest groups of the incumbent technology.
Such ‘blocking mechanisms’ may operate in a formative stage, but they may also
obstruct a transition towards a more self-sustained technological system i.e. one which
is to an increasing extent driven by its own momentum rather than by outside pushes
or pulls in the form of policy.  Clearly, we would expect powerful  inducement me-
chanisms to be needed in order to overcome this  range of potential  blocking me-
chanisms,  and we would expect  the  nature  of  both inducement and blocking me-
chanisms to vary between countries and technologies.19
In what follows, we will first elaborate on the nature of inducement and blocking
mechanisms in renewable energy technology (section 3). We will then relate our un-
derstanding of the dynamics of system evolution. It is particularly unclear under what
conditions a technological system manages to shift to a second phase, and we will,
therefore,  analyse cases in which blocking mechanisms have been overcome and a
process of cumulative causation initiated, as well as cases in which system failure has
occurred (section 4). 
3. Inducement and blocking mechanisms in renewable energy technology
In this  section,  we will  illustrate the wide range and different  character of  me-
chanisms that have either induced or blocked the diffusion of renewable energy tech-
nology.  We will do so by relating how these mechanisms have influenced the five
functions in selected technological systems in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden
(see Table 3.1). Two broad policy challenges are then formulated.
17 Jacobsson and Johnson (2000) and Johnson and Jacobsson (2001a) elaborate on various ty-
pes of ‘blocking mechanisms’. Kemp et al. (1998, p. 181) argue similarly ” … many factors
… impede the development and use of new technologies…These factors are interrelated
and often reinforce each other. What we have is not a set of factors that act separately …,
but a structure of interrelated factors that feed back upon one another, the combined influ-
ence of which gives rise to inertia and specific patterns in the direction of technological
change.” See also Unruh (2000) for an extensive review of mechanisms locking us into a
carbon economy and Walker (2000) for a case study on entrapment in a large technological
system. 
18 Maskell (2001) provides an illustrative example of how institutions in Finland favour the
wood processing industry at the expense of the wooden furniture industry.
19 Some countries and regions may get a head start, explaining not why and when increasing
returns to adoption appears, but where.
Jacobsson/Bergek   217
Government policy  has been the major  inducement mechanism.  R&D funding has
supported the creation of new knowledge, supplied resources and guided the search
of various actors to the new technologies (Jacobsson et al., 2002; Johnson and Jacobs-
son, 2001a and 2001b).20 Instruments  such as investment subsidies,  demonstration
programmes  and  legislative  changes  have  stimulated  the  formation  of  markets
(Bergek, 2002; Jacobsson et al., 2002; Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001a and 2001b) and
the creation of knowledge of applied nature (Jacobsson et al., 2002).
Firm entry/activity has led to the creation of new knowledge, the supply of resources
and the development of different types of designs within each technology field.21 Mo-
reover, it has stimulated market formation; for example, in the German solar cell case,
utilities such as Bayernwerk have introduced ‘green’ pricing schemes, and the entry of
firms into several steps of the value chain has led to the development of new market
segments for solar cells (Jacobsson et al., 2002). 
Feedback loops from the formation of markets  have influenced several other functions.
Increased sales have generated growing resources for technology development in the
capital goods sector (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001a and 2001b) and have also guided
the direction of search of new entrants into the field of renewable energy technology,
bringing with them new resources  (Jacobsson et al,  2002;  Johnson and Jacobsson,
2001b). Finally, local energy suppliers in Sweden have through their investments in
bioenergy technology stimulated further market growth by increasing the legitimacy of
that technology (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001a).
20 In the German and Dutch wind turbine cases, the funding was, moreover, used to create
and sustain variety in the knowledge base (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001b).
21 The latter has, perhaps, been most evident in the Dutch and German wind turbine cases
(Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001b) and the German solar cell case (Jacobsson et al, 2002), but
has been seen in the Swedish solar collector and pellet burner cases as well (Johnson and
Jacobsson, 2001a). 




Government policy Creation and diffusion of  new
knowledge 
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Supply of resources Lack of legitimacy
Firm entry/activity









Formation of markets Government policy
Note 1: These mechanisms are from different cases and this table should, therefore, only be interpreted as an overview of
the most important mechanisms found in the cases.
Note 2: Line weight illustrates the main messages of this section (see the following discussion).
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The first of five major  blocking mechanisms is high  uncertainty, in technological,
economic and market terms,22 which has obstructed market formation23 and guided
the direction of search of potential entrants away from the field (Bergek, 2002, John-
son and Jacobsson, 2001a and 2001b).
The second is lack of legitimacy of the new technology in the eyes of different actors.
This has not only guided the search away from the field of renewable energy techno-
logy,  but  has  also  blocked the  supply  of  resources  and  the  formation of  markets
(Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001a and 2001b). The most prominent example of this me-
chanism is the Swedish ‘nuclear power trauma’ (see Box 1), but lack of legitimacy was
also an important reason behind the Dutch government’s failure to solve the siting
problem for wind turbine, which was due to difficulties to obtain building permits
(Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001b).
22 For example, it is difficult for firms to choose between different design approaches and for
customers to trust that new and unproven technologies will work. Economically, the level
of  compensation  for  small-scale  electricity  production  and  the  prices  of  other  energy
sources are dependent on political decisions. In the market, unarticulated demand from
new customer groups makes it difficult for firms to identify markets and adapt products to
customer needs. 
23 This has been true not only for large-scale process technologies such as black liquor gasifi-
cation (Bergek, 2002), but also for small-scale technologies such as pellet burners and solar
collectors (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001a).
a This account is based on Jacobsson and Johnson (2000) and Johnson and Jacobsson (2001a and 2001b).
BOX 1: The Swedish Nuclear Power Traumaa
The Swedish ‘nuclear power trauma’ has its
roots in the Swedish nuclear power issue,
which has been discussed  since  the  early
1970s and which  led to  a  referendum in
1980 after the Harrisburg accident. It was
decided  that  the  Swedish nuclear  époque
was to end in 2010, but the issue has still
not been settled. 
The energy-intensive  industry,  the  capital
goods  industry  and  the  two  dominant
utilities  formed  the  core  of  a  powerful
alliance  to  oppose  the  dismantling  of
nuclear power. In the other camp, the anti-
nuclear  power movement  referred  to  the
results  of  the  referendum and wanted  to
begin the dismantling process. The Social
Democrats  in  power  had  considerable
problems to balance  the demands  of  the
two  camps,  which  led  to  uncertain  and
unpredictable energy policies.
Over  time,  a  ‘nuclear  power  trauma’
emerged,  which reduced  all  energy issues
to  one:  the  issue  of  whether  or  not  to
dismantle  the  Swedish  nuclear  power
plants.  In  the  very  heated  debate,
renewable energy technology was seen only
as a  substitute for nuclear power,  and all
programmes to induce further diffusion of 
renewable energy  technology were justified
in that context. 
This  trauma  had  two  major  consequences
for renewable energy technology. First,  the
value  of  each  technology  was  judged  in
relation to how many nuclear power reactors
it  might  replace.  For  small-scale
technologies, it was but a fraction, at least in
the short and medium term, which further
weakened  the  legitimacy  of  renewable
energy  technology  and  contributed  to  an
inability to recognise its growth potential.
Second, since renewable energy technology
was  perceived  by  many  as  a  threat  to  the
continued availability  of  nuclear  power,  an
interest  in,  for  example,  wind  power  was
automatically  assumed  to  involve  an  anti-
nuclear  stance  and  a  ‘betrayal’  of  Swedish
industry,  which  enjoyed  the  benefits  of
nuclear  power.  Thus,  it  was  not  surprising
that  renewable  energy  technology  did  not
gain  legitimacy  in  the  eyes  of  the  capital
goods  industry,  potential  users  and  large
parts of the media.  As a  consequence,  the
supply  of  resources  was  constrained,  the
market did not grow and few firms entered
the  industry  supplying  renewable  energy
technology.
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These two blocking mechanisms are common in new technological fields and have
to be handled by the emerging technological systems. However, three additional me-
chanisms have compounded the problem. 
First, weak connectivity in terms of weak learning and political networks between ac-
tors of the technological systems has resulted in a number of problems.24 For exam-
ple, problems have been wrongly formulated, have fallen between stools or have re-
mained  unsolved  even  though  the  knowledge to  solve  them exists  in  the  system
(Bergek, 2002; Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001a). A weakness of the proponents of the
new technologies in the Swedish political arena has made them unable to increase legi-
timacy and induce the institutional changes necessary to stimulate market formation
(Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001a and 2001b).
Second, the ambiguous and/or opposing behaviour of some established energy suppliers
and capital goods suppliers has reduced the legitimacy of renewable energy technology
and has, thus, blocked the supply of resources and guided the direction of search away
from these technologies (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001a and 2001b). It has also added
to  customer  uncertainty  and  vulnerability,  which  has  blocked  market  formation
(Bergek,  2002; Johnson and Jacobsson,  2001a) and delayed important  steps  in the
knowledge-creation process (Bergek, 2002).
Third,  government policy has blocked several functions.  In Sweden, a lack of con-
scious variety creation within R&D policy has guided the direction of search into an
early selection of designs that have not been in demand, for example in the case of
wind turbines. In Sweden and the Netherlands, inconsistent and changing policy mea-
sures have increased the level of uncertainty and resulted in an erratic demand for
some technologies, which has guided the search of firms away from the field of rene-
wable energy technology (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001a and 2001b).
Clearly, there is a wide range of different inducement and blocking mechanisms
which influence the various functions in a multitude of ways. This implies that a first
policy challenge is to create an understanding of the functional pattern of each relevant
system with the purpose of identifying its particular strengths and weaknesses. A key
policy objective should then be to make sure that weak functions are strengthened (by
increasing  the  strength  of  inducement  mechanisms  and/or  reducing  strength  of
blocking mechanisms).
In order to reduce the strength of blocking mechanisms, it is particularly impor-
tant for policy to be concerned with the two functions ‘guide direction of search’ and
‘stimulate  market  formation’.  As  is  clear  from Table  3.3,  these  functions  may  be
blocked in many ways, and there is, therefore, a considerable risk that their potential
to influence other functions through feedback loops (as described above and in the
following section) will not be realised.
Designing policies that aim at influencing the functional pattern of an entire tech-
nological  system  obviously  requires  co-ordination  between  various  ministries  and
agencies responsible for different parts of the incumbent and emerging systems.  For
example, energy policy, science policy and construction norms may need to be inte-
grated in order for a ‘roof programme’ promoting solar cells or solar collectors to be
realised. Achieving such policy co-ordination is the second policy challenge. 
24 However, in some cases, connectivity was too strong, which resulted in strategic conformity
with respect to market and technology choices (e.g. the Dutch wind turbine case) and, thus,
in increased vulnerability to uncertainty.
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4. The dynamics of system evolution
In this section, we will turn to the dynamics of system evolution and analyse the
conditions under which blocking mechanisms in some cases have been overcome, and
a process of cumulative causation started, or how the evolution of a new technologi-
cal  system in other  cases  has  been stunted.  In  the course  of  the analysis,  we will
identify more policy challenges. We will draw upon the experiences of Germany, Net-
herlands and Sweden in wind turbines, Germany in solar cells and Sweden and Net-
herlands in solar collectors.
In Table 4.1, we summarise the diffusion levels at the end of a formative period
(about 1990) and in 2001 in both absolute (MW) and relative terms (MW/total prima-
ry energy consumption). Three observations can be made. First, the relative German
level of diffusion was between two and seven times higher than that of the Nether-
lands and Sweden in 2001. Second, at the end of the formative period, the Nether-
lands and Sweden were ahead in wind turbines and solar collectors respectively (and
about equal to Germany in solar cells) but lost their advantage subsequently. Third,
the Swedish advantage in solar collectors was not only lost vis-à-vis Germany, but the
Netherlands is also catching up with Sweden. 
In our attempt to explain these developments, we will begin our analysis by identi-
fying features of the formative phase and then proceed to discuss the phase in which
a market expansion begins to take place. We will argue that a necessary condition to
take a lead in the transformation process is that the formative stage is characterised by
certain features, but also that this is not a sufficient condition – even if a formative
stage is successfully completed, the transition to a second phase is fraught with diffi-
culties.
4.1. The formative stage
As underlined in section two, institutional alignment is at the heart of the process
of transformation. In the formative stage, the institutional framework has to begin to
be aligned to the new technology. A third challenge for policy makers is to contribute to
a process of institutional alignment (in spite of eventual attempts by vested interest
groups to hinder this process). Such an alignment is multifaceted, and we will point to
three  types  of  institutional  adjustment,  which  are  required  for  a  new  system  to
emerge: variety in ‘knowledge creation’, market formation and, associated with that,
gaining legitimacy for the new technology.
Table 4.1: The Diffusion of Wind Turbines, Solar Cells and Solar Collectors in 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden in about 1990 and 2001
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* 2000 for the Netherlands and Sweden.
Bold figures indicate the ‘leading country’ (of the ones presented here) at the end of the year in question.
Sources: Total primary energy consumption data for 1990, 1992 and 2000 (N.B.!): BP (2001). Wind turbines: BWE (2002), Kamp
(2000), WSH (2002) & STEM (2001), table 5.. Solar cells: IEA (2002).  Solar collectors: Bångens and Sinkart (2003). 
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First, science and technology policy has to induce ‘knowledge creation’ in renewa-
bles.  In the OECD, government R&D budgets for renewable energy technology in-
creased substantially in the 1970s and early 1980s25 and remained broadly constant, in
the order of 500-600 million USD, in the 1990s (IEA, 2000). 
However, although the volume of funds matters, the manner in which policy is
conducted is of great importance as well. As mentioned in section 2, the formative
stage is often characterised by substantial technological uncertainty and by the co-exis-
tence of many competing design approaches. This was clearly the case for wind power
in the 1980s, where designs differed greatly in terms of, for instance, size and number
of blades (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001b). In solar cells, the same variety can be seen
as a whole range of so-called thin film technologies challenge the dominant crystalline
technology (Jacobsson, et al., 2002).26 Where such technological uncertainty prevails,
policy makers ought to avoid thinking in terms of optima. The guiding principle for
policy should instead be to contribute to the generation of a diverse set of technologi-
cal options by stimulating experimentation and the ‘creation of knowledge’ connected
to different design approaches.  The creation of variety is  closely connected to the
number of actors within a field since these may bring different types of visions, com-
petencies and complementary assets to the industry.27 The fourth policy challenge is, thus,
to induce a variety of actors to experiment with different solutions.
The  German  federal  R&D policy  consciously  avoided  guiding  researchers  and
firms in any specific direction in the fields of wind turbines and solar cells. Instead, it
allowed for a broad search and ‘creation of knowledge’ to take place by many diffe-
rent  actors  (e.g.  firms  and  universities/institutes)  over  a  long  period  of  time (Ja-
cobsson et al., 2002; Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001b). In the Dutch wind turbine case,
policy and other factors induced a search in many directions as well. 
In the Swedish case, however, a substantial R&D funding was channeled almost
solely to very large turbines (and just a few actors) as these were seen to be the only
type which could have a substantial impact on power production in the medium term
(see  Box  1).  In  solar  collectors,  the  early  Swedish  pattern  was  the  same with  an
emphasis on large-scale applications, one particular design approach and a few actors
(Bångens and Sinhart, 2002).28 
Second, appropriate financial incentives to invest in renewables need to be put in
place in order to stimulate the ‘formation of (early) markets’, with the purpose of pro-
viding ‘guidance of the direction of search’ for a variety of firms towards the new field
and stimulating the ‘creation of new (application) knowledge’ and the formation of
prime movers. The incentives used may, for example, be in the form of capital grants
for new investments in order to absorb some of the technological and economic risks
for pioneering users. 
25 So did, however,  also those fossil  fuel  and nuclear power R&D; the approximately  700
million USD spent in IEA countries on renewable energy technology R&D in 1998 may be
compared with the more than 2,800 million USD spent on conventional nuclear power
R&D (excluding breeders and fusion) and 1,400 million USD spent on fossil fuel R&D
(1999 prices and exchange rates) (IEA, 2000).
26 Indeed, even in the case of the large-scale process technology of black liquor gasification,
several competing technical solutions have been developed in Sweden (Bergek, 2002).
27 On this point, see also van Est (1999). In addition, having a few, dominating actors in a
field  may be risky since such actors may very  well  become ‘prime blockers’  instead of
‘prime movers’.  This was evident in the case of black liquor gasification in Sweden, in
which the mere withdrawal of a dominant actor blocked the diffusion of the new techno-
logy (Bergek, 2002).
28 Indeed, in Sweden, a bias towards large-scale solutions at the expense of variety is easily
discerned, not only in wind turbines but also in solar collectors and biomass gasification
technology. In all cases, this bias was later associated with a failure to industrialise the tech-
nologies. 
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However, and third, a prerequisite for appropriate incentives to come into place,
and for firms to enter the new area, is that renewables are seen as legitimate in broad
segments of society. In Germany, the Chernobyl accident in 1986 had a permanent
and major effect on the attitude towards nuclear power in the German population
(Jahn, 1992) and a broad legitimacy of renewables dates back to at least 1988 when all
political parties backed a Parliamentary Resolution calling for more R&D in renew-
ables (Scheer, 2001). 
Incentives  to  invest  in  renewables  have  therefore  been  widely  available. Wind
power  benefited  from several  federally  funded  demonstration  programmes,  which
contributed  to  the  formation  of  markets  in  the  second  half  of  the  1980s  and  a
demonstration programme for larger solar power applications was initiated in 1986.
Moreover, the German Ministry of Research responded to the above mentioned Par-
liamentary Resolution with a 250 MW programme for wind energy (Johnson and Ja-
cobsson,  2000)  and  a  highly  innovative  1,000-roof  programme for  solar  cells  (Ja-
cobsson et al., 2002).
The  market  expansion  for  wind  turbines  largely  benefited  German  suppliers  –
small utilities or farmers (the first customers) often favoured local machinery firms in
early user-supplier relations and indeed, much of the market created by the 250 MW
programme  was,  by  various  means,  ‘reserved’  for  domestic  firms  (Johnson  and
Jacobsson, 2001b).  In total, the formative period saw the  entry  of fourteen German
firms, which formed an industry association together with owners of wind turbines
(Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001b). As for wind turbines, the early market for solar cells
benefited almost only German firms.
In the Netherlands,  wind power had a reasonably  strong  legitimacy in the late
1970s and early 1980s, and some demonstration projects in the early 1980s supported
new prototypes and turbines in new applications, e.g. by fiscal incentives and capital
grants (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001b). In addition, investment subsidies were given
to  investors  from 1986 due to a  revived  political  interest  in  wind  power after  an
energy price crisis in 1984. A Dutch market was formed which was larger than that in
Germany in the second half of the 1980s and as many as 15-20 firms entered the wind
turbine industry. As in the German case, these local wind turbine firms supplied most
of the machinery.
In contrast, and as was elaborated on in Box 1, a key feature of the Swedish in-
stitutional  context was a failure  to achieve a legitimacy for  renewables  that  supply
electricity.29 Consequently,  the  wind  turbine  market  was  poorly  developed  in  the
1980s. The little market there was contained no mechanisms for favouring local sup-
pliers with the exception of a couple of megawatt turbines. There was, however, an
advanced programme for large-scale applications of solar collectors connected to dis-
trict heating networks in the 1970s and 1980s, contributing substantially to the forma-
tion of an early market (Bångens and Sinhart, 2002). An early legitimacy was obtained
as solar collectors were primarily seen as a substitute to oil and not to nuclear power.
In this emerging market, a few Swedish suppliers were favoured (Bångens, 2002). 
In summary, in the German and Dutch cases of wind power, initial markets were
formed, albeit small, and firms were induced to enter into the technological system.
Variety was achieved through both R&D policy and from these entrants. An early le-
gitimacy was an underlying factor. Much the same can be said about the German solar
cell case (although the number of entrants into solar cell production was lower) and
the Swedish case of solar collectors  (although there was little technical variety).  In
these cases, industrial firms strengthened the technology-specific advocacy coalitions.
In contrast, in the Swedish wind turbines case there was little variety, an absence of le-
29 Interestingly, after more than a decade of intense debate, the combatants were so firmly
entrenched  that  the  Chernobyl  accident  had  little  effect  on  public  opinion  on nuclear
power (Anshelm, 2000).
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gitimacy, hardly any market formation, few entrants and, consequently, an advocacy
coalition which lacked the strength of industrial firms (in spite of large Government
R&D expenditures in this field).
4.2. Cumulative causation or system failure?
A formative stage needs to be followed by one in which the initial market space is
enlarged so that volume advantages can be reaped, additional firms be induced to en-
ter throughout the value chain and further  learning is stimulated.  As underlined in
section two, an enlargement of markets and the related institutional alignment invol-
ves propelling the system forward in a process of cumulative causation. We will unra-
vel the characteristics of that process where it has evolved, i.e. in the German cases of
wind turbines and solar cells (4.2.1), and discuss why it has failed to occur in other ca-
ses, such as the Dutch and Swedish wind turbine cases (4.2.2).
4.2.1. Wind and solar power in Germany: Cumulative causation unravelled
The German case of wind power reveals how feedback loops may be generated
from early market formation, via early entrants, to changes in the institutional frame-
work beyond the formative phase.
Representatives of the infant wind turbine industry and independent power pro-
ducers (i.e.  early entrants  in the form of,  for instance, farmers in north-west  Ger-
many) collaborated with an association of owners of small-scale hydro electric plants
(Ahmels, 1999) and with an organisation of local and federal politicians favouring re-
newables (Eurosolar) to get the German parliament to pass its first electricity feed-in
law (EFL) in 1991 (see Box 2). The broad legitimacy of renewables in Germany meant
that there was little resistance to this law– the passing of it was, indeed, seen as a ‘sim-
ple thing’ in terms of political effort (Scheer, 2001).30 
This EFL gave a massive and hitherto unheard of incentive for wind turbine ow-
ners,  which resulted in an ‘unimaginable’  market  growth (Johnson and Jacobsson,
2001b). Due largely to this market growth,  the German wind turbine industry was
able to expand rapidly in the first half of the 1990s, and yet new firms were induced to
enter into different parts of the value chain (e.g. wind turbine suppliers, financiers of
large wind parks and component suppliers).  These new entrants influenced the pro-
cess of cumulative causation in three ways.  First, they led to a strengthening of the
advocacy coalition, in part because economic arguments could now be added to envi-
ronmental ones in support of wind power. Indeed, the wind power coalition grew so
strong that it later successfully handled challenges by the larger utilities, which wanted
to change the EFL, both in the German Parliament (see Box 2) and in the court sys-
tem (especially the German constitutional court31 and the European Court (Jacobsson
et.al., 2002)). 
30 With this broad legitimacy, wind and solar power have received support not only from the
federal level but also from the regional and local level (e.g. in Bavaria and North Rhine
-Westphalia).
31 We are grateful to Professor Volkmar Lauber for pointing this out for us.
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Second, the ‘supply of resources’ to the technological system by some new en-
trants allowed for a rapid upscaling of turbines as well as for building of large wind
parks.  Third, they allowed for a further division of labour to evolve, primarily bet-
ween wind turbine suppliers and local component suppliers. The benefits spilled over
to yet more turbine manufacturers (e.g. DeWind) since these could rely on a complete
infrastructure, which reduced entry barriers.
Similar to the wind turbine case, early entrants and positive feedback loops associ-
ated with these strengthened the solar cell coalition in Germany as it tried to influence
the institutional framework to the advantage of the new technology (see Box 3). The
available market formation programs (the EFL and the ‘1,000-roof’ programme) were
not enough to build a growing market for solar cells (the remuneration of the former
was not enough to cover the high costs of solar power and the latter was not large
enough). However, through a political struggle by an advocacy coalition composed
primarily of environmental organisations, solar cell firms, Eurosolar and the Green
party, local feed-in laws (at the municipal level) were formed and were later followed
by a federal ‘100,000-roof’ programme in 1998 and a revised federal feed-in law (in
2000) with much higher remuneration than before (Jacobsson et al., 2002).
An expanding market for solar cells in the second half of the 1990s greatly strengt-
hened the function ‘guidance of  the direction of search’  and new firms and other
organisations entered along the whole value chain: machine suppliers and engineering
firms  developing  production  technology,  solar  cell  manufacturers,  module
manufacturers,  firms applying solar cells in a large number of applications (e.g. on
exhibition halls, football stadiums, parking meters, etc.), tile and roof manufacturers,
facade manufacturers,  builders,  electricians, insurance companies, city planners and,
not the least, architects. This entry strengthened the process of cumulative causation
in three ways. First, some of the new entrants developed the new segments of façade
and roof  integrated  applications.  The  exploitation  of  these  segments  by  pioneers
enlarged  the  market  and  led  to  a  strengthening  of  the  function  ‘guidance  of  the
direction of search,’ which induced yet new entrants,  contributing to the ‘supply of
a This account is based on Johnson and Jacobsson (2001b) and on Jacobsson et al. (2002).
The EFL came into force in 1991. It required
utilities  to  accept  renewable  electricity
delivered to the grid and to pay the supplier
90  % of  the  average  consumer  price  (~17
pfennig/kWh) for it.
The origin of the law was the 1989 proposal
of  two  environmental  organisations
(Förderverein Solarenergie and Eurosolar) of
a  ‘cost  covering  feed-in  law’,  which  was
supported  by  an  association  of  small-scale
hydropower plant owners and the infant wind
turbine industry.
Within  parliament,  politicians  from  CDU,
SPD and  the  Greens,  organised  within  the
Eurosolar Parliament Group, worked for the
acceptance of a law. With support from the
majority of the CDU members (which then
formed the government), the law was passed
in 1991.
In the mid-1990s, the rapid diffusion of wind
turbines  led  to  a  response  from  the  larger
utilities which worked vigorously to convince
the German parliament that the EFL should
be  rescinded. Intense  lobbying  followed,
which reintroduced substantial  uncertainty,
and the market stagnated. Finally, in 1997, a
select  committee  was  given  the  re-
sponsibility for investigating whether or not
the law should be amended.
By then the German wind turbine industry
had  been  able  to  grow  beyond  an  infant
stage,  allowing  it  to  add  economic
arguments to environmental ones in favour
of wind energy. It had also formed powerful
political  networks that  were  manifested  in
e.g. an active industry association of turbine
suppliers  and  owners,  which  through
lobbying  activities  tried  to  influence  the
select committee.
In  contrast,  the  utilities  were  neither
supported  by  the  German  federation  of
industries  (VDMA),  nor  by  any  political
party. 
The  wind  turbine  lobby  won the  political
battle,  although it  was a  close  call;  in  the
select  committee,  the  proponents  of  a
continued  law  won  the  vote  by  eight  to
seven.
BOX 2: The German Electricity Feed-In Lawa
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(more) resources’. Second, the solar cell advocacy coalition gained strength and is now
raising the level of ambition by a call for a ‘10,000-façade’ programme for solar cells
(Siemer, 2002). Third, new entrants helped to induce further institutional changes, e.g.
in  the educational  system.  For  example,  the German pioneer  in solar  cell  facades,
Flabeg, spent a great deal of efforts for about a decade to engage and teach Schools of
Architecture  so that  new architects  are made familiar  with solar  cells  and acquire
competence to design buildings where solar cells constitute building components. 
4.2.2. System failures: Dutch, Swedish wind power and Swedish solar collectors
In contrast to the German wind turbine and solar cell cases, the Dutch and Swe-
dish wind turbine and the Swedish solar collector cases can be characterised as ‘stun-
ted’ technological systems. The Dutch wind turbine and the Swedish solar collector
cases are particularly interesting as they came out very strongly from the formative pe-
riod (see table 4.1).
In the Dutch case of wind turbines, a ‘change in gear’ in the rate of diffusion did
not occur, largely for institutional reasons; the function ‘formation of markets’ was
blocked by problems in receiving building permits32 and, therefore, did not increase
greatly in strength in spite of the presence of different types of market stimulation in-
struments, e.g. continued investment subsidies,  electricity taxation that favoured re-
newables and guaranteed access to the grid for wind power producers (Johnson and
Jacobsson, 2001b). In order to attempt to solve the building permit issue in connec-
tion with a large and potentially ground breaking investment project, the central gov-
32 The building permit procedure was slow and time-consuming – a normal project took five
years to complete.
Box 3: The German Solar Cell Policy Processa
In  the  early  1990s,  the  German  solar  cell
market could not justify investments in new
production  plants,  and  by  the  mid-1990s
there  was  hardly  any  production  of  solar
cells  in  the  country.  The  available  market
stimulation instruments – the EFL and the
‘1,000-roof programme’ – were not enough
to build a larger market.
The advocates  of solar power – firms and
other organisations – began a struggle to sti-
mulate  market  formation.  In  1992,
Förderverein  Solarenergie  proposed  that
more generous feed-in laws covering the full
cost  of  electricity  production  from
photovoltaics should be introduced for solar
power  by  local  utilities  (Stadtwerke)  and,
together  with  local  environmental  groups
and Eurosolar, managed to influence 40-45
towns to implement such laws.
Pressure built up for the federal government
to  follow  up  on  the  local  initiatives.  This
pressure was augmented by an expansion of
the  remaining  two  solar  cell  firms  in  US
plants and an associated threat to dismantle
their activities in Germany.
In 1998, a ‘100,000 roof’ programme
started,  driven  mainly  by  the  Social
Democrats.
In addition, the Greens wanted to move the
local feed-in laws to the federal level. They
organised various environmental groups, in-
dustry  associations,  the  trade  union  IG
Metall,  three  solar  cell  producers  and
politicians from some of the states that had
local  feed-in  laws.  They  also  received
support from SPD, which had an industrial
policy  interest  in  re-writing  the  existing
feed-in law from 1991; they feared that the
liberalisation of the energy market in 1998
would endanger the further development of
the successful German wind turbine indus-
try.
In  2000,  the  EFL  was  revised  and  the
remuneration became fixed for a period of
20  years.  The  level  varied  though for  the
different  renewables.  For  solar  cells,  it
amounted  to  99  pfennig  for  those  who
invested in solar cells in the first year of the
law, a level which hardly would have been
obtained  without  the  very  considerable
interest  in  paying  for  solar  electricity  as
revealed by the numerous local feed-in laws.
a This account is based on Jacobsson et al., (2002).
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ernment made an agreement with the provincial governments as to how to distribute
1,000 MW capacity of wind power. However, the agreement did not involve the local
government (which issued the building permits and which had little reason to support
wind power) and wind power was apparently not a sufficiently important political is-
sue for the central authorities to impose directives on land usage on the local authori-
ties. This may be interpreted as a failure to further develop the early reasonably strong
legitimacy (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001b).
With a weak local market, and with poor access to the first years of the German
growth, the Dutch supplier industry began to disappear, reducing the strength of the
advocacy coalition.
In the Swedish case of wind turbines, an advocacy coalition of any strength never
materialised, and policies favouring wind energy were hesitant.  The total size of the
funds channelled to the diffusion of wind turbines in the form of capital grants were
limited in both time and scale (unlike the EFL).33 Although the grants were supple-
mented by an environmental bonus in 1994, the incentives were much weaker than in
Germany and it was not until 1996 that the utilities were obliged to buy power from
independent producers at fixed price (which moreover was low (Averstad, 1998)).34
The most serious obstacle was, however, as in the Netherlands, problems in obtaining
building permits, and the government did little to alleviate the situation. The cool atti-
tude of policy makers, in the context of the ‘nuclear power trauma’ (see Box 1) and
the great strength of the advocacy coalition favouring the incumbent technologies,
continued to block the transformation process.35
In the Swedish case of  solar  collectors,36 an initial  advantage had been created
through the exploitation of large-scale projects connected to district heating networks
in the 1970s and 1980s. This advantage was, however, lost in the 1990s, largely due to
various mechanisms blocking the function ‘formation of markets’.  The bulk of the
limited expansion in the 1990s occurred in the segment ‘roof-mounted solar collec-
tors for existing single-family houses.’ A first blocking mechanism here was the domi-
nance of the supplier industry by new entrants which were a) disconnected from the
networks associated with large scale applications (that was the main receiver of gov-
ernment funding for R&D and connected to academia) and b) characterised by an un-
derdeveloped division of labour as well as craft-like production associated with lack of
scale  economies.  A  second  blocking  mechanism  lay  in  the  traditional  installation
industry – the industry that potential customers contact when they are to invest in
new heating  equipment  –  which  did  not  enter  the  technological  system since  the
legitimacy of solar collectors was weak in that industry and other substitutes, such as
pellet  burners,  heat  pumps  and electric  boilers,  were  advocated instead.  A vicious
circle  emerged,  where  high  costs;  poor  division  of  labour  and  weak  legitimacy
obstructed market formation.
Other market segments failed to develop. Particularly serious has been the near ab-
sence in Sweden37 of solar collectors applied in the construction of groups of new
single-family houses. The potential of this niche is demonstrated by the Dutch case
33 This first investment subsidy was limited to 250 million SEK (approximately 25 million
USD) over a period of five years (NUTEK 1993a & 1993b).
34 Suggestions for a feed-in law for wind turbines had, however, been made earlier – in 1986
by an expert group and in 1989 by the Centre party (a small party that has always favoured
renewables).
35 The latest evidence of this is a Parliamentary Enquiry (see SOU (2001)), which had the task
of designing a Swedish system for ‘green certificates’. In the proposal, a very modest level
of ambition was set for renewables, and it was explicitly stated that the expansion would
take place  using biomass and that any demand for additional  wind turbine installations
would wait until 2010 (in spite of Sweden having a large potential both on-shore and off-
shore in the Baltic sea).
36 The case of solar collectors is based on Bångens and Sinhart (2002).
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(Bångens and Sinhart, 2002). In a joint programme, government, municipalities, utili-
ties and industry targeted new residential areas and implemented measures that set in
motion a process of cumulative causation. Installers and local consultancy firms were
made aware of the technology through campaigns and educated in training program-
mes. The solar collectors were almost standardised, opening up for economies of sca-
le in production. Two solar collector firms were able to grow, exploit these economies
and become strong enough to form alliances with the traditional  heating industry,
adding legitimacy to the technology.  Annual  sales  have now reached about 30,000
square meters and most of it is in this project market.
In the Swedish case, policy makers did little to improve the legitimacy of the tech-
nology, nor to raise awareness or target new segments. Instead, the main policy issue
was the high prices of solar collectors, which resulted in a series of subsidy program-
mes . These were, however, of small magnitude, short duration and on-off character
and caused a roller coaster phenomenon, which the industry had difficulties adapting
to.
4.2.3. Cumulative causation and challenges for policy
In sum, a central feature of the German wind turbine and solar cell cases is the un-
folding of a set of powerful positive feedback loops in the second phase, the origins
of which are found in investments made in the formative period. Yet, the transition
from a first to a second phase is, by no means, an easy venture. As demonstrated by
the Dutch wind turbine and Swedish solar collector cases, an initially successful tech-
nological system can be stunted in its further growth. Setting in motion processes of cumu-
lative causation is, therefore, the key policy objective and involves the fifth and greatest challenge. 
At the heart of a process of cumulative causation lies the formation of markets. A
sixth policy  challenge  is,  therefore,  to implement pricing policies in the second phase
which give investors benefits that are powerful (to provide strong incentives and to
compensate for the inherently large uncertainties involved (see Section 3)), predictable
(to reduce inherent uncertainties to a manageable level) and persistent (to allow for
long life times of the equipment and a long learning period). In Germany, the EFL al-
most fulfilled these conditions.  When it  was first  introduced in 1991, the high re-
muneration was a powerful  incentive for investors  in wind turbines. The incentive
was also reasonably predictable as it was anchored in a law, but it was not persistent as
it was linked to the market price. With the revision of the law in 2000, the incentive
was, however, made persistent as the law guarantees a price for 20 years to investors. 
The German EFL of 1991 had another drawback (in addition to not being persis-
tent): the remuneration was too low to stimulate a demand for technologies with a
higher cost level than wind turbines, in particular solar cells.  The impact of EFL on
the transformation of the energy sector was, therefore, initially mainly restricted to
wind turbines. Whereas it can be argued that the use of a single remuneration level is
efficient (in the sense of cost-efficient) it may not be effective (in the sense of indu-
cing a transformation of the energy sector). Clearly, a transformation of the energy
sector must be built on a whole range of renewables, which will have different cost le-
vels. Each of these need to go through an extensive learning period, but as argued in
section 2, this will not occur if firms are not induced to enter into various points in
the value chain and firms need the incentives associated with a market to do so.38
Forming markets is, thus,  a necessary requirement for  setting in motion a learning
process. 
37 The exception is mainly a roof integrated solar collector developed by a Swedish municipal
housing firm together with a building contractor, a university and a consultant firm.
38 Implicit in this reasoning is that we do not have the time to wait until the presently lowest
cost renewable has reached its saturation point before we foster other renewables.
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Policy makers are therefore required to use market forming instruments which dif-
ferentiate between renewables, although the size of the market space and the range of
technologies  to foster is  unclear and may vary between countries,39 A  seventh policy
challenge  is, therefore, to design a regulatory framework that includes giving different
prices, and price dynamics, for electricity generated by different renewables. When the
EFL was revised in 2000, prices were indeed set at different levels (and with different
dynamics) for different renewables (see Box 3). 
Yet, economic incentives are not enough. A large obstacle to the diffusion of wind
turbines in both Holland and Sweden lay in difficulties to obtain building permits. In
Germany (for the north-western states where it is windy), on the other hand, it was
stipulated that that if land was not designated for wind turbines, these could be set up
anywhere. This had the result that wind zones were designated by local governments
where it was easy to obtain permit.  In the Dutch case of solar collectors, advanced
building norms contributed to the expansion of solar collectors in the 1990s as did ef-
forts to foster a broad awareness and legitimacy for that technology (Bångens and Sin-
hart, 2002). Institutional alignment therefore goes beyond designing appropriate eco-
nomic incentives.
5. Lessons for Policy
The purpose of this chapter was to contribute to the policy debate with regards to
the management of the process of transforming the energy sector. In the preceding
sections, we revealed central inducement and blocking mechanisms for the diffusion
of renewable energy technology and analysed the dynamics of the transformation pro-
cess in both successful and in less successful cases. In doing so, we identified seven
challenges for policy. In this section, we will first summarise these challenges and then
discuss some problems in meeting them.
The overall policy challenge is to create conditions for processes of cumulative
causation to appear in a variety of new energy technologies. Such processes are ne-
cessary for the transformation process to eventually become self-sustained, i.e. increa-
singly driven by its own momentum, instead of being dependent on repeated policy
interventions. What these conditions may look like and how they may be created is far
from evident, however, but the other policy challenges may indicate at least part of
the answer.
The first of these is to create an understanding of each technological system in or-
der to be able to specify technology specific inducement and blocking mechanisms
and to influence the system’s functional pattern. The latter requires, in turn, policy co-
ordination, which is the second policy challenge. As Teubal (2000, p. 19) puts it “…
the policy effort is more complex than what would seem to be the case in a Neoclassi-
cal  world;  and  … policy  coordination  … is  an  important  …  aspect  of  such  an
effort.”40
39 How much diversity should be fostered (given finite public resources) and how should an
eventual selection between emerging systems take place are issues that go beyond the realm
of this chapter. In addition, as various renewables gain ground, policy must manage a trans-
formation of the infrastructure so that it can support a growing decentralised power pro-
duction.
40 In contrast to what is perceived in the traditional ‘linear’ view of innovation, the functions
of a technological system have to be served simultaneously. This implies that science, tech-
nology and market stimulation policies have to be run in parallel, not in sequence. This may
apply not only to a formative period but beyond it where policy may need to combine ef-
forts to expand the space for the new technologies with efforts to maintain diversity (Ja-
cobsson et al., 2002). 
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The third challenge is to begin to contribute to a process of institutional alignment
in the formative stage in the evolution of a technological system and the fourth is to
induce a variety of actors to experiment with different design approaches.
The final two challenges are related to the transition from the formative stage to a
stage characterised by rapid and sustained diffusion of the new technologies. The fifth
challenge is to implement powerful, predictable and persistent pricing policies in order
to create favourable conditions  for  investors  in renewable energy technology.  The
sixth challenge is to make sure that these pricing policies are technology specific so
that learning may occur in different technologies simultaneously.
These policy challenges are useful in that they formulate the relevant policy pro-
blems. However, the difficulties involved in solving them should not be underestima-
ted. We will point to three issues that policy makers will need to deal with in meeting
these challenges.
First,  policy  makers  need to achieve  an understanding  of  the  complicated  and
complex structure and dynamics of each technological system. It is complicated in that it
is empirically difficult to identify, trace and assess the strength of various mechanisms,
which induce or block the diffusion process.  Even ‘simple’  relations,  such as what
blocks the formation of markets, may be obscure. It could be due to a lack of legi-
timacy, siting problems (for wind turbines), relative prices or a combination of several
of these factors (see section 3). It may, therefore, be difficult to understand what to
do to stimulate, e.g. market formation,41 several factors may need to be influenced si-
multaneously and the outcome of any intervention is uncertain.
The complexity of the system is due to the prevalence of feedback loops. Such “…
causal inter-relations within the system itself as it moves under the influence of out-
side pushes and pulls and the momentum of its own internal processes…” (Myrdal,
1957, p.18) are very difficult to predict, which implies that the properties of a new sys-
tem emerge in ways that are difficult to foresee. For example, in the late 1980s, no-
body could have foreseen the formidable success of the German wind turbine indus-
try or the failure of the Dutch only a few years later (see Box 4).42 Of course, feedback
loops make the results of any intervention additionally uncertain. For instance, what
effects may a particular market stimulation programme have on firm entry, and what
effects will the pattern of entry have on network formation and strength of advocacy
coalitions?  The  German  case  of  EFL  (see  Box  2)  illustrates  this  uncertainty  by
revealing how interventions  to support  one technology  had unforeseen effects  on
other technologies.  The owners  of  small  hydroelectric  plants initiated the law and
gained support in parliament, but the main beneficiaries were the wind turbine owners
and  the  wind  turbine  industry.  Furthermore,  the  expansion  of  wind  power
subsequently helped to pave the way for a revision of the EFL, which provided an
opportunity  for  the  solar  cell  advocacy  coalition  to  (successfully)  argue  for  an
inclusion of solar cells in the revised law (see Box 3). The outcome of policy is, thus,
difficult to predict.
Second, the time scale involved is very long. In Germany, signs of a self-reinforc-
ing process could not be seen until about the mid 1990s, i.e. after about two decades
of activities. After entering into diffusion processes with self-reinforcing features, ad-
ditional time is required for the emergence of complete technological systems with the
capacity to significantly impact on the energy system (see table 1.2). Abatement poli-
41 This was evident in the case of black liquor gasification, in which policy was limited to
R&D grants and investment subsidies in spite of the fact that lack of knowledge and eco-
nomic uncertainty were not the greatest obstacles to commercialisation of the technology
(Bergek, 2002).
42 For instance, who could have foreseen that by the time the EFL was questioned, the wind
turbine industry would have the political strength to counteract the resistance? How could
one have foreseen that the Dutch government would fail to resolve the siting problem?
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cies, aiming to substantially reduce the emissions of CO2, must therefore include poli-
cies that aim at fostering the formation of new technological systems.43 Building these
new systems requires patience – in order to allow for cumulative causation to appear –
and flexibility – in order to be able to adapt to conditions that are bound to change
but without unduly increasing uncertainty.44 
Third, the political struggle over the institutional framework may be intense. Thus,
policy makers need to find a strategy whereby they can eventually challenge and over-
come opposition from incumbent actors in order to align the institutional framework
to the new technologies. Part of this strategy needs to deal with how to foil attempts
by incumbent vested interests to capture the state and hinder an institutional align-
ment simply by having more resources at their disposal than the representatives of in-
fant industries and underdeveloped markets.
Whilst these institutional changes are vital, their scope is limited in a formative pe-
riod; since the scale of activities is low, incumbents may not see the new technology as
dangerous and may, therefore, choose not to obstruct  the formation of the infant
technological system. In Germany, resistance from utilities emerged only after wind
turbines had begun to diffuse rapidly in the first half of the 1990s. This resistance was
met by an increasingly powerful advocacy coalition in favour of wind energy, drawing
strength from a combination of broad legitimacy for renewables and their growing
economic importance. Although it  was not  an explicit  strategy, the German policy
used small steps to build an embryonic technological system before the incumbents
were challenged.
43 Of course, there are other ways of reducing emissions, such as energy savings. Moreover,
the length of the learning period may be shorter for some other technologies, such as bio-
mass fuelled combine heat and power plants.
44 Kemp et al. (1998) underline the role of learning and adjustment in their approach of ’tran-
sition management’. 
Box 4: German and Dutch Wind Turbine Industry Developments in the 1980sa
In  the  1980s,  both  Germany  and  the
Netherlands  developed  a  set  of  industrial
firms,  with  experience  in  building  a  few
hundred  turbines.  In  Germany,  about  15
firms entered in the mid-1980s, and 11 firms
still existed in 1989. In the Netherlands, 15-
20 firms entered in the late 1970s and early
1980s. In the late 1980s, many firms left the
industry, and in 1989 the industry consisted
mainly of five firms.
On the market side, the German market re-
mained  weak  throughout  this  phase;  the
total  installed power was less than 20 MW
by the end of 1989. In the Netherlands, an
investment subsidy was introduced in 1986,
which resulted in a small market expansion.
By the end of 1989, the total installed power
was 33 MW.
Around  1989,  both  Germany  and  the
Netherlands  designed  market  formation
programmes  of  similar  sizes.  In  Germany,
the  federal  100  MW  programme  aimed  at
installing  100  MW  of  wind  power.  The
Dutch  electricity  suppliers  initiated  the  
Windplan project, aiming at installing 50 MW
per year over a five-year period. Both these
projects  were  huge  in  comparison  to  the
then current stock and market size.
At  this  point  in  time,  the  Dutch  industry
must have seemed as likely to succeed as the
German  (if  not  more).  The  Windplan
project  was  much larger  than the  German
100 MW programme, and over 90 percent
of the first 75 MW were reserved for Dutch
firms.
However, whereas the 100 MW programme
successfully  induced  virtuous  circles  of
market growth, increased industry resources
and  growing  political  strength,e Windplan
ended  abruptly  (in  part  due  to  the  siting
problem) and most Dutch firms failed. Had
instead the Dutch been successful with their
programme  (as  many  Dutch  and  foreign
firms expected them to be) and the German
programme  failed  (something  which  was
entirely conceivable), the Dutch today could
be  the  ones  catching  up  with  the  leading
Danish industry. 
a This account is based on Johnson and Jacobsson (2001b).
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In contrast,  in the Swedish case, renewables were put forward as substitutes to
nuclear power, not only by environmental groups but also by two political parties,
which advocated a closure of newly built nuclear plants. The subsequent referendum
on nuclear power held in 1980 (see Box 1) had the clear effect of heightening the
awareness of the coalition favouring nuclear power to a perceived threat of renew-
ables,  long before these had developed into realistic substitutes.  Henceforth, fierce
resistance  met  any policy measure,  which could benefit  renewables  and the ‘small
thing’ of the German EFL could in Sweden well have been a matter leading to the
downfall of a government. 
Dealing with these three issues requires policy makers to develop a range of char-
acteristics – high analytical competence, in-depth knowledge of relevant technological
systems, co-ordination skills, patience, flexibility and political strength – characteristics
which policy makers can neither automatically be assumed to have, nor be expected to
develop.
Policy makers may, however, gain access to at least some of these characteristics
by working with members of different technology specific advocacy coalitions, both
private capital and various interest  organisations.  Industrial  firms clearly strengthen
these coalitions in terms of knowledge, power and other characteristics. This refers in
particular to capital goods firms but also to firms ‘downstream.’ The expansion of the
actor base of the technological system – its enlargement – is, therefore, a vital element
in the evolution of the technological system, not only in terms of learning, but also in
terms of developing these characteristics within the technological system. Indeed, se-
veral German organisations worked with industry representatives as well as with local
and federal politicians to strengthen the function ‘formation of markets’  and, thus,
proved to be critical for the evolution of the technological systems centred on wind
turbines and solar cells – together they formed coalitions of system builders.
Policy makers may, therefore, find it useful to strengthen existing advocacy coali-
tions by creating favourable conditions for private capital, in particular in the capital
goods industry, and to support the work of various interest groups associated with the
new technology. Perhaps the main ‘output’ of the formative stage lies, therefore, in a
technology-specific advocacy coalition that can support elements of the state in over-
coming various blocking mechanisms. Here lies a strategic role of a national supplier
industry.  It is strategic not only in that that it can help to educate local customers
(Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1991), but also in that it strengthens the advocacy coalitions.
With a supplier industry, the ‘green’ is ‘industrialised’.
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The Governance of Transformation in Utility Systems: 
Challenge and Practice
Jan-Peter Voß
Öko-Institut – Institute für Applied Ecology, Berlin, Germany 
1. Introduction
How can the dynamic relationship between society, technology and nature be un-
derstood in order to derive operational concepts for sustainable development? How
can long-term structural change in socio-ecological systems be intentionally shaped?
These are central questions for industrial transformation research. They also form the
background  to  this  chapter  which  discusses  some  conceptual  issues  that  have
emerged from currently ongoing research on the transformation of utility systems in
Germany.1
The conclusion of this chapter leads into an outlook to a set of new research ques-
tions.  These  questions  focus  on  the  process  of  governance  transformation  and
strategies for governance innovation. The background is a concept of sustainability
that is not focusing on questions about the right state of production and consumption
but on new ways to deal with uncertainty and complexity in socio-ecological change. Sustain-
able development thus refers to the processes through which strategies are generated
rather than to their specific content.
I argue that sustainable development requires specific capacities of societal prob-
lem treatment which are not supported by a modernist paradigm of problem-solving
which is enshrined in the institutional arrangements for management and policy-mak-
ing in contemporary industrial societies. Conceptual advances that propose ways to
achieve policy integration, long-term orientation and learning strategies therefore find
it hard to be taken up in practice. These kind of innovations don’t seem to fit a dom-
inant pattern of governance, a governance regime as it is, which is based on specialisation,
short range orientation, prediction and control. The focus of sustainability thus shifts
from system innovations in production and consumption systems towards system in-
novation in the realm of governance.
1 The  research  is  conducted  within  the  TIPS-Project  (www.tips-project.de)  and  the
MICROSYSTEMS-Project  (www.mikrosysteme.org).  Both  are  funded  by  the  German
Federal Ministry for Education and Research within its programme on “socio-ecological
research” (www.sozial-oekologische-forschung.org). 
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The argument is developed by first having a closer look at the object of sustainable
development: socio-ecological systems and their co-evolutionary dynamics (section 2).
This leads me to formulate the problem of shaping sustainable transformation as spe-
cified by the complexity of system dynamics, ambiguity of goals and distribution of
societal control capacities (section 3) and derive a set of process criteria for sustain-
able governance (section 4). In combination, these features pose a need to drop the
fiction of prediction, clear goals  and possibilities of control in problem-solving. Pro-
cess  requirements  for  sustainable  development  are  contrasted  with  the  rationalist
paradigm of management and policy-making which is  dominant in modern society
(section 5). From this I conclude that processes and institutional arrangements which
allow to actively deal with the pluralism of perspectives, interconnectedness of prob-
lems and the ubiquity of unintended effects are more important for sustainable devel-
opment than blueprints of sustainable production and consumption pattern. The final
section of the chapter (6) collects some points in sketching out further research on
the innovation of governance as a prerequisite to introducing sustainable governance prac-
tices in the context of currently established governance regimes.2
2. Socio-ecological transformation
A first step of research on sustainable development is a conceptualization of the
object that we are dealing with. What is it that is supposed to develop sustainably? I
propose a few selected conceptual building blocks in this section in order to illustrate
the nature of the problem that is at hand when we talk about sustainable develop-
ment. A starting point for doing this is to have a closer look at the relation between
society, technology and nature. How can reality be understood as a compound of ele-
ments from these heterogeneous dimensions? How do they hang together and how
do they change in mutual interaction? 
A concrete example is the transformation of utility systems in Germany. It is a
process of fundamental structural change which is importantly influenced by a shift in
the concept of “public service” and respective liberalisation and privatisation policies
which have been implemented in the German telecommunications, electricity and nat-
ural gas system in the nineties of the last century and are currently under discussion in
the system for water provision and sanitation as well. The transformation process en-
tails far reaching changes in market shares, corporate structures, strategic orientations
of consumers, production and consumption technologies, network architecture, insti-
tutional arrangements of governance and many other aspects. These ongoing develop-
ments are highly interdependent and collectively work towards “heating up” the so-
cio-technical configuration of utility provision and opening possibilities for further
change. This happens at a time when, in Germany, about 40% of generation capacity
for electricity has to be replaced by 2010, demand for natural gas is forecasted to grow
by about one fourth within the next 20 years, investment needs for maintenance of
water infrastructure pile-up to 67-100 billion EUR and the volume of data transfers is
expected to double within three years.  The situation is one in which the regime of
postwar utility provision is breaking up when at the same time functional  require-
ments demand a massive build-up of capacity over the coming decades. It is largely
unknown where this will lead up to, which structures of utility provision will emerge,
which paths of future development will be taken. At the same time, the transforma-
tion has a strong impact for the sustainability of industrial society, because utility sys-
tems are closely  entangled witch broader social,  technological and ecological  struc-
tures.  They  provide  an  important  infrastructure  for  production  patterns  and  life-
styles, account for a big portion of economic activity, channel important energy and
2 These questions form starting points for a PhD project that I carry out at the University of
Twente, NL. I appreciate inspiring discussion with Arie Rip and Maarten Arentsen in this
context.
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substance  flows,  entail  considerable  environmental  and  health  risks  and  comprise
some of the most powerful actors in the national governance system. There is a need
to shape the course socio-ecological transformation and the resulting structures  of
utility provision. But how to do it?
For the purpose of having an integrated perspective on the variety of heterogen-
eous aspects that play a role for long-term structural change in the utility systems we
developed a heuristic approach to socio-ecological transformation with elements from
co-evolutionary theories of socio-technical change (Rip/ Kemp 1998; Geels 2002b),
social ecology (Jahn/ Wehling 1998; Fischer-Kowalski/ Weisz 1998) and ecological
economics  (Norgaard  1994;  Costanza  et  al.  1999).  These  theories  are  connected
through a model of social interaction that explains social change in terms of a recurs-
ive relationship between agency and structure (cf.  Giddens 1986; Mayntz/ Scharpf
1995; Hernes 1995; Ostrom 1999; Coleman 2000). In modification of the standard so-
cial science concept of “structuration” where the focus is on institutions  (Giddens
1986), it is here assumed that structuration also takes place within the purely symbolic
dimensions of societal values and cognitive frames and within the materially bound
dimensions of technology and ecology. Thus, a basic framework is constituted for the
analysis  of socio-ecological transformation that is based on a specific set of actors
who are situated within a specific socio-ecological context that is structured along the
dimensions of societal  values,  knowledge frames,  institutions,  technology and eco-
logy/nature (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Basis framework for the analysis of socio-ecological systems
For the understanding of change it is important to note that the socio-ecological
context structure enables and constraints human agency. There is a cause-effect rela-
tionship going from structure to agency. At the same time, however, the structure is
being reproduced and transformed by as a result of human interaction. Through this
there is a cause-effect relationship also from agency to structure. Observable interac-
tion patterns can thus be thought of as being determined by constellations of interde-
pendent actors (with individual identities, perceptions and action capacities), on the
one hand, and socio-ecological structure (consisting of combinations of socially ac-
cepted values and knowledge, institutional and technical structures and bio-physical
conditions), on the other hand. Within this basic framework socio-ecological change
is understood to be caused by the aggregated symbolic and material effects of human
interaction. These feed back on the actors themselves (e.g. make them learn) and on
the socio-ecological structure. Effects that cause change are mostly unintended results
of interaction, e.g. side effects of technology development, public interpretations of
scientific findings, delegitimisation of institutions through individual misbehavior etc.








 240   Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference
cio-ecological transformation are part of the interaction process and they influence its
effects, but due to the complexity of influential factors they cannot control them (cf.
Czada/  Schimank  2000).  The  time,  speed  and  actual  course  of  social-ecological
transformation  must  therefore  be  understood  as  an  emergent  result,  that  comes
“from behind the back of the actors” (see Figure 2 for illustration).
The circular causalities that are involved in the recursive relation between agency
and structure constitute the systemic nature of socio-ecological entanglements. The
ubiquity of positive feedback relations gives rise to the self-organisation of socio-eco-
logical  systems,  momentum,  inertia,  path-dependency  and  other  dynamic  patterns
which are known from the study of complex systems (Kauffman 1995; Holland 1998;
Axelrod/ Cohen 2000). 
Figure 2: Recursiveness of agency and socio-ecological structure
The outlined model can serve as a heuristic framework for the analysis of structur-
al change in socio-ecological systems, no matter if they are defined functionally or re-
gionally. For the purpose of our project on transformation in utility systems we focus
on the  provision of  electricity,  gas,  water  and telecommunications  in Germany  as
functionally defined socio-ecological systems. In analysing change we concentrate on
the sector level, or “regime level” (Rip/ Kemp 1998) of these systems. But we see
that utility regimes are embedded in broader social, technical and ecological macro de-
velopments which exert influence on the regime level (e.g. European integration, dis-
course of Deregulation, spread of ICTs, climate change) and that regime change can
also effectively be induced from developments on the micro level of functional niches
and particular organisations (e.g. decentralised service provision in remote areas, pro-
curement policies in the public sector).3 On the regime level we further distinguish
between three action fields  which have primary relevance for  transformation pro-
cesses: production, consumption and regulation.4 The fields are not sharply delimited
but each comprises a specific network of actors that is aligned under a common func-
3 That means we only “zoom in” for micro processes within organisations or local niches of
provision,  or  “zoom out”  for  macro  processes  on the  landscape  level  of  global  ideas,
institutions, demography, technology or ecology when we find that these are relevant to
explain processes of structural change that are going on at the sector level. We believe that
a multi-level concept of structural change as presented by Rip/Kemp (1998) and elaborated
by Geels (2002b) is useful for studying socio-ecological transformation. Here, we restrict
our presentation of the conceptual framework to the regime level.
4 We deliberately put other action fields like e.g. science and media “in the second row”,
because we believe that they only indirectly influence transformation in the utility systems
(through e.g.  changing mental  frameworks of consumption) or actors from these fields
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tional orientation: producing utility services, making use of utility services or regulat-
ing the production and usage of utility services. Each field is structured by a specific
sub-set  of  values,  knowledge  frames,  institutions,  technology  and  natural  material
conditions.  As such,  the action fields  expose autonomous structural  dynamics but
they are embedded in and part of the socio-ecological  structure of the sector as a
whole.  Their  autonomous  dynamics are coupled.  The provision  of utility  services,
technological innovation or the governance of sector performance comprise interac-
tions between and across the differentiated action fields. The development of new
production technologies, for instance, is linked to changing consumption patterns and
both are linked to, say a stronger reflection of ecological risks in regulation. Novelty
and variation in the established practices of one action field need to find complement-
ary  practices  in  the  other  action  fields  to  be  successfully  established.  Structural
changes in production, consumption and regulation can therefore be observed to un-
fold in mutual adjustment. The transformation of regimes of utility service provision
can be understood as a result of this co-evolutionary process.
Going back to the multidimensional structure of socio-ecological systems we find
that co-evolution actually takes place in two different directions. In the first direction
it is the various structural elements from the dimension of values, knowledge, institu-
tions, technology and ecology that co-evolve as a result of the interaction processes
within a specified action field. An example is the value change from “universal service
provision” to “efficiency” in the regulation of utility services which co-evolves with a
change in the cognitive framing of “natural monopoly”, institutional changes towards
the establishment  of  independent regulatory agencies  and technological change to-
wards a more decentralised network architecture. This co-evolutionary process consti-
tutes structural dynamics within the action field of regulation. But co-evolution also
and at the same time takes place in a second direction: Structural changes in one ac-
tion field, e.g. regulation, are coupled with structural changes in other action fields,
e.g. production. For the above example it can be stated that value change with respect
to  universal  service  is  not  confined  to the  field  of  regulation  only,  but  that  it  is
coupled to complementary value change in the field of production and consumption.
In this direction co-evolution constitutes a specific dynamic of value changes that cuts
across action fields. Taken together, it is this overlapping pattern of agency-structure
dynamics within and across action fields that is behind the transformation of utility
systems.5 We attempt to capture this understanding by using the term “entwined co-
evolution”. Figure 3 visualizes the concept.
Figure 3: Entwined co-evolution in regimes of utility provision
5 We have not explicitly looked at multi-level dynamics, yet. If we include the interaction of
co-evolutionary  processes  across  scale  levels  of  socio-ecological  systems  we  find  that
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I cannot go into more depth or detail with respect to the dynamics of socio-ecolo-
gical transformation within the confines of this chapter. Here, the purpose is only to
show that socio-ecological transformation is  an object  of study that easily escapes
standard concepts and theories that exclude circular causality,  multi-dimensionality,
overlap and nested structures from reality in order to arrive at models that can be eas-
ily handled. The general characteristic of socio-ecological transformation is that it is a
truly complex process that comprises abundant linkages between very heterogeneous
elements. It could be said that science is about finding ways to tidy up this mess of
real world entanglements in order to present models that allow for a clear definition
of elements, cause-effect relationships and prognostic statements since, at last, it is to
solve problems for what we do science. My point is, however, that this kind of prob-
lem-solving knowledge which tells us what to do in order to reach a given outcome is
not available for the problem of shaping socio-ecological transformation. To ignore
the complexity and uncertainty that is involved in long-term structural change across
the boundaries of society, technology and nature would mean to produce knowledge
that simply not adequate for getting the grips on the problem. Indeed, I suppose that
overly simple models of reality, strategies that have been derived from them and their
forceful implementation is one of the main roots of the problem of sustainable devel-
opment. For illustration one can refer to examples such as the “green revolution” for
solving food problems, nuclear power for solving energy problems, suburbial social
housing to solve housing problems etc. (cf. section 3.2 of this chapter).
3. Shaping sustainable transformation
The above outlined concept of socio-ecological transformation provides a back-
drop for elaborating the specific challenge of sustainable development as problem of
shaping complex structural dynamics. This is taken further in the following section. In
particular, three specific features will be highlighted as being constitutive for the prob-
lem of shaping sustainable transformation: complexity, ambiguity and distributed con-
trol. An unvarnished view on these characteristics reveals particular process require-
ments that are necessary for adequately dealing with the problem. These are summar-
ised at the end of the section to build a set of process related criteria for the gov-
ernance of sustainable development.
3.1. Complex system dynamics
3.1.1. Heterogeneous interactions
As briefly exemplified with respect to utility systems, the understanding of socio-
ecological transformation implies knowledge about the heterogeneous dimensions of
socio-ecological systems such as social values, knowledge, institutions, technology and
ecology. It is further important to know how they are related to each other, how they
change and how they interact while they change. Conventional  disciplinary science
does not deliver this kind of knowledge about the “interlinked and complex nature of
reality” (Gallopín et al. 2001:228). Instead, it concentrates on analytically constructed
“slices” of reality, such as molecular processes, problems of technical construction,
social discourse etc. In reality, however, there is no clear borderline between these cat-
egories as part of the same world. Each of the specialised perspectives, consequently,
defines away the systemic embedding of the analytical abstractions they are dealing
with. In specific cases this may be methodologically justifiable because causal linkages
are insignificantly weak so that parts of reality can be looked at in isolation without
loosing important effects that determine processes in reality. In most cases, however,
especially in the area of sustainability problems, linkages will reach well beyond the
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scope of disciplinary defined problems and models to understand them (Funtowicz/
Ravetz/ O'Connor 1998).
But this does not only relate to the restrictions of disciplinary scientific perspect-
ives, it  also relates to the restrictions of science in general to grasp the full  set  of
factors and interactions that are relevant for understanding any specific real world
problem-setting. Knowledge production about problems of sustainable development
can thus not rely on scientific knowledge that is produced within the institutions and
along the methodological guardrails of the science systems. It needs to integrate the
perspectives of societal actors outside of the science system. This includes practical
knowledge which results from experiences made in daily interactions with reality. This
kind of knowledge is often tacit and cannot be used by conventional methods of sci-
entific enquiry. It can only be generated in interactive settings, in which knowledge is
co-produced by scientists and actors from respective fields of societal practice.6  
A first  process element of effective problem treatment for sustainable develop-
ment therefore is  to pursue ways of  integrated knowledge production which tran-
scend the boundaries between disciplines and between science and society. Practical
and methodological steps in this direction are taken under the heading of “transdis-
ciplinarity” (Gibbons 1994; Nowotny/ Scott/ Gibbons 2001; Bechmann/ Frederichs
1996; Thompson Klein et al. 2001; Mogalle 2001; Bergmann 2003).
3.1.2. Uncertainty
If socio-ecological transformation is understood as a process of co-evolution of
social, technological and ecological structures, which are constitutive elements for ac-
tion fields such as production, consumption and regulation, and if these action fields
are at the same understood to co-evolve with each other, we face a highly complex
compound of interdependent processes. The overall process cannot be analysed by
linear models of cause and effect anymore, because feedback is a common appear-
ance. If the process of socio-ecological transformation is further understood as a pro-
cess which takes place within a multi-level structure of nested subsystems (e.g. local,
regional and global level) the interaction between dynamics on each level adds to the
complexity of the overall dynamics of socio-ecological systems. The result is that so-
cio-ecological transformation cannot be predicted. The occurrence of positive feed-
back loops which give rise self-organisation dynamics or destructive resonance is mul-
tiply conditioned and may pop up here and there without possibility for safe predic-
tions (e.g. topics in public discourse, social movements, BSE, strategic action under
regulation, stock market crashs). The thresholds for catastrophic changes cannot be
defined by a single parameter but are determined by a confluence of many factors
which cannot all be traced down in order to determine safe levels of activity (e.g. eco-
logical pressure causing a breakdown of ecosystem resilience, social injustice causing
upheaval, tax level rises leading into an economic depression). This is a fundamental
constraint because of the impossibility to measure all incremental factors (especially
the  human factor)  that  play  together  and  because  of  non-linear  system  dynamics
which may give exactly those apparently minor factors a large say on where the system
will go (“butterfly effect”) (Gleick 1998). 
At the same time this is also the reason why we cannot, for pragmatic reasons, rely
on simpler models of the causes which are behind sustainability problems. If we do
so, we externalise complexity in our cognitive models while the world stays as com-
plex as it  is  (Dörner 1989).  Inadequate problem constructions  then come back in
form of unexpected consequences when strategies are implemented in the real world
(Böhret 1990). That means that, for processes of socio-ecological transformation, we
6 An important  methodological  questions that  follows is  about who is take part  in such
processes  of  interactive  knowledge  production,  which  disciplinary  scientists  and  which
societal actors.  
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face fundamental uncertainty about the effects of deliberate interventions by policy or
management  decisions  (Dobuzinskis  1992;  Stacey  1996;  Walker/  Rahman/  Cave
2001).
The only way out of this dilemma is to stay in it, but do it reflectively: accept that
there will always be a high degree of ignorance and uncertainty connected to societal
action within socio-ecological systems. Unintended consequences will prevail, because
no comprehensive and exact model for the prediction of socio-ecological dynamics
can possibly exist. With growing impact linked to increasing scale and depth of hu-
man intervention a high probability of unintended consequences needs to be taken as
a central condition of problem-solving strategies. This would mean that ignorance and
uncertainty are actively dealt with and are not blocked off in order to pretend to have
a practicable solution at hand (Stirling/ Zwanenberg 2002; Dobuzinskis 1992).
Because no secure knowledge can be acquired to predict socio-ecological system
behaviour and the effects of human intervention, a second process requirement for
the adequate treatment of sustainability problems is an adaptive design of strategies
and institutional and technological structures.  This would entail  the capacity to re-
spond to unexpected developments. Strategies should feature experimentation, monit-
oring and evaluation in order to systematically work with new experiences, altered in-
terpretations and changed circumstances.
3.1.3. Path-dependency
While effects of human action are not entirely predictable they occur all the time
and they feed into a continuous process of socio-ecological transformation. It is hu-
man action that  shapes socio-ecological  transformation,  even if  not intended. This
happens  through  ongoing  structuration  processes  which  are  not  only  linked  to
policies or other strategies that are explicitly aimed at inducing structural change but
also to the daily conduct of production and consumption routines.
Changes in one element of socio-ecological systems are accompanied by changes
in other elements. Within and across social, technological and ecological subsystems
there is a constant generation of novelty and adaptation which induces further novelty
and adaptation in response.  This  process  may sometimes be so incremental  to be
non-conceivable, sometimes it may be very radical and rapid. A certain degree of sta-
bility is maintained as long as a specific configuration of elements play well together in
bringing about systemic performances which meet the capacities and requirements of
components within the system and outside of it. The System is then in dynamically
stability because it produces outcomes which reproduce its structure (Geels 2002a). 
An example are electricity systems. They comprise a specific configuration of cul-
ture, organisational rules, technology, geographical conditions and different types of
actors. These elements play together in specific process patterns and deliver a certain
performance with respect to service provision and side effects. The electricity system
in Germany showed 40 years of relative stability after the second world war. Only to-
wards the end of the last century turbulent changes occurred. An important source of
this fundamental transformation are institutional changes which introduced competi-
tion to the market. This change has triggered other changes, e.g. in investment beha-
viour and technological innovation as well as the cultural meaning of electricity and
consumer behaviour. Further changes in actor constellations, corporate organisation,
technology, resource requirements and ecological impact are to be expected. Yet, it is
highly uncertain how they will look like. These changes may again induce adaptations
of regulatory institutions. At the end they may lead into another stable configuration
which only changes gradually and very slowly over some decades - as it was the case
for the phase after the second world war. But they may as well perpetually feed into
new structural adaptations and not find a new dynamic equilibrium. The crucial point
is  that the future structure  of electricity  provision,  be it  relatively  stable or  fluent,
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emerges from present processes which receive their dynamics from societal action.
The future structure of electricity provision is being shaped by what we do today.
Depending  on  how  this  structure  will  look  like  it  will  entail  specific  social  and
ecological impacts. And it will entail specific opportunities and restrictions for actions
to deal  with these  impacts.  What we now do about  electricity  -  buying electricity,
drafting regulations, investing in technology, discussing public concerns etc. – thus
shapes the future performance of electricity provision and the conditions under which
problems  can  be  treated  that  appear  later  on.  This  is  an  example  of  the  path-
dependence of socio-ecological transformation. It puts large weight on decisions and
actions  that  seem to be of  minor importance  today,  because their  aggregated and
accumulated effect may be of major importance for what is possible tomorrow. The
point  is  that,  in  the  course  of  socio-ecological  transformation,  we  are  constantly
shaping the future,  consciously or not. Future developments which are induced by
today’s problem solving are not easily discernible, but they are largely irreversible.7 
Sustainable development therefore requires a careful anticipation of the long-term
effects of present actions.  Due to the complex dynamics of socio-ecological trans-
formation these effects cannot be predicted with certainty. Anticipation rather refers
to an explorative evaluation of alternative development paths that may be spurred by
the actions that are taken today. The general aim is to explore future opportunities
and to avoid lock-in to trajectories which withstand the achievement of sustainable
development.  Such processes can, for example, be based on scenario construction,
participatory modeling or policy exercises (Godet 1987; Ringland 1998; Asselt et al.
2001; Elzen et al. 2002).
3.2. Sustainability as a strategic goal
Sustainable development is often referred to as a normative orientation. Generic-
ally, however, it refers to a functional relation. Sustainability can be defined as a state
in which something can be sustained, can be kept in existence. Sustainable develop-
ment thus is a type of development that does not erode its own fundaments. In this
perspective, sustainable development is a normative criterion only in so far as it im-
plies a value decision to sustain societal development on earth rather than to annihil-
ate it. Sustainability can hence be defined as “the long-term viability of socio-ecologic-
al systems”.8 On this level, not surprisingly, there is overwhelming social consensus.
The crucial question then is: How can societal development be sustained? In order to
know which practices can serve to sustain societal development it will be necessary to
assess  their  long-term systemic  consequences.  This  requires knowledge about   social and
ecological systems, the ways in which they are coupled, dynamics of their develop-
7 For an example from the electricity system one could speculate that a forceful promotion
of  distributed  generation  could  eventually  lead  into a  gradual  dismantling  of  the  long-
distance transmission grid. From today’s perspective this may seem to be a sustainable path
of transformation. It may be, however, that within a few decades solar power generation in
North African deserts turns ot to be the most cost efficient and ecologically sound way to
provide electricity to Western Europe. The social and technical infrastructure which would
be needed to implement high voltage power import would not be at hand anymore so that
this option for electricity provision would effectively be locked-out  by then consolidated
structures of decentralized electricity provision.
8 Also the political operationalisation of the concept by the Brundtland Commission with its
reference to inter- und intragenerational justice: “sustainable development is development
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs” can be interpreted in functional terms. The fulfilment of needs,
self speakingly, is something that is needed for the continuation of society. If needs are only
fulfilled for some, the resilience of social system is endangered by distress and conflict.
Open questions, however, still are: What are the relevant needs, what will they be? How are
they met? Which factors comprise the ability to meet them?
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ment and the factors that influence it. As such, sustainability is clearly an analytical
question, not a normative one.
In  spite  of  the  analytical  content  of  the  concept  of  sustainable  development,
however, specific practical problem features impede an “objective” scientific clarifica-
tion:
(a) The fundamental limits to predict socio-ecological system behaviour mean that
there can be no secure knowledge about the dynamics (and resilience) of societal
systems and ecosystems. It may be possible to determine ranges of parameters
within which system behaviour can be predicted with satisfying probability. These
may be used to define “corridors of sustainability” within which dangerous sys-
tem change  can be  avoided  (for  e.g.  emissions,  rate  of  inflation).  In  practice,
however, sustainability assessment almost always deals with parameter changes at
the fringe of so defined sustainability corridors.  On these issues uncertainty is
high and risk evaluations become decisive. The readiness to take risks, however, is
a subjective disposition which differs between actors and different situations and
cannot scientifically be decided. 
(b) The dynamic stability of social systems depends on subjective evaluations of the
actors who constitute the system. Societal systems, be it nation states, organisa-
tions or families are stabilised if the perceived situation of actors matches their
identity and values. Values are thus an endogenous component of socio-ecologic-
al systems. Values changes, on the other hand, can shift requirements for sustain-
ability.
(c) People hold different values and decide differently if they evaluate options. Even
if everybody generally agrees on what is good and what is bad there will be differ-
ences in the weight that is given to certain values. This is particularly relevant for
sustainability assessment since equally legitimate goals (such as social justice, re-
duction of environmental risk, economic viability) can only seldom be achieved at
the same time and to the same degree. Value trade-offs are a common character-
istic in the daily practice of sustainability assessment. The different ways to make
these trade-offs effectively feed social dispute about what is sustainable and what
is  not.  These  disputes,  however,  can  less  be  solved  scientifically  but  rather
through social discourse or political decision.
Taken together, sustainable development necessarily remains a contested concept.
Its  substantial content (i.e. definition of the parameters of socio-ecological systems
that have to be met to sustain development) cannot scientifically be determined as
“objective knowledge” but will always incorporate normative valuations which are as-
certained in processes of social interaction. To a certain degree political institutions
may have the legitimacy to decide on matters of values and risk. But when it comes to
actions with potentially irreversible and large scale impacts,  decisions which in fact
have  an  existential  meaning  for  human  life  on  earth,  the  legitimizing  function  of
democratic government may indeed be overstrained. When sustainability is taken as
an orientation for societal action it will therefore not be lend itself to be resolved into
a clearly defined goal but always deliver a variety of ambiguous goals. It may not be
possible to eliminate the inherent discrepancies that exist between different goals or
to define a clear ranking order by way of rational argumentation and empirical evid-
ence. Social conflicts are inherent to the concept and need to be carried out with it.
Another aspect is that sustainability goals cannot be determined once and for all.
Because substantial notions of sustainability are build on the basis of uncertain know-
ledge and social evaluation, they must be expected to change over time. Knowledge
about socio-ecological system dynamics changes with scientific progress and new ex-
periences being made. Values, on the other hand, are endogenous to the process of
socio-ecological transformation. They may change, exactly because they are success-
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fully being followed. And there is no way to know, what the needs of future genera-
tions will be.
Sustainability thus is a “moving target” which can only be followed through pro-
cesses of iterative participatory goal formulation. Sustainability goals and assessments
cannot be determined by principle once and for all, but only through iterative pro-
cesses. The broad participation of affected societal actors in the process of goal for-
mulation  is  necessary  because  their  values  are  constitutive  to  the  sustainability  of
social development.
3.3. Strategy implementation
A third feature of shaping sustainable transformation is related to the implementa-
tion of strategies. Even if certain predictions about socio-ecological system behavior
and clearly defined goals were given, so that “best strategies” of intervention could be
derived, there would still be specific difficulties with the implementation of strategies
to shape transformation. These refer to the fact that capacities to influence the speed
and direction of socio-ecological transformation are distributed among many different
actors. In order to take effect their actions would need to be coordinated along the
lines of a collective strategy. There is no one point from where processes of socio-
ecological transformation can be steered.
The distribution of control capacities is surely not an exclusive feature of sustain-
ability problems. It is a general characteristic of governance in modern societies. The
shift from government to governance in talking about societal management reflects
growing  awareness  for  the  fact  that  capacities  to  take  influence  are  distributed
between different governance levels (e.g. nation states and the EU) as well as between
functional  domains,  such as production,  consumption and political regulation,  and
between different  actors  within these  domains  (Kooiman 1993;  Schneider/  Kenis
1996; Rhodes 1997; Mayntz 1998; Kohler-Koch/ Eising 1999). These conditions have
to be taken as a starting point for strategy formulation and implementation. There are
situational differences in how dispersed capacities of governance really are and in how
far one actor (e.g. the head of government)  or a small coalition of actors disposes
over sufficient power to make other actors follow certain strategies. The situation is,
however that the coordination of actors cannot be taken for granted, but that it needs
to be established for any specific problem anew.
Problems of shaping sustainable transformation are a kind of problems for which
a very high degree of distributed control capacities can be stated. The reason is that
innovation and structural change are highly contingent upon a multitude of different
factors. These are in the hands of many different actors. Overarching competencies
and procedures for shaping structural change are not established. Public actors are but
one type of actor among others, albeit equipped with democratic legitimacy as a spe-
cial source of power. Moreover, the competencies of the state are fragmented into
several  agencies  such  as  governmental  departments,  regulatory  agencies,  political
parties etc.
The “de-factor” governance of transformation thus appears to emerge from the
daily interactions between consumers, producers, policy-makers and various other act-
ors such as researchers or journalists – without anyone controlling it (cf. Rip/ Groen
2002). The diverse actors involved in transformation follow their own vital interests,
partly in cooperation and partly in conflict. And they each dispose over specific re-
sources to enforce their strategies. Transformation, finally, is the result of the inten-
ded and unintended effects of these interactions. In contrast to “normal” policy or
management  arenas  the governance of  transformation  is  neither  an instutionalised
policy field nor are stabilised policy networks in place, yet, which comprise the relev-
ant actors who have influence on transformation. 
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Due to the many roots of socio-ecological transformation distributed control ca-
pacities have to be taken into account in strategy development. For the shaping of
transformation processes it is necessary to coordinate the action of a broad range of
heterogeneous actors. Such coordination cannot rely on hierarchical modes of control
but takes place in heterogeneous governance arrangements which comprise elements
of  negotiation,  market  and  hierarchy.  Problem perceptions,  interests  and practical
knowledge of  the various  stakeholders  need to be linked together  in processes  of
interactive strategy development.
4. Criteria for sustainable governance
The above mentioned specifics of the problem of shaping sustainable transforma-
tion and derived strategy requirements can be compiled into a set of criteria for sus-
tainable governance. Such criteria do not refer to specific targets that should realised
or to the substantial content action strategies but to the very process and the institu-
tional  arrangements  through  which  strategies  to  shape  transformation  are
developed.Table 1 gives an overview on the criteria that have been derived in course
of the above discussion. 
Table 1: Process criteria for sustainable governance
If the complexity of socio-ecological systems, ambiguity of sustainability goals and
distributed control capacities are taken as unavoidable starting points for the develop-
ment and implementation  of  sustainability  strategies,  there  occurs  a shift  in  focus
from questions directed at defining the right way of energy or water provision, agri-
culture or transport to questions about the design of processes which provide effect-
ive guidance in searching for sustainability (Minsch et al. 1998). This leads us to ask if
we have the right institutions in place that create integrated and long-term problem
perceptions,  abilities to respond to unexpected dynamics, learning from experience
and foster capabilities of self-adaptation. The set of criteria for sustainable governance
can be used as orientation for the development of methods and institutions to shape
transformation, and they can be used to assess current governance processes with re-
spect to their adequacy for the problem of shaping sustainable transformation. They
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4.1. Integrated knowledge production
Treatment of sustainability problems needs to be based on integrated concepts of
the problem itself and the system context in which it is embedded. This refers to sci-
entific knowledge production across disciplines and consideration of practical know-
ledge held by societal actors. It also refers to the development of integrated perspect-
ives in defining policy problems, conceptualising its causes and effects and assessing
possible intervention strategies.
4.2. Adaptivity of strategies and institutions
Because of the impossibility to predict socio-ecological transformation there can
be no best solution defined ex ante. A strategy needs to be seen as a hypothesis about
the problem and its  solution. Policies should therefore be designed to test this hypo-
thesis. This entails that the test is thoroughly monitored and that policies can easily be
adapted according to test results. Responsiveness and adaptivity of strategies and in-
stitutions could serve as procedural criteria for sustainability assessment.
4.3. Anticipation of long-term systemic effects of action strategies
Within socio-ecological system dynamics effects may appear detached from their
causes. Important repercussions often occur where they have not been expected and
long after the triggering actions have been carried out. Narrow problem definitions
and short time horizons are therefore likely to exclude important effects. A specific
aspect with respect to socio-ecological systems are lock-in effects which may be the
result of a neglect of the path-sensitivity of decisions at points where small interven-
tions may cause large results. Sustainable governance systematically needs to anticipate
the indirect and long-term effects of pursued action strategies, especially with respect
to structural lock-in. Explorative scenario methods can be a method in case where
complexity forbids analytical modeling.
4.4. Iterative participatory goal formulation
Sustainability goals can for generic and practical reasons not be defined “object-
ively”. The ascertainment of the necessary conditions for long-term viability of socio-
ecological systems involves subjective risk perceptions and value trade-offs that can-
not be decided by scientific methods or political decision but only through social dis-
course. Moreover, values are themselves a constitutive element of the resilience of so-
cial systems because they determine social needs. As such they may change in course
of transformation processes. Sustainability goals thus constitute ambiguous and mov-
ing targets. This needs to be taken into account by way of participatory processes for
formulating sustainability goals. Goals need to be regularly revised in order to adapt
to changing values and knowledge in course of transformation.
4.5. Interactive strategy development
Socio-ecological transformation is an outcome of dispersed social interactions. In-
teractions cut across institutionalised policy fields and action fields such as produc-
tion, consumption, regulation, research or the media. A broad range of heterogeneous
actors is involved who follow their own interests and dispose over specific resources
of influence. Government and other public actors are but one type of actor among
many, albeit equipped with political legitimacy as a special source of influence. In or-
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der to shape transformation diverse actions have to be aligned for a collective stra-
tegic goal. Strategies therefore have to be developed in interaction with relevant stake-
holders in order to integrate their know how and assure support for implementation.
5. Rationalist problem-solving and modern governance
The process features of sustainable governance that have been outlined pose spe-
cific  requirements  to  institutional  arrangements.  When  looking  at  institutional  ar-
rangements and the status quo of problem treatment in industrial societies it appears,
however, that they follow quite different lines. The difference becomes clear when the
criteria for sustainable governance which have been elaborated above are contrasted
with  currently  established  patterns  of  management  and  policy-making  and  their
underlying paradigm of problem-solving.
The ideal of the modern approach to the world is to strive for rational coherence
based on the assumption of a uniqueness of truth and universality of knowledge. If
these assumptions are taken for granted it is a matter of clarification of goals, thor-
ough analysis and choice of right instruments that makes problem solving successful.
Great  achievements  are  built  on  the  cultural  victory  of  the  rational  approach.  It
provides a common bottom-line and a stable reference framework for scientific and
technological exploration, political discourse and even the handling of personal rela-
tionships.  As such it helped to civilise society and gain control over large parts  of
nature.
But rationalisation also has a price. Rational order is not a generic feature of the
world but it needs to be constructed by human cognition. The vast network of causes
and  effects  which  constitutes  the  real  world  beyond  human  perception  must  be
shrunk and sliced in order to make it rationally accessible. Finally, this leads to the
construction of problems in a way that they can actually be solved in a rationalist way.
This orientation has obvious advantages in developing powerful levers to take effect
on nature,  motivating straight  forward action and,  not  least,  providing a common
frame of reference for reasonable discourse. This modernist ideal proved to be appro-
priate for very many problems. However, it also has its specific limitations. Rationalist
problem construction essentially works by externalisation: The order inside of a cog-
nitive model is the result of leaving out the vast majority of factors that take effect in
the real world. This holds true for physics as well as economics and psychology and it
also  holds  true  for  more  practical  models  such  as  those  underlying  the  farmer’s
weather forecast or the politicians campaign strategy. The cognitive externalities only
show effect when strategies which are derived from the model are actually implemen-
ted in the context of the real world. Then they appear in form of unintended or even
unexpected effects. These may cause new problems or even turn against the original
problem-solving intention. The paradox of rationality thus is that the motivation of
getting the grips on the world may turn against its own ends: When the ambition to
make things clear leads to ignorance and neglect of relevant aspects of reality, it may
trigger actions which cause even more disorder. Such an approach is apt to produce
new “second order” problems at the same time as it intends to solve problems (Jahn/
Wehling 1998). When these second order problems become more severe than the
ones that are actually solved, it deems that there is something irrational about rational-
ist problem-solving. Global environmental change, soil degradation, poverty and ad-
verse  effects  of  globalisation  and other  issues  of  sustainable  development  are  ex-
amples of second-order problems. They are caused by rationalist approaches to solve
problems of energy and food provision and economic development. The ideal of ra-
tionalist problem-solving is starting to crumble in light of these experiences. But it is
still deeply rooted in social expectations towards policy-makers and managers and in
institutionalised procedures of societal problem treatment.  
Voß   251
5.1. Functional differentiation
A general pattern of modern societies is functional differentiation (Luhmann 1990;
Mayntz et al. 1988; Schimank 1996). From the early separation of the church and the
state the momentum of differentiation takes effect. It leads through to the depart-
mentalisation  of  policy-making,  the  disciplinary  split  of  scientific  knowledge  and
branching of ever more specialised professions. Differentiation is essentially a process
of slicing up the world. Its main cognitive driver is that it allows for a reduction of
complexity to be considered in carrying out professional communication and action.
As such it allows to extend the application of rationalist problem-solving approaches.9
The patterns of differentiation are deeply rooted in the structures of society and
they are difficult to transgress. Experiences with policy integration, inter- and trans-
disciplinary research and economic innovation networks exemplify the practical diffi-
culties in crossing the boundaries. These are linked to differentiated theories, language
and habitual styles, differentiated perceptions of relevance and feasibility of strategies,
competition over resources and other factors. In many cases it is indeed two or many
different social “worlds” that incompatibly stand beside each other.
5.2. Short-term orientation
Another structural aspect of modern society are loosened personal bondages and
increased mobility compared to traditional forms of living which were prominently
structured by clan membership and local residence. People move across space and so-
cial networks, live in different cities on different continents, change friendships and
work with different organisations. This means a higher degree of personal freedom
and a reduced obligation to stick with certain social relationships. But with it comes a
general loss of liability and the need to introduce more sophisticated means of social
control than communal norms and trust. For professional roles specific procedures of
evaluation have been developed. Politicians are assessed through elections, managers
through the shareholders of their company. This works to make them accountable
and control their work to a certain degree. However, it also introduces a short-term
perspective to their strategic behaviour. Against the background of the paradigm of
rationalist  problem-solving  they  are expected to deliver  solutions  within  the  time-
frame of their assessment period, usually not more than 5 years. If they do not suc-
ceed, they are out. 
Another aspect feeding the short term orientation in professional decision-making
is that, in order to make rationalist problem solving possible, it is necessary to reduce
uncertainty.  The array of  unexpected things  happening,  however,  increases  rapidly
with the time horizon taken that is taken into account. This is a factor that systematic-
ally favours problem definitions and strategies that cover only short time periods. The
more strategies are built on linear implementation plans without allowance for adapta-
tion but only the possibility of failure, the stronger is this effect. Especially in the eco-
nomic system, but also in the domain of politics and social relations, strategies thus
tend to be concentrated on projects with short pay-back periods.10
Beyond both features, functional differentiation and short-term orientation, and
their linkage to the paradigm of rationalist problem-solving many more structural spe-
cifics  of  the  current  governance  regime in  modern  societies  could be  highlighted.
These are, for example, competitive orientations in party politics or markets which
work to impede the realisation of  cooperation  benefits,  veto positions in informal
9 The more aspects of the real world are excluded from theories about human behaviour, for
instance,  the  more  encompassing  and  sophisticated  models  of  economic  development
become possible and instruments appear feasible to control it.
10 Financial  interest  itself  is  another  institutionalised  form  of  the  short-term  as  it
systematically diminishes values when they occur in the future.
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policy networks which are occupied by powerful actors who can dominate collective
action, sovereignty of nation states contrasting the global scale of problems etc.
At first  sight  it  appears  that the dominant patterns  within the configuration of
governance in modern society contradict  the criteria for sustainable governance in
some important respects. Most clearly is the opposition of the modern paradigm of
rationalist problem-solving with the uncertainties involved in complex socio-ecologic-
al transformation. Specifically, the momentum of functional differentiation contrast
with  the  requirements  for  integrated  knowledge  production,  participative  goal
formulation  and  interactive  strategy  development.  The  institutional  embedding  of
short  term  perspective  in  political  election  cycles,  management  perspectives  and
interest rates hints at a mismatch with the anticipation of long-term effects in strategy
development.
6. How to innovate governance?
Against  the background of the rationalist  paradigm of problem-solving and the
structures of current governance regimes it deems important to have a closer look at
the realistic prospect of sustainable governance. Which are the conditions for sustain-
able governance to gain ground and become implemented in the daily practice of soci-
etal problem treatment? How can new modes of governance be introduced within the
context of existing regime structures? From this perspective sustainable development
appears as a challenge to innovate governance.
Several approaches have been developed over the last years with the aim to im-
prove societal problem treatment for sustainable development. Many of them follow
similar lines of reasoning as contained in the criteria discussed above. Some of these
approaches are not yet more than vague programmatic strategies like policy integra-
tion, transdisciplinary research, integrated assessment etc. Some of them, however, are
already  quite  elaborate  with  respect  to  specific  methods  and  procedures  through
which they  can be  applied.  In  some cases  implementation  experiences  have  been
made. Examples of the latter are green cabinets and sustainability councils for integ-
rated long-term strategies, participatory research methods like focus groups and scen-
ario  workshops,  interactive  technology  assessment  and  new forms  of  prospective
strategy processes such as foresighting and transition management.
Some of the experiments that have been carried out on the basis of these concep-
tual approaches can be observed to work quite well. In these cases it seems possible
to implement sustainable modes of governance under the conditions of the prevailing
governance regime, at least to a certain degree. The Dutch transition management
programme, the British sustainable energy policy network, the German socio-ecolo-
gical research initiative, European foresight exercises etc. could be cited as successful
examples of introducing more integrated, learning oriented approaches – although all
of them are pretty recent and only have a short record of experience. Many other at-
tempts fail at different stages of the innovation process. Either the problems with es-
tablished ways of dealing with sustainable development do not even become a topic
of  discourse  or  alternative  approaches  cannot  gather  sufficiently  strong actor  net-
works for further development or they become frazzled in the course of implementa-
tion. The success of governance innovations for sustainable development obviously
depends an many factors from the cultural, institutional and technological context, the
actor constellations and on the innovation strategies that are pursued by the actors in
each case. 
As a hypothesis from the briefly outlined characterisation of modern governance it
can be expected that many unsuccessful attempts at innovating institutional arrange-
ments of societal problem treatment suffer from a lack of fit with the dominant gov-
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ernance regime. Yet,  there is  little  knowledge on these aspects  of  innovating gov-
ernance.  Institutional  and  policy  innovation  for  sustainable  development  is  either
simply referred to as something that ought to happen or it is merely being reported as
a phenomenon that appears in comparative studies. Very few studies go into the de-
tails of the respective innovation processes, so that little is known about the evolution
of  innovation  strategies  for  sustainable  governance.  Some work in the area  policy
studies dares a closer look at the birth and lifecycle of political reforms, but the ana-
lysis usually is restricted to a set of variables that is limited by the disciplinary per-
spective  of  political  science  which  cannot  sufficiently  grasp  the  entanglement  of
governance in the context of socio-ecological transformation.
I therefore end the contemplations of this chapter with a brief outlook to further
research on governance innovations for sustainable development. For this purpose I
present possible directions that this kind of research could take.
• Research on governance innovations  takes into account the embedding of pro-
cesses of societal problem treatment in socio-ecological system contexts. An ana-
lytical framework that is  restricted to actors  and institutions,  as is  dominant  in
political science, may not be able to adequately consider the influence of cognitive
frames,  technology  development  and  ecological  conditions  for  changing  gov-
ernance patterns.
• For a dynamic understanding of governance, steering activities need to be seen to
be endogenous to socio-ecological transformation. Governance is not somewhere
outside or above the socio-ecological systems in which transformations take place
(e.g. electricity systems, food production, geographical regions) but it is part of it.
This is important for not to overlook how governance itself is conditioned by the
social, technological and ecological structures of the area to where it applies. When
governance induces changes in these structures it also induces changes in the con-
ditions for its own working.
• Dynamic concepts of governance should not focus too much on the identification
of general patterns or even universal theories of change. They should rather be
open enough to give due recognition to the many contingencies that are involved
in social and institutional change processes.
• The study of governance innovations may be able to make use of co-evolutionary
concepts and theories from the field of innovations studies and socio-technical
change. By drawing analogies between technological and institutional innovation
some helpful concepts may be derived and interesting hypotheses may be gener-
ated.
• It could, for example, shed new light on the conditions under which institutional
innovations occur, if they were, similar to technology, be conceptualised as “con-
figurations that work” (Rip/ Kemp 1998). This would mean that they comprise a
specific combination of values, knowledge, institutional rules, maybe also techno-
logy and elements  from the natural  environment.  Innovations  processes  would
then require complementary changes within these heterogeneous dimensions to be
successful.
• Against this background “innovation journeys” of new governance arrangements
can be traced by detailed case studies which could work with concepts that are
known from technology studies such as “alignment”, “momentum”, “reverse sali-
ent”, “hot phase and cool phase”, or possibly a phase heuristic that comprises in-
vention (idea), development (concept) and diffusion (implementation).
• It could be worthwhile to apply a multi-level framework of niches, regimes and
landscape which has been developed for analysing socio-technical change (Rip/
Kemp 1998; Geels 2002b). An adapted concept of “governance regime” could be
helpful in explaining institutional path-dependency and lock-in, but also patterns
of governance transformation. This concept could be linked up with existing con-
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cepts from political science such as policy style, political culture, political system
etc. and add a dynamic component.
• Finally, various strategy recommendations which have been drawn from a multi-
level, co-evolutionary analysis of socio-technical change, could be used to explore
the ways in which societies could reflexively innovate their own governance. 
Among these are
o A general orientation towards learning and modulation rather than achiev-
ing prediction and control
o Active experimentation, management of niches in which a diverse portfolio
of governance modes is tested and further developed
o Contextualisation of governance innovation processes by establishing nex-
us arrangements for the integration of perspectives of various stakeholders.
This would help to take socially robust paths of governance innovation. 
o Participatory  formulation  of  performance  criteria  for  sustainable  gov-
ernance and development of long-term visions, road maps of how to get
there, including monitoring and a regular revision of criteria, visions and
road maps.
o Establishment  of  a  “social  innovation  policy”  including  social  science
R&D, support for social innovation networks which comprise researchers
and “institutional entrepreneurs”, support for niche experiments and ad-
aptation of framework conditions, institutional innovation impact assess-
ment.
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The increased demand of goods and services based on water resources - be it for
production  (e.g.  industrial  process),  direct  consumption  (e.g.  drinking  water),  ab-
sorption of pollutants (e.g. dilution of  wastewater)  and other immaterial (e.g. river
landscape) or ecological services (e.g. habitats for fauna) - has resulted in competing
use, increasing scarcity and reduction of renewability.  Any number of examples can
be provided to demonstrate the ongoing degradation of water bodies and, in particu-
lar, aquifers (Gleick 1993; Postel 1997; European Environmental Agency 2003; World
Water Development Program 2003).
Water management is influenced by various institutional rules and social norms,
which represent both constraints and opportunities for the behavior of rival water ap-
propriators. In this chapter, we focus especially on formal property rights (PR), on
specific  water  bodies  and  on  public  policies  (PP)  regulating  sector-specific
exploitation (e.g.  irrigation) or protection (e.g.  pollution from agriculture)  of water
resources.  We  analyze  how  these  two  types  of  institutional  rules  (PR  and  PP)
influence  the  strategic  behavior  of  public  and  private  water  operators  producing
drinking and mineral water from an aquifer and, thereby, the sustainability of past and
current  water  management.  From  a  theoretical  point  of  view,  we  adopt  the
perspective of actor-centered institutionalism (Scharpf 1997). In other words, we pay
close  attention  to  the  capabilities  of  water  operators  to  mobilise,  in  a  given
hydrological context, institutional rules in order to secure water provision. 
 258   Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference
This  article asks  if  the  ownership  status  of  the  water  operator  determines  its
strategy of access to the resource. More concretely, what are the strategies implemen-
ted by water operators to secure drinking water provision in the long-term? Does the
public or private status of these operators influence them directly? Do operators mo-
bilize property rights and public policies in a similar way? What are the impacts of this
mobilization on the resource exploitation, on the exclusion of competing users and, in
the end, on resource sustainability? Such questions are very touchy as they trigger a
vivid political debate about the liberalization and privatisation of water services (Fin-
ger and Allouche 2002). Furthermore, they feed theoretical debates about the respect-
ive effectiveness and efficiency of resource regulation through tradable property and
use rights, regulatory policy instruments (e.g. permits, bans) or voluntary tools (e.g.
negotiated agreements).
As we intend to assess the relative importance of PR and PP on the sustainable
use of water resources, we first review the main hypotheses formulated on these top-
ics (Part). Then we analyse two concrete cases of aquifer exploitation in Belgium from
1880 onwards (Part ): drinking water production by the public-owned Brussels Water
Company and mineral water production by the private company Spa Monopole. The
systematic comparison of these two historical cases studies (Part  ) sheds a new light
on the influence of the operators’ ownership on resource use and sustainability. The
comparison shows that the operators’  strategy is identical. Whatever the ownership
status (public or private), they attempt to privately appropriate the resource. The key
objective of the operators is to maximize their security in resource provision, by sys-
tematically excluding all other local users. The theoretical implications of such a find-
ing are that a combined theoretical approach (PR and PP) is necessary to analyse wa-
ter users’ behavior as well as a dynamic perspective on institutions, including the in-
formal arrangements that facilitate their mobilization and enforcement.
1. Institutional rules orienting operators’ behavior (in Belgium)
An aquifer  provides  different  goods and services:  drinking water,  water  for  ir-
rigation, water for industrial process, water as a sponge for pollution, etc. Thus, each
aquifer’s situation can be characterized by the number and type of (potential) benefi-
ciary groups. It is quite obvious that socio-economic and socio-cultural factors play a
key role in what is and what is not defined as – a good and service of - an aquifer.
Furthermore, it  is very common for different users  to compete for heterogeneous
goods and services provided by the same aquifer (e.g. conflict between farmers and
drinking water companies). In order to collectively solve these rivalries and to tackle
the problem of resource scarcity, several institutional mechanisms have been gradually
defined and implemented by the State or directly negotiated between the water users
themselves. From an institutional perspective, it is therefore crucial to identify these
rules-in-use and to examine their impact on both water users and resource sustainabil-
ity.  Our  theoretical  framework  relies  on  important  contributions  provided  by
institutional  economics  and policy analysis  on this  issue.  We postulate  a  series  of
causal links between the mobilization of institutional rules by the water operators and
the sustainability of the resource that we investigate in the empirical field (see Figure
1).
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Figure 1:  Strategy of water operators and impact on water resources
In a word, we suggest that a (public or private) water operator can choose, com-
bine or even create various institutional rules (PR and PP) in order to exclude com-
peting users from the aquifer exploitation. Furthermore, the sustainability of the re-
source management depends upon the effectiveness and efficiency (for the exclusion
of rival appropriators) of the institutional mechanisms concretely at work.
1.1. Public versus Private Water Operators
The strategy of the operator consists mainly in mobilising institutional rules. The
literature suggests that the behavior of the operator is influenced by its legal status.
But does the legal ownership status of the water operator determine resource prop-
erty? In water management studies, much confusion exists between the status of the
operator and the status of the resource. The privatisation of the operator is often con-
sidered as a privatization of the resource, and respectively the public resource prop-
erty is often deducted from the public status of the operator. On the one hand, the
tenets of the privatization of water provision consider that a public body is unable to
manage the resource efficiently (Winpenny 1994; Brubacker 1995; Anderson and Hill
2001). When considering the resource, they talk about tradable property rights on wa-
ter. But when they refer to drinking water supply, they forget that the operator, be it
public or private, must have guarantees on resource access. On the other hand, the
advocates of the public water management are confused as well, while sustaining that
only a local public authority is able to effectively protect the resource (Petrella 2001;
Shiva 2002). They also forget that public water supply does not necessarily mean that
the resource is under public property. These kinds of commitments must not hide the
actual institutional mechanisms (PR) that guarantee access and exploitation of the re-
source by the water operators. The aim of this article precisely consists in breaking up
this linear and widespread vision between the status of the operator and the status of
the  resource.  It  calls  for  a  deeper  analysis,  historically  informed,  of  the  operator
strategy towards resource access according to its ownership status1.
Does the legal and ownership status of the water operator matter for the strategic
mobilization of institutional rules? The traditional literature on public versus private
(water)  operators  has  not  addressed  this  question  very  systematically.  It  focuses
essentially on the ability of private interests to supply public services. We classify the
arguments  about  the  differences  between  public  and  private  operators  –  and,
furthermore, about the privatization of state-owned entreprises (SOEs) - into two cat-
egories. On the one hand, macro-economic rationales for privatization claim that it
should improve efficiency, reduce the public sector borrowing requirement and ease
price determination (Vickers and Yarrow 1989). On the other hand, micro-level dis-
cussions concentrate their arguments in favor of privatization on the implications of
the type of ownership on management and output efficiency. The general assumption
is that public ownership is by its very nature inefficient and unable to attain satisfact-
1 The institutional arrangement for resource management must fit with the temporal and
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ory levels of economic efficiency (see Winpenny 1994 for the water sector). Empirical
studies show that public managers lack market incentives and shareholders pressure
to attain greater efficiency (Laffont 1996: 1240-42; Nestor and Mahboobi 2000: 19).
However important in quantity and quality, the economic and political literature is
divided on the validity of most of the theoretical assumptions on the superiority of
private property over public ownership of (water) operators. On the empirical level,
many  authors,  having  undertaken  performance  reviews  of  SOEs  and  private
companies, often have not found clear cut evidence of the superiority of public or
private ownership over the other. Rather, the institutional and market environment of
the  company (e.g.  public  regulation,  degree  of  competition,  market  structure)  has
proven to be a much more important factor on productive efficiency than property
(Brooks 1989; Vickers and Wright 1989; Hodge 1999).
To conclude, the managers of public and private water operators obviously face
different  situations  and  incentives.  Accordingly,  we might  expect  that  they  follow
different strategies to secure the provision of drinking water.  However, there are no
strong theoretical arguments that clearly predict the type of institutional rules that will
be mobilized by a public versus a private company. Thus we need to look in detail at
PR and PP, the two pillars of institutional resource regimes (Kissling-Näf and Varone
2000;  Knoepfel,  Kissling-Näf,  and  Varone  2001;  Varone  et  al.  2002;  Aubin  and
Varone 2004).
1.2. Formal Property Rights on Aquifers
The first strategy for a water operator is to become the owner of the resource or,
at  least,  to  have  exclusive  disposal  and  use  rights  on  it.  Institutional  economics
considers property and use rights (PR) as key steering factors for resource use and
sustainability (Bromley 1992; Devlin and Grafton 1998). PR must be clearly regulated
to enable effective and efficient use and management of resources.  PR are usually
defined as social relations between two or more competing users of the same natural
resource. Thus, property is not an object such a water body (e.g. an aquifer), but a
right to a benefit stream derived from the resource (e.g. water for irrigation, drinking
water), usually guaranteed by the State. This right is secure as long as the duty of all
the other (potential) users respects the conditions that protect the stream (Bromley
1992: 2). Accordingly, the first virtue of property rights is to exclude non-owner and
rival appropriators from the use of – goods and services derived from – the natural
resource. It is therefore obvious that the acquisition of PR represents a first possible
target for public or private water operators.
In Belgium, property and use rights on natural resources were formally set in the
Civil Code (CC) of 1804. PR determine who the formal owner is and what its related
disposal  and  use  rights  are.  As  far  as  water  is  concerned,  it  ties  (ground-)  water
ownership  to  land  ownership.  According  to  the  "accession  principle", rainwater,
ponds, groundwater and springs are private water, once extracted by the landowner
(e.g. when rainwater falls on land, when groundwater is located under the soil  and
when  springs  stem  from  the  land).  It  is  obvious  that  the  absoluteness  of  this
organisation of PR would hamper water use by non-owners, for whom water is vital.
The CC actually limits private property on water by means of easements. Easements
are introduced for  public  utility  reasons  and clearly  limit  use rights  of  the  formal
owners. Furthermore, public laws and sector-specific regulations might restrict some
disposal and use rights of the resource owner.
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1.3. Public Policies on Aquifers
The second strategy that water operators can implement, especially if they are not
the formal owners of the resource they intend to exploit, is to mobilise an existing –
or to propose the adoption of a new - public policy. A public policy represents the
response of the political-administrative system to a reality that is deemed collectively
unacceptable. In order to achieve the desired effects, each policy design is based on a
rationale or action logic. This comprises hypotheses on both the causal chain behind
the collective problem to be solved and the possible forms of State action (Knoepfel,
Larrue, and Varone 2001; Schneider and Ingram 1988; Schneider and Ingram 1997).
For the illustrative example of a polluted aquifer, the causal hypothesis responds to
the question as to who or what is to blame or is objectively responsible for the unac-
ceptable use of the resource. This gives rise to the political definition of the target
groups (e.g. agriculture, industry and/or households) in the policy design. The inter-
vention hypothesis  responds to the question as to how the behavior of  the target
groups identified can be influenced in such a way as to achieve the defined aims of the
policy. In other words, it legitimizes the choice of the policy tools mix (e.g. ban of
manure spreading, tax on industrial discharge and/or permit for housing). As a matter
of fact, a water operator might invoke a sectoral policy in order to limit the direct or
indirect exploitation of the aquifer by the specific target groups of the relevant public
policy.
We must  explicitly  acknowledge that  this  strategy is  possible  even if  the target
groups are de jure the owners of the aquifer: the legal definition of PR clearly indicates
that property is not absolute, but could be limited – with financial compensation in
cases of expropriation – by public laws and regulations. De facto, public policies dis-
tribute specific (sometimes exclusive) use rights to the actors, whose behavior is to be
influenced by State intervention.  Thus,  even if  the formal property and use rights
have no longer been questioned since the adoption of the CC in 1804, their material
content of ownership is rendered concrete and restricted by public policies gradually
adopted afterwards. 
Policy analysis  and evaluation show that policy designs are often incomplete or
incoherent (problem of inter- and intra-policy coordination), that they are only partly
implemented (due to  non-adapted administrative  agencies)  and/or  that  the effects
achieved only partly correspond to the defined aims. Thus, it is imperative to examine
the extent to which the concrete use and management of a natural resource depend
on the internal coherence and degree of implementation of such policy designs.
In the French-speaking region of Belgium (Wallonia), public policies in the field of
aquifer  management  concern  both  exploitation  activities  and protection  measures.
They date back to 1889 with the Law on the protection of mineral water extraction,
applied first to Spa, subsequently generalized in 1924 to all mineral water springs and
then in 1990 to all  drinking water sources.  The underlying policy rationale can be
summarised as follows:  If we set a protection perimeter around a spring with limitations of use
inside, then we will guarantee its preservation2. A public water distribution policy has also
been developed since 1907 and is based on the practical assumption that  If we both
allow towns to both collectively organize and create a national (or public-owned) company, then we
will supply drinking water to the whole population and eliminate water diseases. Regulations of
industrial and domestic discharges were implemented as well. As such, public policies
constitute a wide set of public interventions in water management.
It is thus important in the case studies presented below to distinguish between the
status  of  the  operator  and  resource  ownership.  This  status  should  influence  the
strategy of the operator towards the resource access and protection, a strategy where
2 It  must be emphasized that this  policy does not really  guarantee the protection of the
resource but rather, the prevention of pollution accidents, since the perimeters are smaller
than the percolation basin. 
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the  mobilization of  institutional  rules  (property  rights  and public  policies)  are  key
elements.
2. Historical development of water production in Belgium: the cases of CIBE
and Spa Monopole
Belgium’s water resources are distributed among two international river basins, the
Meuse and the Scheldt. The major aquifers are located in Wallonia, the southern and
French-speaking region of  Belgium.  Wallonia  meets  55% of the national  needs  in
drinking water (providing Flanders and Brussels), while it accounts for only 37% of
the population (Barraqué 1995: 54). The yield of groundwater is about 900 Mio m³ for
the  whole  country,  exploited  at  a  rate  of  75%.  Even though  some  fear  of  water
shortage appeared in the 1960s, Belgium does not face a “hydrous stress” (Cornut
2000)3.
From the analysis of water use, we have identified two persistent rivalries (Aubin
and Varone 2004). The first occurs between the high pollution levels in most water
bodies and drinking water production. Pollution is due both to domestic wastewater
discharge and the diffuse pollution from manure disposal. The second line of rivalry
concerns economic development (e.g. construction, industrial use of water, intensive
farming and flood control) and the protection of the environment.
The two historical cases presented below address the issue of drinking and mineral
water production. Each case study successively discusses the aquifer characteristics,
the ownership status of the water operator, the strategy put into action from 1880
onwards  and the  induced effects  on the exclusion  of  rival  users  and on resource
sustainability.
2.1. Drinking water production by the Brussels public water company (CIBE)
As  pointed  out  above,  most  of  Brussels’  drinking  water  originates  from  the
Walloon Region. Therefore, the public-owned company which supplies the urban area
of  Brussels  has  developed  a  specific  strategy  to  secure  ‘its’  water  resources.  This
strategy is mainly based on property rights and public policies, which were reinforced
with a bunch of contractual agreements and additional monitoring measures. In fact,
the story of Brussels drinking water production is closely linked to the growth of the
city as the socio-economic and political center of Belgium.
2.1.1. Groundwater extraction far from the place of consumption 
The first water catchments of CIBE are located in the Condroz region (Wallonia),
approximately 80-100 km south-south-east Brussels, where the major Belgian aquifer
made of folded carboniferious limestone is. Both in Spontin (the 1890s) and Modave
(the  1920s),  the  groundwater  extracted  is  of  high  quality  thanks  to  natural
underground  purification, and  plentiful  thanks  to  the  limestone  that  is  often
compared to a “water highway”. The system used to extract water is very simple. In
the lower part of the valley, an underground permeable gallery is built in parallel of
the river, just a little above its bed level, so as to collect the underground water that
supply the river.  The extracted underground water has percolated, for months and
even  years,  from  the  plateaux  and  slopes  surrounding  the  valley.  The  aquifer  is
vulnerable, though, as its permeability is mainly based on large passages between the
fragmented limestone rocks. In certain areas of the percolation basin, a pollutant can
3 Despite its very high density of population (333 inhabitants/km²), water availability is 1,900
m³/capita/year.
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thus quickly migrate into the gallery. As these areas, either large or very small, are
impossible to precisely locate on a map, the whole basin must be carefully monitored.
After  its  first  developments,  CIBE diversified  its  water  catchments,  both  geo-
graphically and geologically. CIBE now produces approximately 140mio m³ per year
(~50mio m3/year in 1940 and ~100mio m3/year in 1970) from many sources, mainly
in Wallonia: the Condroz limestone aquifer (~45%), the Mons chalk aquifer (~11%),
the Brussels sand aquifer (~11%) and surface water from the river Meuse (~30%).
The Modave and Spontin catchments remain of high importance for the company,
since their cost is very low compared to pumping stations and drinking water treat-
ment plants: there is no need for energy (both for the catchment and the adduction),
the capital invested nearly a century ago has been completely amortized, and the only
costs are dedicated to maintenance.
 
2.1.2. Historical operator of the Brussels-Capital Region
The  Compagnie  Intercommunale  Bruxelloise  des  Eaux  (CIBE)  is  a  public  company,
created in 1891 by four boroughs of the urban area of Brussels in order to extract
drinking water  and to distribute  it  to their  inhabitants  and economic  activities.  In
1899, after 8 years of technical and institutional efforts, the ‘Spontin catchment’ sup-
plied the four associated boroughs with 35,000 m³ per day of fresh and high quality
groundwater channelled through a slow slope aqueduct. Since its foundation, CIBE
has never stopped growing, increasing both its water production capacity and its dis-
tribution area. The major part of production, groundwater, is extracted from the com-
pany premises which now total about 300 ha in Wallonia.
Today,  CIBE  counts  38  associated  boroughs  in  its  capital  and  many  ‘customer
municipalities’: all in all, it supplies about 2mio people (1/5 of the Belgian population):
upstream Brussels (along the aqueducts), Brussels itself and its periphery where it also
is in charge of distribution, and downstream Brussels (as far as the Belgian coast, 110
kms away from Brussels). Recently, CIBE has also extended its activities to the sewer
and sanitation sectors. 
Legally speaking, CIBE is a limited risk public company (  société coopérative à re sponsabilité  
limitée  )  whose shares are exclusively owned by boroughs of the Brussels urban area.
The 1,500 employees of the public company benefit from a high social protection just
as in other public companies or administrations. Originally, the public status of the
Company was not so obvious, for the first project in the 1880s was to create a public-
private company where the four boroughs had the majority of assets  (8/15 of the
shares), the remainder being the property of a private entrepreneur. The project was
finally abandoned, partly because of the specific water catchment that was to be built
by the projected company (see below) and partly for ideological reasons that deal with
political debates on public service and privatization (Cornut 2003).
For  the associated boroughs,  creating a  joint  public  company with  the  aim of
building and managing a water production and distribution system was a risky under-
taking in 1891, for no specific legislation could guarantee a legal framework for the
new firm. However, CIBE succeeded in growing and building its production and dis-
tribution networks, often without any subcontracting. But at the same time, it made
an efficient political lobby to enact new legislation that could give legal status to such
associations of boroughs. The law, adopted in 1907 by the Belgian parliament4, was
clearly modelled on the original status of CIBE. The 1907 law gave new opportunities
to CIBE, such as compulsory purchase and low interest  rates on loans, but at the
same time, allowed the Government to control the accounts, loans and status of such
associations.
4 Loi du 18 août 1907 relative aux associations de communes et de particuliers pour l’établissement de
services de distribution d’eau (M.B., 5 septembre).
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2.1.3. From first settlings to complete control and monitoring of the resource
The strategy used by CIBE to build its ‘water empire’ is complex. However, we
can  get  the  essential  information  on  property  rights  by  looking  at  the  specific
strategies used both to secure access to the resource (possibly by excluding alternative uses)
and to preserve the resource. Given these limits, we can distinguish three major peri-
ods in the history of CIBE: first settlings in the Condroz region (1880-1945), expan-
sion through the mobilization of planning procedures (1945-1990) and legalization of
CIBE water protection strategy (from 1990 onwards).
Phase I (1880-1945): The first project set up by the four boroughs of the urban
area of Brussels was to create a public-private company in association with a private
entrepreneur who was to own 7/15th of the shares. In return for his participation in
the capital and potential benefits of the company, the latter had to give the company
his property rights on hundreds of hectares in Modave, a sparcely populated village
located in the Condroz region,  containing many springs that  could produce up to
70,000 m³ per day of high quality water,  i.e. enough to supply Brussels  plentifully.
According to the Civil  Code, property on these lands entailed the property of  the
groundwater,  so the exchange of real-estate property with company shares allowed
the  projected  company  to  exploit  Modave’s  groundwater.  This  project  was  finally
abandoned,  though,  notably  because  of  the  competition  on  water  resources.  The
catchment of Modave’s springs was actually endangering the flow of the local river, le
Hoyoux (a tributary of the river Meuse), which was still used downstream for industrial
purposes (both for hydro power and the industrial process). As a consequence, the in-
dustrial lobby actively fought against the project, both politically and legally. This well-
organized lobby was clearly efficient, for the Liège Appeals Court confirmed in 1894
the rights of the industrials on the surface water flow, invoking to the Civil Code,
which guarantees riverside landowners the flow of water across their land cannot be
harmed by surface water extraction upstream, including springs5. As a consequence,
CIBE had to give financial compensations to riverside landowners downstream from
Modave who would have suffered from the qualitative and quantitative degradation of
the water flow induced by CIBE’s withdrawal.
The financial setback of the Modave project forced CIBE to find another source
of water to supply Brussels, if possible in a place where competition on the resource
was lower. It found it in 1892 in Spontin, a small village in the Condroz region as well,
about 30 kms west of Modave. The strategy was the same there as before in Modave.
First, CIBE negotiated with the village and private landowners to buy land on which
many springs emerged. At the same time, it negotiated with the Belgian Government
to get an authorization both to extract water from Spontin’s springs and to buy the
necessary lands that guaranteed its property of underground water.  The Government
granted the authorization in 1894, in exchange for a firm commitment of CIBE to
give  fair  compensation  to  landowners  and  industrial  users  of  surface  water6.  The
authorization  also  included  the  ability  for  CIBE  to  carry  out  “public  utility”
expropriations if negotiations failed with landowners.
All  in  all,  one  can  say  that  CIBE succeeded  in  Spontin  because  the  potential
opponents to the project were either too few or badly organized, so that the financial
compensation were affordable for the Brussels water company. The proof came later
on, when  CIBE ‘struck back’ at Modave in 1910, when Spontin’s water didn’t suffice
to meet Brussels’ demand anymore. To get the official authorization, CIBE not only
had to give fair compensation to local landowners, but also to pay a BEF 3mio com-
pensation to industrial users of surface water downstream, and to use 1/30th of that
money to build a sewer along the river for industrial discharge, in order to preserve
5 Case-law of the Liège Appeals Court of 16th May 1894.
6 Arrêté royal du 10 juin 1894 portant sur « Hygiène publique ; agglomération bruxelloise ; distribution
d’eau ; projet du Bocq » (M.B., 25-26 juin, p. 1997).
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the  river’s  water  quality7.  This  agreement  could be compared to an early  form of
today’s environmental ‘win-win’ approach: each of the parties benefits from the agree-
ment which at the same time preserves the (local) natural environment. The story also
gives clear indications of the financial power of CIBE and consequently, of Brussels’
boroughs.
Despite the modus-vivendi officialization, not all Modave residents were happy with
the project,  though,  for  the hamlet  of Petit-Modave was nearly entirely wiped out
after expropriation: a psychological scar that is still perceptible today among the local
population, nearly one century afterwards.
Apart from Petit-Modave’s destruction, it has to be noted that, both in this early
period and after, CIBE has always tried to avoid direct conflicts with local people,
even if it had all the legal rights to buy the land and extract groundwater. For example,
CIBE has always favored fair deals in land purchase and avoided to go to court and
use its  expropriation rights.  It  also supplied  water  at  low cost  to local inhabitants
(even for free at the beginning) and hired local labor to manage its local infrastructure.
As socio-political tools, these measures were essential to make the local populations
and  authorities  accept  the  presence  of  a  ‘foreign’  public  company,  even  if  the
measures did not have any effect on the preservation of the resource. 
The strategy used in Spontin and Modave to secure access to and preserve the
resource has been generalized in all the other catchment places developed later on by
CIBE, and is still the same today. It was enhanced, though, after WWII.
Phase  II  (1945-1990):  The  second  period  is  not  highly  different  in  terms  of
resource strategy, though in some way, it shifted from a property rights-based ap-
proach to a policy design-based one. Of course, the policy of land purchase was pur-
sued, and even geographically extended so as to include in CIBE’s possessions not
only the close catchment area but also lands further in the aquifer basin in order to se-
cure the largest possible part of the percolation basin. The purchases did not proceed
in a one-shot process but rather, in an opportunistic way so as to make the property
map look like a “gruyère” cheese of which the holes were progressively filled. Most of the
time, trees were planted on these lands, in order to both enhance the percolation qual-
ity of the soil and to create a physical, natural and psychological barrier against poten-
tially polluting human activities.
But this strategy was by no means the essential one of this second period, which
was marked by the mobilization of  policy design rules,  in  two directions.  It  is  of
crucial importance to note that the two following measures are mainly based on the
quality of underground water, undoubtedly because the quantity aspects were already
guaranteed by the property right measures.
First,  CIBE hired and trained specific employees, water workers (“cantonniers” in
French, by analogy to roadmenders),  who are  in charge of  watching every human
activity  that  could endanger water quality  or  quantity:  construction,  agriculture,  oil
tanks, etc. When a potential danger is identified, the job of the water worker is to
warn the person in charge about the danger his activity represents for water and if ne-
cessary, to remind him that he is legally (hence financially) responsible for any pollu-
tion he could provoke on CIBE’s water. The  monitoring of  CIBE’s  water workers
was gradually ‘codified’: using geological tools,  informal protection perimeters were
traced around each catchment. In fact, three concentric zones were defined, the ob-
servation criteria more detailed as the distance from the catchment decreased. The
preservation of the resource was thus extended and more efficient. 
Second, CIBE adapted its procedures to the new planning laws set up after WWII.
As every important new construction or economic activity had to ask for a planning
7 Arrêté royal du 19 mars 1910, portant sur «  Travaux d’hygiène; Compagnie Intercommunale Bruxelloise
des Eaux ; Dérivation des sources de Modave » (M.B., 2 avril, pp.1883-1885).
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permission, which includes a public enquiry, CIBE’s water workers could systematize
their monitoring by asking the planning authority to add specific constraints in the
permission to guarantee no pollution of groundwater (e.g. the double envelope of an
oil tank). We can easily interpret this use of planning policy as an economic rationale:
now CIBE does not have to buy as much land as possible,  it can intervene in the
planning procedure to protect its resource, even beyond its property. The protection
process  through  planning  was  not  yet  fully  efficient,  though,  for  (1)  the  planning
authority could decide not to consider the remarks of CIBE and (2) the owner could
easily  hide  his  disrespect  of  the  planning  rules.  Thus  the  preservation  was  not
complete. 
The final strategy in this period, which did not directly affect the water resource,
relied on the dramatic growth of CIBE. Upstream,  it  geographically diversified its
groundwater  sources  and  also  developed  drinking  water  treatment  plants  to  treat
surface water so as to assure its independence on the seasonal and annual changing
capacities of aquifers. Downstream, it has convinced more and more villages to be-
come associated in the company or customers of its water supply, giving itself wider
social justification to new water extraction. This extension process, which made it the
second largest drinking water company in Belgium in terms of cubic meters produced
(and the first in terms of domestic supply),  is probably the major asset of CIBE’s
power today. 
Phase III (1990 onwards):  The third and final period, starting in 1990, saw the
Walloon Region setting up new legislation on water protection, very similar to (and in
a way, officializing) CIBE’s protection zones strategy. The policy is  applied to the
whole Walloon territory, for all water producers including Brussels and Flemish ones.
A regional bill now legalizes CIBE’s preservation strategy, especially the monitoring
measures: landowners located in the aquifer basin are legally obliged to adopt water
preservation constraints on their potentially polluting activities. 
Of course, CIBE’s financial capacities, formerly used to secure its access to as well
as protect the resource, are largely reduced as the Region has levied a tax on each
cubic meter extracted in Wallonia in order to finance all the protection measures im-
posed on local residents. In return, though, water producers can ask for regional sub-
sidies for the implementation of protection measures around their catchments.
2.2. Mineral water production by the private-owned company Spa Monopole
Spa’s water has been tapped for centuries. Since 1888, the communal springs have
been conceded to a private company that exports natural mineral water in bottles and
manages the health “spas”.  Protection and exploitation of the resource are  closely
tied. In fact, Spa’s aquifers are vulnerable to human activity, but located in forest and
a natural setting. The resource has remained in public hands over the whole period,
belonging mainly to the village. However, the private company assists the public au-
thorities in preserving it. As a local producer, Spa Monopole is dependent on the re-
source for its survival. Thus, it has developed a complex strategy to protect the re-
source, based on the securing of access and the exclusion of alternative uses.
2.2.1. Bottling the thermal water of the Fagnes
Located in the East of Belgium, in the Ardennes, the region of Spa is a natural area
benefiting from a very specific  landscape,  originated from timber  overexploitation
before  the  19th century.  The  Fagnes  are  high  plateaux  which  form  a  collection  of
marshes with its characteristically muddy ground (or peat bogs), filled with abundant
rain- and snowfalls.  Spa water percolates from the  Fagnes plateaux through primary
Aubin/Cornut/Varone   267
quartz rocks, and emerges downstream on the slopes of the Spa valley, thanks to deep
faults or impermeable primary rocks. Depending on the deepness of percolation, Spa
water is either very poor in minerals (50mg/l) or poor in minerals (100mg/l).
Spa water fits with the requirements linked to the label of natural mineral water, as
stated in the related European Union directives8 and the Belgian law of transposition9.
More than 300 springs stem from the Spa area, of which 59 are registered as mineral
water springs, and exploited (it has to be noted that Spa water has been exported for
more than 400 years, and since 1700 to the U.S.). Its flow is about 5 to 10 m³/hour.
Most of them are classified as natural mineral waters. This label requires very strict
characteristics,  viz.  stability  in the composition and temperature  of the water over
time (six months without variation).  Furthermore,  natural mineral water cannot be
treated before bottling. 
Both for the qualitative stability required by the mineral water label and because of
the age of the aquifer rock, the aquifers must be carefully protected over large areas
(the percolation basin is estimated at 13,000 ha). In such a context, the mineral water
company fought to preserve the resource against any pressure. Over time, it had to
monitor the development of housing areas in the surroundings (dispersion in rural
areas), and tourism. It benefited however from a low development of agriculture and
a decline in the interest in timber production10.
2.2.2. Industrial development in the exploitation of thermal waters
As from the late 19th century, Spa water have been industrially exploited. If the
water trade is much older, industrial production developed after 1888, when the Spa
municipal  authorities  gave  a  monopoly  of  exploitation  of  its  springs  to  Emile
Dhainaut.  His  company, called the  Compagnie  fermière  des  Eaux de  Spa,  became Spa
Monopole  in  1921.  Exports  kept  growing.  In  1947,  a  holding  named  SPADEL
headed  Spa  Monopole,  which  has  remained  a  family-owned  company  over  time.
Today, SPADEL has a turnover of about EUR 240mio and counts 900 employees. It
is the leader in mineral water production in the Benelux and this in a high growth sec-
tor (8.2% growth in Belgium in 2001).
Spa Monopole is the main subsidiary of the group with 662 employees in 2001
(out of a population of 10,000 inhabitants in the town). It accounts for about 65% of
the turnover of the Group. After huge investments in 1999 (EUR 14.2mio) and the
full  modernization  of  the  production  plant,  Spa  Monopole  feeds  thirteen  lines  of
production with a network of pipes running from the 59 wells under exploitation.
More than 600mio litres are bottled each year. The production capacity grew from 50
m³/hour in 1980 to 100 m³/hour in 2000. In peak periods, i.e. during dry summers,
the capacity rose to 200 m³/hour. In the production process, the flow of water is ex-
clusively reserved to bottling. Other water needs in the industrial process, mainly the
rinsing of bottles,  are provided by pumping in the lake of Warfaaz (about 500mio
l/year). 
Spa  Monopole  mainly  exploits  the  municipal  springs,  under  a  concession.  Ac-
cording to the contract, it pays a royalty of EUR 0.01 per litre to the town. In 1999,
8 Council Directive 80/777/EEC of 15 July 1980 on the approximation of the laws of the
Member States relating to the exploitation and marketing of natural mineral  waters (OJ
L229, 30.08.1980, p.1), as amended by Directive 96/70/EC of the European Parliament
and the Council of 28 October 1996 (OJ L299, 23.11.1996, p.26).
9 Arrêté royal du 8 février 1999 concernant les eaux minérales naturelles et les eaux de source (M.B., 23
avril, p.13486), in application of the Loi du 24 janvier 1977 relative à la protection de la santé des
consommateurs en ce qui concerne les denrées alimentaires et les autres produits.
10 As coupled with the closing of the coal mines in Wallonia. Timber was priorily made to
sustain the galeries.
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the royalty amounted to EUR 5.1mio, corresponding to 40% of the income of the
municipal budget. The company keeps negotiating with the town in order to reduce
‘cash drains’, as the production is permanently growing. This relation of dependence
with the resource is combined with the absolute necessity to keep the composition of
the mineral water constant as the aquifers are vulnerable to external pressure.
2.2.3. Continuous securing of industrial development
 Spa Monopole has developed a strategy oriented both in the guarantee of ac-
cess to the resource and its preservation. This strategy fits with the status of the re-
source (public-owned) and its particular vulnerability (the Fagnes wetland ecosystem).
Throughout the period, the resource has remained the property of the town and is
localized in  a  naturally  protected environment,  without  permanent  human activity.
The strategy is in line with the industrial development of mineral water production
and permanent growth in the activity. How does Spa Monopole progressively secure
its resource access and exclude other users? In order to manage groundwater access
and protection, Spa Monopole both secures its disposition rights (concession contract
with the town of Spa) on the resource, and builds its action on the existing legislation,
a strategy that limits the cost of private intervention. We distinguish three different
phases in the strategy of the operator: first, a securing of the production since 1888;
second,  the  enabling  of  a  boom in  production;  and  finally,  the  constitution  of  a
growth potential.  Spa Monopole,  in its  behavior, manages to straddle a permanent
tension between economic growth and the absolute necessity to keep the resource in-
tact. Overexploitation is synonymous to bankruptcy in such a context.
Phase  I  (1888-1967):  Forecasting  is  one  of  the  conditions  for  investment  in
industry. This is no exception for Spa Monopole. Security in access and quality of the
resource have priority on industrial development. In 1888, Emile Dhainaut signed a
concession contract with the town of Spa, the owner of the springs. The concession
gave him a monopoly in the exploitation of Spa’s water, materialized in 1921 when
the company started its industrial development. In the early 20th century, the forests
and the  Fagnes  belonged to the State,  the springs  to  the town and Spa Monopole
owned the disposition rights (concession) on Spa water. The ownership structure on
the resource did not evolve much afterwards.
During the same period, Spa Monopole relied on public law in order to protect the
resource. In 1889, a protection perimeter (the first in Europe!) was established by law
around the main mineral water spring11.  The spring was declared public utility. All
around it, in a perimeter of 34.6 ha, prospecting and exploitation of mineral water
were prohibited,  as well  as digging at more than two meters’  depth.  Monopoly in
exploitation was thus confirmed by the law. The protection perimeter is progressively
extended to the other Spa springs. It reached 3,409 ha in 1937. The production of
mineral water was more and more regulated12. Any public work that could alter the
flow and quality of mineral water was strictly forbidden, as well as the trade of mineral
water without prior authorization. Competition was restricted,  which limited risks of
over-exploitation, and the resource was subject to protection measures. The context
for the industrial development of Spa Monopole was in place. 
It is also important to note that Spa Monopole soon developed a research strategy.
In 1931 it created the Henri-Jean Institute, specialized in hydrogeology. It monitored
in situ the evolution of the resource and controlled the quality of the products.  It
determined  the  level  of  flow  subtractible  from  the  aquifers  without  altering  the
resource.
11 Loi du 31 juillet 1889 déterminant le périmètre de protection des eaux de Spa.
12 Loi du 1er août 1924 concernant la protection des eaux minérales et thermales (M.B., 22 août) and Loi
du 14 août 1933 concernant la protection des eaux de boisson (M.B., 31 août, p. 4326).
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Phase II (1967-1990): An industry under expansion needs a growing flow of raw
materials.  That  was  the  case  for  Spa  Monopole.  However,  the  necessity  to  keep
constant the composition of the resource forbade over-pumping. Thus, the rise in the
capacity of production was organized around the exclusion of other uses, particularly
drinking water provision. At this time, the town kept drinking water provision from
the springs of Spa. The situation led to a confrontation between the town authorities
and Spa Monopole at each re-negotiation of the concession. In 1974, a new conces-
sion was signed for a period of 65 years (1974-2039), which entails the exclusion of
drinking water provision from the springs. Since then, the regional water company
(Société wallonne des Eaux, SWDE) has operated in the town of Spa with water from the
reservoir of Eupen, located at a distance of 25 km in the neighbouring river basin.
The long-standing rivalry between mineral water production and drinking water distri-
bution was solved through an ‘exclusive’  concession.  Also,  Spa water is no longer
used in the industrial process  of Spa Monopole (for bottle rinsing).  The company
signed an additional agreement with the town to extract surface water in the Warfaaz
lake. From the monopoly on the mineral water produced from the flow of the re-
source (i.e. aquifers), Spa Monopole obtained a monopoly on the whole resource.
In  the  same period,  Spa  Monopole  expanded its  strategy  of  protection  of  the
aquifers. It paid particular attention to activities going around the Fagnes and put pres-
sure to limit their potential effect on the resource. Agricultural activities were inter-
rupted. In 1972, Spa Monopole bought the farm of Bérinzenne located at the edge of
the  Fagnes de Malchamps in order to avoid any risk of manure or pesticide spreading.
Also, it surveyed the forest  management carried out by the national forestry office
(Division  de  la  Nature  et  des  Forêts,  DNF).  DNF  manages  both  the  State  and  the
communal forests.  In 1978, Spa Monopole signed a  modus operandi  with DNF. The
contract consisted in giving priority in forest management to the protection of the
aquifers. For instance, DNF commits itself to limiting the planting of pine trees. Spa
Monopole compensates  the financial  loss in timber production.  The foresters  also
limit  and monitor  recreation activities  in the public  forests.  In order  to enable its
expansion, Spa Monopole developed its strategy of guaranteeing access and resource
protection and completed it with contractual agreements with other users.
Phase III (1990 onwards): In recent times, Spa Monopole has been consolidating
its  expansion  strategy  with  the  goal  of  constituting  a  growth  potential.  It  has
conducted hydrogeological studies above the protection perimeter in order to search
for new mineral water springs, with a composition equivalent to Spa water. The sur-
vey delineated the aquifers more precisely. The outcome led to a proposition for an
extended protection perimeter, according to the regional law of 199013. The Walloon
government agreed on the new perimeter (13,177 ha) in December 200114. The new
law made the restrictions on activities inside the protection perimeter more severe.
Digging activities deeper than three meters were prohibited as well as any activity that
could modify the flow and composition of the mineral water springs. In closer peri-
meters, all activities are severely restricted, with particular attention paid to oil tanks.
Spa Monopole bases its strategy on the law on the protection of wells. It gives advice
to the town in the permission of building or exploitation. Its own patrols (or water
workers)  work  in the public  forests.  It  visits  individual  properties  and inform the
13 Décret du 30 avril 1990 sur la protection et l’exploitation des eaux souterraines et des eaux potabilisables
(M.B., 30 juin).  According to the regional law, the perimeter of protection is divided into
three zones : the extraction zone, a radius of 20m around each well and spring where all
activities are excluded;  the prevention zone, 1 ha around each well  where activities  are
severely restricted; and the monitoring zone covering the whole catchment.
14 Arrêté  ministériel  du  13  décembre  2001 relatif  à  l’établissement  d’une  zone  de  surveillance  pour  la
protection des eaux de Spa et environs (M.B., 1 mars 2002) and arrêté ministériel du 13 décembre 2001
relatif à l’établissement des zones de prévention rapprochée et éloignée des ouvrages de prise d’eau souterraine
de l’administration communale de Spa, de la S.A. Spa Monopole et de la S.A. Exirus, sis sur le territoire
des communes de Spa, de Theux, de Jalhay et de Stoumont (M.B., 1 mars).
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owners about the legislation, particularly their duty concerning oil tanks. Wastewater
discharges are severely restricted, even for individual households. If  the risk is too
high, they buy lands and property. Spa Monopole wants to avoid any risk of pollution
of the aquifers. This attitude is connected to the vulnerability of the resource.
 The strategy is coupled with land purchases. Spa Monopole (or its real estate
tributary Exirus) buys both springs and wells that were formerly in private hands and
sensitive areas where the threat on the wells is high. This acquisition strategy leads to
a diversification of the ownership structure of the springs.  The town of Spa is no
longer anymore the sole owner of Spa water as new springs or aquifers have been dis-
covered. Today, Spa Monopole holds one third of the wells. This purchasing strategy
gives it more leeway to (re-)negotiate the concession with the town and puts pressure
on the commune to reduce the royalties. 
Instead of a strengthening of the legislation and a strategy of land purchasing, Spa
Monopole has continued to settle contractual agreements with other users. In 2001,
the  company  renews  its  modus  operandi with  DNF (now attached  to  the  Walloon
Region). The aim is to balance the protection of the aquifers and the forest manage-
ment. At the same time, SPADEL mentioned the financial burden (‘cash drain’) that
the royalties represent and negotiated with the town of Spa to soften it.
Finally,  the local anchorage of Spa Monopole has enabled negotiation and bar-
gaining with the local authorities. Spa Monopole has succeeded in securing both the
constant quality of mineral water it exploits and its growth potential in a highly com-
petitive market. Such an environment was created to the disadvantage of other local,
be they indirect, water users. Many activities ceased or were put under restrictions in
order to guarantee the viability of the resource. However, substitution solutions were
found out and the mechanism of transfer of property rights seems to be efficient for
the community.
3. Comparison of the case studies
On an empirical basis, we have analysed two cases of water production from an
aquifer occurring over a similar time period (from 1880 onwards) and a similar legal
environment (CC and public laws), gradually establishing the institutional framework
(PR and PP) that the operators mobilize. The problems that both operators faced, as
well as the objectives they attempted to reach, are similar. Initially,  they wanted to
obtain (exclusive) access to an aquifer that they did not own and, afterwards,  they
wanted to secure their access and preserve resource renewability, in order to guarantee
the economic growth of the company. These elements are deemed constant in the
analysis.
Conversely,  the two above-mentioned cases  are to  be distinguished on at  least
three aspects: the status of the operator (public for CIBE and private for Spa), the na-
ture of the good produced (drinking water for CIBE and mineral water for Spa), as
well as the initial ownership status of the aquifer (private for CIBE and public for
Spa). These contrasting characteristics suggest that the strategies of the two operators
would diverge. In fact, if the status of the operator is interpreted as an explanatory
factor for the strategies followed, then one should expect divergences in the institutio-
nal rules mobilized as well as the impacts. 
Surprisingly,  the  systematic  comparison  of  both  cases  shows  a  rather  high
convergence in the strategies followed (see Table 1). Similarities clearly appear from
the analysis:
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1. CIBE and Spa Monopole both mobilize property rights as well as public policies.
These two categories of institutional rules must then be combined in an analysis of
users’ behavior15.
2. Concerning PR, CIBE becomes the formal water owner. It bought the land above
the  aquifer,  with the authorization  of  the State  to  expropriate  for  a  reason of
public  utility.  In  the case of  Spa Monopole,  the company did not  seek formal
property on water, as the village of Spa is the single (public) owner. Rather, Spa
Monopole  signed  a  concession  contract  that  granted  them  of  the  (exclusive)
disposition and use rights on the communal resource. Land purchase to individual
landowners came much later and remained residual in the operator’s strategy. As a
result,  both  operators  got  exclusive  appropriation  of  the  resource.  Another
common point is that quantity problems of water management were solved with a
mobilization of property rights16.
3. Concerning PP, both the case of CIBE and of Spa Monopole are exemplary. In
fact,  the  public  laws  that  set  protection  perimeters  around  springs  and  wells
reproduce former voluntary practises of these operators. In a way, the strategies of
CIBE and Spa Monopole  constitute  "local  laboratories"  for  the elaboration  of
exploitation17 and  protection18 policies.  Also,  it  clearly  appears  that  voluntary
protection measures, as well as the mobilization of institutional rules, evolve with
the development of scientific knowledge on the resource. Finally, we note that the
mobilised  PP  contribute  mainly  to  resolve  qualitative  aspects  of  water
management.
4. Above PR and PP, the strategies of CIBE and Spa Monopole are implemented
with additional mechanisms. On the one hand, contractual agreements with the
locals improve the effectiveness of institutional  rules (e.g.  the  modus operandi  on
forest management in Spa, free water supply for locals in Spontin), and contribute
to the social acceptability of the economic expansion of the two operators (e.g.
hiring local people for CIBE). On the other hand, we observe that the operators
adopt  tight  monitoring  and  control  programs.  Their  own  'private  patrols'
guarantee the respect of the protection laws in force (e.g. participating in all public
enquiries) and even substitute the tasks of the police or public administration.
5. Convergences  between the  strategies  of  both  operators  are  also  quite  obvious
concerning the exclusion of competing users and the sustainability of the resource
use.  Both  operators  adopt  ‘winning’  strategies  (Strategy  =  Access  (1)  >
"Monopoly" (2) > Protection (3)), as all other users are deliberately excluded from
any  appropriation  or  (even  indirect)  use  of  the  aquifer:  farmers,  individual
landowners  wishing  to  construct,  industrial  users  downstream,  etc.19.  The
systematic exclusion of all potential competing uses has allowed both CIBE and
Spa Monopole to manage ‘their own’ resource very rationally relative to their own
(homogeneous)  use.  As  these  two  companies  are  highly  dependent  on  the
renewability  of  the  aquifer  to  assure  their  economic  growth  and survival,  they
carefully avoid any over-exploitation of the resource. In fine, this situation has led
to a very high environmental sustainability of the resource use. Nevertheless, the
economic (efficient allocation) and social (equality in access) aspects of sustainable
development are far from satisfactory, or perhaps in a very indirect way through
financial  compensations  that  CIBE  and  Spa  pay  to  some  excluded  users  (e.g.
15 We  noted  elsewhere  that  the  two  categories  of  institutional  rules  together  form  an
institutional resource regime (Knoepfel, Kissling-Näf, and Varone 2001; Varone et al. 2002;
Aubin and Varone 2004).
16 We note here that other case studies conducted in France, Switzerland, Italy, Spain and The
Netherlands also demonstrate that quantitative aspects in water management are generally
addressed with PR (Bressers and Kuks 2004).
17 See the Law of 1907 on the inter-communal associations.
18 See the Laws of 1889 and 1990 about the protection of wells.
19 Even the local drinking water consumers in Spa are supplied from other sources than the
local aquifer, which formally belongs to the town (or municipality)!
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royalties  to  the  town  of  Spa,  free  drinking  water  provided  by  CIBE  to  local
residents).  As  a  consequence,  we  conclude  that  "private  appropriation  of  the
resource" occurs whatever the status of the drinking water operator20.
6. The scope of these empirical  results  must however be tempered by the strong
local anchorage of these two operators.  Both are vitally dependent on the local
resource, a situation that is a pre-condition for sustainable resource management
(Ostrom 1990). In both cases, places of production and distribution are local. Any
depletion, particularly in the case of Spa Monopole would lead the company to
bankruptcy21.
Beyond these empirical findings, many theoretical implications can be made from
the former comparative analysis.
20 A private  appropriation corresponds  to  a  de  facto  privatization,  as  opposed  to a  de  jure
privatization, i.e. a privatization process explicitly backed by the law.
21 Such a situation, that leads them to secure their water provision, is perhaps not paralleled
by multi-national (e.g. Ondeo-Suez) and multiple-brand water companies (e.g. Nestlé and
Danone) which are so diversified that they can abandon a production location or an activity
in case of problems without much prejudice for the company’s finances (e.g. Ondeo-Suez
which resigned from water distribution supply in Atlanta (see www.waternunc.com, January
2003)).
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(of goods and services)





1.  First  settlings
in  Spontin  and
Modave  (1880-
1940)
PR -Purchase of  communal  and
private lands
-Expropriation of lands
-Financial  compensations  to
downstream users
Agriculture
Construction:  destruction  of
houses
Production: industrial  process  and
energy
Purification: self-purification in the
river 
Quality:  Prevention  against  any
aquifer  pollution  in  the  close
catchment area










Quantity: Prevention against any
aquifer  pollution  in  the
catchment area 
PP -Systematic  use  of  public
inquiries  and  consultation
provided  in  land-use  planning
procedures
-Legal  responsibility  of
polluters in case of pollution
Agriculture:  punctual  pollution
sources
Discharges: industrial and domestic
Mining: limestone and sand
Oil tanking: farms, SMEs, housing,
petrol stations
Quality:  Prevention  against  any






PP -Definition  of  official
protection zones around water
catchments
-Systematic  use  of  public
inquiries  and  consultation
provided  in  land-use  planning
procedures
-Legal  responsibility  of
polluters
Agriculture:  diffuse  and  punctual
pollution sources
Discharges: domestic and industrial
Production:  Limitation  of  manure
spreading
Gardening: careful use of pesticides
Car parks:  restriction on car parks
(>5 vehicles)
Quality:  Prevention  against  any









PR: -Concession on the communal
springs:  monopoly  in  ex-
ploitation of the mineral water
production
Production:  Exclusion  of
alternative mineral water producers
Quantity: No  depletion  risk
due to competing extraction
PP -Protection  perimeter  and
springs  declared  of  public
utility
Construction:  limitation  of  public
works in the city center (prohibition
to dig)
Quality/quantity: Prevention
against  pollution  risk  depletion
due to public works
2.  Expansion  of
production 
(1967-1990)
PR -Renewal  of  the  concession
contract. 
-Monopoly on the aquifers
-Purchase of a farm
Drinking water: provided from the
Eupen dam
Agriculture: stop of activities
Quantity: Whole  flow  to
mineral  water  production.
Renewability secured
Quality: no  risk  of  manure
spreading
3.  Reserve  of
production (1990
onwards)
PR -Purchase of  land  and  new
wells
-Re-negotiation  with  the
commune  of  the  royalties
attached  to  the  concession
contract
Oil  tanking:  SMEs  and  housing
(tightness/ thickness of oil tanks)
Quantity: Exploitation of the
full potential of the aquifers
Quality: Avoid  settlements
above the aquifers
PP -Geographical extension of the
perimeter  of  protection  and








Given the results of our comparison, we can answer our initial research questions
without much ambiguity. The status of the operator (public versus private) does not
influence  the  strategy  adopted  to  gain  resource  access  and  maintain  the  resource
status. In fact, neither the types of mobilized institutional rules, nor the pressure put
on the resource, significantly differ between CIBE and Spa Monopole. The mobiliza-
tion of PR by both operators depends more on the initial ownership status of the land
where the resource flows.
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Concerning the hypotheses about the privatization of the operator or the resource
and the links  implicitly  formulated between both,  we will  provide  some empirical
findings.  First,  we observe  a "private appropriation of  the resource"  whatever  the
status of the operator. In both cases, the local community is dispossessed of the re-
source. The inhabitants of Spontin or Modave do not directly profit from the water
distribution in Brussels. Those of Spa do not consume the 500mio bottles of mineral
water produced each year. Some compensations partially cover the externalities cre-
ated by the "private appropriation of the resource". As such, the necessity to distin-
guish between the operator’s status and the resource property is verified. 
Second, the public operator does not protect the resource more or less than the
private one. Moreover,  its  behavior is not more or less sustainable. Both of them
bring optimal protection to the resource as they vitally depend on it. The public own-
ership structure of CIBE does not make it more sensitive to political pressure in favor
of a diversification of the resource use. In contrast, Spa Monopole responds favorably
to local demands, e.g. about the development of tourist activities on communal land,
such as walks in the forests and visits to the famous springs of Spa. As a result, the
public operator does not manage the resource in a less nor more efficient way than
the private one.
If we link our results with the macro-scale, we observe that the behavior of water
users highly influences the overall water system. PP do not necessarily produce the
desired effects and are not uniformly applied. A study limited to formal institutions
gives a partial view on how things work and cannot foresee evolutions in behaviour.
In our case, we clearly observe that individual users effectively protect the resource,
but at their own benefit. These kinds of exclusive appropriation of the resource, with
strategies combining activations of PR and PP, hamper the goal of a sustainable water
use,  at  least  in  its  social  aspect  of  sharing  access.  As  such,  an  integrated  water
management should consider the users' strategies and assess them. Furthermore, this
chapter  shows  that  "more  attention  needs  to be  paid to  the  relationship  between
property rights regimes and natural resources management" (Klug 2002: 693). PR are
determinant in water management, but they do not always fit with the reality of the
water cycle. This especially holds true with groundwater. A policy of integrated water
management should attempt to reform PR in order to align them with its objectives.
Finally, a twin analysis of PP and PR effects is necessary to understand how water
management works.
In  order  to  more  precisely  identify  the  different  mechanisms  that  make  the
strategy operational and decisive, we should do further research on these cases in four
different areas: 
(1) From the point of view of the State, the consideration of the liberalization of the
resource access would hamper the strategies presented above. These strategies are ef-
fective and profitable when there is a monopoly on the resource. If other users com-
peted on the same aquifer, the logic would change. In fact, the creation of a mono-
poly is the key point of the operator’s strategy22. In a situation of competition on min-
eral resources exploitation, users can hardly self-regulate in order to collectively as-
sume resource sustainability (Libecap 1989). They fall in a public choice dilemma that
is hard to overcome. 
(2) In a State-centered perspective, we should then look more closely at the sectoral
regulations  that  co-ordinate  the  behavior  of  competing users.  The  different  water
users are regulated by different sets of legal dispositions usually designed on a sectoral
basis and producing contradictory outputs and negative outcomes. More co-ordina-
tion should then be required in a true resource perspective. Furthermore, a pro-active
co-ordination of PR and PP is also required, with the same end. With respect to prac-
tical utility, the combining of PP and PR gives rise to an enlargement or broadening
22 CIBE searched for unexploited aquifers and, about Spa, the elimination of the competition
was a pre-condition to its industrial development.
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of the steering potential of natural resources. As a result, it helps to conceive new dir-
ections for the sustainable use of natural resources (comprehensive and integrated re-
source management). The innovative concept of Institutional Resource Regime (IRR)
would be useful in the elaboration of integrated water policies, pointing to gaps and
weaknesses in the current water  policy  and as a result  bringing  internal  coherence
between PP and external coherence between PR and PP (Varone et al. 2002).
(3)  From the point  of  view of  the  locals,  we should  examine the mechanisms  of
"social  reproduction".  The  local  anchorage  of  the  operators  allows  for  the
development of particular relationships with the other inhabitants, who get used to
being constantly  controlled  in their  behavior.  The public  and private  management
rules, that the beneficiaries enforce directly (e.g. ‘private patrols’) have ‘performative
effects’ (Bourdieu 1980). They are embodied by the residents. Private rules become
respected  norms  after  time  has  had  them  penetrate  into  the  locals’  minds23.
Anthropological  and sociological studies could reveal these performative effects  in
more detail. 
(4)  At  last,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  resource,  we  can  wonder  if  reaching
renewability is possible while at the same time respecting the principles of sustainable
development. In the case considered, water use is renewable, but not really sustainable
if sustainability includes economic and social aspects. Reaching sustainability within
the  same  good  or  service  is  far  from  obvious.  Could  we  not  rather  create
complementarities  between  different  goods  and  services,  from  an  inter-resources
perspective, to transform these renewable (but exclusive uses) into more sustainable
practises?
References
Anderson, Terry L., and Peter J. Hill, eds. 2001. The technology of property rights. Lanham
& Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
Aubin, David, and Frédéric Varone. 2004. Water regimes in Belgium. In Water regimes in
Europe, eds. Ingrid Kissling-Näf, and Stefan M. M. Kuks. The Hague: Kluwer.
Barraqué, Bernard, ed. 1995. Les politiques de l'eau en Europe. Paris: la Découverte.
Bourdieu,  Pierre.  1980.  Le  mort  saisi  par  le  vif.  Les  relations entre  l'histoire  réifiée  et
l'histoire incorporée. Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 32-33: 3-14.
Bressers, Hans, and Stefan M. M. Kuks, eds. 2004.  Local water management in Europe.
The Hague: Kluwer.
Bromley, Daniel W. 1992. The commons, common property, and environmental pollution.
Environmental and Resource Economics 2: 1-17.
Brooks, S. 1989. Evaluation des arguments émis en faveur de la privatisation. Politiques et
Management Public 7(1): 34-55.
Brubacker, Elizabeth. 1995. Property rights in the defence of nature.  London, Toronto:
Earthscan.
Cornut, Pierre.  2000. La circulation de l’eau potable en Belgique et à Bruxelles. Enjeux
sociaux de la gestion d’une ressource naturelle. PhD thesis. Manuscript.
Cornut, Pierre. 2003. Histoires d'eau. Bruxelles: Luc Pire.
Devlin, Rose Anne, and R. Quentin Grafton.  1998. Economic rights and environmental
wrongs property rights for the common good. Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, Mass: Edward
Elgar.
23 If  these  rules  were  not incorporated  in the  locals’  minds,  why would they  not protest
against the pressure  that the operator puts  on them? We could even imagine that one
would phone the company if a neighbour is making a bonfire or placing an oil tank in his
garden.
 276   Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference
European Environmental Agency. 2003. Europe's water: An indicator based assessment.
Copenhagen: EEA.
Finger,  Mathias,  and  Jeremy  Allouche.  2002.  Water  privatisation:  Trans-national
corporations and the re-regulation of water industry. London and New York: Spon Press.
Gleick, Peter H., ed. 1993. Water in crisis: A guide to the world's fresh water resources.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hodge, G. 1999. Privatisation: an international review of performance. Colorado: Westview
Press.
Kissling-Näf, Ingrid, and Frédéric Varone. 2000. Historical analysis of institutional resource
regimes in Switzerland. A comparison of the cases of forest, water, soil, air and landscape. 8th
biennal  conference  of  the  International  Association  for  the  Study  of  Common  Property
(IASCP), "Crafting sustainable commons in the new millenium".
Klug, Heinz. 2002. Straining the Law: Conflicting legal premises and the governance of
aquatic resources. Society and Natural Resources 15: 693-707.
Knoepfel,  Peter,  Ingrid  Kissling-Näf,  and  Frédéric  Varone.  2001.  Institutionelle
resourcenregime (Kapitel 2). In Institutionelle regime für natürliche ressourcen: Boden, wasser
und wald im vergleich, eds. Peter Knoepfel, Ingrid Kissling-Näf, and Frédéric Varone, pp. 11-
48. Genève, Bâle, Munich: Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
Knoepfel,  Peter,  Corinne  Larrue,  and  Frédéric  Varone.  2001.  Analyse  et  pilotage  des
politiques publiques. Politikanalyse/Analyse des politiques publiques. Genève, Bâle, Munich:
Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
Laffont, J.-J. 1996. Privatisation et incitations. Revue Economique 96: 1239-1251.
Libecap, Gary D. 1989. Contracting for property rights. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne:
Cambridge University Press.
Nestor, S., and L. Mahboobi. 2000. Privatisation of public utilities: The OECD experience.
In Privatization, competition and regulation, eds. OECD. Paris: OECD.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Petrella,  Riccardo.  2001.  The  Water  manifesto.  Arguments  for  a  world  water  contract.
London: Zed Books.
Postel, Sandra. 1997. Last oasis. Facing water scarcity. New York: W. W. Norton.
Scharpf,  Fritz.  1997.  Games  real  actors  play:  Actor-centered  institutionalism  in  policy
research. Boulder: Westview Press.
Schneider,  Anne  Larason,  and  Helen  Ingram.  1988.  Systematically  pinching  ideas.  A
comparative approach to policy design. Journal of Public Policy 8, no. 1: 61-80.
———. 1997.  Policy  design  for  democracy.  Studies  in  government  and public  policy.
Lawrence KA: University Press of Kansas.
Shiva, Vandana. 2002. Waterwars. Cambridge: South End Press.
Varone,  Frédéric,  Emmanuel  Reynard,  Ingrid  Kissling-Näf,  and  Corine  Mauch.  2002.
Institutional  resource  regimes:  The  case  of  water  management  in  Switzerland.  Integrated
Assessment 3: 78-94.
Vickers, J., and V. Wright. 1989. The politics of industrial privatization in Western Europe:
An overview. In The politics of privatization in Western Europe, eds. J. Vickers and V. Wright.
Totowa: Frank Cass & Co.
Vickers,  J., and G. Yarrow. 1989. Privatization: An economic analysis.  Cambridge: MIT
Press.
Winpenny, James. 1994. Managing water as an economic resource. London: Routledge.
World Water Development Program. 2003. The UN world water development report. Wa-
ter for people, water for life. Paris: UNESCO.
In: Klaus Jacob, Manfred Binder and Anna Wieczorek (eds.). 2004. Governance for Industrial 
Transformation. Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change,
Environmental Policy Research Centre: Berlin. pp. 277 –  294.
A Methodical Approach to Multi Criteria Sustainability 
Assessment of Water Pricing in Urban Areas1
Simone Klawitter
Department of Environmental Economics and Policy, University of Technology Berlin,  Germany
1. Introduction
Drastic changes in water pricing policies are likely to occur in the coming years in
particular in the fast growing urban areas all over the world. Urban populations are
growing as never before. While today 45% of the worlds population live in urban are-
as those population is likely to increase to 61% by 2025. (GWP 2000)
Large financial resources will be required for maintaining and renewing the exis-
ting water service infrastructure or to construct new infrastructure at all to comply
with the environmental needs, but also with the needs of the urban poor. 
To expand privatisation of water supply and of water and wastewater treatment fa-
cilities is often seen as a need to ensure their appropriate, adequate, development and
modernization through increased reliance on private capital. The World Bank recently
adopted a policy of water privatisation and Full-Cost water pricing. Many developing
countries now  fear that than water will not be affordable anymore. To pay for water
became a common objective even among the critics and opponents of privatisation.
Water has an economic value.
Water pricing itself has an direct impact on water use2 and pollution and therefore
on water resources.  A sustainable  water  pricing policy can lead to a reduction of
pressure  on  water  resources  by  reduction  of  over-abstraction  of  groundwater
resources and a recharge of aquifers, the increase of flows in rivers and the restorati-
on of ecological status of rivers or wetlands. Efficient water pricing also ensures that
water infrastructure is adequately designed and that sufficient resources for operating
and maintenance are collected. Water pricing, that builds on sustainable principles and
therefore  influencing  local  and  socio  –  economic  conditions  can  provide  strong
incentives for a more sustainable use of water. 
1 The research was funded by Klaus Tschira Foundation,  Germany,  Heinrich-Böll-Foun-
dation, Germany, BMBF, Germany and MOS, Israel.
2 To  measure  the  influence  of  water  pricing  on  water  demand  is  rather  difficult.  An
important factor in being able to manage metered water effectively  is knowledge of its
price elasticity of demand. Price elasticity of demand measures the respond of customers to
changes  in  price  of  demand (E= percentage  change  in  quantity  demanded/percentage
change in price) In international case studies the residential price elasticity (short run) of
demand for  total  water  usage  range from -0.1  to -0.26.  To measure  price  elasticity  of
demand needs to take into account several factors influencing the water demand, which are
not only directly related to water pricing but also to altering social and economic condition.
For an overview of studies and values of price elasticity of water demand for domestic
users see Bartoszczuk, P. and Nakamori, Y. (2002). "Modeling sustainable water prices".
Handbook  of  Sustainable  Development  Planning:  Studies  in  Modelling  and  Decision
Support. M. Quaddus and A. Siddique. Cheltenham UK; Northamton, MA, USA, Edward
Elgar Publishers (to appear).
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2. Minimum elements of a sustainable water pricing3 concept: 
Multiple and competing policy goals
Sustainable development has many definitions but the perhaps most commonly
quoted within the science community is  the description given in  the report  “Our
Common Future”, known as the Brundtland Report:(WCED 1987)
“Development that meets the needs of current generations without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their needs and aspirations”
Sustainable development is classical portrayed as the interface between environ-
ment, economic and social sustainability, but the detail of what this implies in practice
of water use and especial of water pricing and tariff setting has been open to much
debate.
The concept of sustainable development is used in the management of renewable
water resources to ensure that the rate of harvesting a resource is smaller than the rate
of its renewal. The availability of water in adequate quantity and quality is a necessary
condition for sustainable development. Water, the basic element, is indispensable to
sustain any form of life and virtually every human activity. The need of constraining
human activities within the carrying capacity of the Earth system has been widely ac-
cepted and is written down in the “UN action program for sustainable development”
(Agenda 21), which contains a full chapter only devoted to freshwater resources. De-
aling with urban water issues the program area “Water and sustainable urban develop-
ment”  was  proposed.  It  clearly  states  that  a  better  management  of  urban  water
resources, including the elimination of unsustainable consumption patterns, can make
a substantial contribution to the alleviation of poverty and improvement of the health
and quality of life of the urban and rural poor. Furthermore a continued supply of af-
fordable water for present and future needs and to reverse current trends of resource
degradation and depletion are mentioned as the most important targets.  (UNCED
1993)
Following the approach described above minimum elements of a sustainable water
pricing system have been identified to meet the challenge of the water needs of the re-
cent and future generation: 4
1. Resource use efficiency including ground waters and surface waters;
2. Full  Cost  Recovery,  including Supply Costs,  Opportunity  Costs  and Economic
Externalities;
3. Economic viability of the water utility;
4. Equity and fairness for different uses and users.
Obviously, these criteria describe partly competing water policy goals. A sustaina-
ble water  pricing  system aims  to  achieve a  balance  among these  competing goals
reflected by a consent between several different stakeholder groups.
2.1. Resource use efficiency
Water is a scarce resource in both quality and quantity. Efficient use of the water
resource is not an end itself but an enabling mechanism to promote a more sustaina-
ble use of water. It refers at once to a reduction of total resources costs and a way to
3 Please note that the term “water pricing” refers to both price level and tariff structure
4 The scientific literature knows other concepts of sustainable water pricing, but all of them
comprise  at  least  the  following  criteria:  viability,  efficiency,  equity,  optimality,  see:
Dalhuisen,  J.  M.,  et  al.  (2001).  "Thematic  Report  on  the  Economics  of  Water  in
Metropolitan  Areas".  Metron  Project  Report.   Vrije  Universiteit  Amsterdam,  the  Net-
herlands.,  Beecher,  J.  A.  and  Shanaghan,  P.  E.  (undated).  "Sustainable  water  pricing".
http://www.uwin.siu.edu/ucowr/updates/pdf/V114_A4.pdf., Boland, J. J. (1993). "Pricing
urban water: Principles and compromises". Water Resources Update. 92(summer).
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contribute to an improvement of water quality and quantity, supply reliability and the
quality of service and environment. Key attribute is the level of water resource exploi-
tation: Only as much water might be used as naturally recharge within a defined short
time horizon.
2.2. Full Cost recovery
Regardless of the method of estimation, the ideal for the sustainable use of water
requires that the sustainable value of water and the Full Costs should balance each
other. Various components have to be added to make the Full Costs of water: The
Full Supply Costs and the Full Economic Costs, to which Environmental Externali-
ties have to be added. 
Each of these is composed of separate elements: The Full Supply Costs include
the costs associated with the supply of water to a consumer without consideration of
either externalities nor alternate uses of water. They are composed of Operation and
Maintenance Costs and Capital related Costs. The Full Economic Costs of water are
the sum of the Full Supply Costs, the Opportunity Costs associated with the alterna-
tive use of the same water resource and the Economic Externalities5 imposed upon
others  due to the consumption of  water  by an specific  sector.  Opportunity  Costs
address the fact that by consuming water the user is depriving another user of water.
If that user has a higher value of water, then there are some opportunity costs experi-
enced by society due to this misallocation of resources. 
To the Full Economic Costs the Environmental Externalities have to be added.
These costs  have to be determined based on the damages caused or as additional
costs of treatment to return the water to its original quality.(Rogers et al. 1998)
5 The most common externalities are: The impact of an upstream diversion of water or the


















Figure 1: General principles of Full Cost of water, modified (Rogers et al. 1998)
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2.3. Economic viability of the water utility
In general  the economic theory serve guiding principles to calculate Full Costs
grounded in Marginal Cost Pricing theory. An important issue in estimating the mar-
ginal cost of water service is where the next increment of supply comes from and the
cost of this supply increment. Marginal cost estimation is a forward looking process,
involving forecasts of future costs and future use. Marginal costs can vary within time
and location. Unfortunately they may not always generate revenues that match the
utility revenue requirements due the fact that long run Marginal Costs typically exceed
embedded costs. (AWWA 2000) 
At least the Full Supply Cost of water must be covered to guarantee the economic
long time financial, managerial and technical capacity of the water utility. (Bhatia et al.
1999), (OECD 1999)
2.4. Equity and Fairness
Most economists assert that economic efficient solutions are equitable6. The politi-
cal definition of equity also takes into account justness, fairness and affordability of
water. As far as water is a minimum element of life every human being must be able
to access a reliable and affordable minimum of water in quality and quantity. The cri-
teria of affordability does not necessarily undermine efficiency goals or the viability
criteria and the criteria of full costs recovery. Efficiency is a necessarily but not a suf-
ficient criteria of sustainability. 
This concept of sustainability raises the issue of subsidies, often the only possibili-
ty to make water affordable to the urban or rural poor. Subsidies can be paid as in-
ternal subsidies amid different users and uses within a water supply system and to a
supply system as extern subsidies. External subsidies can be paid as financial assistan-
ce to the water system by the government or payment assistance to individuals by go-
vernmental or charitable organizations. Most common subsidies are those amid diffe-
rent uses: the urban sector subsidies the agricultural sector, the industrial sector sub-
sidies the urban households.  Subsidies between users comprise payments from the
economical  viable customers  to  the rural  or  urban  poor.  Main target  of  subsidies
should be to make the crucial amount of water for everyday life affordable for every-
body, even the very poor:
• The average person needs a minimum of 50 litres of water per day, with 5 litres for
drinking, 10 litres for cooking, 15 litres for bathing and 20 litres spent on sanitati-
on needs. (Gleick 2000) 
• The water expenditures of a family should not exceed 2 % of the family income.
(AWWA 2000)
That also might indicate that external subsidies would have to be paid to the water
system by a government or charitable organization to cover Full Supply Costs.7
6 For  competitive  goods  and  services,  the  concept  of  economic  efficiency  encompasses
equity in terms of willingness to pay. The equilibrium price reconciles supply and demand,
which in turn reflects the producers willingness to produce and the costumers willingness
to pay for a good or service.
7 For a contrary position see Beecher, J. A. and Shanaghan, P. E. (undated). "Sustainable
water pricing". http://www.uwin.siu.edu/ucowr/updates/pdf/V114_A4.pdf.
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3. Measuring the immeasurable: Indicators for sustainable water pricing
Based on the sustainability criteria mentioned above appropriate indicators for the
assessment of water pricing policy were selected. 
The use of indicators has many potential benefits and uses:
• Provision of key information related with water pricing;
• Monitoring of the effects of water pricing management decisions;
• Highlight of strength and weakness of water pricing policy and support  for the
formulation of policies;
• Assistance in assessing investment priorities, project selection and follow-up:
• Providing of an appropriate framework for identifying the main asymmetries bet-
ween different urban areas.
The indicator system incorporates 3 thematic groups of indicators. Integrated pri-
cing  management,  water  pricing  policy  and  Full  Cost  recovery.  Each  of  these  is
composed of separate elements. 
The assessment of a water pricing policy cannot be done without taking into ac-
count the context information of the water supply system, as well as the characteri-
stics of the region. Therefore, in additional context information indicators were de-
fined to collect all necessary information needed for the assessment indicators which
partly derive from. The indicators proposed take into account the actual experience
working with indicators in the water sector8 by analysing case studies.
To describe each indicator and its relation to the comprehensive system the following
indicator characteristics are defined:
• The concept to give a definition of the indicator with a concise meaning and uni-
que interpretation;
• The unit of measure;
• The reference value to define a sustainability range by meaning that, if the indica-
tor lies within the value the sustainability criteria are met;
• The critical value to mark a limit value of sustainability;
• The sustainability criteria to identify to which extent the indicator contributes to
value of sustainability9;
• The sustainability weight to represent how important the indicator is to achieve
sustainable water pricing10.
Indicators needs to refer to a well defined time period and geographical area. The
model uses one year as the basic assessment period and the urban area as the geo-
graphical assessment area. Latter attributes to the political boundaries of urban ad-
ministration.11
For a list of the assessment indicators and their characteristics see the Appendix.
4. Sustainability assessment and decision making: A strategic approach
The model shows that the basic principles of sustainability assessment are being
applied to other than purely environmental or purely economic issues. The demand
8 One of the most developed indicator systems for water supply services was developed by
IWA, see: Alegre,  H.,  et  al.  (1999).  "Performance indicators for water supply services".
Manual of best practice.  IWA.
9 ++ -high contribution, + - low contribution, 0 - no contribution
10 6 - high effect, 3 - average effect, 1 - low effect
11 In contrary to the urban area the metropolitan area refers to a conglomerate of small urban
areas gathered around a large urban area.
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for sustainability assessment at higher levels of planning and policy making and strate-
gic planning has given rise to a discussion about the need for an appropriate assess-
ment method or reference framework. This discussion is linked to the question of
how sustainable development  principles  can be introduced in the decision  making
process.
4.1. Sustainability assessment
Applying the model to a real world water pricing policy for each indicator an eva-
luation can be made, whether the parameter falls within the reference value or exceed
the limit value of sustainability. Once the process has been performed 
• a classification can be given for each indicator and as percentage output for each
(sub) thematic group;
• fields of needful activity can be identified;
• a first appraisal of for which field urgent actions are needed can be done by taking
into account the sustainability weights.
The theoretical aim is to alter the actual water pricing policy in that way that each
indicator falls within the sustainability value. The practise will be rather difficult. The-
re is no solution optimising all criteria at the same time. A decision has to be made by
finding a compromise solution taking into account the different sustainability weights
of each indicator.
4.2. The decision making process
The norm in policy making is that a single criterion is not sufficient. A large num-
ber of multi-criteria evaluation methods have been developed and applied for diffe-
rent policy purposes in different contexts. In general, a multi-criteria model presents
the following aspects:(Paruccini et al. 1997)
• There is no solution optimising all the criteria at the same time and therefore the
decision maker has to find compromise solutions. 
• The relations of preference and indifference are not enough in this approach, be-
cause when an action is better than another one for some criteria, it is usually wor-
se for others, so that many pairs of actions remain incomparable with respect to a
dominance relation.
With a multiple criteria decision aid the principal aim is not to discover a perfect
solution, but to create a basic agreement between different stakeholder groups taking
part in the decision making process.
Once the fields of activity are identified outranking methods can be used to decide
which alternative results in the best compromise. The outranking methods have been
recommended for situations with a finite number of discrete alternatives to be chosen
among.  The  number  of  decision  criteria  and  decision  makers  may  be  large.  An
important advantage of outranking methods, when compared to other decision sup-
port  techniques  is  the ability to deal with ordinal  and more or less  descriptive in-
formation on the alternative plans to be evaluated. Furthermore, the uncertainty con-
cerning the values of the criterion variables can be taken into account using fuzzy re-
lations, determined by indifference and preference thresholds. The difficult interpreta-
tion of the results, on the other hand, is the main drawback of the outranking me-
thods.(Kangas et al. 2001)
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4.3. Moderating conflicting policy goals of different stakeholder groups
Conflicting policy goals have been identified and therefore procedures for consen-
sus building and conflict management are central to a successful sustainable water pri-
cing policy. In general conflicts can occur for many reasons including independence
of  people  and  responsibilities,  jurisdictional  ambiguities,  functional  overlap,
competition on scarce resources, differences in organizational status and influence,
incompatible objectives and methods, differences in behavioural style, difference in
information,  distortions  in  communication,  unmet  expectations,  unmet  needs  or
interests, unequal power or authority, misperceptions and other. (GWP 2002) 
Gaining  a  shared  version  of  a  sustainable  water  price  of  different  stakeholder
groups  a  moderating  process  were  initiated.  The  identified  indicators  of  the
sustainability assessment model were assessed by different stakeholder groups by ap-
praising the sustainability criteria and the general sustainability weight for each indica-
tor.
Out of the four identified sustainability criteria for water pricing the following are-
as for potential conflicts have been identified: 12
• Full cost recovery;
• Economic viability of water utility
• In assessing the general sustainability weight for each indicator differences occur-
red within the following indicator fields:
• Analysis and demand of water;
• Use of subsidies and incentives;
• Full economic cost.
Differences in objectives are seen as the main reason. Managing these conflicts
means for all stakeholders to move beyond possible bargaining and the claim/counter
claim process. By identifying differences and possible conflict areas it becomes possi-
ble to understand which interests lie behind each sides position. Furthermore, win-
win situations can be identified, that meet as much as possible of the interests of all
the stakeholder groups. It has to be stressed, that especially in the field of water pri-
cing issues, not all situations can be resolved with win-win situations in a short term.
Trade off and compromises are often a necessary outcome.
12 The following method has been applied in practise: In a structured email interview for each
indicator the influence of the identified sustainability criterion had to be assessed and a
general sustainability weight had to be named by different stakeholders summarized in two
main groups: Lobby group of economics and lobby group of environment. Please note that
out of 50 stakeholder asked only approx. 40 % answered were received and evaluated. The
evaluation doesn’t claim to be a universal categorization, but shows a possible method of
stakeholder participation and conflict resolution by managing disputes
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5. Putting the model to a practical use – first steps
5.1. Overview about water pricing in urban Israel – the case of Tel Aviv-Jaffa
5.1.1 The water tariff: Increasing Block Rates
All fresh water served in Israel by the national water supplier MEKOROT is paid
by Increasing Block Rates charging Increasing Volumetric Rates for increasing con-
sumption. Increasing Block Rates require metering. By law all water served in Israel is
metered. Increasing Block Rates need to define consumption blocks over which rates
increase. The rates usually are designed by costumer classes (residential, agricultural,
industrial). Theoretically, properly designed Increasing Block Rates recover class spe-
cific cost of service while sending a more conservation oriented price signal to the
classes. Therefore Increasing Block Rates have been favored in relatively water scarce
regions.
But the price signal of Increasing Block Rates will only be sent, if the water price is
calculated in economic terms, not by administrative policy decisions as it is still the si-
tuation in Israel
5.1.2 The water prices: Volume rates per administrative sectors
In Israel two water price types have to be distinguished: The water price the muni-
cipality has to pay to MEKOROT getting water from the national water supplier and
the water price consumers have to pay for their uses. Water prices for urban water
uses for the different administrative sector of the last years are represented in .
If there is no residential consumption at all but a water meter is installed a very
small Minimum Charge of NIS 16.20 per billing period is requested. Large families
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Definition of
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Figure 2: Strategic approach
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Table 1: Tel Aviv – Jaffa urban water prices, 1997-2002, in NIS13 





1997 1998 1999 2000 2002
Residential customer water price, 2 month billing period
0-16 m³ 2.32 2.35 2.54 2.69 2.69
16-30 m³ 3.42 3.47 3.76 3.99 3.99
>30 m³ 4.97 5.04 5.45 5.78 5.78
Industrial
Per quota 1.20 1.39 1.40
Agricultural (urban)
Per quota 0.85 0.88 0.92
The difference between what the municipality of Tel Aviv–Jaffa has to pay to ME-
KOROT is supposed to be used for operating and maintenance expenses, taxes and
capital  related costs  of  the  water  system,  but  in reality  most  of  the municipalities
deserve  a  certain  income  used  for  general  purposes  of  the  municipality.  So  the
additional income is used similar to a general tax income. In 2000 the additional in-
come of the municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa amounted to NIS 1.924 Mio. Therefore in
general every municipality has no economic interest that its customer saves water, but
on the other hand the possibility to make some profit also engages the municipality to
operate efficiently.
5.1.3 Supply and consumption behaviour and affordability of the water price
The supply network of Tel Aviv - Jaffa today is asked to meet the need of about
350,000 inhabitants and some 700,000 commuters working in the city or coming as a
tourists daily. All water for institutional, public, commercial and industrial purposes
has to be added. Following the overall water policy of Israel the actual urban water
policy of Tel Aviv-Jaffa is supply oriented. 
Water in Israel is defined per law as a public property. So far every municipality in
Israel gets as much water as the municipality asks for water from the governmental
supply company MEKOROT 14.
The general level of the total urban water consumption15 in Tel Aviv-Jaffa is much
higher compared with the consumption in other developed countries. The same pic-
ture can be drawn for residential water consumption only. But assessing the data one
has to take into account the large number of commuters and illegal workers, which re-
doubles the number of urban consumers. In 2000 the residential water consumption
amounted for 201.61 Litre/capita/d. 
Providing water to all customers at an affordable price is a basic requirement in
every society. Less affluent households have less flexibility in their budgets to absorb
water bill increases. Due to the fact that there are no substitutes for portable water the
customer can not choose a lower priced alternative. When customers have difficulties
paying their bills, the cost to the utility is raising, too due to late payments, disconnec-
13 Due to the economic situation the Israeli currency varies strongly: Annual Exchange Rate
for US$ 1: 1999: NIS 4.14; 2000: NIS 4.0773; 2001: NIS 4.2056; 2002: NIS 4.8867, Source:
http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/mth/average/averge.htm
14 Water for agriculture and industry is served by means of quotas.
15 The urban consumption is here defined as the total water consumption in the urban area
(residential, industrial, agricultural, public, trade and commercial) for a specific year, divided
by the number of residents in the city in that year.
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tion notices  and service terminations  etc.  This  associated collection costs  and bad
debt write-offs increase all other costumer bills.
Compared to other developed countries the water price in Tel Aviv-Jaffa is mode-
rate. But to assess the affordability of water one has to take into account the income
of the customers, the general consumption expenditures and the consumption beha-
viour, too.
In 1999 only 0.19 % of the average monthly consumption expenditures were used
for water, but e.g. 18.6 % for transportation. 
Assessing a water  price needs to orientate towards  affordability  issues.  For the
group of households, whose family head is employed only 1.31 % of the minimum
wage has  to  paid  for  water.  (Tal  2000)  As mentioned  above special  assistance  to
households is only needed, where the water bill exceeds 2% of the average income
(AWWA 2000). 
In the group of family whose head is unemployed are approx. 16,800 families (out
of 349,045 in urban total) The cost of water represent in this group amounts to 2.6%
of their income.
As shown above the water price not only accounts for a minimum of consumpti-
on expenditures, but also represents an easy affordable percentage of the average in-
come. Rising the water price could send an important signal to reduce the urban water
consumption. Special assistance is needed for low income families on the basis  of
their real income (e.g. low income affordability rates).
5.1.4 Use of subsidies and incentives 
Every water supplier is asked to charge its costumers to cover the Extraction Levy.
The municipality of Tel Aviv – Jaffa on whom an Extraction Levy has been imposed
is entitled to collect the same amount of money per water unit supplied from the wa-
ter consumer, but at the same time the municipality is only allowed to charge prices
posted by the government. Furthermore it is questionable if the municipality charges
their consumer cost  recovery fees at least  for the water produced from their  own
wells.
The water prices of MEKOROT, calculated on an average cost basis, are very low
and don’t reflect the scarcity of water at the present time. The first step was done with
the recently introduced Extraction Levy. But, if the Extraction Levy is collected at all,
the amount of money received is simply entering the general national budget and is
not used for environmental purposes. Hopefully it will cover at least the 20% the go-
vernment is paying to MEKOROT to fill up the public company’s deficit. Today the
public company only covers approx. 80-85% of its costs, the difference is covered by
the state by general taxes (Kislev 2002). In 1994 the Cost Plus method used by ME-
KOROT to calculate water costs was replaced by a more Supply Cost oriented me-
thod in which the fixed and variable costs were defined, and a 2.5% efficiency factor
was  imposed on the company’s  performance. An increase in water prices coupled
with  improved  performance  (saving  in  energy  costs  and  other  variable  and  fixed
costs) have resulted in a significant reduction in the Government’s subsidy from 40%
to 20% over the last years. Under the current water price and tariff structure, water
supplied to the most urban and industrial consumers covers the Supply Cost, while
water supplied to agriculture and urban costumers in remote and hilly areas is partially
subsidized. Since the agricultural price is much lower the urban consumers subsidize
the water for agricultural purposes. The costs of water which is being supplied over
long distances or to hilly costumers are much higher than municipalities have to pay
for it. The intention to subsidize water for certain administrative sectors was and still
is to serve national policy goals. Nearly self-sufficiency in food production is still an
important national target although the number of imported products has been raising
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permanently over the last years.  The foundation of new settlements far away from
urban centres or in the dessert is still an important goal. Both examples require the
transport of high values of water over long distances. But at present time the national
agricultural  policy  goals  are  changing  resulting  in  smaller  water  quotas  for  the
agriculture sector and higher prices.
To reduce leakages every municipality will be punished with a fine if it has more
than 12% water losses a year. A special water administration was set up to monitor
and collect the contributions to the Water Networks Rehabilitation Fund, which is
managed by the Municipal Waterworks Association The money is used to assist muni-
cipalities in investments and renewals of their water networks. In 2000 water losses in
Tel Aviv-Jaffa amounted to 11.9 % of the system input volume. The average water
loss in Israel accounts for 10%. 
5.2. Is the current  water  price  sustainable? An application of the assessment
model to the water pricing policy of Tel Aviv-Jaffa
In a large number of personal interviews and by a comprehensive literature survey
data for all indicators were collected to evaluate the current water pricing concept of
the urban area of Tel Aviv-Jaffa. It has to be mentioned that, as far as every urban
area in Israel can get as much water as it wants to get from the national water supplier
MEKOROT, for an assessment of the availability and use of water resources national
resources and use were taken into account.
By applying the model different fields of activities have been identified. Several in-
dicators exceed the critical sustainability value: (see Appendix: yellow marked indica-
tors)
Table 2: Selection of indicators with a critical sustainability value (Tel Aviv-Jaffa, year
2000, sustainability weight: 5 and 6)
Critical indicator Critical sustainability value 
Use of natural water resources Recently Israel utilize more natural water than nat-
urally recharged (103%)
Level of water bill in relation to con-
sumption expenditures per household
Only a very small interest of consumption expendit-
ures (0.19%) is used for covering the water bill. The
water price is to low.
Level of water bill in relation to avera-
ge family wage
Only 0.48% of the average family wage has to be
paid for water. The water price is to low.
Marginal Cost pricing in use Due to the fact that no marginal cost pricing is in
use no accurate price signal is send to the customer.
Full supply cost coverage Supply costs of water are not fully covered. Eco-
nomic viability of the water utility is questionable.
Operating cost coverage No operating costs are covered. Economic viability
and efficiency of the water utility is debatable.
As far as several indicators weighted with a high effect on sustainability are affec-
ted the actual water pricing system can not be named sustainable and urgent actions
are needed to improve the urban water pricing system of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa. By using one
of the outranking methods mentioned above it can be decided which alternative acti-
on would lead to the best compromise.
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Appendix: List of Indicators, their characteristics and a first practical application
year
Sustainability criterion: 2000
Indicator Concept [Unit of measure] Reference
value














Analysis of Economic Setting, Development Objectives and Policies          





% of the vol. produced from a single
source
<50% <80% Quantity of drinking water not
guarantied in the event of a water
supply crisis 
++ 0 + 0 2 85%
Central water supply Water supplied by a central
system
% of population with access to
central water supply
80-100% <80% Minimum quantity of drinking water
not guarantied 
++ 0 + ++ 3 100%
Full time supply Reliable full time supply
24h a day
yes/no yes no Minimum quantity of drinking water
not guarantied 
+ 0 0 ++ 4 yes
Water Resource Assessment           
Availability and Use of Water Resources




annual yield of natural
resource x100
% <100% >100 Level of water resource exploitation: A
value of more than 100% means that
more natural water is being used than
naturally recharged.
++ + + 0 6 103%
Analysis of Demand and Supply of Water           
Water Balance for a Water Supply System
Inefficiency of use of water
resources 
=Water losses / System
input volume x 100
% <40% <60% Sub-optimal performance and
achievement of infrastructure, future
level of investment, absence of gua-
ranties of water supply
++ + ++ 0 3 8%
Revenue water by volume Value of revenue water as
% of system input volume
% >60 <60% Absence of guaranties of economic
viability of water utility
+ ++ ++ 0 5 88%
Non revenue water by
volume
Value of non-revenue
water as % of system input
volume
% <40% >40 Absence of guaranties of economic
viability of water utility
+ ++ ++ 0 5 12%
Consumption and De-
mand
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Total per capita con-
sumption
=System input volume /
Population served/365
l/capita/d <300 >300 Wastefulness use of water ++ + + 0 5 373,59





l/capita/d <120 >120 Wastefulnes use of water by residential
customers
++ + + 0 5 196,34
Costumer Analysis, Metering and Billing
Residential customer meters as % of Customers for
residential use
% 80%-100% <80% Management difficulties, sub-optimal
tariff setting and billing






targeted within the water
undertaking per year
number/a 6-12 <6 Absence of information and incentive
signal to customer






the water undertaking per
year
number/a 6-12 <6 Absence of information and incentive
signal to customer
++ + + ++ 4 6
Type of residential customer
meter
apartment meters as % of
residential customer meters
% 80 <80% Management difficulties, Limited
possibilities to set specific water
conservation oriented tariffs
++ 0 0 ++ 3 no data
Industrial/agricultural
customer meters
as % of Customers for
industrial/agricultural use
% 100% <80% Management difficulties, sub-optimal
tariff setting and billing








within the water un-
dertaking per year
number/a 6-12 <6 Absence of information and incentive
signal to customer







the water undertaking per
year
number/a 6-12 <6 Absence of information and incentive
signal to customer
++ + + ++ 5 6
Public/institutional meters as % of Customers for
public/institutional use
% 100% <80% Management difficulties, sub-optimal
tariff setting and billing










number/a 6-12 <6 Absence of information and incentive
signal to customer






targeted within the water
undertaking per year
number/a 6-12 <6 Absence of information and incentive
signal to customer
++ + + ++ 5 6
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yes/no yes no Absence of information and incentive
signal to customer
+ + + 0 3 yes




yes/no yes no Absence of information and incentive
signal to customer
+ + + 1 3 yes
Social Impact Assessment            
Demographic analysis 
Population with access to
safe water 
=Resident population
within the supply area
supplied by the
undertaking 
% of resident population 95-100% <85% Reduced hygienic and sanitary safety,
Pricing policy and management
difficulties, future level of investment
0 ++ 0 ++ 5 100
Population with access to
adequate sanitation
=Resident population
within the supply area with
adequate sanitation 
% of resident population 95-100% <85% Reduced hygienic and sanitary safety,
Pricing policy and management
difficulties, future level of investment
1 ++ 1 ++ 5 100
Population growth Forecasted average yearly
growth of resident
population
%/a 0.5-1% >2% Absence of guaranties of capacity of
water supply infrastructure
0 ++ + ++ 2 1
Water Pricing Policy
Analysis of Tariff Level           
Water price and demand
Average water price per type
of customer-residential




<1 Level of water price to give a price
signal 
(Please see also Price elasticity)
0 ++ ++ 0 3 0,66
Price elasticity of residential
water demand
=Change in use as % of
original use level/Change
in price as % of original
price level
negative ratio >-1 <-1 Sensitiveness of water use relative to
changes in the price of water
+ + + 0 3 <-1
Level of water bill in relation
to consumption
expenditures per household
Expenditures for water as
% of consumption
expenditures
% 10 >10 Level of water price to give a price
signal
0 + + +
+
5 0,19
Level of water bill in relation
to average family wage
Expenditures for water as
% of average family wage
% <5% >5% Affordability of water not guaranteed 0 + + +
+
5 0,48
Analysis of Tariff Setting           
Rate design
Design by customer class Rate design by customer
class
yes/no yes no Identification of customer classes,
customer specific cost allocation
+ + + +
+
5 yes
Fixed charge Partly fixed payment for
water supply service
yes/no yes no Full Supply Cost, Coverage of fixed
costs 
+ + ++ + 3 no
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Water conservation rate in
use
Use of rate to motivate to
save water
yes/no yes no Water conservation ++ + 0 0 5 yes
Marginal cost pricing in use Added cost of producing
or acquiring incremental
supplies or capacity
yes/no yes no Optimal rate to send the accurate price
signals to customer, Typical mismatch
of revenues to actual costs
++ ++ ++ 0 5 no
Use of Subsidies and Incentives           
Subsidies
Cross sector subsidies Subsidies for a specific
sector
yes/no no yes Subsidisation of water use by one
sector, Accurate price signal, Cost
coverage
+ ++ + +
+
3 yes
Subsidies for the poor Subsidies for low income
families




Full Economic Cost            
Fu ll Sup pl y  Co s t
Full supply cost coverage =Total revenue/(Total
O&M expenses +Total
capital related costs +Total
taxes)
ratio 1.5 <1 Economic viability of water utility 0 + ++ 0 5 1,01
Operating cost coverage =Total revenue/ Total
O&M expenses
ratio >1 <1 Economic viability of water utility,
Efficiency of water utility
0 + ++ 0 5 1,24
Level of capital related costs as % of Total re-
venue
% 20%-50% >50% Economic viability of water
utility, limited economic el-
bowroom
0 + ++ 0 3 11,58%
Opportunity Cost
Coverage of costs due to
misallocation of water
resource
yes/no yes no Undervaluing of water, Mi-
sallocation of water resource,
which needs to be shared
between different users




Coverage of costs due to the
impact of an upstream
diversion of water
yes/no yes no Undervaluing of water 0 ++ 0 +
+
3 no
Coverage of cost due release
of pollution on downstream
users
yes/no yes no Undervaluing of water 0 ++ 0 +
+
3 no
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Coverage of cost due to
over-extraction from
common pool resources
yes/no yes no Undervaluing of water 0 ++ 0 +
+
3 yes
Coverage of cost due to
contamination of common
pool resources
yes/no yes no Undervaluing of water 0 ++ 0 +
+
3 no
Environmental Externalities           
Coverage of costs of public
health  and ecosystem
maintenance
yes/no yes no Up keeping of public health
and ecosystem quality
0 ++ 0 +
+
3 yes
Sewage treatment charge in
use
yes/no yes no Additional costs of treatment
to return water to its original
quality
0 ++ 0 0 3 yes
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Time Strategies of Transitions and the Transformed
Role of Subsidies as Environmental Innovation Policy
Instrument 
A Policy Framework Demonstrated by the Comparison of 
Innovation in Iron Production and Housing 
Jan Nill
Institute  for  Ecological  Economy  Research  (Institut  für  ökologische  Wirtschaftsforschung  IÖW
gGmbH), Department of Ecological Economics and Environmental Policy, Berlin
1. Introduction
Fostering innovation is often seen as important for policies inducing a transition
towards sustainable development. Yet, given the ambitious environmental targets im-
plied by sustainability,  often it is not be sufficient to stimulate incremental innova-
tions alongside established technological trajectories.  Due to economic and institu-
tional path dependencies, however, such policies aiming at innovations which change
those technological trajectories are difficult.
A broad collaborative empirical research effort on the topic of fostering environ-
mental innovation processes in Germany has established that a simple incentive-re-
sponse  relation between certain economic instruments  and innovative  effects  does
not hold generally, but is context specific (e.g.  Klemmer et al. 1999, Jänicke et al.
2000, see also Kemp 2000). The general result is a multi-impulse theory in which the
same instruments can have different impacts in different circumstances as well as dif-
ferent instruments may have similar impacts. 
If  the relevant contexts  cannot  be specified further,  however,  these results  are
neither scientifically nor politically satisficing. The research project "SUSTIME - In-
novation, Time, and Sustainability.  Timing Strategies of Environmental Innovation
Policy" (Nill and Zundel 2002, Zundel et al. 2003, Erdmann 2004, Sartorius/ Zundel
2005, see also the contributions of Zundel and of Sartorius in this volume)1 is based
on the hypothesis  that  time and the dependency of  innovation  dynamics on time
provide a promising systematic context for environmental innovation policy analysis.
It is part of everyday's knowledge of entrepreneurs and policy makers that not only
the content but also the timing of decisions is crucial. Windows of opportunity play
an important role, in particular if the type or consequences of the decision are not
only incremental. Nevertheless, striving for generality and simplicity, science has hes-
itated to transfer this knowledge systematically into theoretical reflections.
1 Project co-ordination: Prof. Stefan Zundel, University of Applied Sciences Lausitz; other
scientific  partners:  TU  Berlin,  IÖW,  MERIT  Maastricht)  within  the  RIW  research
programme  on  "Frameworks  for  Innovations  towards  Sustainability"  funded  by  the
German ministry of research and education (www.riw-netzwerk.de).
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Hence in the next section a conceptual framework for the appropriate timing and
instrumentation of  political  transition  strategies  is  introduced,  which has  been de-
veloped in the SUSTIME project. In section 3 particular attention is payed to the role
of subsidies as one instrument of time strategies that try to prepare and utilise techno-
economic windows. Section four applies the policy framework in a comparative way
to two empirical cases: iron and steel production and housing. The last section con-
cludes that time strategies are a promising but politically challenging way to enhance
transitions towards sustainability. Time limited Subsidies could play an important role
if they are conceived as one element of such strategies. 
2. A time strategic conceptual framework for innovation policy
2.1. A taxonomy of time strategie
Modern evolutionary economics depicts the creation and implementation of in-
novations  as  an  unsteady  process.  Phases  of  radical  change  of  technological
paradigms  alternate  with  stable  phases  of  incremental  improvement  in  given
technologies (Dosi 1982). During times of change, i.e a critical phase of technological
competition in which the old paradigm becomes unstable due to external factors or
internal  problems and competitive new solutions are available,  opportunities  for  a
transition towards environmentally more sound technologies are better, at least if they
are appropriately supported by environmental innovation policy. Such instable phases
can  be  conceptualised  as  "time  windows  of  opportunity"  (David  1987,  Erdmann
1993). We can define a techno-economic window of opportunity or time window as an
instable phase of (market oriented) technological competition in which actors such as
firms or policy actors have a greater opportunity to change the direction of trajector-
ies in a significant way than during stable phases (for a detailed presentation of the
conceptual framework see Zundel in this volume and Zundel et al. 2005).
What makes the distinction between stable and instable phases of techno-econom-
ic systems interesting from a political point of view is that the success conditions for
policies which attempt to alter the direction of development paths change over time.-
Techno-economic windows provide an opportunity for a more effective or lower cost
environmental innovation policy and make thus transitions towards more sustainable
technologies easier. A time-strategic approach to environmental innovation policy de-
signed for a change or a transition of the given path of technological development
should make use of that.
For political time strategies building on these dynamics, however, also the success
conditions  in the political  system are important:  First,  the system cannot  be com-
pletely separated from society. In democratic societies policy reacts – as it should – to
public interests. On the other hand, the political system is not completely free in ad-
apting  public  interests;  it  has  its  own  institutional  and  social  momentums.  These
mechanisms operate like a filter and influence whether and to what extent external
impulses are picked up by political actors and are transformed in political concepts
and actions. In particular in the competition between old and new technologies, also
(attempts of) institutional and political stabilisation of the old path by the incumbents
have to be systematically taken into account. Here it makes a difference if the path
changing innovations can easily be driven or adopted by established firms or whether
they are disruptive for the established actors because they involve discontinuities in
competencies,  organisation  and  markets  (Christensen  1997).  In  the  latter  case,  a
strong incentive arises for political bargaining instead of R&D in order to prevent a
transition. The political system can then be inert and impede external impulses for
change. In such cases, the political system also has to move in an unstable phase for
making  a  transition  possible,  a  political  window of  opportunity  is  necessary  (Nill
2002).
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Time strategies should reflect the specific conditions and dynamics in the techno-
economic system. In the SUSTIME project, a taxonomy of time strategies has been
developed (see the contribution of Zundel in this volume). In this contribution, we
focus on the strategies of window preparation, when the techno-economic system is
still stable but promising alternative solutions exist, and window utilisation, when an
instable phase has been reached. 
2.2. Policies for window preparation
The phase of window preparation is characterised by a stable old path, but there is
at least one promising new solution. The main targets for policies which prepare the emer-
gence of future techno-economic windows for a transition are creating diversity by
improving search and development processes and stimulating firms to develop at least
one competitive solution, for example by organising learning curves. 
Government should make best  use of  market forces;  here this  involves mainly
searching for new promising solutions and developing new solutions until they be-
come competitive to some extent. For window preparing policies expectation man-
agement is important. Weak signals such as long-term targets also play a role. Mech-
anisms may e.g. include the creation of niches for or the support of new alternatives,
such as argued in the concept of strategic niche management, see Kemp et al. 1998).
Also  economic  instruments  may play an important  role.  If  budget  is  limited or  if
strong increasing returns are involved, a trade off between development of a particu-
lar promising solution and diversity is possible. Additionally, we must keep in mind
that environmental policy requirements can also hinder window emergence, e.g. delay
investment cycles (retrofitting), thereby increasing sunk costs especially if end-of pipe
treatment is involved. In this case a transition is obstructed by environmental policy
itself.
Political-economic  constraints  are  probably  of  less  importance  - except  if  the
policies are expected by relevant actors of the dominant path to be in fact window-
creating policies. However, c.p. the result may be rather a restriction of feasible instru-
ments than of the policies as such: While policies with direct negative impact on dom-
inant path actors are difficult to achieve, policies which rather support new alternat-
ives should remain feasible - also the influence of new path actors may help here.
2.3. Policies for window utilisation
If at least one alternative solution becomes competitive to some extent, the situ-
ation may be generally characterised by the following features: the old path is unstable
or at least a techno-economic window can be anticipated, and there is competition
between different new solutions.  At least one of the new solutions is  competitive in
principle. In short, we face a combination of new/new competition and old/new com-
petition. Fundamentally a transition is now possible and the government’s target now
is to facilitate this transition, for example by abandoning discriminating mechanisms
for the new solution.
For examining appropriate policies which take advantage of or utilise such a techno-
economic window for a transition that has emerged or will emerge in the techno-eco-
nomic realm, it is helpful to first regard two subcases separately, namely dominant
old/new and dominant new/new competition, before looking at the general, but not
always  relevant,  old/new/new case.  If  one  takes  the  specific  background  of  time
strategies, namely increasing returns, serious, it should be rarely the case that the util-
isation of old/new and new/new windows have to be dealt with simultaneously, i.e.
that in both sub-constellations the dynamics are highly unstable. Usually, such win-
dows should rather emerge in sequences (old/new (promise of solution) - new/new –
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old/new (if old is not ruled out politically)), thus often only one of the two types is
actually time critical.
For policies which  utilise techno-economic windows of the  old/new type (case  3a)
sometimes a relatively small and perhaps even temporary political impulse is  suffi-
cient. The main political task is to grasp the situation and have flexible and well meas-
ured out instruments available to deal with the dynamics. However, in this situation
window utilisation usually tends to imply selection. Due to the different dynamics of
old and new technologies,  it  is  difficult to manage a fair  and result-open old/new
competition; this is also normally not the environmental aim. 
However, the utilisation of such a window by policy is supposed to be subject to
political-economic  constraints  only  under  particular  conditions.  The criterion  pro-
posed is a disruptive impact of window utilisation on actors of the old path. This may be
the case if it implies 
a) a probable decision of the technological competition (and not only the ensuring of
window openness), and 
b) this decision would have a significantly negative impact on politically important
economic actors,  for example due to competence- or cost-based constraints  to
utilise the techno-economic window successfully themselves. 
Due to these (expected) disruptive effects,  the result often is a blocking of the
political system so that a political opportunity to utilise the techno-economic window
is supposed to be tied to other change facilitating conditions in the political or social
system, for example political windows (Nill 2002). 
Sometimes the necessity of a transition is clear due to internal limits of the old
path. As a result,  new/new dynamics come to the forefront (case  3b). For policies
which  take advantage of or  utilise these new/new techno-economic windows, "utilise"
can also mean "keep the window open" for a sufficiently long time. Political respons-
ibility is also high here: environmental policy may act as the "small historical event"
within the selection environment important for the increasing returns models, e.g. bi-
ases competition. This may reinforce or even lock-in first mover advantages. Under
some conditions, it may be necessary to extend the duration of the techno-economic
window by  means  of  political  intervention  (David  1987)  in  order  to  ensure  that
political discrimination of ecologically superior better solutions does not occur.
In some cases of phase 3 the situation is more complicated than in 3a or 3b: be-
sides the competitive solution there are other solutions that are merely promising and
have not  yet  attained competitiveness.  The development  of  their  potential  can be
strongly impeded by simply following the target of transition. If some new solutions
can use network effects and early economies of scale, they can gain an advantage, and
cannot be overtaken by other promising solutions with a possibly greater potential. In
other words, in this case there is a trade-off between diversity and facilitating trans-
ition. In this situation the government must keep the window open by suppressing
the selection function of markets until the most promising solutions have developed
their potential. If this is too costly or not feasible and the old/new window can only
be used by  the  more  advanced  technologies,  a  lock-in  of  new solutions  must  be
avoided at least, e.g. through reservation of niches etc. This is not easy for political
reasons,  the promoters  of the available solution might press to secure their  future
market.
2.4. A new, time strategic perspective on instrument choice
From a dynamic point of view, it must be emphasised that the usual treatment of
instruments in economic textbooks is misleading to some degree. In a dynamic con-
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text also framework instruments such as taxes or tradable permits have a “techno-
logical content” depending on the time of implementation. If a given techno-econom-
ic system is in a stable phase and there are no promising solutions, these instruments
mainly induce an improvement of dominant technologies. This contributes to explain
why empirical findings on the impact of taxes and tradable permits on the stimulation
of research and development of new solutions are not very convincing (Kemp 2000).
If the system is unstable, even a weak use of instruments may give the system’s devel-
opment  a new direction.  Hence timing,  design and dosage of instruments  may be
more important than the question of choice of instrument. The vivid debates also on
the implementation procedures of economic instruments such as taxes and emission
trading are a case in point. This confirms some aspects of the multi-impulse-hypthes-
is, but puts them in a systematic context: The dynamic efficiency or innovation impact
of policy instruments is a function of techno-economic dynamics in time. This implies
a change of perspective: from "regulation to innovation" towards "innovation to regu-
lation". A precondition for appropriate time strategies is the identification of the rel-
evant features of techno-economic dynamics (as described in table 1 above) and the
adaptation of instruments to these. 
Moreover, a time strategic analysis of policy instruments involves the following as-
pects:
• instruments should contribute to keep a balance of clear overall transition signals
and adjustment flexibility to new developments
• instruments should be techno-economically and politically feasible and accepted by
society
Both aspects lead to the conclusion that often a combination of general frame-
work instruments and temporary specific impulses is appropriate. For the latter, a set
of additional, process-oriented criteria is important: 
• Is it possible to design the instrument according to the techno-economic dynamics
and to time its beginning and finish of implementation appropriately? 
• Ιs it possible to treat different solutions inequal? 
• Is it suitable to the political system so that a quick and flexible implementation are
possible? 
Given these criteria, appropriately designed subsidies can be an attractive policy in-
strument within a time strategy for environmental innovation policy.
3. The transformed role of subsidies as policy instrument
3.1. A reappraisal of the debate on subsidies as innovation policy instrument
Especially in the economic literature, subsidies have a bad image. They contradict
the polluter-pays-principle, are expensive, politically difficult to remove and there is
the danger of windfall profits. The neoclassical theoretical literature states that the in-
novation impact of subsidies is lower than of taxes or tradable permits (e.g. Milliman
and Prince 1989). The more recent, empirically underpinned literature is less categor-
ic. Kemp (2000) emphasizes the importance as well as the limits of subsidies as instru-
ment. R&D subsidies may be important for variety creation if uncertainty prevails as
well as if a technology switch is costly and no market exists. In his view, investment
subsidies are more problematic, and the empirical success is limited, albeit there are
counter examples if they are managed appropriately. In their broad collection of em-
pirical studies, Klemmer et al. (1999) discover a bigger impact of subsidies than as-
sumed in advance. They highlight the role subsidies may play for the first market in-
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troduction of an innovation. This study is also a first attempt to relate the impact of
instrument to innovation phases. But Klemmer et al. (1999) rather focus on individual
decisions of innovators (invention,  market introduction,  diffusion) than on the dy-
namics of techno-economic and political systems. From the latter perspective, the po-
tential role of subsidies - as well as their limitations - emerge even more clearly.
3.2. Subsidies as instrument of window preparation strategies
At first glance, there are two different strategies for window preparation conceiv-
able. Either a strategy based on a general framework changing instrument like envir-
onmental taxes as main element which destabilises the old path and improves the eco-
nomic perspectives of new pathes. Or, in particular when product or system innova-
tions are aimed at, strategic niche management (e.g. Kemp et al. 1998) which cares
systematically for the development of different alternatives by securing niches for ex-
perimentation. In both approaches, however, subsidies will often play an important
role. It is a well established empirical result that at least regarding to path changing in-
novations, the innovative effects of taxes are limited (Kemp 2000, Linscheidt 2000).
There is at least a complementary role for R&D subsidies. This holds particularly, if
more radical and hence more risky and often also more costly solutions are strived
for. Moreover, subsidies for pilot demonstration projects ore demand creating invest-
ment subsidies are one important instrument to provide for niches. 
The advantage of subsidies is the easy targeting and the possibility to treat differ-
ent solutions inequal. To reach the window preparation goal, a degressive or tempor-
ary way of implementation is crucial, as for example in the German renewables act.
Moreover, they have at least two important political advantages. A successful demon-
stration of feasibility of a new solution paves the way for a more stringent regulation,
a historically well known dynamic pattern of the interplay of process innovation and
regulation in Germany. Second, from a political economy perspective, they are easier
to implement than more general instruments like taxes if established actors fear the
new path to be disruptive. While policies with direct negative impact on dominant
path actors  are  difficult  to achieve,  policies  which rather  support  new alternatives
should remain feasible - also the influence of new path actors may help here. Hence,
implementation may be feasible without the need for a political window of opportun-
ity.
3.3. Subsidies as instrument of window utilisation strategies
It is useful to regard the two subcases of window utilisation, 3a and 3b (see table
1) separately. In the case of dominant old/new competition, and if no economic in-
strument such as taxes or permits is already in place, a time limited environmental
standard, which destabilises the old path, or temporary investment subsidies may be
instruments of choice. For both instruments, however, institutional limits are import-
ant to consider (see cases below). Taxes and tradable permits are also be well or even
better suited, because they allow for flexibility in the firm decisions to make the tech-
nological transition, but difficult to dose and to implement quickly.
In the case of dominant new/new competition, taxes or tradable permits are well
suited  to  let  the  new/new  competition  play  in  an  innovation-enhancing  way.
However, there is the danger that promising solutions which are still on a higher point
of the learning curve are locked-out, especially if are no big and resourceful actors be-
hind this path. In such situations, subsidies or, if a regulatory framework is dominant,
also innovation waivers could play an important additional role to keep technological
competition and thus the techno-economic window open or at least to secure a niche
for future solutions. As a general instrument, however, they are too costly. 
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Taken together, temporary subsidies can play an important role in window utilisa-
tion strategies, in particular if other economic instruments are not available or if the
most promising solutions are in different stages of technological development. 
4. Empirical application: a comparison of two cases
In the following, the policy framework presented is applied to two empirical cases
and  the  window  preparation  and  utilisation  strategies  are  compared.  The  chosen
cases, iron and steel production and low energy housing, share some similarities but
also differ in important respects so that a comparative analysis is instructive. In both
cases, the old technological paradigm is confronted with environmental problems and
new promising technical solutions emerge. Hence, techno-economic windows are an-
ticipated by at least some actors. Another similarity is that both cases are not "high
tech", thus the pace of technical change is rather slow. The first  case represents a
technologically radical innovation of a capital intensive process situated in a market
with substantial  entry barriers.  Moreover,  in this case supra-national  dynamics and
competition play an important role. The second case rather deals with a functional or
system innovation of a capital intensive product supplied by markets with low entry
barriers. One implication is that in the first case time strategies before window realisa-
tion,  i.e.  window preparation strategies,  are of paramount importance while in the
second case appropriate window utilisation policies are the key challenge. The focus
of the presentation is on old/new competition. 
4.1. The case of iron and steel production
Steel production is one of the most energy and environment consuming industrial
activities. Today steelmaking is dominated by two production routes based on differ-
ent technologies. The still dominant coke oven -  blast furnace -  basic oxygen furnace route and
the originally by and large complementary scrap -  electric arc furnace route. The first route
takes place in so-called integrated steel mills at a quite high production scale while the
latter is typical for so-called minimills, which work on a much lower scale. In the last
years the ironmaking stage has seen important invention and partly also innovation
processes. The new smelting reduction technology (SRT) is a technologically radical
new process of ironmaking which skips the coke oven stage and substitutes for the
blast furnace. SRT is one of the very important energy efficiency increasing process
technologies  in  industry,  it  is  expected to  reduce  specific  energy  consumption  by
more than 20 per cent and CO2 emissions by 15% (and other emissions even to a
higher degree). For the use in integrated steel mills, SRT has to compete with the old
blast furnace route of ironmaking (for a detailed analysis see Luiten 2001 and Nill
2003).
A main driver introducing dynamics into these R&D processes since the middle of
the 1980s was the anticipation of a window of opportunity for innovation in the sense
of market introduction due to the replacement necessity of obsolete coke ovens and
blast furnaces in integrated steel mills (ISM). For example, in the Netherlands as well
as in Japan, important replacement necessities of coke ovens or even blast furnaces
were anticipated for 2000 to 2005. At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the
1990s relevant prototypes emerged and the construction of small pilot plants of sever-
al SRT types was the next step envisaged. 
However, the dominant trajectory did not stand still. The existing capital stock was
being continuously improved and upgraded and thus its lifetime extended so that the
need to replace the existing coke ovens became less pressing. One impulse for this
was environmental regulation. Moreover, the incremental innovation of direct pulver-
ised coal injection in the blast furnace, combined with the increasing availability of
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coke imports,  reduced the need for  coke production (EC 2001, 319).  And finally,
cleaner coke ovens were developed. All in all, the cost advantages of SRT became
smaller and smaller and some producers reinvested into the traditional  route, thus
losing  interests  in  alternatives  (Luiten  2001).  As  a  consequence,  the  anticipated
window did not materialize (yet). 
One result was that  only in the Netherlands and in Japan integrated producers
seriously pursued possible market introduction and thus the anticipation of a techno-
economic window stabilised. The technical processes being patented and published in
the mid nineties, and pilot plants being put into place, now the step to a demonstra-
tion plant was on the agenda. Due to the investment scale, and costs as well as the
risk involved, this step in effect proved to be already a very time critical stage, because
it would be only taken if a serious success chance for market introduction were per-
ceived. The Dutch example nicely illustrates this point: Including the pilot plant Hoo-
govens had invested up to this point 6.5 million US $ into SRT development (Moors
2000, 244). From 1996 on Hoogovens planned for its SRT technology a demonstra-
tion plant of industrial scale, i.e. 700.000 tons a year. The costs were estimated at 125
million US $, which is above the costs of an  isolated replacement of a blast furnace
which is reported to cost 100 Mio US $ (Hogan 1994, 186).
Finally, the techno-economic window did not materialise yet, although the Dutch
government wanted to support the facility (see below). Due to the overall economic
situation and other investment priorities, Hoogovens first postponed and two years
later, in 1999, stopped the development (Moors 2000). Also in Japan a demonstration
plant was not build up to now. Probably, market introduction of SRT in integrated
mills will at least be postponed for five to ten years. In the meantime, there is a certain
probability that SRT will be introduced in minimills, substituting hot iron for scrap in
the electric arc furnace route. Some attempts are on the way, but it is not clear if the
critical  investment amount  hurdle,  which is  beyond usual  investment  capacities  of
minimill  producers,  will  be successfully  taken. One first  generation SRT, COREX,
however, which is less promising from an environment perspective and of which the
use is only possible in newly built steel mills, has successfully exploited a local niche
and diffuses now in some emerging countries2
4.2. The case of housing
In Germany, conventional housings have been gradually improved towards a kind
of low energy standard, now defined by the energy saving ordinance of 2002 (about
70-110 kwh per m2a end energy for heating purposes). But in parallel, at the innova-
tion frontier much larger steps are in sight. Technical concepts such as solar housing,
zero heat energy housing or plus energy housing can be mentioned. But in particular
passive housing emerged as a potential new paradigm, enabling much lower energy
consumption for heating at a reasonable cost (for more details see Haum and Nill
2004).
Technologically, a passive house is a a system innovation or functional innovation,
a combination of technologies which reduce the end energy use for heating purposes
to less than 15 kwh per m2a and hence make the omission of conventional heating
systems feasible. To achieve this, a combination of strong thermal insulation, an util-
isation of passive solar gains by solar-oriented windows and internal savings, a special
type of three-layer windows and a ventilation system with heat recuperation which
provides for the necessary rest of energy are used (Feist 1996). The prototype  was
constructed 1991 in Darmstadt-Kranichstein.  The main actors were outsiders to the
2 Seen  on  a  global  scale,  this  process  contains  also  interesting  aspects  of  new/new
competition. For more details, which go beyond the scope of the present chapter, see Nill
(2003).
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construction industry, and strongly motivated by environmental concerns. The main
component innovations required were integrated planning approaches by architects
and better insulated three-layer windows. 
To a certain extent, passive housing can be described as a disruptive innovation
(Christensen, 1997), because at least in the beginnings, a reduced product perform-
ance was accepted by the environmentally motivated lead users. Since 1995, important
component innovations of windows and integrated ventilation and heat recuperation
systems followed. At the end of 1998, there have been some 120 passive house flats.
In 1999 there was a first boost of the new trajectory. Policy reacted and supported the
new solution (see below). The investment cost difference has been reduced to about
15 per cent. The number of houses increased markedly, the necessary window tech-
nology became commercially  available and important  technical problems had been
solved. Expectations rose that there could be a techno-economic window for success-
ful competition with conventional housing, mainly based on three pillars: cost reduc-
tion due to the omission of the conventional heating system, learning and scale effects
in component development, and raising energy prices. Incumbent actors such as con-
structors of prefabricated houses and component suppliers began to react to the dy-
namics and to offer passive houses as part of their portfolio, while still perceiving the
passive house as a niche. At the same time, they explored more incremental steps of
optimising conventional low energy housing towards “three litre houses” (30 kwh per
m2a), keeping the conventional heating systems.
Until  today, these dynamics have resulted in quality improvements and a rising
market share. As of end of 2002, there more than 2500 passive house accomodation
units.  The market share, however, is still well below one per cent of new housing.
There  have  not  yet  been  significant  further  cost  reductions.  The  price  of  passive
houses is still about 10 to 15 per cent higher than in conventional houses, and slightly
higher than in three-litre houses (Schulze-Darup 2002). The cost saving potential is
estimated at nearly 50 per cent for windows and about 30 per cent for ventilation and
recuperation units. Recently, some policies which could be termed window utilising
are visible, but their effects remain to be seen (see below).
4.3. The empirical role of subsidies in transition strategies - window preparation
In the iron and steel case, governments were substantially involved in window pre-
paration, though their activity alone was not sufficient for window emergence. Luiten
(2001, 186) estimates that about 25-30 per cent of the total expenditure for SRT de-
velopment, up to now between 600 and 700 million US $, was provided by govern-
ments. In most industrial countries general R&D efforts in the steel industry were
supported by governments; in the European Community of Coal and Steel financed
by a levy on steel prices. In the SRT case, it played a supplementary but sometimes
rather substantial role. In the Netherlands, the European subsidies were at the begin-
ning of the 1990s complemented with a covenant in the framework of the National
Environmental  Policy  Plan.  The  base metal  industry  agreed to increase its  energy
efficiency between 1989 and 2000 by 20 per cent. In turn, no economic instruments
such as an energy tax were considered. The political feasibility was no problem, be-
cause the political system was open and the techno-economic actors proactive. The
efficiency increase, however, was feasible with incremental improvements. Concern-
ing the impact of subsidies on innovation, Luiten (2001, 191) concludes that in most
cases, the support led to additional research while its impact concerning an accelera-
tion of the development is less clear. 
In the middle of the 1990s, a very time critical stage of window preparation was
reached, in which again subsidies played an important role. In 1997, the Dutch gov-
ernment  announced  the  so-called  CO2 Reduction  plan  that  involved  substantial
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budgets. The integrated steel producer Hoogovens applied for government support of
a demonstration facility. The latter awarded 30 million US $ which was about 25% of
total expenditures. Hoogovens wanted to provide the same amount but failed to find
another investor for the remaining 60 millions. Hoogovens, however, was not willing
to  invest  more,  given the rather  high risk  of  the  project.  Thus  in  1999,  the  firm
formally announced a development stop (Luiten 2001, 196). That in fact the window
preparation policies did not result in the commercialisation of the new technology did
not lie in the hand of policy but seems to be a reasonable element of contingency,
leaving market actors the last decision about the outcome of the competition. 
There was no political window necessary, because the proposed policy, i.e. a sub-
sidy scheme, was an established instrument and the Dutch political  system is well
known for its strategic capabilities (e.g. Nill et al. 2002, 23-31). And the expected ef-
fects were incremental because the change of technologies, even if radical in terms of
processes, is not disruptive, but indeed competence enhancing for the main economic
actor concerned. So there is not too much stickiness towards the old path and an ad-
aptation to the new solution is  feasible.  Moreover,  there were some, however not
binding restrictions at the European level, i.e. the Coal and steel subsidy framework to
avoid unfair competition. The intended subsidy had to be approved by the European
Commission, which was done with the (questionable) argument that the demonstra-
tion project would be far from market commercialisation. In general, there is no ex-
ample that an iron making demonstration plant failed due to lack of political support.
Almost  everywhere  where  a  window preparation  seemed promising,  governments
were ready to support the projects, even with substantial amounts of money.
In the case of low energy housing in Germany, regulation and subsidies are the
dominant policy instruments. The innovative effects of regulatory policies are usually
limited. This is particularly true for building regulation in Germany, where rather the
opposite causal chain, i.e. from innovation with a large time lag to regulation, can be
observed (Lehr 2000). The first commercial passive houses were sometimes suppor-
ted at the Länder level. After the success of the first niche was visible, policy reacted
by redirecting an existing premium loan programme for new private housings from
low energy housing to passive housing, what can be called a window preparing policy.
It supported more than 300 houses in 1999 and more than 500 houses in 2000 and
thus  supported stabilisation and expansion of  the niche. In 2001 the performance
standards have been changed from end energy to primary energy use, creating more
favorable conditions for the integration of renewable energy heating systems. Since
then, also the more incremental new option of three-litre housing is backed, albeit
with less favorable interest rate conditions. It is worth mentioning that since 1999 in
the framework of the so-called ecological tax reform also the tax on gas and heating
oil has been risen to some extent. Expert interviews, however, accord more import-
ance to the subsidies than the tax changes, what is in line with a recent survey of em-
pirical studies (OECD 2003). In effects there were some elements of an unintended
niche management present, mainly carried out by the administrative part of the politi-
cal system which was open to the innovation dynamics. 
Hence in both cases, subsidies were in fact the main instrument for political win-
dow preparation strategies - as far as such strategies have been in place at all. In the
iron and steel case, only in the Netherlands there was a kind of gradual transition
strategy; this is not yet the case in low energy housing in Germany, albeit some first
political attempts are observable.
4.4. The empirical role of subsidies in transition strategies - window utilisation
In the case of new ironmaking technologies, in integrated steel mills in industrial-
ised countries up to now no window utilisation occurred, the worsening economic dy-
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namics working against reinvestment. However, one could argue that the Dutch cli-
mate protection programme contained already some element of de facto window util-
isation, given the decisive role of a successful demonstration project. The use of sub-
sidies as proper window utilisation instrument,  however, is  restricted by European
state aid policies in the iron and steel sector. The planned European emission trading
system is a chance to revive technological competition in this field - but only if it is
appropriately designed and keeps an emission reduction incentive. In fact, by licensing
initial emissions levels for free and not setting strict standards, it does not work as
window preparing instrument in itself.  Hence a so-called innovation reserve - a de
facto subsidy which provides similar opportunities to newcomers - is indeed a neces-
sary complement from a time strategic perspective.
In the case of low energy housing, in October 2002 the renewed red-green Ger-
man government stated the ambition to utilise the emerging techno-economic win-
dow and to create an incentive programme for 30.000 passive houses. Originally it
was intended as capital subsidy, reflecting the well established result that this consti-
tutes  a  better  incentive  than a premium loan  programme (OECD 2003).  Due to
budget constraints and administrative problems of creating a new scheme, it has been
implemented only to a limited extent, by the way of changing the financial conditions
of the premium loan scheme in May 2003. The incentive is now better than before,
but with some Länder schemes being reduced at the same time and another capital
subsidy being stopped, the effects remain to be seen. 
What is observable is a clear effect of the subsidy offer also for less energy effi-
cient houses, which were reintroduced following demands of construction industry.
In 2002 the number of about 700 accomodation units of passive house standard or
equivalent technology was doubled by more than 1500 approved houses of the less
ambitious standard. There may be a ratio to do so for environmental reasons, i.e. to
achieve an old/new substitution,  as long as  it  leads  to  additional  well  performing
houses. From a time strategic perspective, however, it is a questionable window-util-
ising policy, because it may also lead to a replacement of more ambitious new solu-
tions, and hence their dynamic economies are supposed to be lower.
A credible transition strategy is still missing - with regard to the strength of the im-
pulse as well as to time limitations of the instruments. Moreover, in the decentralised
housing market, the critical phase of competition is diffusion beyond a niche, and for
this subsidies are a quite expensive instrument, while framework instruments like en-
ergy taxes would influence the old and new path at the same time. However, for the
latter no political window can be discerned. 
5. Conclusion
Time strategies for transitions are a promising way to conceptualise policies which
use  techno-economic  dynamics  as  leverage  for  a  transition  towards  sustainability.
They often combine a long term framework with specific impulses. Within such a
framework, also traditional instruments such as subsidies play a transformed but im-
portant role. Put differently, a time strategic policy framework may well explain why
subsidies are still used a lot more in real life policies than advised by conventional the-
oretical considerations. 
A time strategic  environmental  innovation policy is  demanding in terms of the
abilities of political and administrative actors to manage dynamic processes. The set of
abilities required include monitoring to identify possible techno-economic windows,
evaluating technological potentials, balancing credible transition goals and a flexible
time schedule, developing a proper design of instruments and a willingness to learn.
Nevertheless, the empirical cases show at least that it seems to be possible not only
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for economic but also for political actors to discern techno-economic windows. Also
political capabilities to react to these dynamics are observable, albeit considerable im-
provements are envisageable. And if the hypothesis holds that it is almost impossible
to have environmental policy without effect on technology choice in a path depend-
ent world, the solution cannot be to refrain from political interventions but to more
closely examine how to improve political capabilities for an environmental innovation
policy. 
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Combining Long-Term and Short-Term Perspectives
on Food Choice: The Case of Meat's Animal Origin
Joop de Boer
Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Introduction
Although Europe, and particularly north-western Europe, has often been charac-
terised as a meat eating continent (Braudel, 1987; Montanari, 1994), there are indica-
tions that meat is losing its position as a particular attractive source of proteins, only
to be criticized by marginal groups of vegetarians. The indications do not only refer
to the negative role of meat in several recent food safety crises but also to a number
of socio-cultural changes that might gradually gain importance in the long-term. Some
relevant examples are the increasing significance that consumers attribute to animal
welfare (Issanchou, 1996) and the growing appreciation of vegetarian meals, not only
by consumers (Beardsworth & Keil, 1997) but also by nutritionists (Sabaté, Duk, &
Lee, 1999). Given the various manifestations of these changes, the question can be
raised whether they will continue and get a substantial impact on the consumption of
meat. This question is particularly important in view of the environmental pressure
that  is  attributed  to the  current  system of  meat  supply  (Aiking & Vellinga,  2000;
Tilman,  Cassman,  Matson  et  al.,  2002).  Gaining  more  insight  into  socio-cultural
changes and their linkages with food choice criteria may contribute to the pursuit of a
food system that is more sustainable.
From a methodological point of view, studying the links between food choice cri-
teria and long-term socio-cultural development is a challenging task. Research into
food choice criteria is often undertaken from a bottom-up perspective in which the
behaviour of the consumer is seen as the result of a restricted number of causes (e.g.
Connors, Bisogni, Sobal et al., 2001). The causes specify, for example, how consumers
make a choice given their motives for a certain type of meal (e.g., a quick meal) and
their beliefs about the foods that fit into such a meal (e.g., a hamburger). In contrast,
studies of long-term socio-cultural changes are often undertaken from a top-down
perspective to explain  why people's activities in a certain period have developed in a
particular direction (Goudsblom, 1996). This approach can reveal irreversible changes
in systems of food provision and consumption, such as the development of fast food
chains in relationship with Western modernization processes (Ritzer, 1996).
Although bottom-up and top-down approaches are often applied separately, they
can be mutually enhancing. For example, a top-down approach of social change may
lead to sweeping generalizations about dramatic transitions, if it neglects the experi-
ence of the people involved who may just have adapted their behaviour to changing
circumstances (Levine, 2001). Similarly, a bottom-up approach may miss the direction
of gradual changes in people's behaviour if this direction can only be observed from a
long-term perspective.
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Combining top-down and bottom-up approaches  is  particularly  relevant for  re-
search into  the  ways  food choices  are  changing.  By  examining  how current  food
choice criteria are linked with long-term socio-cultural development,  their potential
impact on future food consumption can be assessed. Generally, distal processes (i.e.
long-term causes) will determine how proximal factors (i.e. short-term causes) might
work. More specifically, a long-term development will create opportunities for food
choices that match its general direction, whereas it will put constraints on others. Ac-
cordingly, it might be expected that those food choice criteria that appear to be part
of a long-term change will have more impact in the future than criteria that are only
based on short-term trends.
A combined approach to long-term and short-term processes is not a simple task,
however, because there is as yet no historical social psychology to draw the connec-
tions. Moreover, there are no databases and tools to support this type of research. As
two  of  Europe's  most  renowned  culinary  historians,  Jean-Louis  Flandrin  and
Massimo Montanari (1999: 3), note, we are still ignorant about the reasons for certain
fundamental changes in the routines of everyday life, such as changes in cooking tech-
niques, choice of ingredients and seasoning. Nevertheless, it is possible to use insights
from the relevant disciplines (i.e. psychology, sociology, anthropology, history) as ele-
mentary building blocks, and to test at least some implications by small-scale experi-
ments.
The main strategy chosen here is the development of a framework that sorts in-
sights on influences on behaviour into a logical order. Two general notions have been
extremely useful for this approach. The first one is that it makes sense to consider,
from a behavioural perspective, the time it takes to create or develop something. For
example, a real problem cannot be solved in one second and a friendship cannot be
built in an hour. The second notion is that any potentially causal factor can only cause
an effect in a certain context. In other words, a virus can only cause an illness among
those persons who are not immune to it. And this context, in turn, is dependent on
other causal factors, such as the special vulnerability that is determined by heredity.
The  best  approach  to  combine  the  two  notions  is  one  that  builds  a  cascade-like
framework of the relevant processes.
In the next section, the framework of influences on behaviour is explained. Then,
the role of Western modernization processes is analysed as an example of long-term
influences on food choice criteria. These results will be combined with a short de-
scription of the changes that have influenced food supply in the past decades. In the
final part of the chapter, I shall draw conclusions and discuss the implications for the
pursuit of Industrial Transformation.
Framework of influences on behaviour
In considering the causes of a person's behaviour, it is important to take into ac-
count that any act is the result of multiple determinants. The most obvious determin-
ants are the perceptual and rational processes that enable the person to adapt his or
her behaviour to the situation at hand. This refers, for example, to the taste of a food
and the person's ideas about its origin. If the person is in doubt about the food's pur-
ity, his or her behaviour might also be influenced by personal loyalties to the person
who serves it. Also relevant are the business practices that are common in the supply
chain. In short, the behaviour in question is not only a function of processes within
the person, but also of social and organizational processes that can work as proximal
causes of behaviour.
Moving from processes that are internal and proximal to more distal processes, we
can see those determinants of behaviour that will not dramatically change during the
lifetime of  an individual.  These  relatively  stable,  distal  processes  can influence the
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food tasting person, for example, as far as his or her attention is drawn to beliefs
about purity and danger that are part of broadly shared worldviews (e.g., philosophies
of life, magical thinking). Unlike mediaeval men and women, modern people will not
expect solutions from magical powers but they may still be sensitive to some of these
beliefs under conditions of uncertainty. Notably, the process of cultural moderniza-
tion has taken almost a millennium to develop (Levine, 2001). On an even longer time
scale, there are evolutionary processes that have shaped human capabilities to cope
with various kinds of environmental danger, for example, by enabling them to make a
hasty distinction between sweet and bitter tasting foods.
The processes mentioned above can be arranged in a cascade-like framework that
is shown in Figure 1. Its highest level refers to evolutionary processes. One of the res-
ults of the evolution is that humans are able to assess a difference between positive
and negative stimuli in about 100 milliseconds (Smith, Cacioppo, Larsen et al., 2003).
Another relevant feature with an evolutionary origin involves the response strength of
brain systems. Brain systems responsible for evaluating negative stimuli respond more
strongly than those responsible  for evaluating positive stimuli (Smith et al.,  2003).
This so-called negativity bias means that negative stimuli (e.g. suspect odours) have a
greater impact on information processing than positive stimuli do.
The next  level  of  Figure  1 refers  to distal  processes  that  have shaped broadly
shared forms of behaviour in periods of centuries or millennia. This includes the rise
of practices, values and worldviews that are typical of the modern culture in the West-
ern part of the world. To put it simply, the "modern" period started in 1900 and mod-
ern Western societies can be distinguished from their predecessors by their potential
democratisation of both their wealth and their political process (Levine, 2001: 11).
The overall concept of modernization covers a number of more specific processes,
Figure 1: A cascade-like framework of influences on behaviour.
Evolutionary processes, taking 104 to 106 years, which shape humans' capabilities 
and environmental conditions
A person's behaviour at a certain moment
Distal processes, taking centuries to millennia, which shape broadly 
shared forms of behaviour (e.g. language, values, cuisine, worldview)
Social processes, taking days to months, which shape 
personal relationships and commitments (e.g. guests)
Proximal processes, taking years to decades, which shape 
institutions and subcultures (e.g. systems of food supply)
Rational processes, taking minutes to hours, which 
shape problem solving behaviour (e.g. consciously 
buying, cooking)
Perceptual processes, taking 100 ms to 10 
seconds, which shape emotions and 
interpretations (e.g. appraisal of a taste)
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such as the growing importance of an "engineering culture" characterized by the sys-
temic application of scientific knowledge to societal issues (Carroll-Burke, 2001). The
"engineering culture" produced the steam engine and many other things that account
for the present welfare.
By their very nature, distal processes like modernization have offered opportunit-
ies and constraints for the development of institutions and other coordinated prac-
tices that create incentives and disincentives for the behaviour of the people involved.
These belong to the proximal processes of Figure 1, which include the development
of educational systems and systems of food supply. The current functional integration
of nationally and internationally dispersed activities involved in the primary produc-
tion, processing, manufacturing, transport, marketing and selling of foods has been
heavily influenced by all kinds of economic activity around food during the past dec-
ades (Fine, Heasman, & Wright, 1996).
The social processes in Figure 1 are more personal than the professional activities
mentioned above and take much less time to develop. For example, a person's loyalty
to a new housemate may grow in a few days or months. According to Newell (1990:
494) it is characteristic of social situations that there are at least three types of goals.
(1) Each person cares about the shared activities the group is performing. (2) The per-
son also cares about maintaining the social atmosphere of the group. (3) And each
person cares about his or her own position in the group and the personal satisfactions
of group membership. Regarding each of these goals, the person has an impact on the
outcomes but he or she is also dependent on the other group members.
The processes mentioned above are external to the person, except for the social
processes, which are a mixture of external and internal elements. The lowest levels of
Figure 1 refer to processes that are internal to the person or that have been internal-
ised. The rational processes, often taking minutes to hours, include conceptual learn-
ing, problem solving and decision-making. Notably, Figure 1 shows that the person's
behaviour is not fully determined by rational processes. For example, even if the per-
son aims to take a decision in a purely rational way, he or she will soon find out that
on the one hand social commitments and on the other hand perceptual biases can in-
terfere with such an approach as soon as the decision's consequences become serious.
Perceptual processes shape a person's rapid interpretations of a situation and the
emotions  that he or she experiences.  An important  distinction at this  level is  that
between mindless  and  mindful  processing.  Psychological  research has  shown  that
people who are certainly capable of acting mindfully can perform seemingly complex
tasks with little if any active mental involvement (Langer, 1989). This means, among
other things, that they rely on routines developed in the past and that they do not
make new distinctions to accommodate any changes of the task environment. In con-
trast, mindfulness is essentially awareness of contexts. Without this awareness, a per-
son cannot improve his or her performance, self-esteem or health (Langer, 1989).
The framework of Figure 1 is the result of an attempt to sort a wide range of be-
havioural phenomena into a logical order. Only purely biological processes at the level
of organs and cells (e.g. taking microseconds) have been left aside. The framework is
relatively new, although similar  ideas  have been put forward by others  (Diamond,
1999; Newell, 1990; Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, & Coon, 2002). A review of research
and theory relating to these phenomena is obviously beyond the scope of this chapter.
Without going into details, however, it is possible to highlight some relevant implica-
tions.
An important practical message of Figure 1 is that it is not necessary (if feasible) to
change a given culture in order to change a particular behaviour. However, a govern-
ing body that wants to induce a behavioural change should be very familiar with the
distal factors involved. The reason is that these factors provide the context in which
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the more proximal or internal factors can have their effect. For example, the taste of a
new food may only be pleasurable for  those persons who have already learned to
appreciate  the  corresponding  cuisine.  Similarly,  the  introduction  of  a  "free-range"
label  will  only  have  a  moral  effect  on  people  who  value  animal  welfare.  Both
industries and governments know that the achievement of specific policy objectives
(e.g., selling fat-laden foods or promoting health) can be aided by well-chosen appeals
to a few broader values of the same culture (e.g., appeals to the value of "hedonism"
or "security" respectively).
Figure 1 can help to generate information on the chances that a particular diet
shift will be promoted or inhibited. Generally, the effectiveness of interventions will
increase if all the influences on a particular behaviour point in the same direction. If a
particular behaviour, such as smoking, is difficult to change, it is essential to combine
as many supporting influences as possible. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that
the impacts of positive and negative events are not symmetrical. This is evident from
the following:
• The pleasure of eating might easily be spoiled by unpleasant ideas about the origin
of the food.
• However, the unpleasant taste of a food will not easily be improved by pleasant
ideas about its origin.
In sum, the framework can help to get insight into the congruency of the various
influences on behaviour. The framework also helps to consider the role of time for
diagnoses and interventions. The fact that the various influences on behaviour have
their own pace has consequences for the diagnosis of present influences and for the
design of an intervention. The pace of change will depend on the type of process to
be changed. For example, it may take less time to increase the practical knowledge of
consumers than to improve the social status of novel products.
The role of Western modernization processes
Many of the links between current food choices and long-term socio-cultural de-
velopment can be explained in terms of Western modernization processes. To put it
simply,  modern  society  can be distinguished  from its  predecessor  by  its  potential
democratisation  of  both its  wealth  and its  political  process  (Levine,  2001:  11).  In
terms of important periods in world history, it can be said that the "late premodern"
period began in 1350 when Europe had to cope with the social, economic and politic-
al effects of the Black Death and that the "modern" period started in 1900 (Gold-
stone, 2002). The overall process of modernization covers a number of more specific
socio-cultural processes, three of which should be mentioned here. They are:
• the increasing self-control considered typical of Western civilized man, such as the
self-control of animal-like behaviour (since about 1500, see Elias, 1978),
• the rise of consumerism (or the belief that it is good to buy and use a lot of goods)
among the middle classes (since about 1700, see Stearns, 2001),
• and the growing importance of an "engineering culture" characterized by the sys-
temic application of scientific knowledge to societal issues (since about 1800, see
Carroll-Burke, 2001).
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Each of these socio-cultural processes implied some kind of decoupling between
phenomena that once were closely related, such as impulses and behaviour. For ex-
ample, people of the Middle Ages could burst out into emotional behaviour, including
violence,  but  this  became  gradually  less  acceptable.  Other  changes  would  make
people's consumption less dependent on their social status,  and the conclusions of
science less dependent on their moral meaning. The changes were to a certain degree
supported by the mainstream of society, but criticized by one or more counter-move-
ments. For example, the "democratisation of meat " among European working-class
families in the nineteenth century, influenced by the agricultural and industrial revolu-
tions (Knapp, 1997), was accompanied by moral objections to the subjugation of an-
imals and the foundation of the first  vegetarian societies (Thomas,  1983).  Table 1
summarizes the characteristics of the three processes in terms of decoupling, direc-
tion of the mainstream and direction of the counter-movement. 
The process of modernization brought many changes in dietary choice and culin-
ary  technique.  Due  to  the  prevailing  prominent  position  of  the  court  society  in
France, most of the changes were at first part of a French-style modernization before
they became accepted more generally. As far as meat is concerned, many changes are
particularly related to its animal origin. An interesting example is the practice of bring-
ing the whole dead animal, or large parts of it, to the table, where the meat was to be
carved by the master of the house or by distinguished guests. Research by Flandrin
(1999) indicates that the number of animal species served on the tables of the French
aristocrats decreased between 1500 and 1650. This refers, for example, to a decreasing
consumption of various large birds (e.g., swan). By contrast, the status of beef rose
and much attention was paid to the particular cut of meat.
Focussing on meat-related practices, Table 2 summarizes a number of differences
between on the one hand the sixteenth/seventeenth century and on the other hand
the beginning of the twenty-first  century, based on reports on the history of food
(e.g.,  Flandrin,  1999).  The differences  refer to the sections of  the population who
could afford to eat meat, the types of animal that were eaten, the manner in which
Table 1: Main characteristics of three socio-cultural processes that mediate Western
modernization.
Decoupling Direction of mainstream Direction of counter-movement
Increasing self-control




Development of more pre-
dictable  and civilized beha-
viour,  suppressing  every
characteristic felt to be "an-
imal,"  such  as  spitting  or
gobbling or the tendency to
sniff at food.
Discovery by the upper and middle
classes  of  "pacified  nature"  as  an
escape  from  civilizing  rules,  a
source  of  pleasure  and  knowledge
(reason  for  protests  against  the
cruel treatment of animals).
Break  with  the  rule
that  people  should
consume according to
their  rank  in  society
(since about 1700).
Development  of  social  ar-
rangements (e.g., shops) and
personal  lifestyles  (e.g.,
those  of  shoppers)  in  pur-
suit  of  the  belief  that  it  is
good to buy and use a lot of
goods. 
From its early beginning in Britain,
France,  the  Low  Countries  and
parts  of  Germany  and  Italy,  con-
sumerism has provoked opposition,
inspired by various moral, esthetical
and political themes.
Break  with  the  link
between what is mor-
ally  right  and  scien-
tifically  true  (since
about 1800).
Development of "engineer-
ing cultures," which use the
powers of engine science in
the laboratory for other cul-
tural forms such as agricul-
ture and medicine.
Rise  of  various  subcultures  con-
cerned,  among  other  things,  with
natural  foods  and  holistic  medi-
cines, trusting the self-healing capa-
city of the human body.
 314   Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference
they were served,  and the scientific  (or  pseudoscientific)  ideas about proper food.
Flandrin notes, for example, that as late as the beginning of the seventeenth century,
members of the elite left "gross" meats such as beef and pork as well as most veget-
ables to the common people,  whose stomachs  were supposedly more robust.  The
elite ate only "delicate" fowl, relatively "light" fish and soft wheat bread. Notably, the
wisdom of these differences was supported by the scientists of those days.
The list of observations mentioned in Table 2 suggests a significant diet shift and
it confirms that people's preferences are far from fixed. However, it should be em-
phasised that it is difficult to assess whether the list is complete. Moreover, each of
the differences must have one or more proximal causes that explain how changes
were created, but the literature only offers some suggestions of what these might have
been. For example, that members of the elite ate many types of animal may indicate
that 17th-century diet was still largely determined by fluctuating natural circumstances
(Flandrin, 1999). In that period in history, beef was considered "crude" and dismissed
as indigestible by chefs in the aristocratic kitchens. In later years, progress in the arts
of butchery and cooking made it possible that the status of beef rose and that more
attention was paid to the particular cut of meat. Accordingly, the serving of large parts
of the animal to be carved at table slowly went out of use. This decreasing practice is
also connected with the gradual reduction in the size of the household and the trans-
ference of household activities to specialists (Elias, 1978).
Although the direct causes and the precise timing of the changes mentioned in
Table 2 may not always be clear, their consequences got their meaning in the long-
term process of Western modernization. For example, due to the circumstances men-
tioned above, people got fewer reminders that the meat dish has something to do
with the killing of an animal. According to Elias (1978: 120) this shift means that the
Table 2:  Some meat-related practices that have changed in the period between the
sixteenth/seventeenth century (see Flandrin, 1999) and the beginning of the twenty-
first century.
Sixteenth and seventeenth century Beginning of the twenty-first century
There  were  very  large  differences  between
high and low members of society.
A large part of the population of Western
countries can afford to eat meat.
Rich people ate many types of animals, includ-
ing various birds such as swans.
Consumers mainly choose a few types of
animal.
Their cooks served large parts of the animal,
which were carved at table.
Consumers  seldom  serve  whole  animals;
instead they serve cuts of meat. 
It was a matter of good manners that  upper
class men should be able to cut meat from a
pheasant still decorated with its feathers.
The cuts are bought at stores in which the
carcasses  have  been  hidden  from  the
customer's  eye.  The  practice  of
slaughtering has been removed behind the
scenes of social life.
Scientists  agreed that the  rich needed to eat
birds to keep their intelligence and sensibility
more alert.
The  nutritional  literature  has  begun  to
appreciate the value of low-meat diets and
vegetarian diets.
The working classes were considered best off
eating large amounts of vegetables.
Nutritionists see vegetables as an essential
part of each diet. 
Local  authorities  tried to ensure an adequate
supply of "good and honest" food.
Ensuring  the  provision  of  "good  and
honest"  food is  a task  for supra-national
authorities.
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mediaeval standard of feeling by which the sight and carving of a dead animal on the
table were actually pleasurable, or at least not at all unpleasant, has been replaced by
another standard by which reminders that the meat dish has something to do with the
killing  of  an  animal  are  avoided.  Notably,  this  development  is  not  uniform
everywhere. There are differences between the urban society of France and the more
rural  society  of,  for  example,  England,  where  older  forms  are  more  prominently
preserved. However, the general direction of the changes seems to be the same. As
Elias (1978: 120) notes, in many of our meat dishes the animal form is so concealed
and changed by the art of its preparation and carving that while eating one is scarcely
reminded of its origin.
Current development
The long-term processes mentioned in the previous section can be complemented
by a number of processes that have happened during the past decades. Some of these
processes refer to shifts in the way people manage to organize their household, taking
due account of differences in economy of scale. For example, if the costs of preparing
a meal are compared per unit time of the eaters, a decreasing number of persons per
household  will  make convenience  food more  attractive  (Beardsworth  et  al.,  1997;
Warde, 1997). Other important processes refer to the way producers manage to sup-
ply foods and the way the authorities  manage to control  the public dimensions of
food (Atkins & Bowler, 2001; Nestle, 2002). The main characteristics of these pro-
cesses are presented in Table 3.
One of the almost unnoticed consequences that the shifts of Table 3 have in com-
mon is their match with the long-term process of paying less attention to the meat-
producing animal as a whole. As mentioned in Table 2, modern consumers seldom
serve whole animals, but they serve cuts of meat that they have bought at stores in
which the carcasses have been hidden from the customer's eye. Partly as a result of
concerns about risk factors, such as fatty acid profiles, there has been a shift in con-
sumption  toward poultry  and fish  and away from beef  and pork.  As opposed  to
whole roasters, many consumers use further processed products, such as fillets.
The psychological and socio-cultural implications of this development have not yet
been  fully  explored.  Some results  of  a  recent  small-scale  experiment  among  con-
sumers in the Netherlands give an interesting clue. It appears that many people are no
longer aware of the animal origin of meat and that this awareness strongly decreases
among the younger generations (see Figure 2). Another result is that the "three com-
ponents" meal (meat, potatoes, vegetables) that was dominant in the Netherlands dur-
ing the second part of the 20th century has become less popular (see Figure 3). This
may indicate that meat is less used as a central part of the meal. It should be emphas-
ized that these people had not become full vegetarians and that they at least some-
times bought meat. Their attitude towards meat was not completely negative and they
showed positive responses to either meat from well-treated animals or some meat al-
ternatives.
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Final remarks
Industrial transformation is not primarily a psychological process. Technical ex-
perts might change a technological system in a way that does not have to be noticed
by the people that are using it. For example, the fact that meat is less used as a central
part of the meal makes it feasible to design ready-made meals that contain less animal
and more plant proteins. Such an approach might create a substantial shift from an-
imal to plant protein foods without any involvement of consumers. However, there
are at least three reasons why such an approach is not recommendable. Firstly, there
are cases in which a behavioural change can contribute to the objectives of an indus-
trial transformation, such as doing more with less. Secondly, it is expected that values
will come into conflict in many technology-related areas, such as genetically modified
food. This makes it important that all the people involved are mindful of those con-
flicts. And thirdly, by reinforcing mindless acceptance of technological changes people
might become a kind of ecological dummy.
The main message from psychologists to non-psychologists is that there are more
opportunities to induce a behavioural change than commonly is expected. Whether
these opportunities will result in the desired end-states depends heavily on the degree
in which the various determinants of behaviour can be made congruent  with each
Figure 2    Percentage "al-
ways" giving thought to the
animal  origin  of  meat  ac-
cording to year of birth.
Source: Sample of 313 supermarket
customers in Rotterdam who at least
sometimes  bought  meat  (Hoogland,






















Figure  3   Percentage  that
prefers  a  conventional  (i.e.
three components)  meal ac-
cording to year of birth.
Source: Sample of 313 supermarket
customers in Rotterdam who at least
sometimes  bought  meat  (Hoogland,
De Boer, Boersema, in preparation).
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other. The fact that many people are no longer aware of the animal origin of meat
may be interpreted in terms of indifference toward the origins of proteins. This opens
possibilities  for  novel  protein  foods,  based on  plants.  However,  if  people  are  no
longer aware of meat's animal origin, they will also be less inclined to pay attention to
animal welfare. This might have negative consequences for attempts to stimulate sus-
tainable agriculture by promoting high quality meat from well-treated animals. The
solution will be that governing bodies should pay more attention to the segmentation
of protein products in terms of bulk products and specialties.
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Users  as  Pioneers:  Transformation in the Electricity
System, MicroCHP and the Role of the Users
Corinna Fischer
Forschungsstelle für Umweltpolitik, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin
in Collaboration with Raphael Sauter
1. Introduction: MicroCHP and the Transformation of the Electricity System
The electricity system in Germany and Europe is currently undergoing a process
of transformation. Market liberalisation led to fusions and mergers among electricity
suppliers, but also made companies seek out new business areas. Environmental regu-
lation, like the Kyoto process, is putting external pressure onto the sector. New tech-
nologies are emerging, be it renewable energy technologies, combined heat and power
(CHP) or “clean coal” technologies. In Germany, the nuclear phase-out and the de-
commissioning of outdated coal plants will lead to a need for replacement of at least
40.000 MWel generation capacity until 2020 (Umweltbundesamt 2003). The need for
replacement is an extremely important driver for transformation, making old and new
technologies compete for a role in the future energy supply. The recent experiences
with blackouts in the USA, Scandinavia and Italy have disturbed the public and secu-
rity of supply is on the agenda again.
One possible development path is decentralisation. Distributed power generation
in small, decentralised, interconnected units could help to save grid capacity, immun-
ise the system against failures and provide opportunities for renewable energies.  It
may be one building block for a more sustainable energy future. A broad implementa-
tion of distributed generation,  however, would mean a thorough structural  change
and require a surge of innovation. Grid access needs to be regulated and adequate sys-
tem charges be defined to take into account avoided generation and distribution cost
as well as additional costs for regulating energy to balance the feed-in of small inter-
mittent power generators. If the decentralised units are to operate in industry build-
ings or private homes, new forms of co-operation between energy companies and
private operators, new models of operating these systems, and new forms of owner-
ship must be devised. Load regulation may require users to change habits,  for ex-
ample to use energy-intensive applications at another time of the day, or to allow the
energy supplier to switch certain applications or generation devices on or off in ex-
change for  price incentives.  In short,  a complex bundle of innovations  is  needed.
Technical and social changes must interlock to make decentralisation possible. 
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In a current project,  the interdisciplinary  research group TIPS (Transformation
and Innovation in Power Systems, www.tips-project.de) investigates a section of this
potential innovation cluster: small combined heat and power plants (MicroCHP) and
the conditions for their establishment. Industrial transformation is thus studied in a
“micro” perspective: one innovation that could be a contribution to a possible trans-
formation path is investigated intensively. The goal is to identify possible levers and
steering mechanisms to shape a process of innovation – and thereby, transformation
– in a more sustainable direction.
MicroCHP, as defined in this study, are small cogeneration systems under 15 kWel.
They are designed for use in family homes, multi family houses, schools or kinder-
gartens, small commercial enterprises such as hotels, or the like. Various generation
technologies are applied: conventional reciprocating engines, Stirling motors, fuel cells
or even microturbines. Whereas reciprocating engines are commercially available by a
number of manufacturers, Stirling and fuel cell based MicroCHP are still in the devel-
opment phase.
A large potential is seen for MicroCHP Europe-wide. The British Energy Saving
Trust expects 250.000 systems to be installed in Britain until 2010 (Harrison & Red-
ford 2001). The MicroMap study (MicroMap 2002) forecasts between 5 and 12 mil-
lion  MicroCHP systems in 2020. 
Life Cycle analyses done in the context of the TIPS project show that MicroCHP
promises  substantial  environmental  benefits.  Fig.  1  shows the  reduction  in green-
house gas emissions that MicroCHP may provide in comparison to other modes of
electricity production. Heat output has been credited with a modern natural gas boiler
(data  and  figure  courtesy  to  Dr.  Martin  Pehnt,  Insitut  für  Energie  und  Umwelt,
Heidelberg).
The TIPS study investigates the interlocking technical, cultural, institutional, eco-
nomical  and  political  factors  that  shape  the  development  of  the  innovation  “Mi-
croCHP”. One part of the project is to investigate the role of the end user in shaping
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Fig.1:  Greenhouse gas  reduction by MicroCHP.  Source:  Dr.  Martin Pehnt,  IFEU
Heidelberg
Fischer   321
2. Investigating the Role of the End User
2.1. Why Do End Users Matter?
Technology does not develop autonomously, nor is its course determined by the
quest for technological and economical optimisation alone. Rather, technology devel-
opment is shaped by actions and interactions of various societal actors. These actions
and interactions  are,  in  turn,  directed by  institutional  arrangements,  by the  power
structure, and by the actors’ goals, values, interests, perceptions and worldviews. 
Technology users are an important constituent of this tightly woven network of
actors. They influence not only the course of technology and the fate of innovations,
they also influence whether the application of some technology leads to more sustain-
ability or not.  The exact degree and type of their  influence depends,  among other
things, on the specific technology at stake and on its development phase.  As I have
argued elsewhere, there are four general dimensions of user influence: technology ac-
ceptance, technology handling, technology-induced behavioural change (e.g., the re-
bound effect), and technology-independent user behaviour – that is, activities that are
seemingly unrelated to the specific technology, but may interfere with its functioning,
make it obsolete or substitute it (Fischer 2004, forthcoming). In our case, as we are
talking about a technology that has not yet been introduced, the main topic of interest
is technology acceptance. An end user may decide whether or not to buy and use a
new technology. Technology acceptance therefore determines the chances of a new
technology to be introduced and to find widespread diffusion. This is true especially
when the technology is marketed directly to the end user. When it is sold to an inter-
mediary,  for  example  when  a  housing  company  buys  heating  systems,  end  user
acceptance is less important.
MicroCHP systems are being designed for multi-family houses as well as for indi-
vidual homes. In the individual home sector it is the end users who will have to de-
cide on whether to apply the new technology. But will they be interested? Which fea-
tures of the new technology will appeal to them? Which aspects do they consider im-
portant?  Which economic conditions,  institutional  frameworks and political  instru-
ments are perceived as facilitating or inhibiting the introduction of the new techno-
logy? 
These questions cannot be answered for all consumers alike. Rogers (1995) has
identified different groups of actors in the diffusion process of innovation. Villiger et
al. (2002) have adapted this general framework for consumers and for the market dif-
fusion of green products. They distinguish between different consumer groups who
take up the product at different times: In the “introduction” phase, it is taken up by a
small  group of  “innovators”.  This  phase is  followed by the “early  growth” phase
where the product is purchased by “early adopters”. However, the process only gains
momentum when a mass market is reached in the “take-off” phase where uptake in-
creases steeply and the “(early) majority” is ready for the project. In the “maturity”
phase, market saturation is reached and the process slows down.
MicroCHP is still in the introduction phase, meaning that our target group are “in-
novators”. However, I prefer the term “pioneers”, because “innovators” evokes the
association of the entrepreneur and in fact denotes rather the inventor of some nov-
elty than its first user. “Pioneers” seems more suitable to denote users. These pion-
eers  have  very  specific  characteristics.  Rogers  (1995)  describes  them  as
“venturesome”, interested in new ideas, as controlling substantial funds which allow
them to compensate for potential losses of an investment, and as well educated which
enables them to understand the innovation. Due to their originality, though, they may
be outsiders. This chapter will try and describe these pioneers in more detail by an-
swering some of the above questions. The following section will describe the methods
applied for this purpose. 
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2.2. Methodology
As MicroCHP is an emerging technology, there is yet no chance to conduct com-
prehensive market research. Therefore,  we built  our study on two pillars:  first,  we
tried  to  infer  some  conclusions  from  a  literature  study  on  analogous  cases,  and
secondly, we are currently conducting a combined survey and qualitative study on per-
sons who had opted for taking part in a field test of fuel cell based MicroCHP.
The study on analogous cases. As „analogous cases“, we defined technologies for home
production of electricity and / or heat which are, in comparison with the established
ones1, innovative and advanced regarding efficiency and environmental effects. The
technologies we investigated were, on the heat side,  small biomass  plants and sol-
arthermal panels. On the electricity side, we focussed on photovoltaics. A literature
research, heavily relying on the internet, was done to identify studies that discussed
consumer aspects of the introduction of these technologies. The geographical focus
was on Germany and Austria. The studies were analysed with regard to the following
aspects: socio-demographic characteristics of the technology adopters; attitudes (com-
prising motives and goals, technology evaluation; and perception of facilitating and in-
hibiting factors), and, finally, behavioural changes induced by the technology. Hypo-
theses and questions regarding the transferability of the results to the MicroCHP case
were developed. In this chapter, I will focus on the description of the technology ad-
opters in terms of socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes. Induced behavior-
al changes will not be discussed because there is so far no empirical information on
MicroCHP users that could be utilised to compare them to other technology users,
test the hypotheses or answer the questions.
The study on field test applicants. The basis of the study is formed by a sample of per-
sons who had opted to take part in a field test of fuel cell based MicroCHP. The
number of applicants by far exceeded the number of systems to be tested: of almost
1000 applicants, only 25 could be chosen to take part in the test. The study will com-
prise interviews with the participants, a survey of half of the 1000 applicants, and fo-
cus group discussions with selected applicants. 
The survey and the interviews with participants took place in early 2004. There
results will be presented by end of July 2004. This chapter focuses on the results of
three focus group discussions with applicants which have been completed by the end
of 2003. All of the applicants within a certain geographic region were invited to the
focus group discussion. The aim was to keep travel distance to the discussion location
below 50 km. There were 99 applicants in the region which were contacted by mail.
Of these, 94 addresses were still valid. 35 applicants volunteered to take part in a dis-
cussion. 28 were finally chosen on the basis of availability at the scheduled time, of
which 26 actually showed up. The groups comprised 6-12 participants each and dis-
cussed for 2,5 – 3 hours. On the basis of an interview guide, group members were
asked about the reasons for their application, about hopes and fears regarding fuel cell
MicroCHP, about preferred ownership models, and about the advantages and disad-
vantages of fuel cell MicroCHP as compared to other electricity or heat technologies.
The groups were facilitated by an interviewer who applied various facilitation and ac-
tivation techniques. During the group session, there was a short “guided tour” to a
fuel cell system in action. At the end of the session, interviewees were asked to fill in a
short questionnaire with sociodemographic data. Preliminary results will be presented
here and compared to the results of the literature study.
1 Conventional  German  heating  systems  are  gas  or  oil-based  central  heating,  gas-based
apartment heating, district heating, and, in a few East German cases, individual coal stoves.
Electricity is usually taken from the grid. 
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3. Consumer Needs and Acceptance: Results from the Literature Study
3.1. Overview of the Literature
In general, it was not easy to find scientific studies dealing with consumer aspects
of the introduction of the respective technologies. Studies usually focused on techno-
logical performance and economic feasibility.  All  in all,  twelve studies dating from
1992 to 2003 could be used. Table 1 gives an overview of the studies considered (sor-
ted by technology). It becomes clear that besides end users, also multipliers, interested
persons and non-users have been studied. In this chapter, I will concentrate on in-
formation about end users.
Table 1: Literature basis of the study of analogous cases
Study Technology Goal Topics Sample
Greenpeace
1996
Photovoltaics Evaluation of the CYRUS
campaign (which offered a
low cost PV system)
Success of campaign (number of PV
systems  installed),  motivation,  user





Photovoltaics Evaluation of  the  national
„1000 roofs“ support pro-
gramme
Motivation,  satisfaction,  user  evalu-
ation of the support programme, elec-
tricity consumption behaviour 
1.445 PV owners in sur-
vey, 48 in interviews.
Katzbeck
1997
Photovoltaics Analysis of electricity con-
sumption behaviour of PV
owners
Possession of other  energy technolo-





Photovoltaics Survey of motives and ex-
periences  of  PV  owners;
development recommenda-
tions  for  support  pro-
grammes 
Motivation, experience, suggestions 123  PV  owners:  106
households, 17 firms, as-
sociations  and  public
sector departments
Haas  et  al.
1999
Photovoltaics Evaluation of the Austrian
support programme „Breit-
enwirkung“
Characteristics  of  the  users:  are  they
„early  adopters“  as  characterized  by
Rogers (1995)?
60  PV  owners,  17  PV
merchants,  660  „in-
formed persons“
Reif 2000 Photovoltaics Project report Output  and  consumption  data,  ratio
of  output  /  consumption,  degree  of
self-reliance







gical  factors  conducive  to
the use of solar energy; ad-
vice  on  how  to  conduct
campaigns  and  convince
people
Motives, barriers, desired characterist-
ics of the technology
Secondary study, no own
sample
Polzer 2003 Solar thermal panels
and photovoltaics
Assessment of the status of
PV  and  solarthermal  sys-
tems in a small town
Number  and  size  of  systems  in  the
town, motivation, satisfaction, sugges-
tions 
147  owners  of  solar




Solarthermal panels Evaluation  of  the  Do-It-
Yourself  Solarthermal
Movement in Austria 
Information, motives,  user evaluation
of the Do-It-Yourself programme
238 panel owners  
DENA 2003 Solarthermal panels Market research Motivation,  attitudes,  image  of  the
technology, barriers, user evaluation of
support programmes
Users  of  solar  thermal
panels no older than two
years; sample size is not
communicated






Analysis  of  energy  con-
sumption  behaviour  and
energy  consumption  data
in  households  which  use
renewable energies
Investment  behaviour,  consumption
behaviour,  influence  of  structural  as-
pects,  information,  attitudes  and
motives on energy consumption
101  households  owning
renewable  energy  tech-




Biomass heaters Scientific  support  for  the
market penetration of small
biomass heaters
Economic,  technological  and  social
conditions,  motivation,  trigger,
sources  of  information,  user  evalu-
ation of state support schemes
25 biomass  heater  own-
ers, 116 owners of regu-
lar  heating  systems,  28
multipliers
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3.2. Socio-Demographic Characteristics
There is no information about the socio-demographic characteristics of the users
in Hübner and Felser (2001) and in Polzer (2003). In the other studies, remarkable
convergence of the results can be found. All the respondents were technology  users
and not just owners. That is, the studies do not cover cases where a landlord or a
housing company installed innovative energy technology in a house that was not for
their personal  use. On the other hand, users of innovative energy technology were
usually also the owners, with one exception that will be discussed below. They are
very often families, live in family homes which they own, and come predominantly
from rural  areas and small  towns. There is an over-representation of the South of
Germany, namely Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg. Though there are too little cases
to draw a definit  conclusion, user groups seem to differ slightly depending on the
technology  studied.  On the one hand,  there  are the users  of  solar  thermal  panels
(Hackstock et al. 1992; dena 2003) and biomass (Rohracher et al. 1997). These are
predominantly non-academic, with a large share of farmers and skilled manual work-
ers. On the other hand, users of photovoltaics (Genennig 1996; Karsten 1998, Haas et
al. 1999; Haas et al. 2001)2 tend to be high-income academics with a special interest in
sociopolitical issues in general and energy issues in particular. An exception to this
rule is Reif (2000) where the photovoltaic users are low-income families. This is due
to the special design of the project: the 23 houses in question have been built and
equipped with PV by a non-profit cooperative who made them available for hire pur-
chase to the families. The families therefore acquired the houses complete with PV
systems, which were run by a contractor. In the other cases, in contrast, house owners
had to make a particular investment to equip their house with PV.
Which of these results may be transferred to the case of MicroCHP? To answer
this question, we need first to understand the results. If we know why it was a certain
social group that “jumped on the train”, we may draw conclusions on whether the
same reasons apply to MicroCHP.
A plausible hypothesis is that the possession of a family home is decisive. In con-
trast to tenants and to flat owners in multi-family houses, family home owners have
direct personal control over the house technology that is being installed. In contrast
to landlords and housing companies, on the other hand, they have a direct financial
interest. Lower energy costs will have an immediate effect on them whereas in a ren-
ted house, under German law, they will first  of all benefit the tenants and not the
landlord. Furthermore, even if the technology should not pay off financially, this does
not matter as much in a family home than in real estate purchased for investment pur-
poses. A family home is something else, and something more, than an investment that
needs to pay off. It is a culturally defined space for expressing the owner’s ideas, val-
ues and aesthetic preferences, for fulfilling his or her needs, for being shaped accord-
ing to the personal lifestyle. Innovative energy technology may be installed if the own-
er considers it important for some reason, even if it is not profitable.
Home ownership  is  therefore  the core variable that  explains  the prevalence of
families and rural areas: the purchase of a home is usually related to having a family,
and home ownership is more prevalent in rural areas. An additional hypothesis is that
in villages and small towns, the network of interaction between inhabitants is more
tightly woven, so that the word about experiences with new technologies will more
easily spread and neighbours and friends will be motivated to try the same. This hypo-
theses is supported by the fact that a great deal of the study subjects report to have re-
ceived essential information from neighbours, friends or relatives.
2 There is no information about education in Greenpeace 1996.
Fischer   325
The prevalence of the German South may be explained by the fact that people be-
lieve – counterfactually – that only in the South irradiation is sufficient to run a solar
system (Hübner & Felser 2001, p.78 ff).
What is interesting is the difference in professional and educational status between
the users of different technologies.  In the biomass case, most users run the plants
with wood from their own land which explains the prevalence of farmers. For the dif-
ference between solar thermal applications and photovoltaics, my hypothesis is that
solar thermal panels (as well as biomass) are better known, more thoroughly under-
stood and perceived as rather low-tech applications, therefore inviting “Do-It-Your-
self”. In the study of Hackstock et al. (1992) this aspect is explicit because they evalu-
ated a programme distributing “Do-It-Yourself” kits for solar panels. „Do it yourself“
has the double effect of saving investment costs and offering a challenge for people
interested  in  crafting  and manual  work.  Therefore,  these  technologies  may attract
users with technical and manual skills to whom the mounting and maintenance of the
system has aspects of a hobby. Although there are also “Do-It-Yourself” possibilities
for photovoltaics, the latter is less well understood, has a high-tech image, is expens-
ive and, without state support, not economical. It is therefore easily perceived not as a
technology for broad application but as a hobbyhorse of technology nerds and envir-
onmentalists. Having photovoltaics therefore implies a genuine socio-political state-
ment,  means  „outing“  oneself  as  environmentalist  and  pioneer.  This  may  appeal
rather to people with „green“ political orientation, postmaterialist values, specialised
technical interests and / or to individualists willing to take risks. These groups can tra-
ditionally be found in the academic high-income strata.  Of course,  this  hypothesis
needs careful testing which will be done in the survey to come by assessing the polit-
ical and value orientation of different technology owners as well as the image of vari-
ous technologies.
What can we learn for MicroCHP, then? With respect to electrical power, they are
designed to fit single or small multi-family houses. For analogous reasons than with
the other technologies,  we expect that especially family home owners will be inter-
ested, and that therefore families and rural areas or small towns will prevail. The pre-
valence of the South will probably not be replicated because the sunshine argument
does not apply. We also expect that professional and educational status of potential
MicroCHP users will vary, depending on which technology is applied: reciprocating
engine (or motor) CHP, stirling CHP, or fuel cell. MotorCHP is an established tech-
nology that seems feasible and economically sound. It will therefore appeal to broader
target groups, maybe especially to skilled manual workers and farmers who are experi-
enced in maintenance work and see possibilities for “Do-It-Yourself”. Fuel cell Mi-
croCHP, on the other hand, has a high tech image similar to photovoltaics. Self-main-
tenance is not possible and its workability and reliability is yet unclear. It may there-
fore appeal rather to people with specialised technical interests or postmaterialist val-
ues who would like to make an explicit environmentalist statement – that is, to the
academic high-income groups. It is difficult to determine the target group for stirling
MicroCHP. On the one hand, it is a rather old technology. On the other, it has been
little applied and is not too well-known. It remains an open question which groups of
users will be interested in it.
3.3. Attitudes
Three aspects of the users’ attitudes have been investigated in the literature: first,
the  motives,  goals  and  interests  that  made  them decide  to  apply  the  technology,
secondly, their experience and satisfaction with it, and finally, their perception of sup-
port and barriers, especially with respect to state support schemes.
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Motives, goals and interests.  In all studies, innovative technology users reported mix-
tures of different motives. Among the most prominent motives were: autonomy, in-
terest in the new technology and a desire to promote it, the wish to help the environ-
ment, and economic motives. In some studies, convenience and user friendliness were
also mentioned. But because the energy technologies studied do not normally provide
more user-friendliness  or  convenience than conventional   ones,  these  seem rather
conditions any technology must fulfill to be accepted than genuine motives to choose
innovative ones. 
Autonomy was usually not specified by the study authors. It may mean (partial) in-
dependence  from the  grid  and  transport  subjective  notions  of  security  of  supply,
independence from great companies, and the possibility of self-control. Environment-
alism encompasses  various  aspects,  most  prominently,  emission  reduction  and re-
straining nuclear energy. Especially interesting is the aspect of promoting a new tech-
nology. Subjects see themselves as „pioneers“, they want to give a positive example
for others and sensitise the public.  However, from the wording of most studies it
does not become clear what exactly is perceived as the positive or pioneering aspect
that deserves promotion. Do subjects admire engineering skills and technical achieve-
ment in the new technology? Is it its novelty? Its efficiency gains? Or rather the ex-
pected positive ecological effect? Economic motives usually mean the hope to reduce
energy cost. Less often, the technology is perceived as capital investment.
As much as the general set of motives is constant, as much does their relative im-
portance  differ  among  the  various  studies.  Sometimes  environmental  motives  are
most prominent, sometimes autonomy, sometimes technical interest. (However, eco-
nomical motives are never primary). The differences are probably to a great deal due
to methodological reasons. The studies word questions differently, present different
sets of answers to choose from, pose them in different order and elaborate topics in
different detail. For example, there is just one general question on the „environment“
in Rohracher et al. (1997) whereas Haas et al. (1997) mention the environment in sev-
eral items and highlight specific aspects like “providing alternatives to the nuclear”.
What does this mean for MicroCHP? Most of the motives mentioned above may
also be valid for MicroCHP. It is a rather new technology, it promises environmental
benefits, and there may be an economic incentive once the systems are mature and go
into mass production. In contrast to these three motives, I expect that the autonomy
motive is not as valid as long as the machines run on gas, gasoline, or other fuels that
need to be purchased. 
Because of its novelty, MicroCHP involves both high risk and high profile, prob-
ably attracting people who define themselves as „pioneers“ (or “innovators”, in the
terms  of  Rogers  (1995)).  There  may be a  problem with  the  „pioneering“  motive,
however. A MicroCHP plant is not visible from outside the house, like a solar panel
or solar cell is. Even when shown, its appearance tells nothing about its functioning –
it is  nothing but a „grey box“.  Therefore,  its owners cannot as easily demonstrate
their pioneering efforts  to the world. Promoting the technology and setting an ex-
ample therefore requires discussions and explanations. Thus making promotion more
difficult, MicroCHP may not be the technology of choice for people who would like
to make a visible statement.
For our study, it is also interesting how the various motives are weighted and what
they mean in detail: What exactly is attractive about a new technology? What are the
expected environmental benefits? What amount of economic benefit do people ex-
pect? How do they want to promote it?
Experience and satisfaction. Virtually all participants in all studies are highly satisfied
with their systems. Satisfaction is even higher when participants monitor their system
themselves, receiving detailed feedback on its performance. Occasional dissatisfaction
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relates almost exclusively to economic aspects: investment costs were too high or sav-
ings were not as substantive as expected. Some PV users had initial problems with the
reliability of their systems which diminished over time, though (Karsten 1998).
A prerequisite for satisfaction, of course, is the functioning of the system. Given
this, and given the fact that an innovative energy system is something that does not
come automatically but is actively sought ought by the users, I assume that satisfac-
tion  stems  from  having  successfully  realised  one’s  goals  and  aspirations,  and  ob-
serving the positive effects of this. Therefore, I assume that MicroCHP users will also
be satisfied, provided the system works. Satisfaction may be even increased when de-
tailed data about system performance is available.
Support and barriers. An important supportive factor is reliable information. Tech-
nology users get information from many different sources:  mass media, specialised
media,  panel  or  plant  producers,  energy  suppliers,  conferences  and fairs,  environ-
mental groups or plumber firms, the internet, and personal contacts. Many of them
are interested in technical or energy topics and have been following the discussion for
a while. The variety of possible information sources may, however, also pose prob-
lems. It is not always easy to identify relevant information, and to deal with contra-
dictory statements.
Among photovoltaic users, we can observe that many of them made other energy-
related investments before. Among them are heat insulation, energy saving appliances
and, specifically, solar thermal applications. It seems therefore that other technologies
allow participants to gain experience and pave the way for the application of more
complex technologies. We can call this the phenomenon of „trigger technologies“.
By technology users, barriers were perceived mainly in the administration of sup-
port schemes. Programmes were handled too bureaucratically, application procedures
too prolonged, sometimes the combination between investment subsidies and feed-in
bonuses was not optimised. Although a substantial number of the users would have
installed their system even without any support programmes, public support schemes
play a significant symbolic role in recognising the new technology as good investment.
To identify barriers,  it  is helpful  to also look at non-users,  which was done by
Greenpeace  (1996),  Rohracher  et  al.  (1997),  Hübner  & Felser  (2001),  Haas  et  al.
(2001) and dena (2003). It turns out that a substantive barrier is doubt and uncer-
tainty. Doubt refers to the reliability and maturity of the systems, but also to the cost
and profitability. With solar systems, there is doubt on whether there will be sufficient
sunshine  outside  Bavaria  or  Baden-Württemberg.  Subjects  perceive  a  high North-
South divide in sunshine, though in fact irradiation does not differ  much between
North and South Germany (Hübner & Felser 2001, p.78 ff).  Doubt and insecurity
prevail especially when the technology is uncommon so there is no chance to person-
ally make sure it  is  performing well.  This interpretation is  backed by the fact that
„clusters“ of solar energy applications form in certain villages or small towns (Hübner
& Felser 2001, p.23): once some systems are installed, they provide a possibility for
first-hand information and experience that can reduce doubt. 
Other important barriers are of a physical and infrastructural nature. Some poten-
tial users just do not have the right roof gradient or direction for solar applications, or
lack  space  for  storing  wood.  And  finally,  there  are  aesthetic  objections  to  solar
applications.
I assume that for MicroCHP, reliable information will be even more important be-
cause the technology is even less known. Trigger technologies will therefore play an
important role. Also, infrastructural barriers are important, because the systems take
up considerable space and, in case of fuel cell CHP, are dependent on gas supply.
Aesthetic  considerations  will  of  course  not  be relevant,  which may make the  Mi-
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croCHP’s  „invisibility“  a  good  thing,  in  contrast  to  the  considerations  presented
above.
3.4. Hypotheses
On the basis of this discussion, I can now formulate some hypotheses concerning
the potential target group for MicroCHP.
1. The main target group are families living in their own house in rural areas or small
towns. While fuel cell-based MicroCHP may appeal mainly to academic high-in-
come groups, there is potential for MotorCHP among skilled manual workers and
small workshop owners.
2. Persons interested in MicroCHP will  perceive themselves as „pioneers“ with a
mission to promote a new technology. The motives behind this are either a keen
technical interest, a positive evaluation of innovation in general, or environmental
reasons. The technical interest may have a hobby component. Economic motives
may also play a part, but are not decisive. The autonomy motive is less prevalent.
3. Being „pioneers“, users will have an interest in distributing their ideas, sharing ex-
perience and demonstrating the new technology and its workability. These inten-
tions may be counteracted by the fact that MicroCHP is little visible. Users will
therefore welcome opportunities to share ideas, thoughts and experience.
4. Provided that the system works satisfactorily, MicroCHP users will be satisfied
with their decision and possibly act as multipliers for the idea. Feedback on sys-
tem performance and possibilities to monitor performance oneself may increase
satisfaction.
5. In order to promote MicroCHP, reliable information is crucial to reduce doubt.
Potential users will therefore be people who have been dealing with related topics
for some time, and probably have gained some experience with „trigger technolo-
gies“.
6. Infrastructural restrictions play an important role as long as space requirements
are not reduced.
7. MicroCHP can be promoted by suitable design of support schemes. A combina-
tion between investment subsidies and feed-in tariffs will be welcomed by most
users. It is important that programmes are administered flexibly, swiftly and un-
bureaucratically.
4. Focus Groups: Preliminary Results
Focus group results, especially with respect to sociodemographic data, must be in-
terpreted with caution. On the one hand, the high response rate of 37% indicates that
focus group participants are not too untypical for the whole sample of field test ap-
plicants. But still, they are probably not entirely representative, but do represent an es-
pecially interested and committed subgroup. Given the fact that even the applicants
are a positive selection of all potential users and may be characterised as “pioneers”,
we can assume that focus group participants exhibit these “pioneer” qualities to an
even higher  degree.  Therefore,  they do not  give us information about the average
user, but allow us to describe a special group that paves a new technology the way
into the market and is therefore crucially important.
4.1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics
The most striking feature is that all focus group participants were men. In this,
they are representative for the sample that was addressed: of the 99 addressees, 91
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were men, 4 couples and 4 women. In one group, group members realised and dis-
cussed  this  fact.  The discussion  brought  up possible  explanations  that  will  be ex-
plored in more detail in part 4.2.
Regarding age group, both mode and median were in the age group of 41-50 years,
but there were more participants older than 50 than younger than 40. As expected, all
but one were home owners. All lived with a wife, and 20 in families with underage
children. Of the 6 participants with no children in their house, 5 were pensioneers.
The families were also relatively big: the average number of children per family (ex-
cluding the couples without children) was 2,1. Fig. 2 and 3 give an overview of age
groups and family sizes.
 
We also find that focus group members were highly educated. 81% have a gram-
mar school degree as compared to 20% in the general population. 69% have a uni-
versity or comparable degree, 20% a technical degree that allows them to train ap-
prentices (Meister). With the income, the picture is more mixed. On the one hand, fo-
cus group members have high household incomes (see Fig.4), indicating a qualified,
high-status career. The results therefore fit into the picture of academic elites. On the
other hand, high income does not necessarily mean high disposable funds. Focus gro
Fup  members  have  comparatively  big  families  (sometimes  including  grown-up
children or other relatives) which lowers per capita income. Unfortunately, no exact
calculation of per capita income can be given because income was measured in ranges.
The result therefore indicates that the most important aspect of income is not the
availability of funds for investment, but rather, income functions as an indicator for
social status and education.






































Fig. 2: Age of participants Fig.3: Number of children under 18
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What is highly interesting is the professions of the group participants. First, there
is  high technical competence  and interest.  Of 26 participants,  13 are engineers  or
technicians.  Three  more  are  teachers,  all  with  a  science  or  technology  subject.
Secondly, the professions mirror an interest in energy and / or the environment. Four
of the applicants work in the energy sector,  one deals with hydrogen applications,
three work in the environmental  sector.  All in all,  there are 19 persons who work
either on a technical, energy or environmental topic. 
The socio-demographic characteristics of focus group members fit well with Hy-
pothesis 1. We are dealing with a high status, elite group with good education and ac-
cordingly good income, living in their own homes with their families. Three quarters
of the group members demonstrate an interest in technology, energy and / or the en-
vironment already by their choice of education and career. However, the profession
only partly indicates a person’s interests and competences, therefore I will discuss this
subject in more depth in part 4.2. What is striking is the almost exclusive prevalence
of men. When I discuss attitudes, I will come back to this fact and  consider possible
explanations.
4.2. Attitudes
I discuss three aspects of attitudes: first, the motives, goals and interests that made
group members apply for the field test, secondly, perceived supporting factors and
barriers, thirdly, satisfaction. Because group members were not able to test the fuel
cell systems in their homes, satisfaction is mostly based on what they learnt about the
systems during the group sessions and the guided tour.
4.2.1. Motives, Goals, and Interests
Motives, goals and interests were surveyed by different techniques. Every group
member  was  asked  to  explain  the  motivation  for  their  application.  Furthermore,
group members performed a guided brainstorming on hopes and fears relating to fuel
cell MicroCHP. Every group member was asked to note their ideas on slips of paper,
then the ideas were arranged thematically, presented, and discussed in the group. Fi-
nally, group members were asked to reach consensus on a hierarchy among different
technologies for heat and power generation and give reasons for the order chosen. 
When asked about their motives, it first turned out that most participants became
interested on some specific occasion.  In twelve cases, the heating system was out-
dated and needed replacement, in three more, the interviewees had purchased or in-
herited a house and were considering necessary updates. However, there were also in-
terviewees who explicitly stated that there was no special occasion, and that their heat-
ing system would continue to work for some time, but they were more generally inter-
ested in fuel cell technology.
As expected, we find a very strong interest in technical innovation. 18 interviewees
discuss this topic in detail when asked about their motives. Many have been following
the development of energy technologies in general, or of fuel cells or hydrogen tech-
nology in particular, for a number of years. Among them are not only interviewees
with a professional background in engineering or technology, but also “hobby techni-
cians”. Technical interest is inseparably interwoven with the interest in the “new” and
forward-looking (zukunftsweisend, Zukunftstechnologie). Interviewees state to be “open for
everything that’s new”, they want to “jump on the bandwagon of cutting-edge tech-
nologies”. For this purpose, they are willing to invest some money and incur certain
risks. Fuel cell systems are interesting because they are perceived as especially modern
in comparison with other  generation techniques. Visions articulated in this context
dealt with a hydrogen economy, import of solar hydrogen from desert areas, and self-
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sufficient home systems based on a combination of fuel cells, photovoltaics, and hy-
drogen storage.
Subjects  were not  very specific  on what exactly  makes  a technology “forward-
looking”, though. The notion of the forward-looking in German may have a connota-
tion of the ecologically sustainable, but not necessarily so. Because some interviewees
make this link explicit, but others don’t, we cannot be sure whether ecological aspects
are always implied in the  “forward-looking”. 
Ecological aspects are important, however. Sixteen people spontaneously mention
an interest in ecology or “alternative energy”, when asked about their motives. Envir-
onmental benefits form the biggest share of all hopes articulated in all three groups.
Some members state rather broadly that they are looking for something “innovative
and ecological” or “ecologically sound”. But there are also a number of more specific
statements  that  demonstrate that  group members  are  well  informed:  they hope to
lower CO2 and pollutant emissions,  protect  the climate, and give an answer to re-
source depletion. 
Interviewees are no full-fledged environmentalists, though. They don’t favour al-
ternative lifestyles and distance themselves from “Greens”. Ecological considerations
are  usually  tightly  interwoven  with  the  interest  in  technological  innovation  –  the
wording “innovative and ecological” is characteristic. Interest in ecology and innova-
tion melt in the much-used concept of the “forward-looking”. Interviewees have an
optimistic outlook, assuming that technology will solve the environmental problems.
At the same time, new technologies are expected to be more “efficient” and “eco-
nomical”, thus linking environmental and economic benefits. Only in a few cases do
people report a more philosophically or politically motivated environmentalism: two
are religiously  motivated,  one is  “a  determined  nuclear  opponent”,  a  third  one is
“grown up with agriculture and feel[s] close to nature”. 
Group members do not only pay lip service to innovation and the environment.
They  have  already  made  considerable  investments  in  it.  Six  have  installed  solar
thermal panels (mostly for hot water) and / or photovoltaics, three more have such
systems under construction. A few invested in heat pumps, a wood heater or have
equipped their house with heat insulation. As one participant puts it:
It is my aim to rearrange the building in terms of optimum [energy] use. Better
heat supply and heat insulation – a combination of solar thermal water heating and a
fuel cell would be ideal. Later, this could be combined with photovoltaics,  and I’d
achieve some form of self-sufficiency.
Self-sufficiency – or autonomy – turns out to be an important idea. Participants
stress their desire to be independent from the grid and thus safe from grid failure or
blackouts. Autarchy is a dream for many. Autonomy is spontaneously associated with
fuel cells even if, at the moment, they run on gas from the grid. When participants be-
come aware of this problem, it is discussed with great interest and balanced against
the dependence on fuel  oil  and the electricity grid that  is  implied by conventional
solutions. The desire for autonomy goes together with a remarkable degree of distrust
in anything that cannot be controlled oneself.  This becomes very noticeable when
participants (in the context of constructing a hierarchy of power supply options) dis-
cuss  „green power“. Green power is unanimously  rejected because “I don’t  know
what kind of green power it is”, “anyone who believes it is dim-witted”, “I fail to see
why I should pay more when I don’t know where the electricity comes from”. 
Distrust, however, can be overcome. Participants voice satisfaction that the field
test is done by a company that is trustworthy because it is big, well-known and rooted
in the region. These qualities make it an acceptable partner.
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The  desire  for  personal  control  becomes  also  visible  when  participants  argue
against  contracting, because they want to possess  their heating system and “tinker
with it”. They perceive it as a space for self-actualisation: 
„House technology is space for creativity, something you can shape, you can un-
fold your talents, find solutions. It’s not only „It’s working, and that’s all I’m inter-
ested in“. No, I want to be ahead, find better solutions than others.”
Thus  taking pride in  the  new technology and their  competence  in  handling  it,
group members are also willing to act as multipliers and inform others. When asked
whether they would like to show their fuell cell to others, if they had one, they eagerly
agree. 
„I look at my solar thermal panel every day. It would be the same with that [fuel
cell] system. I’d tell everybody: Hey, come on, look, I show you something.” 
The teachers among the participants want to pass the information on to their stu-
dents, and everybody says at the end of the interview that they enjoyed very much ex-
changing information within the group.
This kind of enthusiasm seems to be specific for the male viewpoint. Group mem-
bers state that it had been difficult to convince their wives of taking part in the field
test. The wives, they argued, had not shared their fascination with the technology or
their idealism for the environment, but demonstrated a more pragmatic outlook: How
reliable was the new technology? How often would it have to be repaired? Was there a
danger to sit in the cold? What tangible benefits would come from it? 
The discussion points to the importance of the gender aspect in marketing techno-
logy. The women’s resistance may stem from two sources: a different interest profile
due to a different socialisation, and the responsibility for reproduction work. The so-
cialisation of most women in the generation of the group members did not include
raising their interest in technical issues. It is therefore hard for them to share their
husbands’ enthusiasm. What is more, the wives’ reproduction tasks imply that they
feel responsible for the family’s comfort, and they would be hit more than men by the
daily hassles that would come from faults and repairs of the heating system. To mar-
ket a new technology successfully, it is therefore important to adapt it to the demands
of reproduction work.
Finally, there are economic considerations. None of the participants hopes to be-
nefit financially from the field test – they volunteered out of enthusiasm and stress
that they want to give the new technology a boost, even if this needs some financial
investment. In one group, it is discussed controversially whether economic aspects
should be a criterion at all. It is argued that economic cost and benefit is not (and
should  not  be)  the  central  criterion  in  buying goods.  Other  aspects  like  comfort,
security,  or  symbolic  reasons  were  just  as  important.  However,  there  is  general
agreement that new solutions need to become economically feasible in the long term.
An insatisfactory price-performance relation is tolerated in the development phase,
but  not  for  long.  Furthermore,  economic  aspects  are  thought  important  for  the
“ordinary”  citizen  who  does  not  share  the  enthusiasm  of  the  group  members.
Interviewees do not demand high financial returns. Feasibility is enough for them – it
must “pay off” after some time. Economic considerations are therefore present, but
do not feature too prominently and are thought to be important especially in later
phases of technology development when a mass market is tackled.
The motives, goals and interests of focus group members fit hypotheses 2 and 3
with some adjustments. Group members are “pioneers” with a mission to promote
the new technology and its environmental benefits. They own “trigger technologies”
and are now looking for more. Environmental aspects are important and there is op-
timism that environmental problems can be technically solved. Economic feasibility is
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necessary in the long run, but economic motives do not feature prominently. The “pi-
oneers” are eager to spread the word and exchange information and views with each
other. Outward visibility is not important for this purpose.
Contrary  to  hypothesis  2,  autonomy  is  an  important  motive  and  fuel  cell  Mi-
croCHP is measured against it. One possible explanation is that the “self production”
of electricity in the fuel cell is very tangible while dependency from the gas grid only
becomes clear at second sight. An additional finding is that “windows of opportunity”
like heating replacement, can be used to sensitise potential users for new technologies.
4.2.2. Support and Barriers
The first and foremost barrier, specifically in the current state of technological de-
velopment, is of an infrastructural nature. Most of the applicants, including most of
the focus group members, were sorted out because cellars were just too small or low,
or  doors  to  narrow to  mount  the  fuel  cell  system.  Correspondingly,  focus  group
members insisted that the systems become smaller.
The question about fears with respect to fuel cell MicroCHP reveals other barriers.
First, the immaturity and possible „teething troubles“ of the systems are a commonly
articulated concern. People fear frequent faults and needs for repair. They are willing
to incur  a certain degree of risks,  but do not want to function as „guninea pigs“.
Secondly, the uncertainty of costs seems deterring. People cannot assess neither in-
vestment costs nor operation and maintenance costs and therefore find it difficult to
make a sound calculation and check whether  the installation  may be economically
feasible. A third, albeit not so prominent concern is safety. 
It is striking that all the barriers are related to the current, immature state of the
technology. This does not mean that there will be no more barriers once fuel cell Mi-
croCHP is ready for mass production. But it is difficult to assess possible future barri-
ers today because they are eclipsed by the current problems.
What are supporting factors that can be weighted against the barriers and help to
overcome them? It is crucially important to protect users from risks, may they be of a
financial or technical nature. A contracting arrangement may be helpful for this. The
contractor runs the plant, bears the financial risk and guarantees heat and power sup-
ply for a price fixed by contract. Group members welcome such a contracting system
for the development and testing phase. They feel it would protect them well from
risks. However, with few exceptions they hesitate to accept contracting in the long
run.  Once  the  system is  mature,  most  interviewees  prefer  to  own it  themselves.
Ownership is an important dimension of the autonomy that is sought.
Information plays a more ambigous role. On the one hand, the fact that inter-
viewees are relatively well informed and have often been dealing with energy topics
for a longer time seems to indicate that information supports interest. Interviewees
were grateful for the opportunity of exchange with others that was provided by the
group discussion, and for the information they received at the tour. They suggested
that they be kept informed on a more regular basis and that information about recent
developments  and  successes  be  published  in  company  newsletters.  On  the  other
hand, it was disillusioning to participants when they received detailed information on
the actual state and performance of fuel cell MicroCHP, as will be discussed below.
The results back, in general, hypotheses 5 and 6. Suitable infrastructure is neces-
sary, its lack a decisive barrier.  Information supports interest – provided, however,
that the system is mature enough that the information is not disappointing. Little is
there to be said about support schemes, because costs are yet incalculable so it is un-
clear what type of support programme would be needed. A new aspect is that con-
tracting arrangements can help to overcome insecurity during the development phase.
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4.2.3. Satisfaction
During the group discussion, interviewees had the opportunity to see a fuel cell-
based MicroCHP in action and get recent information on its state of development.
This information resulted in disillusionment among most participants. They had pre-
viously assumed that the product would be ready for the market much earlier, and had
underestimated technical problems and costs. Some had hoped to be able to buy a
fuel cell-based MicroCHP in one or two years. Now they learned that they would not
go into mass production before 2008. The information did not result in dissatisfaction
with the technology in general, but in disappointment about not being able to pur-
chase it soon. 
To avoid this disappointment, it seems important not to raise false expectations. If
pioneers for a field test are needed, communication should be addressed only to a
small group of possible pioneers and the status of the technology and aims of the
field test must be clearly communicated. It is advisable to only address a wider public
once the “teething troubles” are overcome.
It is therefore not yet possible to comment on hypothesis 4, because its provision,
the trouble-free functioning of the technology, is not yet given.
5. Governing technological change: Some conclusions
Technological change does to a relevant degree depend on pioneer users. So does
industrial transformation, insofar as it is driven by technological change. What pioneer
users do for the diffusion of an innovative technology is much more than accept or
reject it. They are ready to actively promote a technology and raise others’ interest -
but they are anything but uncritical mouthpieces. Pioneers critically follow the devel-
opment process, demand to keep informed, make recommendations and communic-
ate successes as well as failures to others. They can be a source of valuable advice to
developers.  When  attempting  to  govern  transformation,  it  is  therefore  helpful  to
know the pioneers and to design suitable programmes to support their pioneering ac-
tion.
Knowing the pioneers. In the case of MicroCHP, first impressions show that the po-
tential target group for MicroCHP in its early stage is a dedicated group with good
education, high social status, enthusiasm for the topic and therefore the willingness to
incur  a  certain  degree  of  risk.  They  are  males  with  predominantly  technical
professions  or education,  and have comparatively large families.  They  are not  the
outsider  innovators  portrayed  by  Rogers  (1995).  Rather,  they  have  important
characteristics of the “early adopters” that are described by Rogers as arising in the
second innovation phase. “Early adopters” are socially well integrated, serve as a role
model for others and communicate the new ideas. 
Some of the fuel cell pioneers’ fascination is specific to the fuel cell (especially the
visions of a hydrogen economy), but there are more general motives, like environ-
mental concern, autonomy and fascination with cutting-edge technologies, that make
this group a target group also for other technologies. This is illustrated well by the
fact that many of them already possess others or have been thinking of purchasing
them. The fuel cell pioneers are therefore also possible target groups for other Mi-
croCHP types.
Targeting  the  pioneers.  Governing  technological  change implies  designing  political
programmes that attract pioneer users and support them in their pioneering activities.
First results  of this study show that one of the pioneers’  core concerns is reliable,
trustworthy information. Information should tackle the areas of concern like safety,
economic performance, and reliabílity. Regularity of information and the possibility
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for feeedback and dialogue are greatly valued.  In order to avoid disappointment, in-
formation on the state of microCHP development should be veracious and avoid to
raise false expectations. Information on sociodemographic data, motives and values
of the pioneers, as presented above, may be used to design media, style and content
of an information campaign suitable to the target group.
On the other hand, if the goal is broad diffusion of a technology, it is as important
to find out who is  not among the pioneers.  That  applies  especially  to the striking
gender imbalance. Even if  the pioneers  users  are predominantly  male, they live in
families and it can be assumed that investment decisions are discussed within the fam-
ily so that women have an important say in the final decision. If a technology does
not appeal to half of the population, its diffusion chances are limited. It is necessary
to identify the “blind spots” in the technology and / or its diffusion strategy in order
to find out what could make it attractive for women. Possible apects to explore are re-
liability and convenience.
Another  conclusion  is  that  it  is  important  to  value  the  pioneers’  contribution,
which may be done financially or ideationally. As stated in the studies on “analogous”
cases, public support schemes also have an element of ideational recognition. At the
very least, recognition means protecting users from risks so that they need not feel as
“guinea  pigs”  of  technological  development.  For  such  protection,  it  is  helpful  to
design appropriate contracting or service schemes that remove from users the burden
of maintenance.
A broad diffusion of MicroCHP depends strongly on the costs and technological
barriers of installation and grid connection and on the financial rewards for feeding
electricity into the grid, topics that have not been touched here but will receive more
detailed consideration in an upcoming TIPS volume on MicroCHP scheduled for
2005.
As with governance of technological change in general, targeting pioneer users is
an enterprise that needs cooperation of various players, including microCHP manu-
facturers, electricity companies, installers and their organisations, the state, and pos-
sibly NGOs. While the improvement of the technology lies in the hands of the manu-
facturers, electricity companies can aid in its marketing and simplify grid connection.
The state and NGOs may provide independent information, the state can give finan-
cial incentives and set the political framework for grid connection, grid use and feed-
in  conditions  and  tariffs.  Installers  need special  training  to  be  able  to  install  and
maintain microCHP and give competent advice to users. 
Future research issues. Future research within the TIPS project will describe the pion-
eer group more representatively and also try to collect information about the “blind
spots” by means of a survey of about half of the 1000 applicants. A further step will
be to study the interaction between technology and the user in a broader way. To
achieve a sustainable energy future, it is not only important in which way a user sup-
ports,  promotes  or  rejects  potentially  sustainable  technologies.  It  also  matters  in
which way he interacts with these technologies,  and whether this interaction forms
part of a sustainable lifestyle. We have to think not only about technology acceptance,
but also technology handling, technology-induced behavioural changes or seemingly
unrelated lifestyle issues that may nevertheless make an efficient technology obsolete.
To put it boldly, MicroCHP will not help us if users do not accept cuts into their
autonomy for load management reasons,  if  MicroCHP is  used to heat ever bigger
badly  insulated  houses,  or  if  it  blocks  other  sustainable  technologies  (like  solar
energy). One part of the TIPS project will therefore be to study how people use the
technology, and which, if any, attitudinal and behavioural changes are triggered by it.
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Industrial Transformation and Agriculture: 
Agrobiodiversity Loss as Sustainability Problem
Franziska Wolff
1. Introduction
Despite leading a shadowy existence in the public biodiversity debate, the issue of
the loss of agrobiodiversity is hotly debated in expert circles. A broad understanding
of agrobiodiversity can be described as that part of biodiversity that contributes in the
context of agriculture to nutrition, livelihoods and the maintenance of habitats.  Its
scope covers  agricultural  crops,  productive  livestock,  raw materials,  medical  plants
and animals used for transport. Agrobiodiversity is “man-made” biodiversity resulting
from plant and animal breeding efforts. It highly threatened mostly by the spread of
modern agriculture and the globalisation of food markets.
This article recognizes today’s agrobiodiversity loss as a socio-ecological conflict
and a second order problem (Jahn/Wehling 1998), as it significantly stems from earli-
er attempts to solve social problems (namely food insecurity in the early 20th century).
By way of an extended policy-analysis it will be shown that beyond economic pro-
cesses and technological developments, interest-formed policies and multi-level gov-
ernance structures - especially intellectual property rights, sovereignty regimes as well
as on seed trade and livestock breeding regulations - impact negatively on agrobiod-
iversity. Reflexive strategies will be necessary to overcome this sustainability problem
characterised by structural uncertainty.
2. Industrial Transformation and agriculture
Industrial Transformation can be described as the changes in production and con-
sumption patterns necessary on the path to sustainable development against the back-
drop of complex society-environment interactions (Vellinga/Herb 1999). Despite the
inclusion of the term “industrial”, the concept certainly is not confined to the second-
ary, i.e. industrial sector: it has it’s relevance for the primary sector of resource extrac-
tion and agriculture, too. This is valid particularly since the two sectors are interre-
lated to an ever increasing extent: Not only have soil and nature as prime production
factors become increasingly substituted, but agricultural production has become in-
tensely industrialized and integrated into the industrial production chain.
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While the agricultural sector in the 19th century still disposed of a high autonomy
via-a-vis the other economic sectors,  today, most inputs such machines, fertilizers,
seed, feedstuff and agricultural outputs are being manufactured industrially  outside
the actual agricultural sector (Bechmann 1990: 30, see also Ditt et al. 2001, Münkel
2000,  Schulz  1996,  Franz  1962).  Production  chains  have  become  longer:  food
industry  (which  processes  raw  foodstuff  industrially  and  demands  standardised
agricultural products to be easily treated by machines) and a highly concentrated trade
sector hold a dominating position.  With the politically promoted mechanisation of
agriculture  irreversible  investment  („sunk  costs“)  have escalated,  and  pressure  has
increased to compensate these costs by means of a higher productivity: i.e. through
intensive  land  use  systems,  the  use  of  machines,  fertilisers  and  pesticides,
monocultural  cultivation  -  and  the  breeding  of  high  yielding  crops  and  high
performing  livestock.  These  processes  have  caused  massive  social  and  ecological
effects, encompassing not only in a dramatically altered job profile of the farmer and a
sinking  job rate in agriculture  but also unsustainable  production and consumption
patterns with impact among others on agrobiodiversity. For the breeding sector, the
interrelatedness of policy, technological and environmental change as well as the need
of Industrial Transformation will be described. 
3. The concept of agrobiodiversity
The term agrobiodiversity has evolved only in recent years in the wake of the gen-
eral biodiversity discourse, which really began in the 1980s. Analogous to the term
biodiversity,  agrobiodiversity encompasses different levels. It relates to the diversity
of agro-ecosystems as well as that of species of crops and farm animals, and to the ge-
netic variance within populations, varieties and races. In its broadest sense, agrobiod-
iversity also comprises soil organisms in cultivated areas, insects and fungi that pro-
mote good production, wild species from off-farm natural habitats as well as cultural
and local knowledge of diversity and management forms as the basis of the exploita-
tion of diversity (Thrupp 2001). This article focuses on species and genetic diversity.
Though the term agrobiodiversity emerged late, a wide intersection of the topic
was already analysed under the term “genetic resources” in the 1960s when the FAO
started to discuss the genetic foundations of plant breeding. Genetic resources for
food and agriculture (GRFA), generally speaking, encompass the genetic material con-
tained in (traditional and modern) plant varieties and farm animal species as well as
well as in primitive and wild relatives that are used, or may be used, for the produc-
tion of food and agriculture (FAO 1996a, 1999). The term of agrogenetic resources
therefore not only embraces diversity in actual use, but also that of potential use and
value  (“latent  diversity”,  cf.  Gollin/Smale  1999).  They  are  the  raw material  from
which new crop varieties and breeds are being developed.
During the last three decades the understanding of agrobiodiversity has developed
from the recognition of the importance of genetic diversity, particularly for crops and
an emphasis on the ex situ conservation of genetic resources in the 1970s, to the adop-
tion of an in situ/on farm approach where plants and animals are kept in natural sur-
roundings or used within agricultural production systems in the 1990s. Finally, agrobi-
odiversity thinking has become embedded in an integrated, holistic agro-ecosystem
approach (Aarnink et al. 1998). 
4. From riches to risk
While in animal breeding genetic erosion is conceded by most relevant actors, with
respect to plants the diagnosis of agrobiodiversity loss is not undisputed. The plant
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breeding industry e.g.  stresses that “although the visible diversity  in farmers’  fields
may have been reduced, the diversity of valuable genes has been increased by intro-
gression of new materials” (ASSINSEL 1996). Not only does the analysis vary accord-
ing to the level of diversity analysed (genetic, species, ecosystem), but also according
to the measures of diversity and the methods of analysis employed. However, the fol-
lowing data and assessments can be considered reliable. In the report on the “State of
the World’s Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (PGRFA)”, the FAO
(1996) describes as “substantial” the loss in diversity of plant genetic resources for
food and agriculture (PGRFA) including the disappearance of species, plant varieties
and gene complexes (“genetic erosion”). World nutrition today is mainly based on a
mere ten crops. For Germany it is estimated that, compared to the first half of the
twentieth century, 75 percent of cultivated plants in agriculture and horticulture have
disappeared (UBA 2002: 403); in some areas “genetic erosion” is even supposed to
have reached over 90 percent (TAB 1998). Similar processes have been taking place
globally from the mid nineteenth century onwards (GTZ 2000). Concerning livestock,
half of the breeds that existed in Europe at the turn of the century have become ex-
tinct; a third of the remaining 770 breeds are severely endangered. In Germany only 5
out of at least 35 indigenous breeds of cattle remain. The FAO predicts that world-
wide 28 percent of livestock breeds are currently at risk of extinction (FAO 1993).
5. Agrobiodiversity loss as sustainability problem
Sustainability problems can be defined as conflicts with a social, ecological and an
economic dimension both in terms of causes and impacts. However, they can also be
defined structurally via their reflexive nature and the underlying interaction between
social, ecological and technological change. All three approaches will be applied here.
5.1. The impacts
Why is agrobiodiversity  loss problematic  at all?  This  question will  be answered
with  respect  to  the  social,  ecological  and  economic  impacts  that  characterise
agrobiodiversity loss as a sustainability problem. 
In terms of its ecological dimension, the loss of robust cops and livestock adapted
to their surrounding eco-systems (soil, climate) and the subsequent use of genetically
homogenous  high yield  varieties  and high performance animals  (kept  in high-tech
sheds) makes necessary numerous unecological inputs: These varieties and races are
not only more vulnerable, often prone to diseases caused by breeding (“burn out syn-
drome”), but they dependent on high and stable inputs of (fossil) energy, fertilizers
and pesticides in the case of plants, and food, energy, and pharmaceuticals in the case
of animals. The loss of locally adapted traditional varieties and races also impacts on
the surrounding eco-system and wild biodiversity. On the other hand, the protection
of landraces and indigenous livestock breeds is worthwhile despite their lower yields
since they often possess valuable traits such as disease and pest resistance and are bet-
ter adapted to harsh conditions and poor quality feed, which are qualities desirable for
low-input, sustainable agriculture. 
In terms of social impacts, the loss of genetic resources poses a threat to food se-
curity. Genetic resources, along with soil and water, constitute the foundation upon
which agriculture and world food security are based (FAO 1996: 6). The destruction
of the diversity of these resources not only increases vulnerability in terms of animal
diseases, pests and harvest failures, but it also undermines the foundations of future
breeding and development paths. Beyond the immediate uses of agrobiodiversity as
described above (relevance to nutrition, livelihoods, habitats), agrobiodiversity is im-
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portant  to preserve possible future development  paths:  Genetic diversity  found in
domestic  animal  breeds  and  plant  varieties  allows  farmers  and  breeders  to  select
stocks or develop new breeds and varieties in response to changes in the environ-
ment, threats of disease, new knowledge of human nutrition requirements, changing
market conditions and societal needs, all of which are largely unpredictable. A second
social dimension of agrobiodiversity loss is the equity issue. It becomes relevant in re-
lation to property rights regulating the balance between farmers and agribusiness, and
in relation to the distribution of benefits between agrobiodiversity rich countries in
the South and industrial countries in the North appropriating the returns when utiliz-
ing these resources.
Finally, agrobiodiversity loss also has economic impacts: the genetic, species and
agro-ecosystems variety protects against vulnerability to e.g. climate stress, insect pests
and diseases that can devastate a uniform crop, especially on large plantations. There
are  famous  examples  of  economic  disasters  springing  from ‘genetic  monoculture’
such as the 19th century Irish potato famine and the US pest “Corn Leaf Blight” in
1969. With farm animals, too, lacking genetic diversity impedes adaptation to diseases,
parasites, or variations in the availability and quality of food. Thus, agrobiodiversity
loss increases the economic risks for individual farmers and can undermine the stabil-
ity both of agriculture and the food business (Thrupp 1997).
5.2. The causes
The causes of agrobiodiversity loss are manifold and interrelated. The economic
development, above all the spread of modern, commercial agriculture and intensive,
high-input production systems features as prime driver of diversity decrease, putting
native varieties and breeds at risk (FAO 1996a: 13, FAO 2003). Native varieties and
breeds are substituted with high-yielding crops and breeds that no longer need to be
adapted to natural (climate, soil etc.) conditions, since machinery, irrigation, fertilizers
and pharmaceuticals homogenize habitats (in a both costly and environmentally harm-
ful way). In developing countries, this process has been reinforced by a donor policy
that has promoted the import of exotic breeds and crossbreeding and that threatens
the survival of local breeds (Geerlings et al. 2002: 6). Both the markets for agricultural
inputs and for agricultural outputs have been increasing in size, thus feeding into a
globalising food market that demands goods in huge consignments. In order to pro-
cess them industrially, those agricultural goods need to be homogenous. Therefore,
apart from the yields it is the requirements of industrial cultivation, husbandry and
processing (and to some extent consumer demand) that determine the breeding ob-
jectives rather then nutritional value, taste, improved stress resistance or adaptation to
natural conditions.
A second driver of agrobiodiversity loss is seen in the technological realm. Mod-
ern, highly selective breeding methods contribute to the problem by making possible
dangerous degrees of homogenisation. In livestock breeding e.g. artificial insemina-
tion, multiple ovulation and embryo transfer are applied to reproduce only a few top
performers; a huge number of other individuals are thus excluded from breeding and
the genetic distance within populations is correspondingly reduced. Hybrid breeding,
with both animals (e.g. poultry,  pigs)  and plants (e.g. corn, rice), and in the future
cloning are methods used to reproduce genetically homogenous and high performing
livestock and plant varieties. In the case of animals, impacts on the genetic pool are
expected when traditional pure breeding gets replaced by the modern methods (Wet-
terich 2001: pp. 45). Also, since hybrid breeding produces infertile breeds and seed
farmers cannot use the material to continue breeding/growing according to their own
selection  preferences,  they  have  to  instead  content  themselves  with  commercially
bred/grown livestock and seeds, which they even have to buy again every year.  In
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plant  breeding,  ‘Genetic  Use  Restriction  Technologies’  (GURTs)  have  the  same
effect. 
In the social and political realm, policies and legal regimes contribute to agrobiod-
iversity loss, such as breeding law and intellectual property regimes. In chapter 5, a se-
lection of these factors is discussed in detail. Interrelated with these policy factors,
conflicting societal interests and interpretations characterise the arena and hamper a
conflict resolution. In plant breeding, the mere problem perception is contentious, as
was mentioned above.
5.3. The structure
Structurally,  agrobiodiversity constitutes a genuine socio-ecological constellation:
As opposed to wild biodiversity, agrobiodiversity (for the most part) is characterised
by the proximate interaction between natural ‘material’ and human action.  The di-
versity of productive livestock and crops is the result of a century of human breeding
efforts based on locally differentiated resources. It reflects the diversity of various ag-
ricultural production systems and their cultural and social dependency. Also, the de-
velopment (as well as the destruction) of agrobiodiversity is closely related to the hu-
man knowledge of cultivation and husbandry as well as the emergence of different
breeding techniques and technologies. Maintenance of agrobiodiversity, too, is insep-
arably linked to the use and utilisation of crops and livestock by humans - unlike with
wild biodiversity, protection in the sense of ‘leaving it alone’ does not suffice.
Besides the socio-ecological structure, agrobiodiversity loss like many other sus-
tainability problems is characterised by a reflexive nature: A substantial part of the
problem can be described as being caused by the unintended feedback of a previous
problem solving strategy. Specifically, it was the post-war policy of food security that
aimed at alleviating food scarcity but as a side effect destroyed agrobiodiversity.  It
massively promoted the industrialization of agriculture, first in the developed nations
(e.g. through the EC Common Agricultural Policy) and later in developing countries.
The “Green Revolution” - the political push for the introduction of high yield crops,
irrigation, fertilizers, pesticides and mechanization from the 1960s on - aimed at clos-
ing the so-called ‘development-gap’ between the South and North. The model of food
security not only led to major increases in production output, but also contributed -
among other factors - to the global homogenising of production structures and mar-
ket conditions. Agrobiodiversity loss thus can be considered a “second-order prob-
lem” (Jahn/Wehling 1998), to the extent that it is at least partly caused by efforts to
solve (other) problems. The efforts have led, as a result, to the reduction of the fun-
damentals of agricultural production: agrobiodiversity. The development, therefore, is
paradoxical: the result of breeding for a high yield and homogeneity for “food secur-
ity” destroys the race, species and genetic diversity and, therefore, the resources on
which the breeding itself is established.
6. The role of policy regimes and governance structures
The  economic  and  technological  developments  detrimental  to  agrobiodiversity
(described in chapter 5.2) were partly supported by policies and governance structures
such as intellectual property rights and sovereignty regimes that regulate access to and
control over genetic resources as well as seed and livestock breeding law. Those have
intentionally, or as side effects,  supported the orientation towards high output and
homogenisation, thus also affecting the choice of plants and livestock in agricultural
use. 
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6.1. The regulation of access and control
Access to and control of plant and farm animal genetic resources is regulated by
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in the realm of private law and, in the context of
public (international) law by sovereign rights of states (Kameri-Mbote/ Cullet 1999).
6.1.1. Intellectual property regimes
Breeding, particularly of plants, heavily relies on Intellectual Property Rights. The
background of this can be found in the specialised nature of agricultural production
and the fact that breeding involves a high amount of work as well as intellectual and
financial efforts. Especially for new plant varieties (not so much for animals), breed-
ers’ returns are endangered by the biological possibility that farmers would reproduce
the seeds. Without breeders’ efforts, on the other hand, it is argued that the supply of
agricultural production with high quality seeds would suffer (Wuesthoff et al. 1999:
96). Against this backdrop, in the early twentieth century intellectual property rights
that originally applied to industrial inventions were merely extended to living matter
to compensate breeders’ efforts.
Two major IPR regimes can be distinguished that impact on agrobiodiversity in
varying degrees: plant variety protection (PVP), applying only to plants, and patents. 
Plant Variety Protection (PVP)
PVP systems have emerged in Europe from the late 1920s onwards. At the core of
PVP  are the so-called Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBR), a specific form of Intellectual
Property Right, which provides an exclusive right over the variety a breeder has de-
veloped. The main difference from patent protection lies in the restriction of PBRs to
the concrete variety as a marketable product, while patents provide generic protection.
In the 1960s an international harmonisation of national plant protection laws took
place  and  the  International  Union  for  the  Protection  of  New Varieties  of  Plants
(UPOV) was founded. Today, with 53 member states (increasingly from the develop-
ing world, too) the UPOV Convention has become the international reference system
for PVP. 
Plant Breeders Rights require that anybody who (re-) produces, conditions, offers
for  sale,  markets  or  imports/exports  propagating material of the protected variety
needs the authorization of the breeder, which the breeder may subject to conditions
(usually royalties) and limitations. (Art.  14 UPOV Convention) The breeders rights
are restricted by the so-called breeders’  exemption and the farmers’  privilege (Art.
15.1, 15.2), both of which were cut back in 1991. The breeder’s exemption constitutes
the right to use protected varieties for the breeding of other varieties and for experi-
mental purposes, while the farmer’s privilege refers to the farmer’s right to save and
re-use (formerly also to sell) harvested material. Depending on national implementa-
tion, the plant variety protection may cover all plant varieties and needs to last a min-
imum of twenty years (Art. 3, 19 UPOV Convention). 
In two senses the plant variety protection system of UPOV can be seen as harmful
to agrobiodiversity. Firstly, the criteria for variety protection - the so called “DUS re-
quirements”  on  Distinctness,  Uniformity/Homogeneity  and  Stability  of  new plant
varieties - impact on plant variability. Secondly, it is argued that Plant Breeders Rights,
like other IPRs have indirect effects on agrobiodiversity by restricting access to genet-
ic resources.
Within the DUS requirements it is particularly the uniformity criterion (Art. 5 (1)
iii, Art. 8 UPOV Convention) that meets with criticism. It aims at restricting genetic
diversity within a plant variety, because in order to apply a Plant Breeder’s Right it is
necessary to unequivocally distinguish the variety from other varieties. This presup-
poses physical distinctiveness and uniformity, which disappear  at the expense of sig-
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nificant genetic variability (Crucible Group 1994). In the field, uniform varieties are
less able to buffer stress (diseases, lack of growth factors)  without suffering major
qualitative and quantitative losses (Léon 2002: 33). At the same time, the uniformity
criterion precludes the protection of old landraces, which are frequently rich in genet-
ic diversity within a variety (Dutfield 2000). From a broader perspective, the uniform-
ity criterion is identified as a factor that makes PVP biased towards plant breeding for
industrial agriculture (GRAIN 1999): Compliance with this criterion inclines breeders
to develop varieties that have low adaptability and are highly adjusted to monocultural
production systems for large markets. Contrary to this rationale, it is also argued that
PBRs enhance genetic diversity because the introduction of PVP regimes has boosted
the growing number and registration of new varieties (UPOV 2002). However,  link-
ing the number of licensed varieties and the degree of genetic diversity neglects the is-
sue of genetic distance or the degree of relationship between varieties. Phenotypical
diversity does not give evidence of the genetic diversity of a plant variety (Neumeier
1990: 231; Butler/Marion 1983: 72, Prall 1998).
The indirect impacts of PVP on agrobiodiversity result from the restricted access
they  determine.  The breeders’  authorisation to (re-)  produce,  condition or  market
propagating material means that the material is not freely (i.e. free of charge) access-
ible. For the breeder, the right, in the first place, increases the incentive for commer-
cial  plant  breeding.  Secondly,  it  promotes  the  development  of  varieties  with  the
largest  market  potential.  This  leads  to  the  predominance  of  major  crops  that  are
widely adapted across large areas and that feature characteristics that best meet the
needs of  commercial farmers  and the marketing or processing industries (Crucible
Group 1994). This impedes diversity.  Therefore,  the strengthening of PBRs in the
1991 UPOV revision is to be seen critically. PBRs have been strengthened with re-
spect to the object of protection (extension to  all plant genera and species), to the
scope of protection (extension to ‘essentially derived’ varieties and to harvested ma-
terial) as well as to the possibility for member states to grant patents on top of breed-
ers’ rights (‘double protection’). At the same time, the Breeder’s exemption was re-
stricted. These revisions mostly go back to pressures resulting from the growing im-
portance of biotechnology (Bragdon/Downes 1998: 20). A further indirect effect of
PVP is  that  it  probably reduces the flow of scientific  information  and germplasm
from the private to the public sector (Butler 1996). This is due both to the private
sector’s interest  in not having public competitors who develop varieties for public
welfare as well as to the forced market orientation within public research institutes in
times of scarce public funding.
Patents
Originally, patent law was not designed to apply to living matter, i.e. to material
capable of self-reproduction or of being reproduced in a biological system. However,
in the United States plant patents have been granted since the 1930s. Internationally,
patent law is becoming more and more important with the growing relevance of bio-
technological methods, in particular genetic engineering. The patenting of biological
material  is  regulated in  international  patent  law such  as  the  WTO Agreement  on
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the European Patent Convention
(EPC)  and  the  EC  Biotechnology  Patent  Directive.  The  interpretation  of  these,
however, led to a number of highly contentious questions. The TRIPs constitutes the
international minimum standard for all WTO members. It codifies that member states
need to provide patents “for any inventions,  whether products or processes,  in all
fields of technology” (Art. 27 (1) TRIPs, italics added). At the same time, “plants and an-
imals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the produc-
tion of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes”
may be excluded from patentability in national legislation. However, states are bound
to provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by effective sui gen-
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eris  systems (e.g. plant variety protection, cf. Leskien/Flitner 1997) or a combination
of the two regimes (Art. 27.3 (b) TRIPs). In the industrialized world, there is usually a
lot less leeway in terms of legal coverage. In the EPC, patents in the field of biological
matter are excluded merely for “plants or animal varieties or essentially biological processes
for the production of plants or animals” (Art. 53 (b) EPC, italics added). This implies
that plant and animal components such as genes, gene sequences or cells, individual
plants/animals  as  well  as  certain  (non-microbiological)  processes  actually  are
patentable.  The  patent  exemption  on  plant  and  animal  varieties  as  well  is  being
watered down by the European Patent Office judicature. In the EC Biotechnology
Patent Directive, plant and animal varies prima facie are also excluded from patentabil-
ity (Art. 4.1 (a)) However, this provision is qualified by the clause that “Inventions
which concern plants and animals shall be patentable if the technical feasibility is not
confined to a particular plant or animal variety” (Art. 4.2). US patent law is even more
expansive.
What is the background of this discussion? Generally, in order to receive a patent,
an  innovation  in  the  first  place  needs  to  qualify  as  an  invention.  The  term
“invention”, though, is defined in none of the international agreements on patent law.
Nonetheless, there is a general agreement that innovations need to be practical and
technical. In a second step, in order to be eligible for patent protection, the invention
needs to be new, involve an inventive step (i.e. are ‘non-obvious’) and be capable of
industrial application (‘usefulness’). Finally, the granting of patent protection requires
the disclosure of the invention. As for patents on biological matter (‘biopatents’), a
major dispute surrounds whether or not plant or animal genetic material may at all
constitute the subject of an invention (WTO 2002, 1995; Marin 2002; Watal 2001).
This raises doubts with respect to both practicality and technicality. In terms of prac-
ticality,  it  is  still  controversial  whether  products  of  biotechnology  that  are,  or  are
based on, genes or cells taken from nature or isolated from pre-existing living matter
constitute a product of nature and as such a unpatentable discovery, or whether they
are  patentable  inventions.  In  the  court  practice  of  most  industrialized  countries,
however, there is a clear, though not uniform, trend towards recognizing naturally oc-
curring substances as patentable subject matter if they were isolated or purified and if
their existence was previously unknown (Leskien/Flitner 1997: 9). The patentability as
such of living matter is no longer disputed by most courts. In terms of technicality,
over the last years in many countries (as well as implicitly in the TRIPs Agreement)
living beings have been ascribed a ‘technical nature’ that is a prerequisite for patent-
ing. Reproducibility, as an additional requirement to prove technicality, leads to the
necessity of disclosing inventions relating to or relying on biological material that is
not publicly available and cannot be described in writing alone; this  conundrum is
partly resolved by the possibility of depositing biological material for the purpose of
sufficiently describing a product patent. On top of the decision of whether plant and
animal genetic innovations fulfil  the legal criteria of an invention at all (practicality,
technicality), the specific patent requirements of novelty, non-obviousness/inventive
step, usefulness/ industrial applicability as well as sufficient disclosure need to be sat-
isfied (cf. Marin 2002; Dutfield 2000; Correa 2000, 1992; Leskien/Flitner 1997). Then
again, these requirements are insufficiently specified in international agreements (e.g.
TRIPS)  and interpreted in different  ways in national legal systems.  However,  they
have proved not to be insurmountable for the granting of biopatents.
Patents impede the development of agrobiodiversity by restricting access to genet-
ic  resources  used in breeding  and research  (CIMMYT 2000:  26).  Similar  to  Plant
Breeder’s Rights in conventional plant breeding, the utilisation of germplasm, seeds of
animals with a patented element (product patent), presupposes the right-holder’s au-
thorization. However, patents are more exclusive since licences to competitors can be
refused. Only research without market-orientation is exempted. Also, licence fees are
more costly than PBR royalties and may develop even prohibitive effects. When pro-
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cesses  for  the  genetic  modification  of  plants  and  animals  are  patented  (process
patents) third parties depend on the patent holder’s authorisation not only for the im-
mediate application of the patented process, but also for the use, selling or import of
products immediately derived from the process. Not only due to this generic protec-
tion, but also due to the usual lack of a breeder’s exemption and a farmer’s privilege,
the  exclusive  right  provided  by a  patent  has  stronger  exclusive  effects  than Plant
Breeder’s  Rights.  It  is  unclear  whether  a  system  of  compulsory  cross-licensing
between patents and plant breeders’ rights will suffice to secure access to genetic ma-
terial for breeding purposes.
Experience with patents on plant biotechnological  innovations corroborates the
feared restrictions on access and utilisation of the protected products and processes.
Patent licences, if granted by the patent holder, reduce the incentives for third parties
to engage in research and breeding within the scope of protection of the patent. This
indicates that broad patents, which extend to second-generation uses, have stifling ef-
fects on the breeding efforts of competitors of the first patentee. An example was the
US patent on all transgenic cotton plants. With its extremely wide-ranging exclusive
rights it had caused a standstill in cotton research so that in the end, the US Agricul-
ture Department attained the patent’s annulment (Seiler 2000: 16). The problem is ag-
gravated by the cumulative application of IPRs. Developing a transgenic plant variety
may lead to multiple rights, such as Breeder’s Rights (on the variety) and patents (on
selectable marker genes, traits, as well as transformation and gene expression techno-
logies) (cf. Seghal/van Rompaey 1992). There are already over 9000 patents on staple
crops (Action Aid et al. 2001: 8); in the case of animals, in Europe alone more than 50
animals have been patented with some 600 animal patents awaiting approval (Green-
peace 2001: 8). The multitude of IPRs and their accumulation will step up the costs of
the breeding process as well as that of the end product. In the case of plants, this will
increase the pressure to develop ‘universal varieties’ with a big market share that can
be cultivated under very different natural conditions and feature only a minimum of
uniform characteristics. It will also shift any added value from farmers to agribusiness
and within agribusiness from small breeders to major companies that are equipped
with the appropriate technology and with patents. Today, four multinationals hold 44
per cent of all patents on staple crops (Action Aid et al. 2001: 8). Concentration pro-
cesses are likely (Ect Group 2003), leading to the fusion of corporate genebanks and
breeding populations, thus not only reducing diversity of breeding strategies but also
increasing the risk of genetic erosion.
Against this backdrop, the current tendencies of strengthening international IPR
regimes are questionable. While TRIPS is still being severely criticized (especially from
a developing country perspective), a new trend has emerged especially with the US,
but also in the EU, to conclude bilateral “TRIPS Plus” treaties with developing coun-
tries that go beyond TRIPs. For example, they define the UPOV 1991 provisions as
an effective sui generis system and demand “the highest international standards” in
intellectual property rights protection, including patent protection of plant and animal
varieties and of biotechnological inventions (GRAIN 2003). At the same time, the de-
velopment of the Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) under the auspices of WIPO
is  being pushed (cf.  WIPO 2002).  The draft  treaty not  only  strives  for  minimum
standards (like TRIPS) but it defines both the top and the bottom line of IPR stand-
ards. The draft strongly expands the conditions of patentability (no concept of inven-
tion, no technicality), will probably restrict exclusions from patentability and aims at
prohibiting member states from making any further  demands on patent applicants
than those found in the treaty (GRAIN 2002). Some potential for a movement away
from mere tightening of patent regimes might be provided by internal processes in
the WTO. Firstly, in 1999 a review of TRIPs Art. 27.3 (b) was started. It was initiated
largely because the United States, under pressure from private industry, wanted to ne-
gotiate stronger life patenting requirements without exclusions for plants and animals
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(Bragdon/Downes  1998:  11,  cf.  CIEL  1998).  However,  other  members  have
perceived the review as an instrument to drive back bio-patenting. As the process has
reached a deadlock, it is at present unforeseeable whether the US position will prevail.
Secondly, the Doha Mandate in § 19 sets on the negotiation agenda the relationship
between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).
This raised the question whether TRIPS should be amended to incorporate certain
requirements of the CBD (WTO 2002: pp. 3). Particularly, patent applicants might be
required to disclose the origin of any genetic material or traditional knowledge used in
inventions and to demonstrate that they have obtained prior informed consent from
the competent authority in the country of origin and entered into appropriate benefit-
sharing  arrangements.  Though  it  is  unclear  whether  the  development  of  an  IPR
regime for traditional knowledge (cf. WIPO 2003, IISD 2003, Dutfield 2002) might
not  lead  to  a  further  tightening  up  of  the  IPR system,  which  can  be  considered
detrimental  to  agrobiodiversity,  disclosure  of  origin  and  prior  informed  consent
address “bio piracy” of biological resources and traditional knowledge, thus adding to
a  more  equitable  system (Correa  2003:  1).  However,  determining  the  “origin”  of
genetic  resources  for  food  and  agriculture  will  prove  difficult,  since  international
exchange in breeding has led to a strong interdependency among countries.  A last
strand of discussion to mention is the debate on the design of “effective sui generis
systems” under Art. 17.3 (b) TRIPs. This provision is only relevant for developing
countries,  which  have  yet  to  dispose  of  a  regime  for  plant  variety  protection.  A
number of suggestions have been made. They range from the adoption of a UPOV
1991 or UPOV 1978 to developing alternative PVP systems with different criteria as
well  as  to  an  opening  of  the  protection  system  for  benefit  sharing  agreements,
Farmers’ Rights or the protection of communities’ intellectual rights (Biothai/Grain
1998, Leskien/Flitner 1997). 
Farmers’ Rights
Farmers’ Rights are a very open concept that was meant to countervail ‘classical’
Intellectual Property Rights in the field of plant genetic resources for food and agri-
culture, especially with relevance to developing countries. They were created as a reac-
tion to the asymmetric benefits derived by the Southern donors of plant agrogenetic
resources (i.e. seed that was developed by local farmers and communities but that was
unprotected by any IPR) and the Northern users of this germplasm. In the context of
the (non-binding) International  Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture (IU), the FAO Conference in 1989 defined Farmers’ Rights as “rights
arising from the past, present and future contributions of farmers in conserving, im-
proving, and making available plant genetic resources, particularly those in the centres
of origin/diversity” (Res. 5/89). As pledge to the recognition to Breeders’ Rights the
FAO member states recognised Framer’s Rights. However, a substantive definition of
those rights was not made. It was envisaged that the realization of Farmers’ Rights
should ensure a flow of benefits from the use of plant genetic resources, to farmers
and their  communities.  FAO Resolution 3/91 therefore  laid  down that  “Farmers’
Rights will be implemented through international funding on plant genetic resources,
which will support  plant genetic conservation and utilization programmes,  particu-
larly, but not exclusively, in the developing countries”. More radical proposals strived
for developing Farmers’ Rights into some form of property rights equivalent to Plant
Breeders’ Rights: “Farmers developing a new, distinct, variety would own it, just as
plant breeders own varieties they have developed. Access to the variety would be un-
der farmers’ control” (Wood 1998: 24).
The International Seed Treaty signed in 2001 takes up the concept of Farmers’
Rights which here includes the protection of traditional knowledge relevant to plant
genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA), the right to equitably participate
in sharing benefits arising from the utilization of PGRFA, and the right to participate
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in making decisions, at the national level, on matters related to their conservation and
sustainable  use  (Art.  9.2).  The  responsibility  for  implementing  Farmers’  Rights,
however, is entrusted to the nation states.
While the effects of Farmer’s Rights on North-South equity are obvious, it is un-
clear  how exactly they will  impact  on agrobiodiversity.  A plausible  argumentation,
however, is that local participation will help keeping local varieties in the developing
countries. This might especially be relevant against the backdrop of weak perform-
ance of high yielding or GMO varieties under the conditions of the South and the ex-
perience of unfavourable side-effects like additional costs for the necessary agrochem-
icals.
6.1.2. Sovereignty
At the international level the questions of access relates to the public vs. national
sovereignty over resources. As with private right restrictions (IPRs), access to, and ex-
change of genetic resources can be hampered by way of sovereignty regimes.
In 1992 when the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was passed, a major
shift in the property regime concerning genetic resources took place: Up to then, bio-
logical resources were considered a “common heritage” or public good, and access to
them was unrestricted. Compared with this, the new regime was one of national sov-
ereignty over genetic resources, including those for food and agriculture. Thus, biod-
iversity was attributed the same status as other natural resources like oil and ores. The
background for this change was that during the 1980s the utility value of biodiversity
(for pharmaceutical and industrial purposes) became more apparent, especially com-
bined with the emergence of new methods of biotechnological use and bioprospect-
ing. The utilisation perspective began to dominate the international debate on biod-
iversity loss that led to the CBD negotiations (Elliott 1998: 74). As it is the South
where  the  major  part  of  global  biodiversity  is  concentrated,  developing  countries
played an important  role  in raising equity concerns about the open access system.
They argued that if Northern companies were to continue to exploit the species and
genetic resources of the South, while the South had to pay when making use of the
breeding results, an equitable sharing of benefits was necessary to compensate for the
unequal exchange. The concept of common heritage favoured by the industrialised
countries and nature protectionists was successfully rejected (Henne 1997: 190). The
CBD instead recognizes the sovereignty of nations over their genetic resources, thus
defining property rights. It also requires the establishment of conditions of access to
genetic resources and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their
utilization (Art. 15 CBD). The core of the access regime is a bilateral system that is
subject to mutually agreed terms and prior informed consent. On a case by case basis,
nation states and companies that want to use genetic resources from the country sign
public-private contracts on the exchange of genetic resources as well as monetary and
non-monetary  benefits  such  as  technologies  and  knowledge.  A  number  of  such
biopartnerships have been agreed with varying degrees of success (Marin 2002: pp.
120,  Bialy 1998).  The crucial  point  is  the negotiation of  fair  and clear contractual
terms  in a situation that  might be asymmetric  in terms of information and power
shares.
As the exchange of genetic material in the field of agriculture is much more com-
mon, breeding having long since been an internationalised activity, it was obvious that
the CBD bilateral system would not be optimal for agro-genetic resources, for the
transaction costs of negotiating bilateral agreements would simply be too high. Also, it
was feared that developing countries would stop to contributing genetic material into
international gene banks since access to ex situ collections was not addressed by the
Convention - a loophole threatening to undermine the CBD. Therefore, in order not
to thwart the CBD adoption, it was agreed to regulate this issue under the auspices of
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the FAO, traditionally responsible for agriculture. This change of forum lead to the
revision of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (IU), a non-binding instrument that had to date governed access to plant
genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA).  Still based on the concept of
“heritage of mankind”, the IU needed to be brought into harmony with the CBD.
After  eight  years  of  tough  negotiating,  an  internationally  binding  Seed  Treaty
(International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture/ITPGR)
was signed in 2001, which regulates facilitated access to PGRFA. 
The crucial difference in the access regimes of CBD and Seed Treaty is that the
latter is  based on a Multilateral  System (Art.  10 ITPGR).  This  Multilateral  System
consists of a list of 35 food and feed crops for which the member states will provide
facilitated access. The respective genetic material belonging to public institutions will
be kept in the public domain. “Facilitated access” means that an exchange free of
charge or at minimum fees may exclusively take place for breeding, research and - ex-
pressly not for industrial purposes (Art. 12.3 (a) (b)). Unlike in the CBD there is no
need to apply prior informed consent procedures on a case-by-case basis. Although a
number  of countries  (among others  the EU) aimed at maintaining open access  to
PGRFA, a restriction in the form of a list  was inevitable;  especially the Group of
Megadiverse  Countries  under  the  leadership  of  Brazil  had fought  hard  for  it  and
wanted to keep it as short as possible. A standardised Material Transfer Agreement
(MTA) will specify the details of access and will also be the basis for private contracts
between the providers  (mostly  gene  banks)  and the demanders  of  PGRFA.  Many
questions are still open and will need to be clarified once the Treaty comes into force.
One  of  those  questions  is  the  status  of  intellectual  property  rights,  since  the
interpretation of the Treaty’s wording on the protection of material received via the
multilateral system is still very contentious. Some discern it as a loophole since the
holder of an IPR, specifically of a patent, could restrict use of the protected sequence
or compound by others, and even access if the patent covered the method of isola-
tion, so that the Seed Treaty’s intention of facilitating access would be undermined
(Dutfield 2002: 17, CIPR 2002: 69). Despite some weak spots the ITPGR is certainly
an essential instrument for ensuring the sustainable use of PGRFA. It might serve as
a blueprint for dealing with farm animal genetic resources that have not yet been the
object of much specific consideration within international politics.
6.2. Seed and breeding regulations
Seed and breeding law is national law, although some aspects in EC countries un-
derlie European harmonisation. As an example, aspects of German seed law and an-
imal breeding law will be described in order to outline what other legal factors apart
from IPRs and international access regulation may turn out to restrict the develop-
ment of agrobiodiversity. They are problematic in terms of agrobiodiversity to the ex-
tent that they promote the streamlining of selection criteria. Also, by implicitly fur-
thering high performance varieties and races they contribute not only the displace-
ment of traditional varieties/races but also to the spread of high input agriculture.
In plant breeding, independent of private law on variety protection, EU member
states, most transition countries and some developing countries feature a compulsory
variety registration under public law (Gisselquist 1999: 413). This means that in order
to market seeds commercially, the variety needs to fulfil  specific criteria. The basic
principle  of  the  German  Seed Law (SaatG)  concerning  agricultural  varieties  goes:
Seeds and seedlings can only be marketed when they are approved of; they will only
be approved of when they belong to a variety that is registered (Rutz 2002: 8). For
variety registration, Germany, like many other countries, has established a double set
of requirements. Firstly, the “DUS” criteria, that are also crucial for variety protection,
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demand that plants grown from a specific lot of seeds are distinct and uniform, and
that their characteristics are stable over a minimum of 2 years. For the reasons out-
lined above (chapter 6.1.1), it is the uniformity criterion (§§ 30.1, 32 SaatG) that some
experts are very sceptical about. In addition to the DUS, set seed registration in Ger-
many presupposes that the variety demonstrates value in cultivation and use (VCU) (§
30 (1), § 34 SaatG). A government agency, the Bundessortenamt (Federal Agency for
Varieties), conducts the DUS and VCU tests, which are paid for by the breeding com-
panies, who also pay an annual fee for the listing of registered cultivars. The VCU, or
performance criteria, are a bundle of value designating qualities such as qualities of
cultivation, resistance, yield and quality. The VCU is, under German Seed Law, the
toughest standard that a breeder has to comply with in order to get a new crop re-
gistered; some 90% of applications fail, mostly due to lacking VCU (Steinberger 1999:
34). Varieties are considered to have value in cultivation and use when the entirety of
their ‘value designating qualities’ represents a distinct improvement vis-à-vis existing
varieties (at least within a regional area) in terms of the exploitation of either the har-
vested material or any products thereof. Individual, unfavourable characteristics may
be compensated for by other favourable qualities (cf. § 34 SaatG). The specification
of VCU, which is crop-specific, is being defined by the Bundessortenamt, i.e. by the
executive powers.  Although there have been some change in the weighting of the
qualities (Steinberger 1999), high yield for many crops still constitutes the predomin-
ant orientation. In terms of agrobiodiversity, this legal provision adds to economic in-
centives for a relatively mono-structured alignment of plant breeding. Per se, a stand-
ardisation of selection criteria is promoted. Thus, variety registration as a means that
was, and is, intended for consumer (i.e. farmer) protection as a side effect streamlines
plant breeding according to state-defined preferences. And those preferences are not
shared by every farmer; organic farmers, for example, require varieties with different
qualities  since  chemical  inputs  in  cultivation  are  prohibited  in  organic  farming
(FiBL/Öko-Institut 2003: pp. 55). Another bottleneck of diversity is that seed sale of
old cultivars - traditional varieties as well as out-of-date commercial cultivars - is illeg-
al. This issue, however, is being tackled by way of an EU initiative on conservation
varieties. Registration of land races and varieties endangered by genetic erosion shall
do without the DUS criteria and with liberalised VCU requirements. At the moment,
the implementation provisions are still being drawn up by the European Commission.
Beyond seed and beering law, marketing standards and grades of goods play an
important role in terms of agrobiodiversity. Based on UN/ECE norms, the EC (and
for  some additional  crops German legislation)  have specified standards  for  a  vast
number of fruit and vegetables, potatoes etc. that are relevant in trade. The standards
regulate  quality  grades,  sizes  (diameter,  weight),  tolerances  vis-à-vis  sorting  errors,
packaging and labelling for agricultural products that are sold freshly (aid 2001). While
the standards aim at protecting processors, traders and consumers against cheating
and aim at furthering simplification and differentiated sales, they also impact on the
variety of marketed crops. Those varieties of apples, tomatoes and potatoes that are
bigger or smaller than required, that are not as regular as required cannot be offered
for sale to the end user except in direct marketing on farms. This has led to a compre-
hensive drop out of cultivation and sale of many crop varieties and to the dominance
of ‘standard cops’.
The regulatory regime on livestock breeding reflects to a large extent the economic
conditions. Over a long period of time, animal breeding and husbandry law have sup-
ported one-sided selection strategies focused on economic performance. They have
thus contributed to the depletion of farm animal diversity. Although in the meantime
the objective of “genetic diversity” is codified in the German Livestock Breeding Act
(§ 1.2 (4), § 4.1 TierZG), the longstanding specification of selection criteria through
state agencies, which used to build the basis of performance tests and of obligatory
assessments of breeding quality, has fostered a narrowing of animal genetic diversity.
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This trend has been resumed by including into the Breeding Act the promotion of
“breeding progress” as an undefined legal term (§ 5 TierZG). As a consequence of
this  orientation,  the administrative  bodies  give permission  for  the insemination of
cattle, pigs, sheep, goats and horses only if the breeding value of the sperm donating
animal is higher than the average breeding value of comparable animals (§ 10.2 (1)
TierZG). For chickens, there is no legal control of breeding. Nor is there access to the
breeding process for chicken farmers since the existing breeding lines of laying hens
and  broiler  are  private  property  of  a  small  number  of  trans-national  breeding
companies;  farmers only raise hybrid chickens and they, themselves,  cannot breed,
correspondingly influencing genetic diversity.
7. Conclusions
This article has shown that access restriction in the form of IPRs and sovereign
rights as well as high performance oriented regulation of crop and livestock breeding
might  impact negatively on agrobiodiversity.  The respective regimes have only de-
veloped in the last 80 years, gaining rigidity parallel to the increasing relevance of bio-
technology (Raustiala/Victor 2004). From the 1920s onwards, these various regimes
started to replace an open access regime and a largely unregulated seed and livestock
sector. It needs to be stressed that the former regimes actually contained a number of
deficiencies. The introduction of variety protection (plants) and performance testing
(livestock) certainly increased productivity in times when food security in Europe was
still endangered. Also, before the introduction of seed testing there was the danger of
cheating farmers by not procuring information on the quality of the seed. The solu-
tion  of  restricting  and  privatising  access  and  of  prescribing  selection  objectives,
however, might turn out to have caused new problems: the loss of agrobiodiversity. 
Having described agrobiodiversity loss as unintended feedback of previous prob-
lem solving strategies, the imminent challenge now is not only about reducing given
obstacles and introducing new instruments. It is also about using reflexive strategies to
avoid causing new problems in the future. Elements of a reflexive strategy could be
integrated knowledge production, the anticipation of systemic consequences, adaptivi-
ty  of  problem-solving,  as  well  as  participatory  evaluation  and  goal  formulation
(Voss/Kemp 2003). Some of these elements have already become reality, such as par-
ticipatory breeding approaches as promoted by the FAO; others need to be devel-
oped.
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Driving Forces for Environmentally 
Sounder Innovations: 
The Case of Finnish Pulp and Paper Industry
Paula Kivimaa and Per Mickwitz 
Finnish Environment Institute
1. Introduction
Moving towards sustainability requires that new environmentally sounder techno-
logies are developed and widely adopted. Policy instruments that advance technologi-
cal development are necessary, while at the same time it is clear that public policy is
far from the only factor affecting the emergence and diffusion of environmentally so-
under technological innovations. Other factors influencing the innovation process ar-
rive from company external influences such as market forces or within the company
due to desires e.g. for cost cuts. 
Even though there is wide spread agreement on the importance of technological
innovations, there is still comparably little consensus on the relationship between dif-
ferent types of policies and technological development. Several contradicting claims
have been expressed regarding the policy-innovation relationship, yet empirical tho-
roughly examined evidence is rare. 
Some argue that  environmental  regulation is  likely to  stimulate innovation  and
technology adoption that will facilitate environmental compliance (e.g. Porter and van
der Linde 1995, Jaffe et al. 2003), while others have found that emissions standards
are often based on available technology with little incentive for innovation (e.g. Kemp
2000). Common to these studies has been the view that stringent regulations are more
likely to produce innovations than lax regulations (Porter and van der Linde 1995,
Kemp 2000). Another commonly held view is that economic instruments are more li-
kely to prompt innovations than regulations (Milliman and Prince 1989, Jung et al.
1996, Hemmelskamp 1997). It has, however, also been found that, according to empi-
rical studies, the dynamic effects of environmental policy instruments in practice dif-
fer from the ideal instruments in theoretical studies and that the relationship of poli-
cies and innovations may not be as simple as often stated (e.g. Hemmelskamp 1997).
Regarding technology policy, it has been stated that public R&D may play an import-
ant role for environment-related science and technology (Jaffe et al. 2003), but that
subsidies have had a limited impact on decisions regarding investments in environ-
mentally beneficial technology (Kemp 2000). 
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Innovation has been defined by Freeman (1987) as “the introduction of a new
product, process, method or system into the economy”. If a broader view including
also social innovations is taken, innovations can mean all new elements, practices and
applications  used in  a  social  system.  The term environmental  innovation  has  had
many different  meanings.  Some use it  for  all  innovations  with  beneficial  environ-
mental effects (e.g. Kemp 1997), while others have used the term for those innova-
tions intended to have positive environmental effects (e.g. Hemmelskamp 1997). In
this  article we focus solely on technological  innovation and use the term environ-
mentally sounder innovations  to describe any new and innovative technology with
less harmful environmental effects than the available alternatives. The term environ-
mental innovations is, in turn, used only for those technologies that have specifically
aimed at reduced environmental impacts. 
Based on a previous examination of selected claims in the light of the pulp and pa-
per and the marine engine sectors, we have chosen a number of specific innovations
in the Finnish pulp and paper sector to further examine the driving forces for innova-
tions and their diffusion. The sector provides an interesting focus because it has long
been a target of traditional pollution control measures, while restructuring and globali-
sation have reformed the industry during the last decades. Three innovation cases,
namely the development of black liquor recovery technology, a paper machine pump
system, and an effluent concentrate combustion system, were selected to present in-
novations with reduced environmental impact but different innovation settings. 
This article presents a study of how environmental policy and R&D support have
affected the emergence and diffusion of these environmentally sounder innovations.
It begins by providing a background for the study and introducing the Finnish pulp
and paper industry. The impacts of environmental policy and R&D support measures
on innovation are analysed empirically, followed by a discussion on their combined
impact. The wider innovation setting is accounted for by discussing internationalisati-
on and its influence on innovations. The article ends with a summary of the key con-
clusions.
2. The starting point and scope of the study
Previously we have examined selected claims on the effects of policy instruments
on innovation and diffusion based on empirical experiences from the Finnish pulp
and paper sector and a company producing marine engines (Mickwitz et al. 2003). The
results for the pulp and paper sector are summarised in Table 1. Although the marine
engine case is not discussed, it should be noted that the results differ for some of the
claims.
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Our analyses have shown clear effects of policies on the diffusion of environment-
ally  sounder technologies  but less  on the very emergence of  innovations.  Further-
more, we have found that the effects of policy instruments on innovations are context
specific, e.g. influenced by the cost-benefit distribution of the policy (Mickwitz et al.
2003). Various factors such as market demand for new technologies affect also the
formation of different innovation settings.
Earlier studies by our research group (Hildén  et al.  2002, Similä 2002, Mickwitz
2003 and Mickwitz et al. 2003) have examined the issues largely from the perspectives
of the pulp and paper companies and public authorities. The innovations that were
examined in detail were those technologies that have attributed to the drop in tradi-
tional water and air emissions, and our focus was largely on the period between the
early 1970s to the mid 1990s (Figure 1). Since then the concentration and increased
globalisation of the industry have affected for example the investment behaviour of
the companies (e.g. Siitonen 2003).
Table 1: Summarising the experiences on the policy-innovation claims* (Mickwitz et al .
2003)
Claim Supporting experiences Contradicting experiences
• Environmental regulations (permits,
standards, etc.) are often based on existing
technology and provide no incentive to
innovate but may stimulate diffusion.
• Activated sludge treatment -
diffusion was stimulated
• Chlorine-free bleaching of pulp
• Filters for air emissions
• Activated sludge treatment -
innovative application to this
sector and these climatic
conditions
• Non-binding permit conditions or
standards do not provide any incentive to
innovate.
• Waste water permits, especially
for BOD and phosphorus
• Permit conditions or standards only
confirm the development that has taken
place otherwise. 
• Reduced discharges of chlorine
compounds from pulp bleaching
• Change from sulphite to
sulphate pulp production
• Activated sludge treatment
was applied in novel conditions
due to strict standards
• Environmental regulations can easily
hamper innovations, by directly specifying
the technology to use or indirectly making
try-outs impossible.
• The flexibility of the Finnish
water permits to support try-
outs
• Environmental taxes are superior to other
policy instruments with respect to
innovations. 
• The Finnish energy taxation
had no effect on innovation in
pulp and paper production
• R&D subsidies have limited impacts. • The share of R&D subsidies is
low in the total R&D ex-
penditure of the forest cluster
• The existence of subsidies is
important
• Innovations can be promoted by en-
couraging/forcing co-operation between
organizations that would not otherwise work
together.
 • When networks are tradi-
tionally strong, as in the forest
cluster, no change may be
imposed.
*Some claims are widely supported and others are held by a few. They have all been challenged.
Figure 1: Temporal distribution of some earlier cases and the new cases for this study
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Three new cases were selected to expand our earlier picture of the innovation pro-
cesses and to bring forth the perspectives of technology developers and researchers
within the Finnish forest cluster (Box 1). Two of the cases were chosen to represent
very recent innovations, whereas the third case covers innovations development on a
wider scale and during a longer time period from the 1980s to the present. Also, the
company  format  differs  between  the  cases  covering  two  small  companies,  POM
Technology and Conox Ltd, and two major machinery developers, Tampella Power
and Ahlström.
Common to the selected cases  has been reduced environmental  impact,  but in
comparison, the innovations are of different types. Viewed from a purpose perspect-
ive, technological innovations can be divided into two categories: environmental technolo-
gies, where a specific environmental effect has been a key intention of the innovation,
and  other technologies, where the key intentions have not included environmental con-
cerns but e.g. cost reduction (Figure 2). The paper machine pump system POM is a
process innovation with beneficial  environmental  side-effects,  whereas the effluent
concentrate combustion system Conox was created as an environmental technology
to reduce the organic pollutant load to water. Black liquor recovery technology posi-
tions itself somewhere between the two, being originally developed for improving the
process and saving costs, but further innovative development has also had environ-
mental intentions. 
Box 1: Three additional cases







POM is a compact wet end system for the paper making
process, developed by POM Technology, and its main
component is air-removing centrifugal pump. POM achieves
faster and shorter water recirculations in the paper mill and
reduces grade change times, resulting in improved energy
efficiency and reduced water consumption, effluent discharge
and waste compared to the conventional process. This has
been regarded by some as one of the most important pulp and
paper innovations of the 1990s (Oinonen 2000, HS 2004). The
idea was generated in the early 1990s and the first full scale














The Conox process, developed by Conox Ltd, is based on
pressurised thermal oxidation of process water effluent
concentrate. It was originally designed to eliminate organic
compounds creating chemical oxygen demand (COD) present
in bleaching plant effluents (Myréen et al. 2001). Later the
concept was applied to black liquor from non-wood pulping.
In addition to reduced water discharges, it’s a development
towards closed water cycles and it somewhat improves energy-
efficiency. The idea was generated in the early 1990s and the
first full scale operation for non-wood pulping started in 2003. 
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The third case explores the development of various black
liquor recovery technologies aimed towards increased dry
solids content and gasification of black liquor. Efficient black
liquor recovery reduces air emissions and increases the plant's
energy supply. To a large extent, the significant sulphur
emission reduction of the forest industry in the 1980s can be
attributed to the increase of the black liquor dry solids content
to over 70% (Interview II). These technologies have been
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3. The Finnish pulp and paper industry 
The pulp and paper industry has had a highly significant role in the Finnish eco-
nomy since the 19th century. Finland's first paper mill was established in 1873. The
significant expansion of the industry began in the 1950s and by 1970s the production
of paper had experienced a six-fold increase (VTT 1999, 39). In 2002 the annual pulp
and paper production were nearly 12 million tonnes and 13 million tonnes respect-
ively (FFIF 2003). The forest cluster, comprising forestry and the production of pulp,
paper and wood products,  contributes to about 20% of the industrial  value added
gross production (Statistics Finland 2002). The forest industry's share of total export
value was 26% in 2001 and the largest share, 19% of  total export value, can be attrib-
uted to the pulp and paper sector  (Metla 2002, 284).  Although exports have been
growing, their share of the total export value has been shrinking with e.g. high-tech
electronic  companies  gaining  increased  export  volumes  (Ali-Yrkkö  and  Hermans
2002). 
Concentration of the Finnish pulp and paper industry has resulted in only six com-
panies operating in the sector (Näsi 2001, 13) compared to over 20 independent com-
panies in the beginning of the 1980s (Hagström-Näsi 1999, 88) and around 30 com-
panies  in the mid 20th century.  The three largest  corporations,  Stora Enso,  UPM-
Kymmene Corporation and the Metsäliitto Group, constitute circa 98% of Finland's
paper and pulp production capacity (FFIF 2000) as well as being internationally signi-
ficant actors in the sector.
Also technology companies Metso Paper and Ahlström have developed globally si-
gnificant market positions as manufacturers of paper and pulp machinery. Much of
the technological development occurs in cooperation with pulp and paper producers,
technology companies and consultancies, such as Jaakko Pöyry and some smaller ac-
tors. In addition universities, e.g. Helsinki University of Technology and Åbo Akade-
mi University, have had important roles in basic and applied research.
The environmental impacts of the sector have been significant due to extensive
use of energy and timber as well as emissions to air and water. Technological innova-
tion and development have lead to increased production capacity simultaneously re-
ducing the pollutant load significantly. A change from sulphite pulping to sulphate
pulping is an example of a significant process change. In 1965, nineteen of total 35
pulp mills were sulphite mills but by 1985 only three sulphite mills were left and, since
1991, only the sulphate process has been used (Ministry of the Environment 1997,
39). This shift that has taken place mainly for economic reasons has contributed signi-
ficantly to the decline in water discharges (Hildén et al. 2002). Several important devel-
opments in environmental technology can be identified in the past three decades, e.g.
Figure 2: A typology of technological innovations viewed from the environmental
perspective
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chlorine-free bleaching and tertiary waste water treatment. Significant advances have
been made to improve the resource efficiency and water consumption of the produc-
tion processes, the latter developing towards closed water systems within the plant.
For example, the per unit water consumption of pulp production has been reduced
from 600 m3 per ton, in the 1950s, to close to 10 m3 per ton in the early 21st century
(Kettunen 2002, 36).  
4. The impact of environmental policies on innovations
4.1. Regulatory environmental policy instruments 
In Finland permits, designed on a case-by-case basis, have been the main way of
controlling point source pollution (Hildén et al. 2002, 37-44). Emissions to air and wa-
ter were controlled separately through different kinds of procedures prior to the im-
plementation of the EU Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control
(IPPC) in 2000. For air emissions the limit values in individual permits were comple-
mented with general norms and guidelines, e.g. regarding air quality, depositions or
emissions. Contrarily, for water discharges the permit system has functioned without
general standards to explicitly guide individual decisions. Our earlier empirical exam-
inations have indicated that permit decisions have mostly been based on existing tech-
nology and have provided no incentive for innovation, and have affected diffusion
mainly in relation to activated sludge technology for water treatment and filters for air
emissions (Hildén et al. 2002, Mickwitz et al. 2003). The three cases examined here also
reveal diffusion effects of the regulatory instruments.
The origin of innovations increasing the dry solids content of black liquor lies in
basic scientific research and in attempts to achieve more economic thermo-technical
solutions for black liquor combustion. For example, Ahlström's evaporation techno-
logy increasing the dry solids content of black liquor, achieved in the early 1980s, ori-
ginated from the basic research of lignin not related to energy efficiency or emissions
(Kettunen 2002, 88). As a result, it was noticed that sulphur emissions after the pro-
cess were practically non-existent (Interviews II, III). During the 1980s and 1990s, the
process  was  further  developed  through  large  national  research  programmes  and
development work by major technology companies.  The air emissions received in-
creased focus in the later development phases partly through tightening environment-
al regulation "which probably brought forward these issues to the pulp and paper producers, who
then knew both to require improvements from the technology developers and to enthuse about the de-
velopers'  solutions" (Interview III).  Specific permit  conditions  have in some cases af-
fected the diffusion of the technology, while in others adoption has preceded actual
permit regulation. For example, one pulp mill postponed new investments for nearly
ten years, and permit conditions effective from the beginning of 1999 finally forced
investment in new technology including 80% dry solids content evaporation and re-
covery boiler with a new system to collect and combust odorous gases (Illi 1999). 
For POM technology, environmental policy had no role in the innovation process
(Interview I). Also, the diffusion of this technology to various countries, e.g. Germany
and Japan, has occurred due to cost and competitiveness factors alone. As an excepti-
on out of 20 installations, environmental regulation was one of the reasons for acqui-
ring this technology for a paper mill in Spain. POM enabled them to meet the short-
term maximum limits in the water permit and reduce the emissions below the legal
requirements set up by the Municipality (Clariana 2003). This together with increased
flexibility was considered as an important characteristic when deciding on the invest-
ment. By 2003, POM had been installed in only one Finnish paper mill, for process
improvement reasons not related to environmental issues.
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In 2003, Conox had not reached the demonstration stage in Finland and the pro-
gress had halted for various reasons. Some view that the environmental regulations
concerning e.g. discharges of heavy metals are not strict enough to awake the interest
of pulp and paper producers for this technology, while others argue that competing
solutions are more appealing (Interviews III, IV). However, during 2003, the Conox
application to  non-wood pulping was  installed  to small  mills  in  Spain and  China.
These mills faced tight regulations, and non-complying would have closed the mills,
resulting in serious conditions for the rural communities dependent on those mills
(Interview IV).
4.2. Anticipation of new or tightening regulations
The impact of environmental policies on the innovation process is, in effect, not
straightforward and the dynamic nature of both innovations development and envi-
ronmental policy must be accounted for. The duration of an innovation process in the
pulp and paper industry is often more than a decade, and therefore anticipation of fu-
ture markets is essential. Anticipation of future environmental policies may, conse-
quently, have a decisive role in the innovation process. 
The development  of  the Conox system addressed  the  issue  of  water  pollution
caused by plant effluents. The original idea was spurred by anticipation of increased
regulatory measures for closing the bleaching processes. The anticipation rose from
the  issue  being  high  on  the  agenda  for  the  Central  European  paper  buyers  and
NGOs, such as Greenpeace, during the early 1990s (Interviews IV,V). Unexpectedly,
in the late 1990s, the NGO and government interest in the chlorine issue diminished
in Western and Northern Europe due to reduced organic loads, and the anticipated
regulatory action did not happen. Simultaneously water discharges of non-wood pul-
ping, e.g. in China, were discovered to be a significant environmental problem (e.g.
WBCSD  1996)  and  the  further  development  of  Conox  was  redirected  to  those
markets. 
The anticipation of future regulation has also played a role in the development of
black liquor innovations. Much of the R&D for increasing the black liquor dry solids
content had already been carried out prior to the 1987 Council of State Decisions that
for the first time set national guidelines for sulphur emissions. Yet the need to reduce
forest industry's emissions was already discussed in the 1970s and e.g. Finland's signa-
ture for the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution in 1979 was an
indication of possible future regulation regarding air emissions. Later, the need to re-
duce sulphur  emissions  affected the  participation  of  pulp mills  in  the  try-outs  of
emerging  technologies.  For  example,  this  motivated  the  Äänekoski  pulp  mill  to
purchase Ahlström's LHT-system (Interview II), one of the first to achieve over 80%
dry content and zero sulphur emissions, in 1990 (Pearson 1993). 
In many instances technological R&D and environmental policy have progressed
simultaneously, and it is difficult to identify when policy affects technological deve-
lopment and vice versa. For example, in the black liquor case, national air pollution
regulations were implemented in permit decisions from 1987 onwards and national
technology programmes, including black liquor research, were carried out from 1988.
5. The impact of public R&D support on innovations
5.1. R&D support
During the last decade the trend in Finland has moved from financing individual
projects  towards focused technology programmes.  Also,  the public expenditure on
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R&D has increased both in monetary terms and as share of the GDP (Prihti  et al.
2000). At the same time the financial contribution of external R&D support has re-
duced in the pulp and paper sector. In the 1970s, a large corporation may have re-
ceived over 25% of its R&D finance from outside (Kettunen 2002, 102) whereas, in
2001, only 3,3% of R&D funding in the sector was received from external sources,
less than received by industrial companies in general (4,7%) (Statistics Finland 2003).
For example public finance received by KCL, a research company owned by the four
largest  pulp  and paper  companies  in  Finland,  has  reduced  by  half  from 9,4% of
turnover to only 4,6% between 1998 and 2002 (KCL 2002, 24). Although, the share
of public finance seems rather low, a former head of research at Metsäliitto Group
has stated that the National Technology Agency of Finland (Tekes), after its founding
in 1983, has provided funding to every major research project of new technology that
the company has undertaken (Kettunen 2002, 104). 
Public funding is mainly given out in the form of grants and low-interest loans
from Tekes and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). These constitute to 60%
and 36% of external R&D funding respectively (Statistics Finland 2003). Tekes also
supports pilot projects and commercialisation. Other sources of public funding inclu-
de the Finnish National Fund for Research and Development (Sitra), the Start Fund
of  Kera,  and the  regional  TE Employment  and  Economic  Development  Centres.
Besides R&D funding for independent projects, there have been six major technology
research programmes supporting the development of environmentally sounder tech-
nologies relevant to the pulp and paper sector. 
With respect  to  black liquor innovations,  it  has  been argued that  technological
change would have progressed more slowly without public subsidies that have lowe-
red the barriers and risks to investors (Interview II). Black liquor related R&D has re-
ceived  financial  aid  motivated  by  several  political  goals,  including  environmental
protection, enhancing the competitiveness of domestic industry and supporting the
use of domestic fuels. The aid has been especially significant through the two LIEK-
KI research programmes (1988-1992, 1993-1998), financing projects related to com-
bustion and gasification technology. These created a favourable climate resulting in
"two waves": firstly, over 80% dry solids content evaporators focusing on other than
sulphur emissions and, second, chemical research and information systems aiding e.g.
gasification research (Interview II). The Jalo (1988-1992) and Code (1999-2002) pro-
grammes  have  also  covered  black  liquor  research.  Code  developed  numerical
modelling of  combustion processes  dramatically  reducing the need for pilot  expe-
riments (Interview III). The technology programmes have been crucially important in
creating and increasing the necessary knowledge base for black liquor research before
specific innovations could be generated (Interviews II, III).
The Conox developer views that public R&D funding is important in the early
stages for generating inventions, but for innovations to appear also risk capital and
markets are required (Interview V). The general view appears to be that public fun-
ding is fairly well available for basic and applied research and technology develop-
ment, but finding finance for prototypes is more difficult.  Black liquor dry content
technologies have reached the commercialisation phase because they have been fairly
risk-free  incremental  innovations  on  the  existing  system,  whereas  black  liquor
gasification is a technology requiring more significant system changes. No demonstra-
tion system has yet been created in Finland due, likely, to the high risks and costs in-
volved (Interview III). 
POM Technology received public R&D funding in the technology development
and the installation phase. Tekes provided product development support in the be-
ginning and, with the help of development support from Tekes and risk capital from
the Start Fund of Kera, the first four POM systems were installed in Germany and
USA in the late 1990s (Lindén 2000, 1996; Oinonen 2000). Significant funding from
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Tekes  and  other  public  sources  reduced  the  risk  for  other  investors  and  made
reaching the commercialisation stage possible. 
5.2. R&D networks
Co-operation  of  pulp  and  paper  companies  with  technology  developers,  con-
sultancies  and  research  organizations  has  been  characteristic  to  the  industry
throughout its history (Hildén et al. 2002). Information on end-of-pipe solutions has
been  quite  freely  exchanged  between  mills  and  often  R&D  has  been  undertaken
jointly. For example Conox Ltd was jointly established by a consultancy, a chemical
producer  and an environmental  technology company,  and the technology  was  de-
veloped in cooperation with two large pulp and paper companies. The development
of POM technology involved cooperation with a university  and some paper mills,
whereas  the  black liquor  R&D has  been jointly  carried out  by several  public  and
private actors. The co-operation of the technology companies with public research in-
stitutes has been crucial to advance black liquor related R&D.
"The Finnish situation, where two major technology developers have co-operated in the
same projects and research programmes has been unique from the global perspective,
and this has created a positive competition on the level of basic know-how… the know-
how of  both  has  clearly  increased  and  they  were  clearly  distinguished  from  their
American or Japanese competitors." (Interview III)
Some public funding schemes require companies to have a university or public re-
search institute as a partner in R&D projects. The critique suggests that the measures
used to encourage or even force co-operation and networking between organizations
can also have negative effects and that establishing a technology programme is not ne-
cessarily the best form of public R&D funding from the perspective of the estab-
lished players in the field (Mickwitz et al. 2003). However, at least Ahlström saw the
experiences from the LIEKKI programme positively: 
"The LIEKKI program has  improved the availability  of  information resulting from
public research, and it has enhanced the adjustment of the research needs of public
organisations and those of industry for better mutual agreement. At the same time it
has  improved  the  cooperation  between  public  projects…and the  industrial  projects
aimed at product development" (Hupa 1994, 71).
Also,  Tampella stated that  the programme enabled international  cooperation in
black liquor related modelling, but viewed the programme benefiting cooperation only
when entering new research areas (Hupa 1994, 73). This view is supported by the fact
that POM Technology did not gain any new cooperation for joining the CACTUS
programme (1996-1999) three years after patenting its first  invention. In the POM
case,  there  has  not  been  a  difference  between  participating  in  a  technology  pro-
gramme and receiving outside-programme public  funding since the CACTUS pro-
gramme only resulted in one way information flow from the project to other partici-
pants:
"…certain large companies invested in their own development projects and, regarding
information access and participation, we did not gain participation to those seminars
that covered these results and did not become sharers of others' results, but did present
our own results." (Interview I)
In many occasions, the additional benefits of a technology programme in compa-
rison to funding for independent projects seem insignificant from the technology de-
velopers' viewpoint. However, according to a consultant and former representative of
a technology company, technology programmes are necessary to generate and share
basic research knowledge, without which even private commercial projects would be
difficult to carry out (Interview II). This point is further illustrated in the Conox case,
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where  the  developer  received  technical  answers  for  many  uncertainties  from  the
'combustion technology cluster' created by the LIEKKI-programmes (Interview III). 
The impact of public R&D support on innovation may differ between smaller and
larger companies. On one hand, smaller companies with fewer resources tend to be
more dependent on outside financial support, but large companies benefit from wide
access  to  various  research  programmes.  For  example,  the  role  of  Ahlström  and
Tampella has been significant in combustion technology programmes. Their projects,
although not all black liquor related research, accounted for 29% of the total expendi-
ture of the LIEKKI programme and received 17% of the total MTI funding (Hupa
1994). 
6. Combined impact of environmental policies and R&D support
Although many policy issues of today are so broad and complex that they involve
several traditional policy branches and institutions, there is still often a lack of co-or-
dination. This can result in at least two kinds of problems: aspects of an issue not be-
ing covered by any sector and aspects covered by several sectors but potentially in
conflicting ways or inefficiently. It has been argued that these types of problems are
present in the Finnish central administration (Bouckaert  et al. 2000). Examining the
combined impacts of environmental policies and R&D support can thus be seen as
being relevant also in this wider context.
Environmental and technology policy measures are usually directed at very diffe-
rent aims, yet they both influence the emergence and diffusion of innovations affec-
ting the environment. Table 2 lists the environmental policies and R&D support mea-
sures having affected the studied innovations. It appears that R&D support has affec-
ted all these innovations and environmental policy has acted as a driving force for all
but one, namely the development of POM technology. However, the connection bet-
ween policies  and innovations  is  complex.  For  example, the  CACTUS technology
programme financing POM included environmental aims, such as reducing the use of
water and the environmental impacts in water, in air and on land (Komppa and Nei-
mo 2000). In turn, the development of the Conox system was partly influenced by the
know-how created in the LIEKKI programme.
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The combined effects of environmental policies and R&D support can be studied
more specifically  by using the typology of  technological  innovations introduced in
Section 2 (Figure 2). Potential goal-conflicts occur in areas where R&D support is di-
rected at technologies with detrimental environmental effects (Table 3). These envi-
ronmental effects may be anticipated or unanticipated. In occasions, there can be lack
of knowledge transfer between the policy sectors. If an invention is dependent on a
chemical that will be prohibited or the use of which will be circumscribed through en-
vironmental regulation, it might never be realised and the work done by the innovator
and the allocated R&D support could be wasted.
While Table 3 only lists the overall intentions of the policies, actual policy practices
might differ from these intentions. It is well known that good intentions do not guar-
antee good results. The adoption of environmentally sounder technologies may in fact
be obstructed by environmental policies in force, even though there might be a joint
Table 2: The impact of environmental policies and R&D support on the studied cases
Environmental Policy Innovation R&D Support
§ Generally no impact
§ Water permit limits affected the
adoption in a Spanish mill.
POM § Start Fund of Kera capital & TE loan for
company establishment
§ Independent Tekes finance 1994-95,2000-02
§ CACTUS programme 1996-99
§ EU funding for first commercial installation
§ Anticipation of regulatory meas-
ures for closing bleaching processes
in W. Europe - did not happen
 § Water discharge limits for non-
wood pulping in Spain & China
Conox § Research project partly funded by Tekes
1995-98
§ Independent Tekes finance 1999-2002
§ EU LIFE funding for a planned prototype in
a Finnish mill - not realised
§ Finnfund a shared owner of Conox Holdings
Ltd to finance installations in China
§ Anticipation of emission limits
for sulphur & nitrogen in 1980s -
Council of state decisions issued
1987 onwards
§ Emission limits & technology





§ LIEKKI programme 1988-92
§ LIEKKI 2 programme 1993-98
§ CODE programme 1999-02
§ Anticipation of emission limits
for sulphur & nitrogen in 1980s
§ Discussion on the need to
prevent the fifth nuclear power
plant in the late 1980s and early
1990s by providing more electricity




§ JALO programme 1988-92
§ LIEKKI 2 programme 1993-98
Table 3: Policy intentions vis-à-vis different types of innovations
Technological innovations




















Encourage Encourage Encourage /
Obstruct
Encourage Neutral Obstruct













Kivimaa/Mickwitz   367
interest to promote the diffusion of such technologies. Policies focusing solely on en-
vironmental technologies may delay environmental improvement, because often the
non-environmental  technologies bring many environmental  benefits.  This is in line
with the results of several other studies, which have shown that a range of technolo-
gical changes with major environmental performance impacts are not shaped by en-
vironmental factors (Berkhout 2003, Hildén et al. 2002). In Finland, due to the flexib-
ility of the permitting system, conditions have often been temporarily relaxed during
demonstration periods or pilot phases of new end-of-pipe technologies (Hildén et al.
2002). Innovations have, therefore, not been hindered in a way that for example emis-
sion limit values, in theory, could do.
The studied innovations are all examples of cases where there are potential syner-
gies between the policies, i.e. they have resulted in beneficial environmental effects.
For example, the further development of black liquor recovery was simultaneously
supported by national emission limits and various research programmes. However, in
some instances, the encouraging effect of environmental policies may not be strong
enough to support the commercialisation or diffusion of environmentally sounder in-
novations, especially if the users cannot see the other benefits of the technology. The
Conox process was not adopted in Finland because, despite a granted EU LIFE fun-
ding  for  a  prototype  in  a  Finnish  mill,  environmental  regulations  were  not  strict
enough to keep up the interests of pulp producers to install this technology. In turn,
the development and diffusion of some environmentally sounder technologies, such
as POM, may occur without the direct impact of public environmental intervention.
These are often so called 'win-win' solutions that are driven by other factors bringing
also competitive advantage for the companies. 
7. Internationalisation and its effects on innovations and policies
Market areas outside Finland have always been important for the Finnish forest in-
dustry. Until the 1970s the forest industry exports accounted for more than half of
the total exports. Subsequently the forest industry's share of the total export value has
decreased from 56% in 1970 to 27% in 2000, despite the real value of forest industry
exports doubling during that period (Metla 2002, 295). 
The pressures and opportunities caused by increased globalisation of the sector are
an important factor behind the concentration of the industry, where a few major in-
ternational companies control over 90% of the markers, in pulp and paper production
as well as  in technology development.  The largest  paper producer Stora Enso is a
merger  of  two previously  national  companies,  the  Swedish  Stora  and the  Finnish
Enso-Gutzeit. A similar example from the technology side is Aker Kvaerner. There
are about 20 companies in the forest cluster that are in foreign ownership, and especi-
ally the manufacturers of chemicals, suppliers of systems and equipment and industri-
al  automation  companies  have  attracted  foreign  capital  during  the  1990s  (Lammi
1999).
One feature of the ongoing globalisation process is that it has become easier even
for small and medium-sized companies to sell  their products in other parts  of the
world than where they are designed or produced. This feature is especially important
for firms in know-how intensive sectors where production does not require a lot of
capital. For both POM and Conox technologies, the main markets have been abroad.
Moreover, innovation spin-offs can emerge if the access to global information and
markets is present, as the Conox case illustrates. This benefits both the domestic tech-
nology sector and the environment, through more rapid international transfer of new,
environmentally sounder technologies. The Aracruz pulp mill is another example of
the  global  deliveries  of  the  machinery  and  plant  manufacturing  sector,  installing
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equipment from several Finnish companies: Ahlström, Sunds and Rauma (Häggblom
1999, 300). 
While globalisation has widened the market and created increased possibilities for
companies, it is obvious that international markets mean an increased level of com-
petition. It has also been argued (e.g. Foster et al. 2003) that, as a side-effect of global-
isation, the company motivation for investing in new, innovative and unestablished
technology has decreased. This is because new technology is simultaneously available
for pulp and paper producers all over the world if proven successful, and the forerun-
ner's benefit is thus reduced. However, even if technologies are usually available for
purchase immediately after commercialisation, in practice technology transfer to other
countries  can be  slower  because,  for  example  in  Finland,  the  interaction  between
companies  is  more  frequent  and  information  transfer  is  faster  than  e.g.  between
Finnish and Brazilian companies (Interview II). 
The internationalisation of companies can also have negative effects on the deve-
lopment of innovations. It sometimes becomes more difficult to receive public R&D
support, because national organisations may not be willing to finance R&D by com-
panies in foreign ownership (e.g. Interviews II, III). Conox Ltd has a contract for a
cooperative project with a German research laboratory, but proceeding in it has been
extremely  slow perhaps  partly  due to local  decision  makers'  reluctance to  support
foreign technology  (Interview IV).  However,  it  can also  be argued that,  generally,
company ownership is not as an important criterion for public funding as the effects
of the company operations for the country in question. Tampella still continued to be
part of the LIEKKI research programmes after being sold to Kvaerner. Andritz and
Foster Wheeler, that are not in Finnish ownership but continue to concentrate their
research operations to Finland, have still been actively involved in Finnish research
programmes after acquiring the Finnish companies (Interview III). 
The internalisation of  markets can also be observed in many other sectors, some
of which may be linked to the pulp and paper industry. Several countries have deregu-
lated the electricity market creating an opportunity for any company to participate,
while previously selling electricity has been limited to a government-owned regulated
monopoly. The next possible step to deregulation - common markets between coun-
tries - is gradually succeeding with plans for a common market for trading electricity
within the EU borders and the already operating Nordic market covering four states. 
The Finnish  electricity  market  was deregulated in 1995 and Finland  joined the
Nordic  electricity  market  system,  Nordpool,  at  the  start  of  1998 (e.g.  Pineau and
Hämäläinen 2000). The new markets have increased the diffusion of new, more effi-
cient black liquor recovery boilers by creating a incentive for the pulp and paper com-
panies to produce electricity exceeding their own needs. Already three mills have been
(re)designed for producing electricity for the markets: Metsä-Rauma in 1995, Joutseno
Pulp during 1997-2001 and Wisaforest completed in 2004 (Interview II). For example,
the Joutseno mill can annually export 15-30 MW of the electricity produced with the
black liquor recovery boiler alone while, prior to the new recovery boiler, it had to
purchase around 8 MW of electricity from outside producers (Illi 1999, Interview II).
However, generally the short term effects of the electricity market liberalisation have
been perceived as reducing the interest of companies for new investments (Interview
III). In the future, electricity markets will guide the innovation development through
the electricity price. If  electricity prices increase, the development and diffusion of
energy-efficient technologies will be promoted.
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8. Conclusion
The cases studied have reinforced our position that it is equally important when
analysing as well as promoting technological change to consider both technologies de-
veloped for environmental purposes and technologies with beneficial environmental
effects primarily developed for some other reason.
Policy  anticipation  affects  both  the  innovation  and diffusion  processes.  When
companies have reasons to believe that environmental requirements set by public po-
licies will become tighter they often act in advance. By adopting environmentally so-
under technologies before required to do so they gain leeway to respond to political
and  market  situations.  Our  case  studies  have  shown in  practice  that  expectations
about future environmental policies can have an important role for the innovation
processes of environmentally sounder technologies. Developing innovations is a long-
term task focused on future markets, where environmental policies are among the key
shapers.  However,  uncertainties  are  always  involved  in  future  predictions  and,  in
occasions, the anticipated conditions may not arise, as illustrated by the Conox case.
If environmental policy does not develop as expected by the innovator, at the absence
of alternative markets, the R&D efforts might have been wasted. Although the future
will always be uncertain, this stresses the importance of transparent and predictable
long term environmental policies.
For a successful environmental innovation to emerge and diffuse, often a combi-
nation of R&D support and environmental policy measures is required. While there
are areas where the interests of the two policy fields are compatible, there are cases
where these interests  are conflicting, potentially resulting in both negative environ-
mental impacts and wasted resources. When a technology, that is above all developed
to increase competitiveness, has environmental benefits the challenge is to ensure that
the intentions are also supported in practice. This stresses the significance of coordi-
nation in policymaking, but also emphasises the importance of accounting endoge-
nous  technological  change  when formulating  environmental  policies.  Co-operative
networks have been shown here to have a significant impact on innovation, and these
could be expanded to include policymakers in order to facilitate information transfer.
When environmental policies are well known by those providing R&D support there
is a reduced risk of wasted R&D resources for technologies that will be impeded or
even blocked by environmental policy measures. Also, when new technologies with
negative environmental effects are emerging or when significant environmental im-
provements can be achieved with new technologies, it is important that the environ-
mental authorities are aware of the development so that policies can be redirected ac-
cordingly. 
The increased globalisation has at least two important effects on environmentally
sounder innovations. Firstly, it increases the potential markets for these innovations.
If the anticipation of one emerging market is wrong, there might be market potential
for  the new technology somewhere else as in the Conox case. Alternatively, if the
conditions for the crucial first commercial application are not right in the domestic
market it  might  be carried out  elsewhere,  as in  the POM case.  Secondly,  when a
Finnish innovation is developed because a potential market has been identified, it is li-
kely that  a foreign competitor  has also  seen the  opportunity.  Competition is  thus
clearly increased by globalisation.
 370   Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank all the interviewees and e-mail respondents for their parti-
cipation. The study has been undertaken as part of the EcoInno project, contributing
to the Research Program for Advanced Technology Policy (ProACT) funded by the
Finnish Ministry of Trade and Industry and the National Technology Agency, Tekes.
Interviews
Interview I: Paul Meinander, POM Technology, 25 September 2003
Interview II: Esa Vakkilainen, Jaakko Pöyry, 23 October 2003
Interview III: Mikko Hupa, Åbo Akademi University, 14 November 2003
Interview IV: Bertel Myréen & Lauri Prepula, Conox Ltd, 7 November 2003
Interview V: Bertel Myréen 2002
References
Ali-Yrkkö Jyrki and Raine Hermans 2002. Nokia Suomen Innovaatiojärjestelmässä [Nokia in the
Finnish Innovation System]. Discussion Papers No. 799. Helsinki: ETLA, Research Institute of
the Finnish Economy. (In Finnish)
Berkhout, Frans 2003. Technological regimes, environmental performance and innovation
systems. In  Towards Environmental Innovation Systems, edited by K.M Weber, J. Hemmelskamp.
Berlin: Springer, forthcoming.
Bouckaert, Geert, Derry Ormong and Guy Peters 2000.  A Potential Governance Agenda for
Finland. Research Report 8/2000. Helsinki: Ministry of Finance. Accessed November 25, 2003:
http://www.vm.fi/vm/liston/page.lsp?r=3525&l=fi&menu=3744
Clariana 2003. Declaración Medioambiental 2003 [Environmental Statement 2003]. (In Spanish)
FFIF 2003.  The Finnish  Forest  Industries  Facts  and Figures  2003 -   Statistics  2002.  Helsinki:
Finnish Forest Industries Federation.
FFIF 2000. Key to Finnish Forest Industry. Helsinki: Finnish Forest Industries Federation.
Foster,  James,  Mikael  Hildén  and  Niclas  Adler  2003.  The  Complicated  Story  of  Induced
Innovation: Experiences from the role of public interventions in the pulp and paper industry, unpublished
manuscript.
Freeman C. 1987. Innovation. In The New Palgrave : a dictionary of economics (I/IV), edited by
J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman. London: the Macmillan Press, 858 - 860.
Hagström-Näsi, Christine 1999. The pulp and paper industry, making more from less. In
The Green Kingdom - Finland's Forest Cluster, edited by A. Reunala, I. Tikkanen, E. Åsvik. Helsinki:
Otava Publishing, 88-103.
Hall  J.  and  R.  Kerr   2003.  Innovation  dynamics  and  environmental  technologies:  the
emergence of fuel cell technology. Journal of Cleaner Production 11(4): 459-471.
Hemmelskamp,  Jens  1997.  Environmental  Policy  Instruments  and  their  Effects  on
Innovation. European Planning Studies 5(2): 177-194.
Hildén M., J. Lepola, P. Mickwitz, A. Mulders, M. Palosaari, J. Similä, S. Sjöblom and E.
Vedung 2002. Evaluation of environmental policy instruments - a case study of the Finnish
pulp & paper and chemical industries. Monographs of the Boreal Environmental Research 21. Helsinki:
Finnish Environment Institute.
HS 2004. Paul Olof Meinander saa Wallenberg-palkinnon [Paul Olof Meinander receives
the Wallenberg prize]. Helsingin sanomat January 17, 2004. (In Finnish)
Hupa,  Mikko  1994.  LIEKKI  Combustion  Technology.  Final  report  on  the  energy  research
programme 1988 - 1992. Reviews B:153. Helsinki: Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Kivimaa/Mickwitz   371
Häggblom, Rainer 1999. The forest cluster is becoming global and more compact.  In The
Green Kingdom - Finland's Forest Cluster, edited by A. Reunala, I. Tikkanen, E. Åsvik. Helsinki:
Otava Publishing, 296-301.
Illi, Anita 1999. Joutseno Pulp kuroo kiinni muiden etumatkaa [Joutseno Pulp reaches the
head-start of others]. Paperi ja puu - Paper and Timber 81:4, 90-93. (In Finnish)
Jaffe A., R. Newell and R. Stavins 2003. Technological Change and the Environment. In
Handbook of Environmental Economics: Volume 1, edited by K-G. Mäler, J.R. Vincent. Amsterdam:
Elsevier Science, 468-510.
Jung C.,  K.  Krutilla  and  R.  Boyd 1996.  Incentives  for  Advanced  Pollution Abatement
Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 30: 95-111.
KCL 2002. Annual Report 2002. Espoo: KCL Oy Keskuslaboratorio - Centrallaboratorium
Ab.
Kemp,  René  2000.  Technology  and  Environmental  Policy:  Innovation  Effects  of  Past
Policies and Suggestions for Improvement. In OECD Proceedings: Innovation and the Environment.
Paris: OECD, 35-61.
Kemp R. 1997.  Environmental Policy  and Technical  Change -  A Comparison of the Technological
Impact of Policy Instruments. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Kettunen, Jyrki  2002.  Kuuseen kurkottajat.  Teknologian kehitys  Metsäliiton piirissä  1950-luvulta
vuosituhannen vaihteeseen  [Technology development in Metsäliitto from the 1950s to the turn of
the Millenium]. Helsinki: Metsäliitto. (In Finnish)
Komppa, Antero and Leo Neimo 2000. Vähävetisen paperin valmistus CACTUS 1996 - 1999
[Manufacturing low water consumption paper CACTUS 1996 - 1999]. Technology programme
report 1/2000. Helsinki: Tekes. (In Finnish)
Lammi, Markku 1999. The forest cluster: an alliance of wood, machines and know-how. In
The Green Kingdom - Finland's Forest Cluster, edited by A. Reunala, I. Tikkanen, E. Åsvik. Helsinki:
Otava Publishing, 182-199.
Lindén, Carl-Gustav 2000. Patenttvist obehaglig störning, POM färdigt för affärer [Patent
dispute unpleasent disturbance, POM ready for business].  Hufvudsstadsbladet  August 29, 2000.
(In Swedish)
Lindén, Carl-Gustav 1996. Uppfinnaren måste också vara entreprenör [An inventor must
also be an entrepreneur]. Hufvudsstadsbladet March 11, 1996. (In Swedish)
Metla  2002.  Finnish  Statistical  Yearbook of  Forestry  2002.  Vantaa:  Finnish Forest  Research
Institute Metla.
Mickwitz P. 2003. Is it as bad as it sounds or as good as it looks? Experiences of Finnish
water discharge limits. Ecological Economics 45:2, 237-254.
Mickwitz P., H. Hyvättinen and P. Kivimaa 2003. The role of policy instruments for the innovation
and  diffusion  of  environmentally  friendlier  technologies.  Presented  in  GIN  2003:  Innovating  for
Sustainability Conference, San Francisco October 12 - 15.
Milliman S.  and  R.  Prince  1989.  Firm Incentive  to  Promote  Technological  Change  in
Pollution Control. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 17: 247-265.
Ministry of the Environment 1997. The Finnish Background Report for the EC Documentation of
Best  Available  Techniques  for  Pulp  and  Paper  Industry.  The  Finnish  Environment  96.  Helsinki:
Ministry of the Environment.
Myréen B., J. Ilme and F-M. Müller 2001. A Novel Oxidation Process for Elimination of Organic
Compounds in Aqueous Waste Liquors. 3rd European Congress of Chemical Engineering (ECCE),
Nuremberg 26-28 June.
 372   Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference
Näsi,  Juha  2001.  Historiallis-strateginen  lähestymistapa  suomalaisen  metsäteollisuuden
kehkeytymiseen  [Historical  strategic  approach  to  the  development  of  the  Finnish  forest
industry]  In.  Metsäteollisuusyritysten strategiset  kehityspolut -  Kilpailu,  keskittyminen ja kasvu pitkällä
aikavälillä,  edited by J.  Näsi,  J.A. Lamberg, J.  Ojala, P.  Sajasalo.  Helsinki:  Tekes, 13-23. (In
Finnish)
Oinonen,  Hannu 2000.  POM parantaa  märän pään toimintaa [POM improves wet end
operation].  Paperi ja Puu - Paper and Timber 82:8, 513-515. (In Finnish)
Pearson, John 1993. High-solids firing becomes a reality.  Pulp & Paper International, June
1993.
Pineau, Pierre-Olivier and Raimo Hämäläinen 2000. A perspective on the restructuring of
the Finnish electricity industry. Energy Policy 8:3, 181-192. 
Porter,  Michael  and  Claas  van  der  Linde  1995.  Toward  a  New  Conception  of
Environment-Competitiveness Relationship. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(4): 97-118.
Prihti  A.,  L.  Georghiou,  E.  Helander,  J.  Juusela,  F.  Meyer-Krahmer,  B.  Roslin,  T.
Santamäki-Vuori and M. Gröhn  2000.  Assessment of the additional appropriation for research. Sitra
Reports Series 2. Helsinki: the Finnish National Fund for Research and Development, Sitra.
Siitonen, Silja 2003. Impact of Globalisation and Regionalisation Strategies on the Performance of the
World's Pulp and Paper Companies. PhD Thesis, Helsinki School of Economics.
Similä, Jukka 2002. Pollution regulation and its effects on technological innovations. Journal
of Environmental Law 14:2, 143-160.
Statistics  Finland  2003.  Tutkimus-  ja  kehittämistoiminta  vuonna  2001 [Research  and
development  activity  in  2001].  Helsinki:  Statistics  Finland.  Accessed  June  23,  2003:
http://www.tilastokeskus.fi/tk/yr/ttt_ktaulut.html (In Finnish)
Statistics Finland 2002. Energy in Finland 2001. Helsinki: Statistics Finland.
VTT 1999.  Energia Suomessa - Tekniikka, talous ja ympäristövaikutukset.  [Energy in Finland -
Technology, economy and environmental impacts]. Helsinki: Edita. (In Finnish)
WBCSD  1996.  Towards  a  Sustainable  Paper  Cycle.  Geneva:  World  Business  Council  for
Sustainable Development.
In: Klaus Jacob, Manfred Binder and Anna Wieczorek (eds.). 2004. Governance for Industrial 
Transformation. Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change,
Environmental Policy Research Centre: Berlin. pp. 373 – 385.
The Ecological Modernisation 
of the Automotive Industry
Peter Wells 
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Automotive Industry Research, Cardiff University, Cardiff 
Dr. Renato J. Orsato
Marie  Curie  Research  Fellow,  Centre  for  the  Management  of  Environmental  and  Social  Responsibility
(CMER), INSEAD, Fontaineblau, France
Introduction
Few can doubt that the contemporary automotive industry is one of the most ob-
vious manifestations of the difficulty of reconciling environmental, social and econo-
mic goals simultaneously. Nonetheless, there are indications that the internalisation of
ecological responsibility,  the implementation of anticipatory planning practices, and
the switch to the use of cleaner technologies are happening in the context of the auto
business. These practices characterise the phenomenon of  ecological modernisation (Co-
hen 1997; Orsato 2001). 
For those interested in sustainable industrial development, the question then is not
about whether or not improvements have been made in the auto industry but rather
whether the improvements are conducive to ecological sustainability. Indeed, the me-
thodological rigour of scientific research leaves little room for studies attempting to
guide decisions over what might be (i.e. as a prescriptive tool to guide innovative strat-
egy) a transformed − or as we prefer to use, an ecologically modern − automotive in-
dustry. 
Finally, the sheer size and complexity of the sector makes for a problematic and
political policy arena, and indeed limit the chances we have to do full justice to the
sector in this article. Nonetheless, we challenged ourselves to create one possible view
of what a sustainable automobile industry could look like. By exploring the business
concept of Micro Factory Retailing (MFR), we attempt to demonstrate that a new pa-
radigm of production and consumption for the car industry is not only possible but
has already been seeded by several empirical examples. Importantly, business models
have been relatively neglected within the overall theme of industrial transformations,
which as we argue in this chapter is a significant oversight from a policy perspective.
 374   Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference
Traditional Manufacturing and Distribution: ‘locked in’ large scale
The current business model for vehicle manufacturing involves the construction
of large car plants able to manufacture and assemble all-steel cars in large numbers.
Manufacturing economies of scale are realised and per-unit ex-factory costs are low.
In order to sell this many cars, geographically extensive markets are required – which
in turn means long logistics chains and dense networks of retail outlets. To date, most
vehicle manufacturers have not had to bear a great deal of the investment cost in the
dealer network because these have been independent, franchised retail concerns. Neit-
her have the vehicle manufacturers sought to capture a high proportion of the total li-
fetime revenue stream created by a car in use: revenues have been earned primarily
through the sale of new cars and through associated finance packages for consumers.
Between the manufacturing plant and the customer are stockpiles of cars throughout
the system, build to order is only achieved by long customer lead times. The essence
of lean production has been to seek compliance from the supply base and the vehicle
distribution network to the demands of the vehicle manufacturing process thereby re-
ducing stock levels in the system– not to optimise the system as a whole.
Despite many measures,  the traditional manufacturing and distribution business
model faces problems (Wells  and Nieuwenhuis,  2000).  The high capital costs  with
very ‘lumpy’ investment in plant and models inherent in all-steel body technology are
high risk. There is a chronic tendency to over-supply, resulting in discounting and ra-
pid erosion of residual values in cars already sold. This rapid depreciation in economic
value results in reduced economic lifetimes for the car, and in turn reduced product
longevity: hence rates of material usage and vehicle scrappage are much higher than
optimum. At the same time, the introduction of a new model can often lead to long
waiting times for customer-ordered cars. 
The inflexibility of manufacturing is leading to an inability to adjust output to de-
mand and difficulties in switching from one model to another – responding to increa-
singly violent market fluctuations is difficult with existing production technology. In
essence, the prevailing business model is best suited to market conditions of conti-
nuous steady expansion, and profits achieved via reduction in per-unit manufacturing
costs.  As market conditions have changed, so the business model has come under
greater pressure. The reliance on the continued expansion sales of cars as the main
source  of  revenue is  increasingly  untenable  in  saturated  developed  markets,  while
costs rise as shorter model lifetimes lead to lower per model volumes. 
Eco-modernisation in the Auto Industry 
The automobile constitutes an industrial product that engenders both considerable
economic wealth creation and serious burdens to the natural environment. Although
governments worldwide regard the capacity of the auto industry to generate jobs as a
political asset to be preserved, they have also pressured car manufacturers to improve
environmental performance. The industry has responded to stricter governmental re-
gulation, voluntary agreements, and collaborative R&D initiatives by seeking to adopt
cleaner manufacturing technologies and investing in environment-related research. In
addition, competitive pressures ensure that every major high-volume car manufacturer
is  working  towards  increased  levels  of  resource  productivity.  They  have  targeted
energy  and  material  conservation  for  both  financial  and  environmental  reasons
(Knibb  et al. 1998; Rogers 1993). From the mid-1990s, most world carmakers have
also started to release annual environmental reports containing detailed information
about improvements in vehicle manufacturing, emissions reduction in vehicle use, de-
velopments in hybrid and fuel cell powertrains, and recycling strategies for end-of-life
vehicles. 
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There are no doubts that improvements have indeed been made by car assemblers.
The average environmental performance of most fleets has significantly improved in
the last quarter of the 20th century (Graedel & Allenby 1998), at least in terms of toxic
emissions. With respect to fuel economy and carbon dioxide emissions the industry
has not performed as well, because the benefits of more efficient engines have been
offset by increased vehicle weight, along with the favouring of performance characte-
ristics such as acceleration and top speed (Wells, 2003a). Such improvements as have
been made, however, have not alleviated the pressure faced by firms operating in the
industry. Regulatory measures on air emissions from exhausts have continuously in-
tensified.  During  the  1990s,  although  the  industry  in  Europe  lobbied  against  the
imposition of direct  regulations on end-of-life vehicles (ELVs),  the European Par-
liament approved a new Directive on ELVs in September 2000 (CEC, 2000). In order
to satisfy standards of environmental performance, the industry has also been obliged
to  invest  in  increasingly  expensive  research  and  development  activities.  Environ-
mental issues have certainly become an important economic issue for the automotive
industry.
Vehicle manufacturers have responded to the regulatory and market pressure but
the technological paradigm orientating car design and manufacture substantially limits
the alternatives available to them. Most actions have been designed to reduce costs by
reaching greater economies of scale in all aspects of the vehicle production industry
including R&D, purchasing,  production, distribution, marketing and sales. Platform
consolidation whereby many visibly different models are derived from substantially
common underpinnings, supply chain management and modular assembly constitute
the most widely adopted management initiatives pursued among vehicle manufactur-
ers in this direction. Additionally, the industry has sought cost-savings through conso-
lidation with mergers and acquisitions to create ‘multi-brand constellations’ or groups
with a portfolio of brands that straddle the major markets of the world. Such ratio-
nalisation practices have the potential to generate substantial cost savings in systems
of design, component supply, production, and distribution and marketing. As a result,
industry consolidation has assumed such a pace that many expect that by 2020 only
six global corporations, each one producing around 15 million cars per year, will be
competing worldwide (Eggleston et al. 1999; Feast 2000). 
The current approach adopted by industry players can be seen as indicative of an
appreciation that the contemporary business model is under threat. What is less clear
is whether these actions represent the last gasp of the technological regime that was
framed by and for the automobile industry during the 20th century. Although no one
can forecast who will be the key players in an ecologically modernised industry, most
within and outside the industry would agree that the technology used in the vehicles
of the near future will differ substantially from that currently used. The reason for
such conviction is contained in the word ‘efficiency’. After more than one hundred
years of technical improvements, current automobiles are absurdly inefficient − if effi-
ciency is measured in terms of the conversion of energy (fuel) to the functional pur-
pose of the car (transporting people and items). It is unlikely that these changes in the
technology that constitute the car will occur in an industry that is otherwise exactly
the same as today. Rather, these technologies in the car will allow, enable and require
a change in the terms of competition, and alter the balance of the industry.
Vehicle manufacturers are already aware of the poor efficiency of their cars, and in
various ways are working towards major shifts in design and manufacturing technolo-
gies. The problem, for most of them, is that they lack the core competences required
to produce radically more efficient vehicles, and are struggling to escape from their
own embedded business models. Moreover, a shift away from the current all-steel, in-
ternal combustion engine car requires automakers fundamentally to reform their sys-
tems of production − something not so easy for those who have sunk investments in
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current car manufacturing technology. That is, there is a deeply entrenched sense of
the need to change, but rather less clarity on how to change.
Barriers for the Transformation of the Automobile Industry
Isolating the variables influencing the transformation of the automotive industry
has been tried from several scientific disciplines and perspectives. Studies based on
evolutionary  and  quasi-evolutionary  economics  in  constructivist  sociology  suggest
that a ‘lock in’ situation have been created around the ICE technology (Kemp 1994;
Schot et al. 1994). The socio-technical context of the modern automobile is embedded
in a self-reinforcing system of rules and beliefs of design and engineering practices,
characterising what Nelson and Winter (1977) called a technological regime. 
Orsato (2001; 2004) analysed the socio-technical context of the automobile from a
multi-disciplinary perspective and identified seven factors fostering or inhibiting the
industry  to  develop  environmentally  sound  strategies  and  practices.  These  are:  (i)
organisational  commitments,  competences and constraints,  (ii)  market demand and
patterns of utilisation, (iii) environmental policies and programmes, (iv) competitive
forces and collaboration (v) industrial ecology conditions, (vi) positioning of related
businesses, and (vii) interest groups and organisations. These are the main influences
in a process that can eventually result in changes in the automobile field. However,
the factors should not be seen as independent entities.  They are immersed in what
Orsato and Clegg (1999) termed ‘the circuits of political ecology’ − the terrain political
and strategic actions in which the environmental strategies and practices are embed-
ded.  From such perspective, transforming the automobile industry requires a rede-
finition of its circuits of political ecology.
At the organisational level, while not seeking to deride or belittle the very real pro-
gress made by global vehicle manufacturers, it is hard to escape the conclusion that
these companies are to some extent trapped within their own paradigm (Niewenhuis
& Wells, 1997; 2003). Our contention is that a vital missing ingredient is the business
model that underpins ‘normal’ practice within the car industry. In our view, there is an
intimate causal relationship between the characteristics of product design, the manu-
facturing processes used to create those products, and the consumption patterns that
result.  Surrounding  and  reinforcing  these  characteristics,  the  pervading  business
models in the automotive industry consist of a set of assumptions, practices and nor-
ms that define and constrain what is ‘possible’. Thus far, most studies have concerned
with process, and to a lesser extent with product design, in a multiple organisation
context. However, in order to achieve industrial transformation at an aggregate level
there is a need for it to be achieved at a business level, either by new entrants or by
existing businesses.
The Micro Factory Retailing Approach for Industrial Transformation
The concept of Micro Factory Retailing (MFR) is in essence a business model for
the automotive industry in a distributed economy: in this sense it is an attempt to de-
fine a business model that allows the transition to be made from the current condition
to some (more sustainable) future.. The MFR concept is not an account of an existing
business. It is an idealisation, a vision, a view of what might be rather than what is, a
hypothesis that could be tested by the tools of IT or worked towards from a ‘backcas-
ting’ perspective. MFR is an attempt to provide an individual understanding of how a
specific industry could try to meet the many and varied demands of sustainability. As
such, MFR represents a radical reshaping of the relationships between product tech-
nology, process technology, business organisation, and the purchase and use of cars.
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If new patterns of production and consumption are to emerge, MFR might be one
means of achieving these new patterns. Despite these comments, the MFR concept is
grounded in contemporary reality, it is based upon the reality that parts of the MFR
concept are in evidence in the industry today – albeit not in one single place. In this
respect the MFR concept seeks to identify a business model that can transform the
automotive industry today. 
Thus far, eco-modernisation in the automotive industry has foundered on being
unable to compete in economic terms with the existing vehicle manufacturers  and
their prevailing business models: there is therefore a need to redefine the terms of
competition, to find a business model wherein eco-modernisation can flourish. This
transformative business model needs to embrace several aspects. These may include a
radical (and more sustainable) product technology that is less polluting, less energy in-
tensive, longer product lifetimes and so forth. In turn there will be a radical manufac-
turing technology and strategy with reduced environmental burdens and no or redu-
ced  tendency  to  over-supply.  New  ways  of  reaching  customers  will  be  needed,
alongside new ways for people to own and use vehicles to allow greater overall effi-
ciency in vehicle use. The key is for the innovative business model to allow market
entry, to overcome existing barriers erected by the contemporary industry and its sur-
rounding technological regime.
Micro factory retailing refutes the logic of matching the high-volume, low unit cost
approach of traditional manufacturing and distribution by placing small factories wi-
thin the markets they serve  and so eliminates the distinction between production and
retailing (see Wells  and Nieuwenhuis,  2000).  For example,  rather  than having one
large  plant  producing  250,000  cars  per  annum  (an  average  break-even  point  in
traditional  car  manufacturing)  the  MFR  approach  would  involve  50  plants,  each
assembling 5,000 cars per annum (i.e.  250,000 in total)  and distributed spatially to
match  concentrations  in  population.  Importantly  this  approach  makes  feasible
alternative  materials  and design concepts  that  are only viable at  ‘low volume’,  and
which in many ways allow significant improvements in the industrial ecology of the
automobile, but which in traditional business model  thinking are not economically
viable at ‘high volume’. It does so through the mechanism of multiple low volumes
generating economies of scale in different ways to the traditional centralised factory.
There would be no separate distribution channels or sales outlets: the factory is also
the sales, maintenance, service and repair location. Powertrain components and other
generic items could be centrally produced in conveniently located highly automated
facilities for distribution to the decentralised assembly plants, thus allowing small scale
assemblers to benefit from externalised economies of scale. 
The MFR concept is not just normal car manufacturing on a small scale, it ne-
cessarily involves a radically different product technology and body production pro-
cess, as the case of TH!NK, in the next section, will make it clear.  This was a vehicle
built on a folded steel platform onto which is fixed an aluminium body frame, which
holds thermoplastic outer panels. Virtually any type of non-steel unitary body techno-
logy  is  suitable  for  this  type  of  low  volume,  modular,  low  investment  devolved
assembly. Despite this,  the idea of factory retailing itself  is not entirely new to the
automotive industry and there are parallel lessons to be learned from other sectors
(such as steel mini-mills, specialty chemicals and micro-breweries that have already ex-
perienced some aspects of MFR in action (see: Johanasson & Holapa, 2003). In other
sectors, such as computers (see for example Dell Computers) consumers deal direct
with the factory, a practice likely to become more prevalent with Internet shopping.
The combined fixed cost of traditional manufacturing and distribution, including
the franchised dealer network, is indeed substantial and represents a formidable barri-
er to entry or to change. Compared with this, the fixed costs for MFR are probably an
order of magnitude lower. Perhaps more important than the simple investment cost
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comparison are the many strategic possibilities which flow from MFR (Wells, 2001a)
that collectively create the strategic space to redefine the business model and thereby
obviate or negate the barriers to transformation. 
Before we provide some empirical examples of MFR (next section), we emphasise
that we make no claims here that our concept of Micro Factory Retailing (MFR) is
‘the’ answer  i.e.: that it will make the automotive industry ecologically and economi-
cally sustainable. Indeed, the logical conclusion of our analysis that economic activity
needs to be embedded in locality and context means that there can be no prescriptive,
generic solution of the type purveyed by the business gurus to be found on the shel-
ves of airport bookshops around the world. Diversity means just that, a multiplicity of
solutions that might all co-exist in time and possibly space. Moreover, our understan-
ding of  the  significance  of  organisational  fields  is  such that  there  are  huge impe-
diments to any process of change that might lead from the automotive industry as
currently constituted towards something like the vision we have for MFR. An interes-
ting issue, though one that cannot be explored here, is whether the demise of the exis-
ting automotive industry is inevitable, that the alternative structures envisaged under
the MFR concept will triumph purely because of economic (competitive) superiority
over existing business.  However,  in order  to give some illustration of  the ways in
which the automotive industry could be transformed through a re-design based on in-
dustrial ecology we here outline the basic concept of MFR – though other accounts
could also be consulted (Wells and Nieuwenhuis, 2003)
Empirical Examples of MFR 
Research into the  MFR concept  has  identified  several  instances  where  the  ap-
proach, or parts thereof, have been tried. The various examples illustrate one or more
aspects  of  transformative  business  models  that  challenge  the  existing  set  of  ass-
umptions and norms. It is interesting to note that thus far the larger suppliers to the
automotive industry, be they materials companies or component suppliers, have not
attempted direct involvement – perhaps because of fear that they would not like to
appear as competitors to their customers, the vehicle manufacturers. Rather, most of
the examples listed briefly below come from those who are outside the industry or on
its periphery in various ways. One example is presented in a little more detail, but are
several ways of thinking about product technology, manufacturing process, industrial
inter-linkages, scale, and business models that go beyond ‘fire and forget’ production.
TH!INK: radical innovations in manufacturing 
One version or approach was the TH!NK1. This example illustrates new product
and process technology, and new ways of reaching customers while foregoing the use
of franchised dealerships. That is, the factory with a low break-even point, is also the
point of sale. The basic design concept was a two-seat city battery electric vehicle with
a  thermoplastic  body  for  urban  commuters  and  utilities  (Wells  and  Nieuwenhuis,
1999).  The TH!NK employed a lower frame constructed  from 90% high strength
steel cut, folded and welded rather than pressed into shape − the design for which was
developed in co-operation with British Steel Automotive Engineering Group. Normal
steel pressings would have required large investments in tooling. Mounted onto the
lower  frame  was  an  upper  frame  constructed  from  aluminium  extrusions,  seam
welded at the joints - this time Norsk Hydro provided useful expertise. The thermo-
plastic body was moulded in one operation, with separate mouldings for the doors,
1 For a detailed account of the evolution of the TH!NK enterprise, see Chapter 10 of Orsato
(2001b).
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roof and a few smaller parts, and was non-structural. The factory in Norway had a
design capacity of 5,000 units per annum. The wider business plan included the use of
internet  sales  and  mobile  service  delivery  to  obviate  the  need  for  dealerships.
Furthermore, the intention was to supply potential new markets such as California by
locating a ‘cloned’ factory in the market. 
Ridek: Sharing vehicle parts
This example illustrates the ways in which an innovative product design can also
liberate an innovative approach to vehicle ownership and use. It does not illustrate in-
novative manufacturing techniques, but the original concept was designed around the
need to use large and heavy battery packs for a zero emissions vehicle. The example
highlighted here is that embodied in the Ridek concept (Wells,  2003b). The Ridek
consists of two parts: a motorised deck (or ‘Modek’) that combines the chassis with
the powertrain in one integral unit; and a self-contained body module (or ‘Ridon’) that
is  mounted onto the motorised deck via four  fixing points.   Under the proposed
business model only the Ridon would be purchased and owned by the consumer. The
Modek would be owned by the municipal authority, which would have to retain suffi-
cient numbers to allow Modeks to be exchanged as required. Modeks would then be
rented or leased out to consumers, but could be serviced, repaired, maintained or up-
graded at a central urban facility.
MDI Air Car: a new business model for card design, production and distributi-
on
This particular business idea provides a good illustration of an attempt to combine
in one innovative package a new approach to vehicle design, vehicle production, and
exploitation  of  the  market  with  a  rapid  approach  tomarket  entry  and  expansion
through franchising of production. Motor Development International (MDI) is the
company formed to bring to market the ideas of the inventor of the compressed air
engine, Guy Negre (Wells, 2002). The technical concept and the business plan have
generated much controversy in the automotive industry,  and doubts over both re-
main. 
However, the case is reported here as indicative of a different means of combining
product technology and business model. In this vehicle, compressed air is held in a
suitable canister. As such, compressed air represents stored energy. The compressed
air is then fed into a cylinder and allowed to expand, and in so doing the expansion
provides the motive force to push a piston and hence turn the engine. There is no
combustion, so there are no emissions at the point of use other than air- though of
course overall emissions performance depends upon the energy source used to com-
press the air. A useful attribute of the technology is that any sort of dedicated infra-
structure would not be technically difficult or expensive to install – air refilling points
could easily be added to existing petrol stations for example. Simple air compressors
could be run from domestic electricity and re-charge the cylinders overnight. The de-
tailed design of The Air Car is more complex than the above suggests, for example it
involves an innovative articulated connecting rod to allow the piston to be positioned
at top dead centre for a longer duration in the cycle than is normally the case with an
internal combustion engine. The engine develops maximum power at 3,500 rpm and
maximum torque at just 800-1,300 rpm. The slow speed and low temperature of ope-
ration (air in the cylinder head reaches 400 C maximum) mean than vegetable oil is
sufficient for lubrication, and the oil will last up to 50,000 km.
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The car is positioned and performs rather like a battery electric vehicle without the
weight and cost penalty of high performance batteries. Compared with contemporary
petrol and diesel cars the range, top speed and acceleration are limited. An interesting
by-product of the technology is that the exhaust air is at minus 15 Celcius, so air con-
ditioning for the cabin is easy to obtain.
The engine concept has various non-automotive applications. However, MDI have
designed a vehicle structure within which the engine and tanks can be placed. The ve-
hicle is available in four basic body styles that reflect the urban / commercial vehicle
focus of the product: family car; van; taxi; and pick-up.
However, of equal interest is the business plan developed by MDI. With many in-
novators, the core problem is usually lack of investment resources allied to the need
to break the hold of the existing market leaders. MDI is no exception, but rather than
seek to persuade an existing vehicle manufacturer to take up the technology, MDI
have tried a quite different approach. The core of the MDI approach is to grant li-
cences to third parties that in effect take on an MDI franchise for a defined territory
in return for the investment needed to create the factory to serve that territory. MDI
has designed a standardised or modular factory, and claims that 50 factories have al-
ready been allocated in various  locations  around the  world.  In  addition,  the stan-
dardised factory includes office space and a showroom, because in the MDI concept
the point of manufacturing is also the point of retail and service / maintenance delive-
ry.  A prototype factory is  claimed to exist  in Nice. The factory therefore includes
4,200 m2 of workshop space; 500 m2 of offices; and 300 m2 of showroom space. On a
single shift, with 70 workers, the factory is expected to produce about 2,000 vehicles
per annum. In terms of operations, the factory would manufacture and assemble en-
gines,  car  parts,  the  chassis,  and undertake  final  assembly.  The  large  plastic  body
panels would be manufactured at the factory as well. Of course, in addition the facto-
ry would undertake promotion and sales, and distribution, sale of spare parts, repairs
and service within the zone allocated to them.
The MFR Approach as a Business Model to achieve Industrial
Transformation
It  is  worthwhile  to  consider  how  far  this  re-thinking  of  a  major  industry
fundamentally changes the terms of comparison and performance, in business, social
and environmental terms. These issues are treated in several themes below.
Customers, brands and market success
In order to be sustainable a business must be commercially viable, and the way to
achieve this is to deliver superior customer satisfaction than rival approaches. A key
problem for new market entrants, and one that is not entirely resolved by the MFR
concept, is that of brand value. Particularly in large, complex and expensive products
such as cars it is the case that consumers tend to be risk averse. Of course new brands
have been introduced into the market over recent years by the existing vehicle manu-
facturers, but at great cost and over a long period of time. The MFR concept may al-
low some of this risk to be reduced because customers do not necessarily have to buy
the  product,  they  might  well  just  buy  the  mobility  service.  However,  the  MFR
business model offers a mechanism to deliver superior customer satisfaction in many
different ways if sufficient credibility can be established. For example, the consumer
will benefit from a reduction in depreciation of the vehicle (reflected as lower lease
rates), because of reduced over-supply.. One interesting aspect is that customers can
visit the plant, can meet the workers on the production floor who will make their car,
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and can thereby have an affinity with the product (a practice already used to sell pres-
tige  vehicles  in  Europe).  The  factory  gains  valuable  market  data  direct  from  cu-
stomers, with insights into customer life-styles, aspirations and mobility needs. In turn
this might help shape new product development, because the factory has daily de-
alings with those buying, servicing and repairing their cars: even modifications to the
production process can be instituted quickly and cheaply. The inherent production
flexibility and geographic proximity of MFR is the practical basis upon which new
levels of customer care can be built. MFR makes possible flexible response, shorter
lead times, and late configuration that in turn yield shorter times to market, and quick
responses to customer orders. 
Sustainable growth strategies
Existing industry grows by producing more and selling more. This in itself is not
sustainable, while the actual growth patterns are severely disruptive. Investments with
a MFR framework in assembly capacity can be relatively small-scale and incremental,
either by adding (subtracting) more units or by the expansion (contraction) of existing
units - and thereby supply can expand or contract in line with the market. A chronic
problem with industries that have sought ever-increasing economies of scale is large
fluctuations in demand relative to supply. Each additional capacity increment or new
plant is very large, a step-change in supply, so the industry comes to be characterised
by poor capacity utilisation and low margins. Conversely, each MFR unit would have
an investment cost well below that of a traditional manufacturing plant – although the
cumulative investment cost for the same production capacity may be higher. The in-
cremental expansion of capacity can also have a geographic component in that new
plants can be added to develop new market territories. The environmental benefits or
the economic benefits of this sort of ‘smoothing’ are by no means proven, but are at
least suggestive and worthy of further detailed research.
The Social Value of MFR 
One potential avenue for theoretical development is to bring in the concepts to be
found in the debate on the decentralised economy and on the phenomena of ‘re-lo-
calisation’. In particular, the social value of production and work is of importance as
an oft-neglected aspect of sustainability. The work on eco-industrial parks represents
one (environmental) basis for understanding the character of localisation. Our first
starting point for this analysis is that of Schumacher (1973), and that quite simply,
‘small is beautiful’. By changing spatial scale it is possible to create wealth, useful pro-
ducts and ‘rewarding’ work to the community in which it is based – a goal that has va-
lue in its own right (Shuman, 1998).
With this combined product-service function and social applicability, the MFR fac-
tory becomes the location for  repair,  spare parts,  in-use modification (e.g. external
panel refresh, power-train upgrades, refitting of interior trim) that allows the manu-
facturer to benefit directly from profitable aftermarket activities. The factory becomes
the centre for  trade-ins,  used vehicle sales,  and End of  Life Vehicle  recycling and
hence becomes the embodiment of product stewardship within the local community.
The MFR concept has potential to liberate communities and meet their social and
political  objectives by creating local employment and wealth creation in high-value
manufacturing  activities,  countering  the  disenfranchising  impacts  of  globalisation.
Those purchasing the product or service would know that there would be direct local
economic benefits and, equally, there would be fewer concerns over e.g. exploited la-
bour in far-off locations. The MFR concept further embodies the growing desire to
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increase the use of skilled labour and reduce fixed investment in order to reduce cost,
increase flexibility and increase social cohesion. Given that sustainability does not and
can not mean the ossification of social or economic structures, it is incumbent upon
those advocating a different future to consider the adaptability of the business solu-
tions they propose: adaptability is a key facet of the MFR approach. In the longer
term the business model assumes a transition from pure manufacture of new product
into a greater reliance on service, support, re-manufacture, etc. and this offers a means
to escape the ‘production growth equals business growth’ trap.
Transitions for Emerging Economies
One of the initial stimuli to the work undertaken in industrial ecology was the ba-
sic concern that it would be impossible for the planet to support a standard of materi-
al consumption attained by highly industrialized countries if the emerging economies
attained the same level. In other words, emerging economies desperately need ‘deve-
lopment’,  but  the  terms by  which this  is  achieved must  be different  – this  is  the
essential message of the Bruntland Report after all. In addition, emerging economies
tend to suffer from chronic under-capitalisation, high levels of national debt, and sur-
plus labour. While some materials may be abundent, these economies often lack local
processing capabilities and export only the raw material: there is insufficient local ad-
ded value. The MFR approach makes some contribution to these issues. For example,
the approach is conducive to the creation of products that are appropriate to the lo-
cality. Of course it is debatable whether different places have different needs in terms
of cars and mobility, but a cursory glance at the cities of the world would suggest that
they do. Furthermore, the reduced capital requirements and high labour content im-
plied is  ideal  for  the  structural  conditions  in many emerging economies,  while  si-
multaneously providing for a substitution of expensive imports. 
The Environmental Footprint of MFR
In any industry or activity there is a choice to be made between concentrating or
dispersing that activity, and which is ‘better’ for the environment. With fewer, larger
plants there are various efficiencies (equivalent to economies of scale) in processes
that will mean lower per-unit burdens in terms of e.g. energy consumption, water pol-
lution, etc. However, a large facility can also mean that for the locality in which it is
placed there are very real environmental consequences both with normal operations
and with catastrophic events. 
The environmental advantages of MFR are slightly different to this debate. For ex-
ample, compared with traditional car manufacturing, the MFR approach makes viable
low-volume  production.  This  type  of  production  often  utilises  technologies  other
than the all-steel body, pressed, welded and painted. Therefore the MFR approach
enables the traditional paint-shop, one of the environmental ‘hot-spots’ in car manu-
facturing, to be abandoned. Other advantages might follow. The MFR plant does not
require a large, flat dedicated site with extensive support services. A modern car plant
occupies  several  square  kilometres  of  land.  Compared  with  this,  MFR  requires  a
classic ‘light industrial’ facility and could even be used in ‘brownfield’ sites needing in-
dustrial regeneration.
Another interesting aspect is that the factory can undergo a transition over time
from an essentially new car production focus, to one more involved in service and re-
pair. That is, the factory does not depend absolutely on the continued sale of new
cars. This helps to mitigate the tendency to over-production with all manner of asso-
ciated environmental and market benefits. The environmental cost of over-producti-
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on is rarely addressed by environment-related studies, but we believe it to be crucial in
the long term. Finally, the MFR can work as a point of collection of end-of-life vehic-
les, with the option to become a dismantling facility. This can certainly facilitate reuse
and recycling of materials.
Concluding Remarks
In this article we not only analyse why the current system of production and dis-
tribution of automobiles is unsustainable but also presented an alternative for such
paradigm.  The MFR was introduced as  an ideal typology. By doing so our ‘ideal
model’ can be used as a basis for the evaluation of existing and future alternatives that
combine environmental demands with those of business and society. Our experience
in the industry taught us that the environmentally-sound processes and products will
not  become  common  practice  unless  they  are  anchored  in  a  sustainable  business
model. Although we believe the MFR provides exactly this, we contend that this artic-
le is just the opening of a dialogue for advancing research and practice in this area.  
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Section D: Technologies for Sustainability Transformation
Green Technology Foresight as Instrument in
Governance for Sustainability
Mads Borup
Technology Scenarios Research Programme, Risø National Laboratory, Denmark
There is increasing focus on foresight exercises as a tool in public governance of
research and industrial innovation systems. Technology foresight has in recent years
been carried out at the European level as well as in many individual countries e.g.
Austria, France, UK, The Netherlands, Greece, and the Czech Republic. Technology
foresight can be defined as systematic analysis and discussion about possible techno-
logy futures. The activities are in many cases set up as an input to research and tech-
nology policy and prioritisation, often with close connections to industrial policy and
innovation policy. Apart from governmental institutions, innovation and engineering
supporting institutions e.g. associations of engineers in Germany, Sweden, and Den-
mark have engaged in establishing technology foresight activities. Also people in the
fields  of  technology  studies  and  technology  assessment  are  discussing  technology
foresight at present.
Green  technology  foresight  (GTF),  or  environmentally  oriented  technology
foresight,  has occurred as part  of this  renewed and extended focus  on technology
foresight. The environmental and climate problems are widely acknowledged as seri-
ous problems facing the world today both locally and globally. Environment issues
and thoughts  about  sustainability  are  if  not  high  on,  then  at  least  visible,  on  the
agenda in society in general. They have become part of the mainstream discussions.
This has created a new area of relevance and legitimacy for technoscientific develop-
ment and research and new opportunities and markets for environment technology
are gaining importance. An integration of science and technology policy with environ-
ment policy seems more relevant and obvious than earlier. These things are reflected
in the appearance of green technology foresight and also in the inclusion to some ex-
tent of environment aspects in more general technology foresight activities. Special
methods of green technology foresight have been developed, as many normal techno-
logy foresight approaches are not suitable for dealing with environmental issues.
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The  foresight  exercises  usually  happen in  interaction  with  different  actors  e.g.
from industries,  science  areas,  and public  governance  and planning.  The  activities
contribute to coordination and integration of expectations, knowledge and perspect-
ives of the different areas. Thus foresight is a multi-actor activity that supports net-
work developments across established institutional and sectorial borders. Green tech-
nology foresight can be seen as one of the important new instruments in the gov-
ernance of the transformation of innovation and industry towards environmental sus-
tainability. The chapter describes the character of green technology foresight and dis-
cusses critically the connections between technology foresight and environment. The
description of green technology foresight is given primarily through presentation of
examples of concrete projects. They are analysed with respect to: 1) the method em-
ployed, 2) the actors and organisations involved, including the embedment of the pro-
jects  institutionally and in policy developments. The examples of green technology
foresight are these:
1. 81 options – A Dutch Green Technology Foresight
2. The Danish Green Technology Foresight
3. Life cycle assessment and technology foresight
4. Precautionary principle and technology foresight
The main argument of the chapter  is  that  green technology foresight can be a
fruitful tool in environmentally oriented research and technology policy, but that tech-
nology deterministic understanding of innovation is still quite dominating in the nor-
mal foresight methods and hence alternative and specialised methods designs than
these are  needed.  As an example  of  problem-oriented  technology  foresight,  green
technology foresight might be a useful element in a transformation of the innovation
systems  to sustainability  as  the  experiences  about  integration  of  environment  and
technology  development  experiences  from green technology  foresight  can be  em-
ployed more generally in science and technology planning and discussion. When this
is said, it shall also be emphasized that there still are only very few examples of actual
green technology foresight exercises. There is not basis for saying that green techno-
logy foresight in general has so far had more than limited influence on environment
policy, technology policy, science policy or the integration of these.
The perspective of the chapter builds on social studies of science, technology and
society dynamics (STS),  on governance studies,  and on studies of the connections
between environment problems and innovation. Before presentation of the specific
approaches of green technology foresight, the chapter contains firstly an elaboration
on the background for technology foresight, secondly a perspective on technology de-
velopment and environment, and thirdly a brief description of environment issues in
general technology foresight projects.
The chapter primarily describes green technology foresight as it appears in connec-
tion with public policy and planning processes at a central national or societal level. It
does not deal with strategy processes internally in e.g. companies, research institutions
etc. The chapter only considers activities, which are explicitly considered as techno-
logy foresight with focus on environmental/green issues. It does not claim to cover
the huge amount of future-oriented discussions, scenario analyses, ‘backcasting’ etc. in
one way or the other dealing with environment/sustainability and technology devel-
opment. Neither does the chapter give a complete picture of strategic planning pro-
cesses  on environment  and technology even though it  discusses  the  role  of  green
technology foresight in connection with planning and policy processes on environ-
ment, technology and science. Green technology foresight is but one of many ways to
do strategy and policy processes on technology and environment.
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Foresight and governance in a change-oriented society
The focus at technology foresight at present goes hand in hand with the tendency
of an increasingly change-oriented culture (as pointed out by e.g. Giddens 1998). Con-
tested technological futures are a central element in present time’s policy discussions,
agenda settings and power struggles (Brown et.al. 2001). Expectations and promises
about the future play an increasingly significant role in science and technology devel-
opment activities both at a macro,  meso and micro level i.e. both at the levels  of
policy and planning, of industrial  sectors  and research programmes and of experi-
ments and laboratory work (van Lente 1993, van Lente & Rip 1998). Generative vis-
ions  are  thus  constructed  and  developed  also  by  scientists  and  engineers  (Borup
2001). At the same time the understanding of science and knowledge is under signific-
ant change. Science and knowledge are to an increasing extent considered strategic is-
sues and objects of management and prioritisation. Knowledge production is by many
considered the central driver of development and economy. This is captured in the
term knowledge society.  The relevance of science and scientific knowledge is not giv-
en by science internal assessment only. Science’s new ‘social contract’ with society is
under development and it is a challenge to develop knowledge that is socially robust
(Gibbons 1999, Nowotny et.al. 2001). In this situation it is not surprising that techno-
logy foresight as a systematic tool for dealing with the future of not least research and
science enjoys relatively high attention.
The significance of technology foresight is related also to the strong technology-
orientation in general in society. Technological development and innovation are sup-
ported and encouraged in a multitude of ways. They are considered an important driv-
ing force for growth and societal development in general. When looking for solutions
to the problems in the society of today, eyes are often turned in direction of technos-
cience and the promises  of  new technology.  This  technology  deterministic  under-
standing is reflected in technology foresight studies. The weight is predominately on
technology push and science push issues and not on demand-pull or problem-ori-
ented understandings. Technology foresight studies thus usually focus on the positive
promises and potentials of new technologies.
Not least the climate and environmental problems have to some extent challenged
the technology optimism and an un-reflected belief in future technology. Recent dis-
cussions on technology foresight have to a higher degree considered the complexity
of technology development and its’ dependency on many diverse factors. The charac-
ter of dynamic co-evolution between many actors and the mutual integration of social
and technological aspects are considered (e.g. Rip 2002). Renn (2002) points out five
central characteristics of foresight:
• Foresight is based on the philosophy that future developments are contingent on
human actions and decisions; this is why foresight is not a process of forecasting
the future but rather an attempt to explore the space for human actions and inter-
ventions to shape the future
• Foresight is aimed at producing orientations rather than predictions; it provides
guidance to all actors and reduces uncertainty
• Foresight includes multiple perspectives, multiple actors and multiple disciplines
on different levels of governance
• Foresight is focused on opportunities and risks alike
• Foresight emphasis the interrelations between the technological, economic, social,
political and cultural sector of society
In practice, there is however still focus on approaches that primarily include sci-
entific and technological experts for example through expert-oriented questionnaires
(‘delphi studies’) and expert panels. The ‘delphi study’ approach has to some degree
been paradigmatic for  technology foresight activities. In Europe, it  is  not least the
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German and the British technology foresights  employing the delphi approach that
have been a common reference point for design of foresight projects. 
Technology  foresight  and  other  of  the  ‘new’  governance  approaches  are  gov-
ernance in and by networks of actors.  They focus on interaction and coordination
between actors instead of having a hierarchical view on governance and they emphas-
ise the importance of decentralised activities and the interplay between centralised and
decentralised steering. As it is the point in the recent years’ governance literature, dir-
ections and strategies for innovation and technology development occur not as a gov-
ernmental dictate or as autonomous processes detached from governmental influence,
but are developed in interaction between governmental authorities and policies and
actors in the covered activity areas. This is described as well in governance literature
on innovation and research specifically (Hackmann 2001a+b, Fuller 2000, Glynn et.al.
2001, Fèron & Crowley 2002, Goncalves 2003) as in the more general governance lit-
erature  that  often  emphasise  the  connection  between  forms  of  governance  ap-
proaches and the issue of democracy (March & Olsen 1995, Pierre 2000, Hirst 2000,
Christiansen 1999). The question is not if there is interaction between government
actors  and actors  relevant  for  the  research areas  to  be  managed,  but  which actor
groups and networks are included in the processes, and which are excluded. Secondly,
it is a question how, in which interaction processes and with which weight the differ-
ent actors are represented and involved in the processes.
Technology foresight must however be understood primarily as a practical, prag-
matic  activity.  The methods  and approaches  are  not  developed and fully  analysed
within an academic research perspective. There is a lack of systematic and independ-
ent analyses of the impact of technology foresight. The impact is clearly smaller than
and not as thorough as promoters of foresight will say, when talking about the single
technology foresight project. A study of the influence of technology foresight as a sci-
ence and research policy means concludes that there is no or only very little effect on
values and practice in academic research. Primarily the effect consists of a shifting and
more open attitude towards industry (Henkel 2000). Other studies find that there can
be important impacts from foresight, however very dependent of institutional rela-
tions  in  connection  with  the  foresight  (van der  Meulen  1999;  van  der  Meulen &
Löhnberg 2001). Especially it is concluded that foresight in the Netherlands has had
important impact on research in sustainable technology as well as in environmentally
oriented technology policy. In some circles of environmental policy makers it raised
awareness  that  as  part  of  the environmental  policy a  technology  policy  is  needed.
While the impact is seldom significant concerning the single foresight processes, tech-
nology foresight might gain importance if it becomes a widespread activity and a nor-
mal tool in policy, planning and strategy processes in connection with technology. On
four contemporary and partly overlapping foresight processes van der Meulen con-
cludes that:
“The interesting point however  is  that  at  the system level  a  new balance  has  been
constructed. The four foresight processes together create a new balance of future ori-
ented strategy development which includes different perspectives and interests.” (van
der Meulen 1999, p. 20)
Technology development and environment
In discussion of green technology foresight, it is relevant to draw on the perspect-
ive of the well-known classification of technologies in relation to environment issues:
1. End-of-pipe and add-on solutions
2. Cleaner technology and integrated solutions
3. System changes for sustainability
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The list can to some extent be seen as a historical development of environment
technologies where end-of-pipe solutions were the first way of dealing with pollution
and environment problems, then first cleaning technologies and later integrated solu-
tions and cleaner production technologies appeared. And where sociotechnical system
changes  now are the  ‘environment  technology’  that  shall  be  developed.  However,
there will still be a need for new cleaning technologies also in the future, and the third
point on the list shall also be seen as a quality characteristics or a goal to employ as it
points to a lack in many technology development activities. There are two dimensions
in this: the system dimension and the value dimension. Firstly, the system changes in-
dicate that  changes at the level of the socio-technical systems,  and not just  in the
single technological artefact or product, is needed if environmental sustainability shall
be pursued.  Approaches  that  include technology use and consumption patterns  as
well as institutional, organisational and market aspects are needed in order to obtain
the radical reductions in resource and material consumption and in emissions that are
required if sustainability shall be reached. This is often illustrated with figures like the
one below that indicates that radical system innovations (and a factor 10 reduction
rather than factor 5) are needed.
System changes for sustainability have to do with practices and norms within in-
novation and technology development:
”...severe contradictions between innovation and sustainable development exist.  ...we
resume  that  the  present  practice  of  industrial  innovation  still  stands  in  significant
contradiction to sustainable development.” (Meyer-Krahmer 1998)
”...most if not all  of the environmental  problems facing the world ultimately  derive
from the long-run processes of technological change that began with the first industrial
revolution.” (Smith 2002)
Thus system changes for sustainability also mean that changes in values and norms
in direction of sustainability are a necessary element in connection with the techno-
logy development for sustainability. There will be no sustainable society if sustainabil-
ity and environmentally awareness are not a part of the norm set in most areas and in-
teraction arenas of society, including scientific and innovation oriented institutions.
A draw back of the three-step classification of environment technology is that it is
a classification of technologies through the character of their positive environmental
impacts, while negative environmental impacts are not in focus. Most technology de-
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Environment aspects in general technology foresights
The amount of literature on environment and technology foresight is limited. An
overview on the subject can be obtained through the proceedings of an OECD work-
shop on Technology  Foresight  and Sustainable Development  (OECD 1999).  This
section also builds on a literature study on environment and technology foresights we
have done for the Danish Ministry of Environment (Rasmussen et.al. 2003).
The typical picture in the general national technology foresights studies is that en-
vironmental issues appear clearly primarily in the two categories: 1) energy and 2) en-
vironment technology. To some extent environmental issues are also present in trans-
port categories (energy efficiency and fuels). Energy is, whether defined in terms of a
technology area,  a sector,  or  in other  terms,  in many technology foresight  studies
among the overall  main areas identified under which a number of sub-sectors and
sub-technology areas are clustered. Typically there are between 4 and 15 of these main
areas in a general national technology foresight. The sub areas within energy are for
example energy savings technologies,  energy production systems,  renewable energy
technology, fossil fuel clean technologies, and energy transport and storage. Environ-
ment aspects e.g. climate problems, resource consumption and efficiency, are a very
central and explicit element in most parts of the energy main area.
Environmental technology categories have compared to energy not been among
the  typical  overall  main  areas  in  the  general  technology  foresight  studies,  but  are
found as smaller sub-areas subordinated other categories.  Environment technology
usually means cleaning technology and pollution and waste treatment technology in
the technology foresight studies. Also environment monitoring and control technolo-
gies appear in this category. 
There are exceptions of this general picture, for example in the Austrian techno-
logy foresight where 1) clean production and 2) biological (organic) food are among
the seven overall  areas in the technology and research oriented delphi study (ITA
1998). Environmental futures scenarios has been carried out in connection with re-
cent rounds of the UK foresight programme (Eames & Skea 2002). Environment and
Clean Production Technologies is one of the six key technology sectors selected in
the  European  ‘Futures  Project’,  which  builds  on  the  various  national  technology
foresight studies and has sustainable development as a priority concern (Cahill et.al.
1999). The ‘high-ranked technologies for Europe’ within this key sector and the en-
ergy key sector from this study are shown in the box. It is also found in this study,
that examples of environment technologies and especially clean technologies can still
be found within a number of sub-areas e.g. biodegradable plastic and carbondioxide
fixation technologies within the area of material technology (the latter also within the
biotech – agro food sector).
In a long range of other categories than energy and environment technology in the
general technology foresight studies, environment aspects of future technologies are
not or only to a very limited extent present. Environmental aspects are thus only dealt
with in a minority of the areas and sub-areas covered, not because the potential future
technologies are not connected with environment issues,  changes in resource con-
sumptions etc. but because technology foresights and their methods do not focus on
this issue.
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Despite the fact that environment aspects are only dealt with in a minority of areas
in the general technology foresight studies, the environmental dimension is usually ex-
plicitly present at the value level in the technology foresight studies and in the overall
picture given of the relevance and legitimation of research and innovation. Sustainable
development is generally viewed as a key future need to which science and technology
should be directed (Fukasaku 1999). However, the connection from sustainability as
overall value to practical method is not elaborated.
Some examples of environment-related issues identified in the different  general
technology foresight studies are listed below. The examples are from the Czech Re-
public foresight 2002 which as one of the cross cutting ‘thematic panels’ had an envir-
onment panel, from the classical delphi survey in UK 1995, and from the French ‘crit-
ical technologies study’ 1996 (the latter is shown in the appendix). Of course a list of
issues is often a simplification and does not give the full picture of environmental as-
pects in the technology foresight studies.  However in many cases, not least  in the
studies  building  primarily  on the  delphi  method,  the  description  of  the  individual
technology or area is very brief. It is not unusual that a future technology is described
through one sentence only, the ‘delphi statement’. Some recent delphi surveys have
adopted environmental criteria among the other criteria of importance like ‘economic
growth’, ‘competitiveness’ that are briefly touched upon.
As the lists indicate the weight in the general technology foresight has mostly been
on the single technology and on a number of individual changes in the future, treated
more or less independently. The perspective is usually most often particularistic rather
than systemic. It is also clear from the lists that it is the positive environmental effects
of future technology developments that are described, while negative environmental
impacts and risks seldom are represented. Important uncertainties are also often ab-
sent in the descriptions. 
The Futures Project: Technology Map (Cahill et.al. 1999)
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Part Two: Examples of Green Technology Foresight Projects
The number of specific green technology foresight projects  is still  very limited.
Apart from examples that will be described below, there are however also other inter-
esting activities. Some of the recent projects running currently which are worth keep-
Technology Foresight in the Czech Republic: Thematic Panel Environment
(Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the CR 2002)
Expected trends in the Czech Republic in the next 10 years
• Expanding scientific discussion on key problems and methodology of their solution
• More attention will  be paid to long-term effects  of human activities on man and eco-
systems
• Interconnection of environmental science and political agenda for sustainable development
• Concentration of research on the study of interactions between the environment and man
and on possible ways of directing this interaction to a sustainable trajectory
Proposed key research directions in order of their importance
1. Technologies for the environment
2. Interaction between man and environment
3. Sustainable transport
4. Protection of natural resources and material flows
5. Sustainable power engineering
6. Environment and health
7. Economic and social context of sustainable development
8. Sustainable agriculture
9. Man and landscape
10. Long-term ecological research – LTER
United Kingdom Technology Foresight – Delphi Survey (Loveridge et.al. 1995)
Selection of environment related delphi statements from ‘Top-10 Statements’ within different
sectors
• Widespread use of separation and membrane technologies and biotechnologies for waste
management.
• Widespread use of genetically engineered plants and micro-organisms to control and/or
reverse environmental contamination
• Development of an integrated approach to retrofitting existing buildings, using existing
techniques  and understanding,  which improves the energy  performance  of  refurbished
buildings by 50%
• Widespread use of highly efficient (>20% improvement on current practice), low emission
engines for transport.
• Development of cost-effective refinery processes that meet future requirements for clean
transportation fuels
• New conversion/transmission techniques provide viable economic and environmentally
acceptable alternative energy sources
• Widespread  use of  modelling techniques  which predict  and minimise  waste  products
from an entire facility
• Development of novel and practical catalytic systems for SOx/NOx removal
• Widespread  use  of  recycled  building  materials,  composites  incorporating  synthetic
materials  such  as  plastics  and  alternative  forest  products,  resulting  from  modified
construction concepts and design standards
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ing an eye on are e.g.  The Science Forward Look 2004-2013 in the UK department
for Environment, Food and Rural Areas (DEFRA 2003) and the project on Trans-
itions  towards  sustainable  production/consumption systems  under  the  ‘Factory  of
Tomorrow’ programme in the Austrian Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Tech-
nology (Whitelegg & Weber 2003).
81 Options – A Dutch Environment-oriented Technology Foresight
The first example of an environment-oriented technology foresight study that shall
be described here was carried out in the Netherlands in 1996-1997. The objective of
this foresight study was “to find handles for policy to stimulate technological systems
that are able to raise the environmental efficiency of products, processes and activit-
ies” (Weterings et.al. 1997). The study was commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of
Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment in connection with attempts to gain
a further elaborated understanding of the possibilities technology presents to reduce
or  to  resolve  current  environmental  problems.  According  to  Vollenbroeck  et.al.
(1999), it was explicitly meant to contribute to re-alignment of technological develop-
ment with the long-term goal of achieving sustainable development. The study was
carried out by TNO, which is a semi-public contract research organisation on applied
science, innovation etc. The Central Planning Bureau (part of the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs) also contributed, primarily on the scenario parts.
The participants in the study process were primarily the project team and other
staff members at TNO. A panel of 7 external experts from e.g. universities, DTO (a
Sustainable Technological Development programme) and from innovation and tech-
nology assessment institutions was established and consulted in some parts  of  the
process. A project-following committee consisted mostly of people from the Dutch
ministries, primarily from the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Envir-
onment.  In addition, interviews with a number of individual experts on the future
technology development were made in the beginning of the process.
The basic design of the study is a technology push – demand pull model of devel-
opment and innovation, with the environmental perspective integrated in the techno-
logy push side. This is reflected in the two main lines of work that were followed:
Technology Push
• Mapping  out  of  the  technology  developments  that  could  lead  to  a  substantial  en-
vironmental load over the next 15 to 25 years, or to a considerable reduction in the current
environmental problems.
Societal demand pull
• Investigating  the  main  societal  driving  forces  which  are  decisive  for  the  resulting
development
This was spelled out in three main phases in the method:
1. Inventory of potential technological developments
2. Assessment of the environmental relevance of the technological developments
on a system level
3. Scenario analysis and analysis of societal driving forces
The inventory primarily built on existing foresight studies and end up with long
list  of  2,500 technology developments.  The title  of  the final  report  “81 options  –
Technology for a sustainable development” refers to that the study from the 2,500
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technology  developments  identifies  81  environmentally  relevant  technological  sys-
tems, which could lead to changes (positive or negative) in the environmental effi-
ciency  of  products,  processes,  and  activities.  The  81  technological  systems  were
clustered in five categories: Energy systems, new (raw) material supplies, production
systems, information & communication systems, and transport systems. Examples of
the identified technological systems are:
• Advanced separation
• Cultivation of biological raw materials
• Coal gasification
• New generation of photovoltaics cells
• Hydrogen for driving vehicles
• Intermodal goods transport
• Domestic communication systems
• Novel protein foods
• Optimization of horticulture behind glass
• Industrial waste as building material
The  environment-oriented  technology  foresight  study  is  significantly  different
from most traditional technology foresights on a number of issues. Firstly, the inclu-
sion of demand pull aspects, though most emphasis is still on the technology push
side. Secondly, it diverges from other studies by the integration of the environmental
aspects and by approaching future technologies not only as potential solutions to ex-
isting environmental problems, but also as potential sources of new environmental
problems. 
“…encouraging  technological  development  is  no  guarantee  of  environment  im-
provements. For example, new technology can lead to new forms of pollution. In other
words technology implies threats as well as opportunities.” (Vollenbroeck, p.83)
“…we did  not approach technology  solely  as  a  potential  solution to  existing envir-
onmental problems, but we also took into account any potentially new problems that
could result from technological development.” (Weterings, p.98)
A limited number of environmental aspects where considered: Utilisation of fossil
fuels (including CO2, SOX, and NOX emissions),  utilisation of scarce raw materials,
emissions to air, water and soil, generation of hazardous and non-hazardous waste.
Also space use where considered. In this assessment process also a number of extern-
al specialists and generalists were consulted. The environmental aspects of each po-
tential technological system were assessed according to the sphere of application and
specific social function for which the system is developed. The assessment was made rel-
ative to the currently dominant system on this function. It is based on unit of output.
Developments  in  production  volume or  amount  of  consumption  and behavioural
changes were not taken into account. Though this static system comparison might
have some important  limitations,  the  system perspective  in  the assessment  of  the
technological opportunities is also at this point significantly different from the tradi-
tional object understanding in technology foresight studies.
 The conclusion on this part of the process was that around 60 of the 81 technolo-
gical systems lead predominantly to improvement in environmental efficiency and 20
had, in addition to positive effects, also adverse effects. The assessment of the envir-
onmental future technological systems was often uncertain, difficult and problematic
and it was also a conclusion that:
“It is impossible to make an unequivocal assessment of the environmental relev-
ance of all the systems.” (ibid p. 3)
The demand pull side of the project consisted of scenario analysis based on three
macro-political and economical, global scenarios made by the Central Planning Bur-
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eau:  1)  Balanced  growth:  towards  a  sustainable,  multi-polar  growth;  2)  European
Renaissance:  new opportunities  for  Europe;  3) Global  Shift:  shifting the centre  of
economic growth to the Pacific Rim. The potential integration and role of the differ-
ent technological systems in the story lines of the three scenarios were analysed and it
was assessed if and how the integration could lead to also more radical innovations in
the social functions of society. Changes in social functions and not just less radical re-
designs and optimisations of the existing systems were considered needed in the long
term if significant environmental improvements shall be obtained. The policy handles
identified by comparing the scenarios with the technological systems are these:
1. Regulatory price measures on fossil fuels should be established as the price of
oil, gas and coal ‘is evidently the main obstacle standing in the way of environ-
mentally-efficient technological systems’, not only with regard to energy supply in-
novations but also to innovations in industrial production systems and transport
systems.
2. Supply  dynamism of  technology  development  should  be encouraged,  e.g.  by
combined public  and private  R&D, by facilitating knowledge transfer  between
companies, or by pursuing a prevention-oriented technology policy
3. Selective demand articulation e.g. by government acting as pro-active party on
a market or by introducing price measures which selectively lowers the threshold
for introducing new systems
4. Direct governmental control and intervening in the development of technolo-
gical systems which could lead to adverse environmental effects
The Dutch environment-oriented technology foresight has been used in policy de-
velopment in the Netherlands e.g.  in connection with the National Environmental
Policy Plan III and the research-programme on Economy, Ecology and Technology.
While the green technology foresight activities seems to have had important impact
on a technology and research-oriented element in the environment policy, there are
no indications that it has significantly influenced the general technology policy and
science policy or been integrated in these areas.
The Danish Green Technology Foresight
The  Danish  Green  Technology  Foresight  is  part  of  the  national  technology
foresight programme that has been running since the beginning of 2001. The pro-
gramme was first managed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry and then, after the
change of Government in late 2001, by the Ministry of Science, Technology and In-
novation. The Green Technology Foresight is one of the first three areas selected for
a foresight exercise after the establishment of the programme and the initial definition
of the foresight perspective employed. (The other areas are pervasive computing and
bio & health technology).  The work in the Danish Green Technology Foresight is
carried out from early spring 2002 to spring 2003 (www.teknologiskfremsyn.dk, Er-
hvervsfremmestyrelsen 2001, Cowi 2002 (all in Danish)).
Under the general objective of identifying and debating technologies and scientific
breakthroughs and assessing the opportunities and challenges in a Danish perspective,
the specific objectives of the green technology foresight are:
1. to map the global environment problems in a 10-20 years perspective, including
the aspects of behaviour and consumption that intensify the environmental prob-
lems
2. to identify and debate technological and institutional solutions
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3. to map competences and potentials in Danish industry and the innovation system
with departure in the identified environmental problems, driving forces, and solu-
tions
4. to make recommendations on radical and outstanding environment innovations
with business potentials and recommendations on which market and policy initiat-
ives that are needed to support them
The process consists of four steps to a large extent corresponding to the four ob-
jectives:  1)  The environmental  challenge,  2)  Technological  advances  with environ-
mental potentials, 3) Danish competences and business potentials, 4) Integration of
the three steps: Challenges for the technological development and definition of ‘focus
areas’. Most time is used on the last step. Schematically the method can be illustrated
by this figure, where point four is represented in the middle.
The foresight is organised as an expert panel process, with five discussion meet-
ings as the central element. There are 18 members of the panel, most of which both
have technological, research and managerial background. 6 are industry managers, 6
public researchers, 2 from other innovation system institutions and 2 from environ-
ment NGOs. The last 2 members are respectively from a large investment institution
and from the Ministry of Environment. The members of the panel are selected by the
science ministry’s  project group,  building on recommendation of persons made by
e.g. members of the advisory group and scientific background group connected to the
Danish technology foresight programme in general,  who were also involved in the
definition of the green technology foresight and its objectives. The expert panel dis-
cussion is supported by a consult group which acts as process consultant and secret-
ariat that prepares presentations, background papers, reports etc. drawing also on the
experience from other external experts and existing analyses.
With the many-sided and complex objectives, it is clear that the weighting and the
specific integration of them will be decisive for the character of the results of the ex-
ercise. The mapping of the environmental problems (step 1) builds on analyses from a
number of international organisations: OECD, World Watch Institute, European En-
vironment Agency, World Resources Institute, UNEP, and the European Commis-
sion. The identification of technological solutions in step 2 builds among other things
on other technology foresights and on interviews with external experts on environ-
ment-related technology. This step results in a first list of around 65 potential techno-
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cussions and prioritisations around one fourth of these were selected for deeper de-
scription and analysis.
The  competences  and  potentials  of  Danish  business  and  industry  and  of  the
knowledge and research  institutions  relevant  for  the  selected  technology  solutions
were mapped and discussed. Market potentials and use forms as well as institutional
and regulatory opportunities and constraints were discussed. This also included so-
called  SWOT  analyses  (assessments  of  Strengths,  Weaknesses,  Opportunities  and
Threats).
The green technology foresight ends up with the identification and definition of
four or five ‘focus areas’ as recommendations of technology innovations and connec-
ted business, production and consumption opportunities that could mean important
environmental differences, if pursued. The focus areas can be said to represent im-
portant elements in the intersection of the environment problems, the technologies
and the competences and business potentials, as indicated on the figure. The focus
areas have character of socio-technical systems. They are comprehensive, integrated
pictures of production and use patterns with emphasis on the role of technological
changes. For example a potential focus area related to transport could be ‘integration
of public and private transport through traffic information technology and road pri-
cing’. It would not be defined as ‘public transport infrastructure’ or new vehicles or
engine types. A focus area on energy would similarly rather be defined as hybrid re-
newable energy supply systems rather  than biomass  waste systems or wind energy
technology.
The selected focus areas are:
1. Flexible energy systems with increased wind energy
2. Systematic energy optimisation of buildings
3. More environmentally-friendly agriculture
a. Precision agriculture
b. Organic farming
4. Design of green products and material
The descriptions of the focus areas are typically a text of around 6-12 pages each
and include sections on the related knowledge and innovation institutions and clusters
and on market aspects, incentives, and regulatory elements. The level is not industrial
sectors, rather sub-sectors. The same is the case concerning knowledge aspects where
the focus is not on scientific areas or disciplines, but on different, more specific sub
areas of development and research and the interaction between these.
Scenarios development processes supported the final discussion and selection of
the focus areas. For each of the selected areas, four different scenarios (2x2, going
along two axes) are presented. The dimensions of the axes are for example 1) techno-
logy  object  -  integrated  systems;  2)  central  –  de-central  solutions;  and  3)
market/product - regulation.
The results of the green technology foresight process are published in a report in
May 2003. The target group is stated to be politicians, other decision-makers and the
broad public. Until the publishing of the foresight report, the project is a closed pro-
cess in the sense that it is not open for broad participation. The communication of
the contents to a broader audience is a planned part of the activity. In connection
with the public presentation of the report, an open debate conference is held in the
parliament building. It is the intention that the green technology foresight shall create
a broad political debate in Spring 2003. At first this goal is not reached as only few
politicians  participate  in  the  conference  and  the  mass  media  coverage  is  limited.
However, a considerable number of relevant industry representatives attend the con-
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ference and the results of the exercise are employed in quite a number of discussions
in the rest of 2003 both in industries, in NGOs and in public governance of innova-
tion and research e.g. in the energy area.
It has been an idea in the planning of the Danish Green Technology Foresight,
that the exercise shall function as a phase one in a two-phase process, where the first
phase is a general study that points out a number of areas that can be analysed in
more details in a phase two. Phase two will however not be carried out in the national
technology foresight programme in the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innova-
tion but by the Ministry of Environment and other ministries.  How integrated the
results of the Danish green technology study will be in the innovation policy and pri-
oritisation is too early to say. Through the Phase two carried out by other ministries,
the experiences and recommendations can be utilised within the specific areas. There
is at the same time a risk that the identified potentials for research and innovation in
the green technology foresight by the Phase Two will be left out of the general tech-
nology and innovation policy. If that happens, the potentials of integration of envir-
onment policy, science policy and technology policy will only partly be exploited.
For the time being two green technology foresight exercises are about to start un-
der the Ministry of Environment: one relatively broad and general on design of envir-
onmentally friendly products and materials and the environment challenges and po-
tentials of biotechnology, nanotechnology, and information and communication tech-
nology, and one specifically on environmentally-friendly agriculture. Both are to be
carried out in 2004 – 2005.  Whether the focus areas on energy will  continue in a
second phase is still an open question.
Summing up on the method structures in the Dutch and the Danish green techno-
logy foresight, it can be concluded that there are similarities in goals and methods but
there are also important differences:
a) The Dutch foresight has a symmetrical method structure on the analysis of envir-
onmental aspects  in  the sense that  both positive  and negative impacts  are in-
cluded, while the Danish method only works systematically with the positive po-
tential impacts and looks for solutions to the general  environmental  problems
mapped in the initial phase.
b) The system perspective in the Danish foresight is integrated and multifaceted on
the selected focus areas including specially developed scenarios, while the Dutch
system perspective appear through a breakdown of the present overall society in a
number  of societal  functions  within which each future  technological  system is
compared with the currently dominating system. The scenarios are external to this
and are general macro-political scenarios. The main method structure of the Dan-
ish foresight does not include other social driving forces than the existing com-
petences and potentials in industry areas and in research and innovation institu-
tions.
c) The time dimension to some extent seems more spelled out in the Dutch project
with its distinction between long-term radical changes of systems and shorter-
term redesign and optimisation and with its inclusion of possible new environ-
ment problems through the changes. The Danish is more focused on the present
business potentials and present environmental problems.
d) The Dutch foresight  is  carried out as a consultancy research project  while the
Danish is an expert panel discussion process. In both cases there is little emphasis
on broader or public participation.
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Life cycle assessment and technology foresight
In the last three years we have in our research group carried out projects that com-
bine  traditional  technology  foresight  methods  with  life  cycle  assessment  methods
(LCA). The third example on green technology foresight is a project with this hybrid
LCA and foresight approach in the wind energy area.
The key element in the methodological approach of life cycle assessment is  an
identification and analysis of all the different processes included in the entire lifecycle
of a product or a technological system, including a careful accounting of the materials
and energy flows associated with the processes. The method is primarily used for as-
sessing the environmental impacts of industrial products. There is, however, increas-
ingly focus on life cycle assessment as a tool in strategy, and planning processes, also
on long-term issues, in scenario processes etc. (Frankl & Rubik 2000, Pesonen et.al
2000, Christiansen 2001).
LCA and technology foresight  methods  (like e.g.  delphi surveys,  brainstorming
etc.) are very different and, in some respects, quite opposite. For example technology
foresight usually addresses partial elements of the (future) technological systems in the
sense of the main technical functionality, while LCA addresses all processes in the dif-
ferent life cycle phases and gives a more comprehensive picture of the actual techno-
logical system. LCA is in its traditional form a very detailed method, focusing on cer-
tainties and the most precise data available while foresight is more sketchy, process-
oriented and at least to some extent trying to deal with the large uncertainties con-
cerning future developments. Some of the typical characteristics are listed in the box.
In practice, the differences can be used productively to structure the interaction pro-
cess of green technology foresight especially designed according to the specific pur-
pose and area.
The green technology foresight project I will mention is entitled ‘Environmentally
sound design and recycling of windmills’. It is funded by the Energy Research Pro-
gramme managed by the Danish Energy Agency. It is carried out in collaboration with
the Wind Energy Department at Risø National Laboratory. The objectives of the pro-
ject are, apart from the method development:
• in a long term perspective to analyse the environmental impact of the manufactur-
ing and removal phases of windmills’ life cycles
• to make societal recommendations on dismantling, recycling and waste handling of
existing and future windmills
The two frameworks, typical characteristics
Lifecycle Assessment Technology Foresight
- Present -  Future, changes
- Products -  Technology
- Lifecycle perspective, -  Functionality, the single
      processes of different phases       technical characteristics
- Comprehensive -   Partial
- Environmental impacts -   Not focus on environment
-     Detailed -   Sketches, scenarios, strategies
- Objectified, results -   Interaction processes, actors
- Certainties -   Uncertainties
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The focus on the production/manufacturing and removal phases of the life cycles
of the windmills (and not on the important operation phase) is due to the fact that the
environmental aspects of the operation phase are already relatively well-described (the
main positive impact through green electricity production, the land use aspects, noise
etc.)
There are several target groups of the project. The recommendations on the soci-
etal level go to among others the public planning authorities. The project contributes
to  the  discussion  on  LCA  guidelines  and  standards  in  the  wind  energy  area  at
international and national level. And it is an input to actors in the energy sector, wind
turbine manufacturers and windmills owners/operators on future design and handling
of wind farms and windmills. The project has both been reported to the international
and Danish wind energy community (Dannemand et.al. 2001, Borup et.al. 2002).
Though there are connections from the project to the national policy level and
public authorities,  the project is not in the same way as the above described green
technology foresights part of the general research and technology policy. It is more a
sector-oriented project. However, the life cycle assessment perspectives and the prin-
ciples of the hybrid method might, with suitable adjustments and changes, be em-
ployed in national green technology foresight studies as well. 
The different steps in the project’s method design are shown in the figure below.
All in all the method is quite complex and I will not go into all details here but elabor-
ate briefly on a few points. The initial LCA is a traditional, complete and detailed LCA
of present time wind power systems and their environmental impacts. (This is a whole
project in itself and in fact this step is building on a separate, parallel LCA project and
on existing LCAs on wind power systems).
The first expert panel step is a workshop identifying central elements and driving
factors for the development of future windmill technology. The 10 participants in this
panel were representatives of public research, wind turbine industry, power grid oper-
ators, wind farm operators, LCA consultants and a representative of an environment-
al NGO.
The delphi-like survey was a questionnaire with 24 statements building on future
windmill technology. It was handed out to participants at a large international wind
energy conference in Copenhagen 2001. Emphasis in the questionnaire as well as in
the expert panel workshop was on technological factors (two third) while one third
was on socio-economical and policy/regulatory issues. For each potential future de-
velopment, the respondents were, in addition to the traditional delphi questions on
when (if ever) the change is going to come true, asked about the environmental ef-
fects of the change on a scale from highly beneficial to highly harmful.
LCA at a state-of-the-art 
wind power system
Mapping current trends of wind 
power technologies and concepts
Expert panel brainstorm 
on future wind technology
Delphi survey on future
wind technology
Scenarios of future wind
power systems
Expert panel brainstorm on environmental aspects of 
decommissioning current and future wind technology
LCA scanning of future wind power systems
Reporting
Phases of the project
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The expert panel involved in the workshop on environmental aspects of decom-
missioning and removal is another one than the first panel. It is in its composition re-
flecting the end-of-life phase of the windmills. The 11 participants were representat-
ives of consultants  and knowledge institutions  on dismantling, recycling and waste
handling,  removal/recovery  companies,  LCA  consultants,  and  wind  turbine
manufacturers.
The discussions on the workshop were influenced on the life cycle and environ-
mental considerations earlier in the project. The life cycle scanning elements and the
scenarios were relatively simple sketches of different elements of future windmills and
windfarms and their environmental aspects. They are both qualitative (e.g. on the fu-
ture materials of the blades of the windmills) and quantitative (e.g. on the future sizes
of windmills, blades and of the wind energy area.) A LCA comparing offshore and
onshore windfarms was carried out in this period.
It is likely that the most important results of this green technology foresight occur
through the interaction  processes  with and between the  many different  actors  in-
volved and through the outwards communications of the process during the project.
The concrete results in terms of conclusions concerning the environmental aspects of
future of wind energy systems and their handling are very diverse in character. Some
of the results are e.g.:
• Environmental impacts
­ Windmill  blades  will  constitute  an  important  waste  problem  if  the
present development with large fibreglass blades continues (around 2020
it will be very visible in the fibre glass disposal statistics for a country like
Denmark)
­ Future blades of carbon fibre constitute a similar problem
­ In future offshore windfarms far from the coast, the cables will consti-
tute an important environmental impact
• Societal role of wind energy technology
­ Wind power  can contribute  with 10% of the  electricity  production  in
Europe at some point between 2011 and 2020
• Windmill concepts
­ Two-bladed flexible windmills will probably never have a radical break-
through on the market
• Organisational and knowledge development
­ The  institutional  organisation  of  future  removal  phases  is  uncertain.
Three models for the organisation and actor set-up were identified
­ There is a need for knowledge development on some of the recovery and
waste handling processes
­ A short cut between the knowledge of dismounting/recycling actors and
windmill designers is needed
The  conclusion  on  the  integration  of  the  life  cycle  perspective  in  technology
foresight method is first of all that environmental aspects of future technology and
future socio-technical systems can be included with this approach. Not only the posit-
ive environmental  potentials  but  also negative  environmental  aspects  are  included.
Once the life cycle perspective is introduced through the detailed LCA early in the
project, it helps maintaining the focus on environmental aspects throughout the pro-
ject.  The  life  cycle  perspective  in  addition  maps  out  the  socio-technical  system.
Through this it also points to a number of actors and knowledge areas that are relev-
ant to include in the technology foresight processes.
With  the  integration  of  life  cycle  assessment  methods  there  is  a  risk  that  the
foresight project will become too restricted to the socio-technical landscape of today,
including the present institutional set-up, production and consumption patterns etc.
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In addition there can be a tendency to focusing on the certainties, not giving enough
attention to the uncertain aspects. The specific project design is most fruitful if the
LCA elements are seen as parts of a learning process, rather than a 100% objective
analysis.
There are similarities between the hybrid LCA-TF approach and the approach of
the Dutch green technology foresight not least on the more or less symmetrical inclu-
sion of both positive and negative environmental aspects and on working with de-
mand pull factors. As life cycle assessments are becoming more and more normal in
many industrial areas, it is likely that green technology foresight through integration of
LCA with TF methods can be done more easily, as it can to a higher degree build on
existing reports and data material.
Precautionary principle and technology foresight
A last example of method principle of environment-oriented technology foresight
shall be mentioned. It is widely acknowledged that technology development is a cent-
ral element in many of the most important risk issues facing society. Many efforts are
made to deal with, minimize and avoid environmental risks in connection with new
technological developments and to handle the high degree of uncertainty that is con-
nected with these. The precautionary principle has been adopted in some policy areas
at European level and in a number of national states as a way of dealing with the risks.
The definition of  the precautionary  principle  is  still  discussed both at the political
level and at an operational level. Within technology assessment and foresight efforts
are done to take the environmental risks, and not only the more certain environment
impacts,  into consideration (Hellström 2003).  In  connection with the  work in  the
European STRATA project  PRECAUPRI,  combination  of the precautionary prin-
ciple with traditional technology foresights approaches is suggested as a way of doing
technology  foresight  and  assessment  that  include  the  environmental  risk  aspects
(PRECAUPRI work, especially Stirling 2002).
The basic principle of the combination is that the precautionary principle and the
technology foresight methods are complementary and opposite and that a combina-
tion of them will result in a more balanced perspective. Through this balanced per-
spective the environmental risks of potential future technologies will be treated ad-
equately. (Another way around: that technology foresight methods can be employed
in order to find solutions for risks problems, is an alternative, which is not offered so
much attention in this connection.)
Put very briefly, the understanding is that technology foresight approaches usually
are optimistic and positive to technology development. They focus on the positive
opportunities in new technology and identify, develop and promote the promising ex-
pectations.  Opposite  to this,  the precautionary principle is  said to be sceptical and
critical to new technology. It focuses attention to negative consequences of the tech-
nology. The precautionary principle identifies environmental risks etc., which are nor-
mally hidden in the technology foresights, and points to policy actions for how to deal
with the risks.
“Of course, there are obvious constraints between precaution and foresight dis-
courses. Whereas precaution reflects pessimistic and critical perspectives on technolo-
gical innovation, foresight embodies more up-beat sentiments. Precaution addresses
the restrictive  aspects  of  social  ambiguity  and the dangers  of  ignorance.  Foresight
highlights the creative propensities of social diversity and the positive potentials of in-
certitude. For all these differences however, both precaution and foresight are con-
cerned with intrinsic indeterminacy, social contingency and path dependency in pro-
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cesses  of  technological  innovation.  ...  Together,  they  offer  the  prospects  of  more
socially responsive technologies.” (Stirling 2002, p.25)
A general  model  for  instrumental  implementation  of  precaution  in  connection
with science and innovation is suggested. The model understands the treatment of the
risks issues as a social process that takes place at a number of organisational and dis-
cursive levels and involves questions of institutional structure and process design. The
combination of foresight and precaution is understood as a process between social
actors and it is argued that it can lead to more social responsive technologies.
The work on the precautionary principle and technology foresight is at an experi-
mental level. To my knowledge there is not yet carried out full-blown practical experi-
ments with the approach. The approach is criticised for a too simple understanding of
technology foresight and especially of the precautionary principle. It has been noted
that while it is true that technology foresight is usually technology optimistic, the prin-
ciple of precaution does not embed a general pessimistic and negative attitude to tech-
nology development. It is usually only on a single few specific aspects of the techno-
logy, that the precautionary principle is critical. Not on all aspects, and not on all tech-
nologies. The quality of the precautionary principle instead consists in its deliberate
aspects. It can contribute to a more qualified and reflected view on future technolo-
gies.  Despite the critique that can be raised against  the precaution & foresight ap-
proach, it is important that work is done to find ways of including the aspects of en-
vironmental  risk  and  the  related  uncertainties  in  technology  foresight  and  similar
strategy processes.
Concluding remarks
Contrary to the existing tradition of technology foresight in general which is not
suitable for integrating environment and sustainability issues in technology policy and
development, green technology foresight seems to have a large potential for making a
valuable contribution to governance for sustainability. Usually, the method designs of
the green technology foresight projects are system-oriented and capable of addressing
future technology as integrated developments and solutions, instead of as isolated and
partial technical function developments. Instead of technology push/science push as-
pects only, green technology foresight studies include ‘pull’ aspects of environment
problems and social matters and address the complicated, mutual integration of push
and pull aspects. The precautionary & foresight approach might, at the level it is de-
veloped so far, be an exception to this picture, however the approach emphasises the
important  aspects  of  including  environmental  risks  and  uncertainties  in  foresight
activities. In all four examples, there is still large emphasis on technology push. The
assumptions and details of this side might be more explicitly reflected. A symmetrical
method in the sense that both environmentally negative and positive aspects are sys-
tematically considered seems also to be a reasonable requirement to green technology
foresight.
While the Dutch green technology foresight activities have contributed to a tech-
nology-oriented dimension in the environment policy, the Danish green technology
foresight exercise is an element of integration of environment issues in the general
technology  and innovation  policy. However,  with the Phase  Two still  to  come in
Denmark, the integration in environment policy issues might become at least as signi-
ficant.
One of the aspects of technology foresight in general that still needs to be de-
scribed, is the communication of the foresight to other actors.  Who are the results
and processes communicated to, what do they use it for, and how do the foresight
activities relate to other strategy and policy activities. Though not always explicitly ac-
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counted for in the material I have used, it seems plausible that the green technology
foresight  projects,  with their  integrated and system-oriented perspectives,  also  can
have an important function of contributing to development of new niches and net-
works of innovation.
The green technology foresights  are interesting also for  the area of technology
foresight in general both at a national and European level. In connection with a more
general integration of sustainability perspectives in technology development and in-
novation systems, the method principles of green technology foresight can play an
important role. Moreover,  the green technology foresight projects are examples on
how technology foresight processes can be designed explicitly according to the specif-
ic purpose and target groups in case. Usually in technology foresight the influence on
the specific perspective is, apart from the clear perspective of science and technology
push, only implicitly reflected in the descriptions of the project designs.
It is a very common method element of technology foresight studies to build on
the technology  expectations  of other  technology foresight  studies.  The technology
foresight community is across the single studies growing and maintaining a body of
knowledge and technological futures which to some extent has its’ own life and is in-
dependent of other policy and strategy processes. This might in many cases be an ad-
vantage and not a problem (and it is moreover a very normal feature of knowledge
production). There is however a risk that this professionalized body of technological
futures can gain too much weight and momentum, so that important new, maybe loc-
al opportunities  are overlooked and the potentials  of the diversity  of research and
technology areas are not used adequately. A similar thing might be the case concern-
ing the environment problems where a limited number of global accounts, outlooks
etc. from a limited number of institutions is employed across a large number of stud-
ies. Green technology foresights should be careful not only to rely on the global en-
vironment problems but also to deal with more local environment problems and with
local forms of appearances of the global problems.
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Appendix
Critical environmental technologies in France
Source: Fukasaku 1999, referring to Ministere de l’Industrie (DGSI) 1996: Les 105 Technologies clés pour l’Industrie
Francaise a l’Horizon, Paris
Health and environment area
• High yield crops for use as bio-fuels
• Genetic modification of plants
• Decontamination and remediation of polluted soil
• Biological purification of water
• Radioactive waste treatment and disposal
• Final treatment and disposal of harzardous wastes
• Measurement and monitoring of environmental pollution (air, water, solid wastes)
• Modelling the impact of industrial pollution
• Cleaning without using hazardous substances
• Recycling of polymers
• Treatment of urban wastes
• Treatment and quality control of drinking water
• Collection, stocking and compression of urban wastes
• Using ‘filières transversales’ for waste disposal
Transport area
• Improving the recyclability of cars
• Batteries for electric cars
• Traffic flow control and management system
• Reducing the fuel consumption of motors
• Clean combustion engine
• Reduction of the weight of cars by using lightweight materials
• Reducing noise of airplanes and rapid trains
• Reducing noise of automobiles
Materials
• Intelligent materials
• High temperature resistant materials
Energy
• Biomass conversion




• Management of water resources
Production, instruments and measuring
• Intelligent sensors
• Catalysts
• Continous processing in steel
• Membrane separation processes
In: Klaus Jacob, Manfred Binder and Anna Wieczorek (eds.). 2004. Governance for Industrial 
Transformation. Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change,
Environmental Policy Research Centre: Berlin. pp. 409 – 437.
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1. Introduction
Radical changes to present production and consumption systems, especially in the
developed world, are required to achieve sustainable development. Those changes on
a system level are often described as industrial transformations, while terms like sys-
tem innovations or transitions towards sustainability are also being used. These sys-
tem changes or transformations require combinations of technological, cultural, soci-
al, institutional and organisational changes, while they affect many stakeholders when
diffusing into society, and involve complex processes of social change on the long
term. Questions have been raised so far about how to identify attractive and desirable
system changes (system innovations, industrial transformations or transitions),  how
to explore these, how to get them started and implemented in practice, about the role
of different stakeholder groups and stakeholder co-operation and how do they relate
to the issue of governance. According to Quist et al (2002) bringing about system in-
novations requires new integrated approaches that should at least combine:
• The involvement of a broad range of stakeholders and actors from different so-
cietal groups including government, companies, public interest groups and know-
ledge bodies, not only when defining the problem but also when searching for so-
lutions and conditions and developing shared visions. 
• Incorporating not only the environmental component of sustainability, but also its
economic and social component. 
• Taking  into  account  the  demand side,  consumption  and  the  supply  chain  fo-
cussing on related production and consumption systems
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Though these characteristics imply guidelines that give at least some direction, but
they definitely do not give the full answer to the questions raised above. Yet backcas-
ting might be an interesting candidate as an approach that meets the characteristics
mentioned above and could be used for dealing with the questions mentioned. Back-
casting has been proposed and tested in the Netherlands as a promising participatory
planning approach to identify and explore such innovations towards sustainability (on
a system level), while also aiming at follow-up and implementation in public research,
companies, public interest groups and the government. Backcasting can be defined as
first creating a desirable (sustainable) future vision or normative scenario, followed by
looking back on how this  desirable future could be achieved, before defining and
planning follow-up activities and developing strategies leading towards that desirable
future. While quite some results of participatory backcasting have been reported so
far, rather little has been done on comparing different backcasting experiments, on
conceptual issues, on the relevance for governance, and how it relates to other recent-
ly emerging approaches like transition management and strategic niche management. 
This chapter aims to explore how backcasting relates to the issues and questions
raised above. It provides an overview of the developments and varieties in backcas-
ting that occurred during several decades. It elaborates how backcasting can be seen
as an integrated approach for bringing about sustainability on a system level and de-
scribes its key characteristics including the issue of involving stakeholders. It also de-
scribes and compares two backcasting experiments and discusses the relationship with
other emerging system oriented participatory approaches in sustainability studies. This
chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief history of backcasting starting
with its origin in the 1970s in energy studies and its further elaboration and applicati-
on for sustainability issues especially in Sweden and the Netherlands. It concludes that
participatory backcasting is the most recent and emerging variety. Next, section 3 ela-
borates upon methodological and theoretical aspects of participatory backcasting. It
proposes a general scheme based on different varieties of backcasting developed and
tested before.  It also deals briefly with some key mechanisms and elements under-
pinning participatory backcasting.  Section 4 and Section 5 present and analyse two
participatory backcasting cases from the Netherlands in the area of food production
and consumption. Those are derived from the governmental Sustainable Technology
Development  (STD)  Programme  and  the  international  spin-off  research  project
‘Strategies towards the Sustainable Household (SusHouse) and deal with how back-
casting has been applied and what kind of follow-up and implementation results have
been achieved (so far). Finally, section 6 contains conclusions and discussion with re-
spect to backcasting and its broader relevance, while also attention is paid how the ap-
proach relates to other approaches like transition management and strategic manage-
ment and to the relevance for governance. 
2. Back-casting: a brief history
This section explores the existing literature analysing different conceptualisations
and practices of backcasting, from its early emergence in the 1970s till now, and focu-
sing on sustainability applications. In fact, there seems to be more or less a family of
related approaches all using desirable futures or normative scenarios. Interestingly, the
history of backcasting goes back to the same origin as the strategic and multiple scen-
ario approaches, which were so advantageous to Shell during the first oil crisis in the
early 1970s. 
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2.1. Backcasting in Energy studies: soft energy paths
The origin of backcasting goes back to Amory Lovins, who proposed backcasting
as an alternative planning technique for electricity supply and demand in the 1970s1
(Robinson 1982, Anderson 2001). According to Robinson (1982) Lovins mentioned
the method originally  ‘backwards-looking analysis’,  while  Robinson introduced the
term Energy backcasting. Assuming that future demand is mainly a function of cur-
rent policy decisions, Lovins originally suggested that it  would be beneficial to de-
scribe a desirable future (or a range of futures) and to assess how such a future could
be achieved instead of focussing on likely futures alone. After having identified the
strategic objective in a particular future, it would be possible to work backwards to
determine what policy measures should be implemented to guide the energy industry
in its transformation towards the future required energy industry. 
This  type  of  backcasting  studies  was  especially  concerned  with  so  called  soft
energy (policy) paths, taking as a starting point a low energy demand society that relies
on renewable energy technologies. The focus was on analysis and on achieving policy
goals, while the ‘backcasts’ of different alternative energy futures were also meant to
reveal the relative implications  of  different policy goals  (Robinson 1982:  337-338),
and to determine the freedom of action for policy making. From the beginning, it was
strongly emphasised that the purpose of backcasting was not to produce blueprints,
but to compare relative feasibility and implications of different energy futures (inclu-
ding social, environmental and political implications) under the assumption of a clear
relationship between goal setting and policy planning.
Robinson (1982) also elaborated the principles set by Lovins into a sequential six-
step methodology for energy and electricity futures. The central step was to develop
an outline of the future economy through the construction of a model of the econo-
my in a final future state followed by developing an energy demand scenario corre-
sponding to the results of the model. Recently, Anderson (2001: 612) has commented
that the proposed future step in the original approach applied by Lovins and Robin-
son included a model that was dependent on long-term economic predictions. Ander-
son (2001) has therefore suggested an alternative model in which both supply and de-
mand are treated as endogenous factors in the process of policy making. He has adap-
ted the energy backcasting approach aiming to reconcile the electricity industry with
sustainable  development.  The adapted approach assumes wider environmental  and
social responsibilities,  a broadening of necessary knowledge (from a range of disci-
plines and including so-called non-expert knowledge) and a more flexible and resp-
onsible policy agenda. 
However, both Robinson and Anderson emphasise the potential of backcasting
for  policy  analysis  and  policy  development,  but  especially  from  a  governmental
perspective. They refer to policy analysis in the traditional sense of supporting policy
and policymakers with information on different future options and ‘to indicate the re-
lative  feasibility  and  implications  of  different  policy  goals’  (Robinson  1990:  823).
Furthermore, the early focus in backcasting was not yet on the wider applicability for
dealing with sustainability issues, but on exploring and assessing energy futures. 
1 The original publications of Amory Lovins are referred to by Robinson (1982). It includes
Lovins’  paper  entitled  ‘Energy  strategy:  the  road  not  taken?’,  which  was  published  in
Foreign Affairs in October 1976 and his book entitled ’Soft Energy Paths’, published by
FOE/Ballinger in 1977. Additionally, Robinson (1982) contains a comprehensive list of the
soft energy path backcasting studies, which were especially carried out in Canada.
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2.2. Backcasting for sustainability in Sweden
Those who applied backcasting must have realized that it had a much wider po-
tential for application, due to its normative nature. For instance, Robinson (1988) de-
alt with wider conceptual and methodological issues,  including the role of learning
(and unlearning)  about the future,  the issue  of  broadening the process  to a larger
group  of  potential  users,  and  to  alter  the  hegemony  of  existing  theoretical
perspectives. Elsewhere, Robinson (1990: 822) mentioned that backcasting is not only
about how desirable futures can be attained, but that it can also be used to analyse the
degree to which undesirable futures can be avoided or responded to. However, the
focus is on desirable futures, and backcasting is described as an explicitly normative
approach involving working backwards from a particular desirable future endpoint to
the  present,  in order  to  determine the physical  feasibility  of  that  future  and what
policy measures would be required to reach that point. 
Robinson's (1990) paper marked the move towards sustainability applications of
backcasting. It also links to the origin of the backcasting practice in Sweden as the pa-
per reports on a study funded by the Swedish Energy Research Commission. This
was followed by substantial efforts in practical backcasting and conceptual thinking
(e.g. Dreborg 1996, Holmberg 1998, Bannister et al 2000, Hojer and Mattsson 2000).
For instance, Dreborg (1996) mentions that traditional forecasting is based on domi-
nant trends and is therefore unlikely to generate solutions based on trend-breaches.
He argues  that  backcasting approaches  due to their  problem-solving character  are
much better  suited for  long-term problems  and long-term sustainability  solutions,
while it is more useful to consider backcasting as an approach within in a range me-
thods can be applied, than as a specific method (1996: 818). According to Dreborg
backcasting studies should aim at providing images of the future as a background for
opinion forming and decision making to policy makers and the interested general pu-
blic. Interestingly, Dreborg emphasises that our perception of what is possible or rea-
sonable may be a major obstacle to real change, which refers to earlier remarks (Ro-
binson  1988)  about  (un)learning  and the dominance  of  existing  perspectives.  The
scenarios of a backcasting project should therefore broaden the scope of solutions to
be considered by describing new options and different futures. Dreborg (1996: 816)
also argues when backcasting is especially promising. This is in case of: (1) complex
problems, (2) when there is a need for a major change, (3) when dominant trends are
part of the problem, (4) when externalities cannot be solved by a market approach (in
a satisfying way), and (5) when there is a need for long time horizons. Sustainability
problems are then clear examples of such problems (Dreborg 1996). 
Interestingly, Dreborg also focuses on the conceptual level beyond the stepwise
method of Robinson, and relates backcasting to the field of Constructive Technology
Assessment. This enables to distinguish between the practical and analytical side and
the constructive process-oriented side. Concerning the practical and analytical side the
main product of backcasting studies are alternative images of the future, thoroughly
analysed as to their feasibility and consequences. Concerning the process and con-
structive oriented side, backcasting studies should be addressed, according to Dreborg
(1996), to many actors including political parties,  governmental  authorities,  munici-
palities,  organisations,  enterprises  and an informed general  public.  In addition,  the
studies are also meant for providing input to a policy developing process in which
these actors should also be involved. Dreborg also argues that it is essential that back-
casting  studies  provide  alternative  images  of  the future  that  are assessed  on their
consequences in a credible way, while the results are not meant to form a basis for a
single big decision nor as a detailed plan or a blueprint. 
Also  working within  the  Swedish  backcasting  community,  Hojer  and Mattsson
(2000)  suggest  that  backcasting  and  different  forecasting  approaches  are  comple-
mentary, favouring backcasting especially in cases where current trends are leading to-
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wards an unfavourable state. They include a step in which forecasts and a desired visi-
on is compared with each other. If  the vision cannot be reached according to the
most reliable forecasts, model calculations, and other estimates, the task of the back-
casting study should be to generate images of the future or scenarios that fulfil the
targets expressed in the vision. The images must be scrutinised to examine potential
effects.  Furthermore,  in  addition  to  the  normative  scenario-forming  side  of
backcasting,  Hojer  and  Mattsson  (2000:  630)  also  emphasise  what  they  call  the
analytical and critical side of backcasting, by asking themselves how is it possibly to
attain a state that has been identified as desirable? They mean here that it is not only
important to develop the normative future vision solving certain problems, but that it
is as  important to work back from that desirable future to check the physical and
social  feasibility  of the route  towards  that  future,  and the necessary  measures  and
actions  for  bringing  about  that  future.  Furthermore,  Hojer  and  Mattsson  (2000)
emphasise that the use of models and tools helping to quantify the consequences of
different measures is as important as constructing the future visions. With respect to
the consequences,  regular forecasting tools can be necessary,  while tools  from the
field of impact assessment and technology assessment can contribute too.
In Sweden backcasting has also been elaborated as a methodology for  strategic
planning for sustainability (Holmberg 1998), which has become known as the Natural
Step  methodology  and  has  been  advocated  and  popularised  by  Robert.  Though
Robert considers it more as ‘backcasting from principles’, rather than as ‘backcasting
from scenarios’, it could be said that satisfying the principles takes place in a future
state. This variety of backcasting has been applied quite successfully in corporations
like Ikea, the carpet producer Interface and Scandic hotels (Holmberg 1998, for a de-
tailed account see Nattrass and Altomare, 1999). It starts with support by the CEO or
owner and includes broad participation of as many employees as possible. It also in-
cludes consultation of all levels for generating ideas how to become a sustainable cor-
poration. It goes beyond good housekeeping and regular environmental management
and aims at making the business itself sustainable over the full production chain. This
example shows that it is possible to apply backcasting both on a system or societal le-
vel and on the level of particular organisations. 
2.3. Backcasting in the Netherlands
Since the 1990s backcasting has also been applied in the Netherlands, first at the
governmental programme for Sustainable Technology Development (STD) that ran
from 1993 up to 2001, and in its EU funded spin-off, the research project ‘Strategies
towards the Sustainable Household (SusHouse) that ran from 1998 to 2000. Both in-
itiatives  focused on achieving sustainable need fulfilment in the far  future  using a
backcasting approach that included broad stakeholder participation, future visions or
normative scenarios, and the use of creativity for getting beyond present mind sets,
paradigms and actor reference frameworks. Vergragt and Jansen (1993), inspired by
the Swedish example, mentioned backcasting as part of the philosophy of the STD
programme. They described the basic idea (1993: 136) as to create a robust picture of the
future situation as a starting point, and start to think about which (technical and other) means are
necessary to reach this state of affairs. Such a view of reality is not a scenario or a product of forecas-
ting, but should be seen as a solid picture that can be accepted by the technological spokesmen right
now. Furthermore, Vergragt and Jansen emphasised – like Dreborg (1996) in Sweden
–  the  link  with  Constructive  Technology  Assessment  concepts  and  approaches
referring to the broadening of technology development processes with sustainability
aspects and the participation of social actors like public interest groups in addition to
the traditional participants in such processes. Elsewhere, Vergragt and Van der Wel
(1998: 173) go beyond the desirable future – like Hojer and Mattsson (2000) also did
– and emphasise implementation and planning for action.  Future visions alone are not
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enough: Backcasting implies an operational plan for the present that is designed to move toward anti-
cipated future states. Backcasting, then, is not based on the extrapolation of the present into the fu-
ture – rather, it involves the extrapolation of desired or inevitable futures back into the present. Such
a plan should be built around processes characterised as interactive (many stakeholders are involved)
and iterative (feedback is continuous between future visions and present actions). Elsewhere, Wea-
ver et al (2001: 74) reporting on approach and results of the STD programme. They
describe backcasting as a possible  tool  for  establishing shared visions of  desirable
future system states, while securing a ‘systems’ perspective on the transition process
and of help in defining feasible short-term actions that can lead to trend-breaking
change. Interestingly, Weaver et al (2002: 72-78) refer to backcasting as a tool, as a full
methodology, as a concept, as an operational approach and also as a specific step in
the full methodology. This seems to reveal the need for clear definitions and distinc-
tions. 
The aim of the SusHouse project was to develop and test strategies for sustainable
households in the future.  The researchers referred in general  to the SusHouse ap-
proach, but in fact it was a backcasting approach that used stakeholder workshops,
creativity  methods,  normative  scenarios,  scenario  assessments  and  backcasting
analysis (Vergragt 2000, Quist et al 2001, Green and Vergragt 2002). Contrary to the
STD programme, the emphasis was less on the technology and more on achieving
cultural and lifestyle changes contributing to sustainability. Though it was originally
planned that all backcasting activities could be concentrated in a single workshop, it
appeared that these took place throughout the whole project, not only during the sta-
keholder workshops, but also during the scenario elaboration and scenario analysis ac-
tivities by the research teams (Quist et al 2000). Furthermore, Quist et al (2000: 8-16)
also mention the link with CTA, social shaping theories of technology development
(from which CTA originally was derived). Furthermore they mention the connections
with the field of Creative Problem Solving (e.g. Isaksen 2000), the importance of de-
fining steps contributing to developing such a sustainable desirable and the importan-
ce of (conceptual) learning by stakeholders and involved researchers facilitating the
process. 
Taking a more reflexive perspective and looking back to the participatory backcas-
ting  experiments  in  the  Netherlands,  Vergragt  (2001:  11)  emphasises  that  future
visions that are shared among stakeholders are a necessary but not sufficient conditi-
on for achieving implementation and follow-up. It is also important to understand the
culture and interests of stakeholders, their motives for both participation in the back-
casting study and for the desired follow-up after the backcasting study has been com-
pleted. 
Backcasting has become a popular approach in the Netherlands. It has been app-
lied rather widely and influenced the Dutch strategies for sustainability considerably
(AWT 1998) and long-term strategic thinking in the Netherlands in general. For in-
stance, backcasting and normative future visions have been applied in strategic re-
orientation of the research programmes at DLO, the major Dutch research organisati-
on for agriculture and rural development (Grin 2003). Partidario has elaborated and
applied an approach rather similar to the SusHouse approach for studying future pro-
spects for sustainability in paint chains in the Netherlands and Portugal (Partidario
2002). Van de Kerkhof et al (2003) have developed a backcasting approach focussing
on the diversity in views, visions and interests among stakeholders involved in a deba-
te on different futures meeting Kyoto targets with respect to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. Geurs and Van Wee (2000) have applied backcasting as a tool to develop
sustainable transport scenarios. Rotmans et al (2001) working on transition manage-
ment also refer to backcasting from the future within their approach. Finally, Jansen
(2003) pays attention to backcasting in national foresighting programmes and com-
pares these to the Dutch practice in backcasting at the STD programme. 
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2.4. Conclusions so far
Backcasting originates from the 1970s and was originally developed as an alterna-
tive for traditional forecasting and planning. It was originally considered as an additio-
nal  policy  analysis  tool  for  energy  planning,  using  normative  or  sometimes  also
possible scenarios emphasising its analytical nature, while later on since the 1990s the
emphasis shifted towards its potential for identifying and exploring sustainability solu-
tions,  towards  broad stakeholder  participation,  and to  multi-actor  interaction  pro-
cesses, towards enhanced normativity of scenarios based on strong visions shared and
supported by stakeholders, and to the importance of conceptual learning. So, partici-
patory backcasting is the most recent variety and an emerging approach. Interestingly,
the shift to participatory backcasting has, quite independent from the developments
in the Netherlands, taken place in Canada (Robinson 2003) and more recently, also in
Belgium (Keune & Goorden 2002) and in Sweden (Carlsson-Kanyama et al 2003).
Furthermore, it can be concluded from the literature review that backcasting can
refer to a concept or philosophy, a study, an approach, a methodology, an interaction
process among participating stakeholders, an assessment/analysis (sometimes referred
to as a backcast) or the specific step of looking back from the desired future within an
overall stepwise (but iterative) approach or methodology. This implies also that back-
casting can be dealt  with on the conceptual or holistic  level, the level of social or
multi-actor processes, the level of overall approaches and methodologies containing
multiple steps, methods and instruments, and on the level of specific steps, methods
or instruments within such an overall approach or overall methodology. This implies
that backcasting is more than looking back from a desirable future, and when using
the term backcasting reference should be made to the level and the activity. 
 
3. Methodological and theoretical aspects of participatory backcasting
This section starts dealing with methodological aspects, before proposing an ela-
boration of five stages, and ends mentioning some key mechanisms and concepts un-
derpinning participatory backcasting.
3.1. Activities, toolkit and possible goals for participatory backcasting
Though backcasting has not always been applied as a participatory approach, sta-
keholder involvement is strongly emphasised in recent backcasting experiments for
sustainability (Weaver et al 2000, Quist et al 2001, Green & Vergragt 2002, Robinson
2003, Van de Kerkhof et al 2003). Therefore, in this section is focussed on the me-
thodological aspects and characteristics of participatory backcasting. 
From a methodological viewpoint, it is possible to distinguish four major activities
that are necessary within a participatory backcasting framework. These are:
• Orientation (on the problem);
• Design (of the future vision or normative scenario and of the process)
• Assessment and analysis 
• Participation of stakeholders
This implies that backcasting uses very different methods and tools that relate qui-
te strongly to the major activities distinguished above. So, backcasting requires tools
and methods for  stakeholder participation, for  design and development of future vision, for
the process, and for analyses and assessments. In addition to the participatory tools,
tools and methods for process and stakeholder management are an important catego-
ry too. It is necessary to make this distinction, as these are different from participatory
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tools focussing on interaction and involvement. Furthermore, there is not a specific
group of tools connected to the orientation, but here tools and methods can be used
from  each  category  of  tools  and  methods  distinguished  below.  Furthermore,  the
orientation  should  include  setting  normative  assumptions  and  goals.  So,  four
categories of tools and methods can be distinguished in a participatory backcasting
framework:
• Participatory tools and methods. This category concerns all tools and methods that are
useful for involving stakeholders and generating and guiding interactivity among
stakeholders. It includes specific workshop tools, tools for stakeholder creativity
and tools helping stakeholders in specific backcasting activities and tools for parti-
cipatory vision and scenario construction. Mayer (1997) has given an interesting
overview of participatory tools and methods.
• Design tools. This category includes not only scenario construction, but also elabora-
tion and detailing systems and process design tools. De Bruijn et al (2002) dealt
with process design methodologies,  while design methods for scenarios and for
defining and elaborating (socio-technical) systems are widely available.
• Analytical tools and methods. Those relate not only to assessment of scenarios and
designs,  for  instance  consumer  acceptance  studies,  environmental  assessments,
economic analysis, but include also methods for process analysis and evaluation,
stakeholder identification and stakeholder analysis. 
• Overall process management and stakeholder management tools and methods. Apart from spe-
cific participatory methods, there are methods that are relevant for the overall ap-
proach and the overall process, but which are more specific than the overall back-
casting approach. It includes methods, which can be applied for shaping and main-
taining  stakeholder  networks  that  originate  from  the  backcasting  study.  Some
mention this process management (e.g. De Bruijn et al 1998), while there are also
methods in Constructive Technology Assessment (Van den Ende et al 1998).
In the literature on energy backcasting,  there is a considerable goal orientation.
However, this relates to goals connected to the desirable future states. Here, backcas-
ting is considered as an approach applied in a study of limited time, which can be se-
veral months to several years. Possible goals for backcasting studies include:
• Generation of normative options for the future and putting these on the agenda of
relevant arena’s;
• Future visions or normative scenarios;
• A follow-up agenda containing activities for different groups of stakeholders con-
tributing to bringing about the desirable future;
• Stakeholder  learning  with  respect  to  the  options,  the  consequences  and  the
opinions of others.
It is important to realise that the main activities, the groups of tools and the diffe-
rent goals identified here, imply the usage of different types of knowledge and skills
not only from different stakeholder groups but also from different disciplines and dif-
ferent professional  groups and that it  requires  interaction between different  stake-
holder and professional groups. This means that it is not only multi-disciplinary, but
also trans-disciplinary.  This implies not only clear knowledge demands, but equally
important – and even more difficult to be met - clear process demands and process
management. 
3.2. A five-stage approach for backcasting
Though most approaches found in the literature show differences in methods app-
lied, ways of stakeholder involvement and number of steps (Robinson 1990, Holm-
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berg 1998, Weaver et al 2000, Quist et al 2001), it is possible to generalise and transla-
te the approaches identified in the literature into a general description for participato-
ry  backcasting  consisting  of  five  stages  (or  steps).  The  five  main  stages,  as
distinguished here, are:
• Strategic Problem Orientation
• Construction of sustainable future visions or scenarios 
• Backcasting stage
• Elaboration, analysis and defining follow-up activities and action agenda
• Embedding of action agenda, activities and generating follow-up and implementati-
on
It is necessary to address a few points here. First, it is assumed that setting the
normative assumptions and goals are part of the first stage, as is achieving agreement
on the normative  assumptions  among stakeholders  involved.  However,  sometimes
these are set before the problem orientation starts or have already been set within an
overall  frame. This  was for  instance the case in the Netherlands at  the STD pro-
gramme, where the time horizon of 40 years, the factor 20 and the focus on sustaina-
ble need fulfilment were set as general assumptions, and were approved by key per-
sons of participating ministries and some leading industries in the Netherlands before
specific backcasting studies were initiated. 
Second, if there are more than five steps distinguished in a backcasting approach,
it is in general possible to see specific steps as part of the suggested five stages. Next,
it has been suggested (e.g. Holmberg 1998) that the fourth and the fifth stage could
be combined into one. Furthermore, it may also be argued that because it is so diffi-
cult to finish the fifth step in particular  projects,  the end of the backcasting study
should be positioned early in the fifth stage, leaving out implementation and the gene-
ration of follow-up – like was done in the SusHouse project (Quist et al 2001). Howe-
ver,  as  embedding  and  initiating  follow-up  and  implementation  are  so  crucially
important, it is argued here that is justified to distinguish it as a separate stage in the
approach. 
Fourth, it must be mentioned that though the approach is depicted stepwise and
linear, it definitely is not. Iteration cycles are possible, while there is also a mutual in-
fluence between two steps following one to another. Although it might be interesting
to conceptualise it as a set of activities that all need to be done, instead of in a linear
sense, in practical applications it remains necessary to combine it with a transparent
time frame that can be communicated with stakeholders involved. So, due to the time
and process constraints, it has to be depicted as linear in time. Five, the backcasting
process has a dynamic nature, which means that stakeholders might leave the process,
while new stakeholders might join it.
In addition, each stage of the backcasting approach requires in general tools and
methods from all four categories distinguished; though it may be different tools and
methods in particular stages. Finally, four major societal groups can be distinguished:
companies, research bodies, government and related bodies and last but definitely not
least public interest groups and the public. Of course, identifying appropriate organi-
sations and relevant individuals within these organisations, also reflecting all stages of
the supply chain and the related consumption system is to be done within specific
backcasting studies. 
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3.3. Brief elaboration of the stages in participatory backcasting
Five stages can be distinguished in participatory backcasting. This subsection deals
with each stage and pays also attention to the variety that can be found in a specific
stage.
Stage 1: Strategic Problem Orientation
This stage includes - if this has not been done yet - setting normative assumptions
and targets, which can also be done through stakeholder participation. This stage aims
at exploring the problem from a systemic viewpoint,  possible problem definitions,
main unsustainabilities,  opportunities,  and possible solutions,  identifying and invol-
ving relevant stakeholders. In addition, it should be analysed how the problem is per-
ceived by different stakeholders, how it relates to need and function fulfilment on an
appropriate level – which is often a societal level or the level of socio-technical sys-
tems (Quist 2003), how other stakeholders evaluate and judge the different problem
formulations according to their own mind set, values and interests, and how supply
chain and demand side are interdependent and influence each other. It is important to
take an integral viewpoint, while taking into account related consumption and produc-
tion systems and present trends and developments for the whole system. Involving
stakeholders is also important because they are experts in the field or system under
study (of a part from it). The table below provides a preliminary checklist that can be
applied.
Table 1: A preliminary Checklist for a Strategic Problem Orientation Stage
What is the problem (at stake)? Who is (are) the problem-owner(s)
What are major trends and developments?
Who are stakeholders and future stakeholders? What are their problem definitions and pro-
blem perceptions? What are their interests, relations and resources?
What kind of possible solutions or solution directions do stakeholders see? How do other
stakeholders perceive these? Who might have an interest concerning this solution? Who does
not? 
Stage 2: Construction of sustainable future visions or scenarios
The results of the Strategic Problem Orientation stage are the starting point for
construction  of  sustainable  future  visions  or  scenarios  in which the identified un-
sustainabilities and problems have been solved. Stakeholder participation is important
here,  so workshops  are an important  tool  in  this  stage,  though different  types  of
workshops and other participatory methods are also possible. The relevant question is
how this societal need or function can be fulfilled in a sustainable way in the far fu-
ture, assuming that it is always possible to define a societal need or function in a parti-
cular backcasting study. 
Furthermore, different types of future visions are possible. For instance, within
the STD programme a generic sustainable future vision was generated that contained
several solutions for different major unsustainabilities, while in the SusHouse project
several sustainable and more detailed scenarios were generated that depicted different
sustainable lifestyles that could be seen as each other’s substitutes. In addition, Sus-
House scenarios did not only contain a vision and a description of main characteri-
stics, but were elaborated with storyboards depicting daily life stories within a specific
scenario, proposals for product-service systems supporting the sustainable scenario,
and sometimes with images. It seems that generating single visions or several scenari-
os have each specific advantages and drawbacks, but a systematic evaluation of this
has not been done yet. Furthermore, quite a number of specific methods are available
for constructing future visions and normative scenarios. Scenarios or future visions
can either stress the vision part, the feasibility, or the creative part. It is also possible
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to add first estimates or preliminary assessments for particular aspects like environ-
mental improvement potential, consumer acceptance, socio-economic aspects, etc.
Stage 3: Backcasting – setting out sustainable alternatives
Though the overall approach is named after this stage, it is actually the stage that is
least elaborated and described in the backcasting literature. Aarts (2000: 36-40) refers
to realising the gap between a sustainable future and the present situation, and to look
backwards seeking for ideas, leapfrog technologies and trend breaches. She mentions
as methods elaboration of future visions, writing essays, explorative research, expert
workshops and stakeholder workshops. Quist et al (2000) try to guide the backcasting
stage with a specific guiding question ‘What are the necessary changes to realise this
future vision or scenario’. So, different varieties can be distinguished in this stage:
• A quick one just meant for identifying attractive solutions or clusters that would
enable radically increased eco-efficiency. This was, for instance, done at the STD
programme (Weaver et al 2000). 
• A more elaborated variety, asking for the changes necessary for achieving a speci-
fic future vision or sustainable normative scenario, which was applied in the Sus-
House  project  (Quist  et al  2000).  This  meta-question can be split  into specific
questions for which technological changes are necessary, which cultural and beha-
vioural changes are necessary, which structural-institutional changes are necessary
and which organisational changes are necessary for realising the desirable sustaina-
ble future state.
• A very detailed one defining and describing also in-between states. For instance, if
the final state is set in 2040, reasoning back from 2040 the state of 2030 can be de-
scribed, before describing the state of 2020 and 2010. Though this variety is com-
monly used for explaining backcasting, it has hardly been applied in professional
practice.
Stage 4: Elaboration and defining follow-up activities and agendas 
Elaboration can take many forms and depends strongly on capacity, budget and
time available. Assessments, analyses and feasibility studies are important in the first
part of this stage, while defining follow up activities and agendas that enable imple-
mentation and realisation on the longer term are important in the second part of this
stage. Differences can be noticed too. For instance, in the SusHouse project, it were
the normative scenarios that were elaborated and assessed by small research teams de-
aling with two case studies and for each case study several scenarios. At the STD pro-
gramme, backcasting was used to identify promising clusters and directions within a
single future vision, and those clusters were subjected to feasibility study and further
elaboration in particular  projects.  This  enabled to involve more  specialised resear-
chers, while stakeholders involvement was more focussed too. 
Stage 5: Embedding of action agenda and generating follow-up
As the aim of backcasting for sustainable strategies is to bring about change pro-
cesses, system innovations or transitions towards sustainability, it is important that the
outcomes of the backcasting study are embedded and taken further by stakeholders of
groups of stakeholders. It has already been mentioned that each societal group has to
deliver its contribution, while it cannot be blueprinted due to the complex nature of
social change and social learning processes. Nevertheless, the future vision can act as
a guiding image or leitmotiv, while R&D and action agenda contain a bundle of possi-
ble roads and suggestions that must be elaborated by appropriate stakeholders. 
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3.4. Theoretical aspects of participatory backcasting
This subsection briefly deals with some theoretical aspects and key mechanisms
underpinning the approach of participatory backcasting. But before that, we want to
stress here that backcasting is inherently of a normative nature – sustainability is a
normative concept -, while this is combined with the recognition that our society is
socially shaped. This means that the results of backcasting approaches stem from pro-
cesses of social interaction involving various social actors and taking into account the
plural character of present societies. 
Future visions
It has been shown that visions are important in technology development as gui-
ding images that are endorsed by actors. This has led in Germany to a body of litera-
ture on leitbilder (in analogy with leitmotiv) in technology studies. For instance, Grin and
Grunwald (2000: 1) assume  that one way to shape socio-technological  systems is  through the
visions that guide their development… the assumption is that these visions exist already in most so-
cietal sectors, that these visions tend to reproduce the ways in which these sectors have developed hi-
therto, and that a critical discussion of these visions is a prerequisite for changing the course of deve-
lopment. In addition, they ask .. [I]s it possible to provide some orientation to long-term develop-
ment in a way that it may contributes to meeting challenges like the need for sustainability, while en-
suring public legitimacy and avoiding the risk of authoritarian blueprints. Their preliminary ans-
wer is in fact positive. They distinguish two main features of visions (Grin and Grun-
wald 2000: 11). First, mental images of attainable futures shaped by a collection of ac-
tors. Second, it guides the actions of and the interactions between these actors (see
also Quist et al 2001). Furthermore, these visions can be used for broadening the de-
bate on changing socio-technical systems, and it could lead to conceptual learning and
adjustments in technological designs and design processes resulting in an improved
alignment of technology and society. In addition, visions may have the potential for
dealing with problems  for  which there  are no  rules  or  institutions  available (Grin
2003, Quist 2003). Sustainability problems are clear examples.
Stakeholder learning
Another important element is higher order or conceptual actor learning. Social in-
teraction between actors and negotiations can lead to learning processes not only on
the cognitive level but also with respect to values, attitudes and underlying convic-
tions. The latter is also known as higher order learning for which several conceptuali-
sations  have  been  made  (for  a  discussion  on  this,  Brown  et  al  2003).  In  policy
oriented learning, for instance, it involves redefining policy goals and adjusting pro-
blem definition and strategies, while in organisational learning it involves changes in
norms, values, goals and operating procedures governing the decision-making process
and actions of organisations. This is of great importance in case of complex problems
with opposing actors having a different mental framework or action theory (Grin et al
1997). The approach of action theories is of interest here as it links the mental frame-
work with the space for behavioural alternatives. The assumption here is that higher
order learning leads to changes in the mind set or reference framework and thereby
broadens the space for actions and behavioural alternatives.
Process aspects
Next, process aspects and dynamics are not only relevant for explaining the outco-
mes immediately after a backcasting experiment, but include relevant factors enabling
and constraining the realisation follow-up and implementation supporting the directi-
on  of  the  defined  (desirable)  transformation  of  the  socio-technical  system (Quist
2003). Backcasting experiments around normative future visions are in fact complex
processes and involve numerous actors having different reference frameworks, value
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sets and interests. So, tactic and strategic behaviour can take place, there are power
issues  and  dependencies  at  stake,  while  it  also  concerns  negotiation  on  problem
definitions, normative goal setting, creating a sense of urgency on the short term, etc.
Therefore, process management is also relevant here (e.g. De Bruijn et al 2002).
4.  Case I: STD programme: Novel Protein Foods
4.1. Background of the STD programme
After  the  history,  the  methodological  aspects,  and  some  theoretical  issues,  we
present here two cases in which participatory backcasting was applied. Early in the
1990s  the  governmental  programme  for  Sustainable  Technological  Development
(STD) was initiated in the Netherlands aiming not only at exploring system innova-
tions towards sustainability, but also to explore opportunities and possibilities for de-
veloping sustainable technologies. This was then not as straightforward as it is nowa-
days in many developed countries. At that time the focus of policy makers, techno-
logy developers and corporations was mainly on clean technologies and end-op-pipe
solutions, while there was still a strong debate, if technology was the major cause of
environmental problems or if technology could also be part of a solution. The STD
programme ran from 1993 until 2001. Taking the factor 20 increase in environmental
efficiency of need fulfilment as a challenge for technology development at the STD-
programme,  and  applying  an  interactive  and  stakeholder-oriented  backcasting  ap-
proach, a number of societal needs like nutrition, water, mobility and housing were
explored focusing on future sustainable alternatives for fulfilling these societal needs. 
This was done by developing future visions for the sustainable fulfilment of these
needs using the expertise of stakeholders from government, companies, research bo-
dies and public interest groups (STD 1997, Weaver et al 2000). These future visions
were  analysed  as  alternative  solutions  having  the  potential  to  meet  the  factor
challenge, which were elaborated in projects. Examples of factor 20 projects at the
STD programme included the mobile hydrogen fuel cell (Vergragt and Van Noort
1996, Weaver et al. 2000), Urban Underground Freight Transport (STD 1997), Novel
Protein Foods (Quist et al 1996; Weaver et al 2000), Sustainable Multiple Land Use in
which function integration and reduction environmental burden in rural areas were
combined (STD 1997), Sustainable Urban Renewal in the city of Rotterdam, C1-che-
mistry based on biomass (Weaver et al 2000) Sustainable Municipal Water Systems
(Weaver et al 2000). For an overview of all projects and results, see STD (1997), while
Weaver et al (2000) give a more detailed analysis of 7 projects.
The projects at the STD programmes included not only radical technological inno-
vations that met the factor challenge but also the identification of cultural and structu-
ral conditions for development and implementation. Projects could also be described
as complex multi-actor processes around a socio-technological solution aiming at a
factor 20 reductions in environmental burden in fulfilling societal needs in the future.
Objectives of these projects included future visions or designs, research programmes
for developing the fundamental scientific knowledge required for realising the identi-
fied sustainable technology, networks around the identified technology, development
paths or trajectories, sight on short term spin-off and embedded follow-up activities
by stakeholders. 
In general, the STD programme was considered to be very successful in identify-
ing alternative solutions having the potential for achieving considerable environmental
reduction factors,  and in developing follow-up agendas and strategic research pro-
grammes, though the programme did not succeed in all projects to establish follow-
up.  Furthermore,  during the STD programme it appeared that  quite a number of
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sustainable technologies are available (or ‘on the shelf’), but that present cultural and
structural conditions restrict further development and implementation (Aarts 1997).
4.2. Approach at the STD programme
A participatory backcasting approach was applied at the STD programme, but how
was it applied? Following the description of Weaver et al (2000: 76), it was an ap-
proach of 7 steps as depicted in Figure 1. According to Weaver et al (2000: 76), Step
1-3 are meant for developing ave solutions for sustainable need fulfilment. Step 4 and
step 5 were meant to clarify the short-term actions that are needed to realise that fu-
ture which can be seen as a joint action, R&D and policy agenda. Step 6 and step 7
focused on implementation and realising the action agenda and plan. This was meant
to be done by stakeholders involved in the backcasting process by setting up co-ope-
rations enabling implementation o long-term vision based on a strategic  review of
how a need might be met in the future  in a sustainable way and using backwards
analysis to set out alternatif a research agenda. The STD programme facilitated this as
far as possible. 
Figure 1: The STD methodology (Weaver et al 2000, Vergragt 2001)
Develop long term vision Develop short term actions Implementation
1 Strategic problem orientation
and definition
2. Develop Future Vision
3. Back-casting
4. Explore solution options
5. Select among options: set
up action plan




The 7-step approach applied at the STD programme agrees well with the approach
of five stages described earlier, as Table 3 also shows. Steps 1-3 of the STD approach
are similar to the stages 1-3 as proposed in this chapter. In addition, step 4 and step 5
of the STD approach matches with stage 4 in this chapter, while step 6 and step 7 are
similar with stage 5. So, in comparison with the general description, at the STD pro-
gramme both stage 4 and stage 5 were split into two steps. 
Table 3: Comparison of the backcasting approach proposed and the STD approach
Backcasting approach STD approach
1. Strategic problem orientation Step 1 
2. Construction of desirable (normative) scenario or
future vision
Step 2
3. Backcasting stage Step 3
4. Elaboration (design and analysis) and defining
follow-up activities and action agenda
Step 4, step 5, 
5 Embedding of action agenda, activities and gene-
rating follow-up and implementation
Step 6, Step 7
The approach at the STD programme was applied in an iterative way, while some-
times parts of the visioning were redone later in the process, for instance to involve
newly entered stakeholders. This can be illustrated for the exploration of nutrition.
The construction of a sustainable future for the need of nutrition led to the identifica-
tion of several alternative solutions like multiple sustainable land-use and novel prote-
in foods as an alternative for present meat consumption and production. The next
step – step 4 in the description of Weaver et al and stage 4 as proposed here – would
be to explore this solution further. This is shown below when dealing with the exam-
ple of Novel Protein Foods. 
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4.3. Novel Protein Foods case: outline and results 
Novel Protein Foods emerged from the participatory stakeholder analysis for nu-
trition as a sustainable alternative for present meat consumption and production, whi-
le  also having the potential  to meet the Factor  20 challenge.  Targeting meat  con-
sumption itself, or the production of meat, as environmental improvement strategies
was recognised but not included in this case. After a feasibility study a project was de-
veloped to elaborate the option of Novel Protein Foods that was co-financed by ma-
jor companies from the food supply system in the Netherlands and bringing together
consumer  scientists,  economists,  food  technologists  and  Life  Cycle  Assessment
(LCA) researchers. During the project a more detailed future vision was developed.
The key of the future vision was that Novel Protein Foods could replace 40% of meat
consumption in 2040. Looking from a backcasting perspective, this implied that food
technology had to be improved considerably enabling to produce protein foods simi-
lar superior in taste and structure as meat, while it was also assumed that Novel Prote-
in Foods should have similar nutritional value as meat. It also implied cultural changes
not only related to the role and status of meat and meat consumption, but also related
to the role and status of protein foods from other sources than animals. This future
vision also implied structural changes, as the meat sector would decrease, while new
protein food chains would emerge.
It was concluded when finishing the project in 1996 (Quist et al 1996), that these
new protein foods could be produced 10-30 times more environmentally efficient,
compared to production of pork meat at that time. It was also concluded that NPFs
could be attractive to both consumers (‘taste is the deciding factor’) and producers
(‘lower production costs than of meat’), while socio-economic effects remain relative-
ly  limited when compared to present  autonomous  development and foresights.  In
addition, it was concluded that the development and large-scale introduction of NPFs
in the future is  possible,  but  that  new knowledge, research and development were
required (STD 1997, Quist et al 1996). Results included a set of different NPFs analy-
sed with respect to consumer acceptance and benefits, environmental impact, produc-
tion costs and socio-economic effects and opportunities; R&D-programmes to deve-
lop lacking fundamental  and applied knowledge,  and a development  trajectory  to-
wards 2040 containing 7 clusters of follow-up and implementation activities for both
the short-term and the long-term (see Table 2). Furthermore, a strategy was proposed
that NPFs would be especially beneficial in the processed segment (burgers, sausages,
etc) and as assembled dishes and foods like pizzas and ready-mades.
 
Table 2: Action agenda for development and introduction of Novel Protein Foods
1. Communication with the general public and supply of adequate information
2. Professional education and transfer of new knowledge
3. Consumer research and development marketing instruments
4. Fundamental research and chain organisation
5. Novel Protein Foods product development (both as food and as ingredient)
6. Improvement environmental reduction factor and improving LCA-instrument
7. Necessary legislature and social measures (facilitating both the growth of a no-
vel protein food chain and the decrease of the meat sector). 
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4.4. Backcasting approach in the Novel Protein Foods case
The previous section clearly showed that the normative future vision was a central
element and could be used for identifying necessary major technological, cultural and
structural changes. Those findings were elaborated in a set of promising NPFs based
on several vegetable and microbial sources. So, next to developing and designing a fu-
ture  vision and its  backcasting,  elaboration and research activities  took place. The
latter included that several NPFs were designed and defined in the sense of food pro-
ducts for which specific design tools were applied by the food technology researchers
in the project. Furthermore, defining the set of NPFs enabled to detail the future visi-
on of 40% meat replacement and to assess socio-economic consequences and envi-
ronmental improvement, while the set of products enabled the study for each NPF of
its consumer attractiveness, the environmental improvement factor and the producti-
on costs. 
So,  the  option  of  Novel  Protein  Foods  was  explored  using  a  combination  of
design, backcasting and analysis activities before defining a possible development tra-
jectory containing the 7 clusters of activities in Table 2. The list of activity clusters in
Table 2 can be seen as a policy and action agenda for sustainable technological deve-
lopment around the option of Novel Protein Foods. The elaboration of this agenda
included the societal groups and specific  stakeholders who should take the lead in
certain clusters or specific activities. 
From the viewpoint of stakeholder participation, it is important to present how
stakeholder involvement was organised? First of all, relevant research bodies did the
research during the project. This was not only done from the viewpoint that resear-
chers and their institutes  would bring relevant knowledge, this  was also important
from the viewpoint that research institutes are important players in the relevant natio-
nal innovation system. Second, participation was guaranteed trough funding from re-
levant ministries and two major private industries. Those stakeholders were members
of an advisory board, which was extended with key persons from research and public
interest groups. Third, Constructive Technology Assessment was used for involving a
broader range of stakeholders from the four societal groups distinguished earlier. The
“Future Images for Consumers” (Fonk 1994)) methodology was applied (Weaver et al
2000: Chapter 6, Fonk & Hamstra 1996) for organising and structuring a dialogue
among the stakeholders involved. Participating stakeholders met during three work-
shops in which progress,  opportunities and dilemmas were discussed, while it  was
completed with a statement containing both agreements and disagreements. Fourth,
there were less focussed ways of involvement through for instance consumer rese-
arch,  general  communication,  etc.  In  addition,  the importance of  participation for
achieving stakeholder learning has been explained. It was therefore evaluated if lear-
ning, especially on the higher or conceptual level, took place (Loeber 1997). It was
found that this was indeed the case.
4.5. Follow-up and impact
An important premise underpinning backcasting is that conceptual or higher order
learning by stakeholders is a condition for endorsement and supporting/participating
follow-up and impacts.  While follow-up relates more to concrete activities,  impact
concerns a broader term that includes learning effects and what is sometimes called
the utilisation of knowledge. So it is interesting to discuss to which extent follow-up
has been accomplished (see also Loeber 1997). First of all, a large research project
(entitled “Profetas”, www.profetas.nl) is carried out dealing both with the technologi-
cal issues and the socio-economic and cultural aspects of the production and con-
sumption of NPFs. Several major food companies in the Netherlands are involved in
this project and are also working on this type of foods in their own R&D. Furthermo-
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re, NPFs are discussed occasionally by a major supermarket chain in their consumer
magazine, while this issue is incorporated in the sustainable consumption activities of
the Ministry of the Environment. Further, several new stakeholder co-operations are
emerging that become visible at meetings and conferences focusing on the production
and  the  consumption  of  NPFs,  and  bringing  together  producers,  public  interest
groups  (including  environmental  groups  and  the  association  for  vegetarians),
consumer  organisations  and representatives  from research bodies  and other  chain
parties. In addition, the interest of consumers for protein foods, not being meat from
animals,  is  growing  due  to  recent  affairs  like  BSE  and  the  mad  cow  diseases.
However,  it  must  be  realised  that  the  growing  consciousness  due  to  this  is  not
automatically long lasting. On the other hand, from history it is known, as for instan-
ce  shown  by  Geels  (2002)  and  numerous  others,  that  contextual  factors  can  be
important for transitions and transformations. 
The emerging question is now if the follow-up and impacts are the signs of an
emerging transformation or transition of the present meat production and consumpti-
on system towards a more sustainable socio-technical system having a considerable
share of Novel Protein Foods (or ‘meat-like products’ as NPFs were originally called).
Though a major research project strongly entrenched in the innovation system for
food production and agriculture, specific development projects and occasional recur-
ring discussions are good results, it might be not enough to ensure the societal em-
bedding of this innovation as it is the majority of ordinary consumers which must
change their consumption pattern before the environmental promise of NPFs will be
realised. More  research is  necessary  to  investigate  how, under  which conditions,  a
transition to a NPF system could be brought about. Backcasting can (again) play a
role in this follow-up research.
5. Case II: SusHouse project
The second case presented and discussed here is the case study on Shopping, Coo-
king and Eating, which was carried out in the Netherlands as part of the SusHouse
project. This case took the demand side of the food production and consumption sys-
tem as a starting point for exploring future sustainable options.
5.1. Background
The EU funded SusHouse (Strategies towards the Sustainable Household) project,
was concerned with developing and evaluating strategies for transitions to sustainable
households. The starting point of the SusHouse project was that a combination of
technological, cultural and structural changes is necessary to achieve a Factor 20 envi-
ronmental  gain in the next  50 years  through system innovations,  while  both  con-
sumption  and  its  interconnection  with  production  through  products  and  product
usage taking into account (Green and Vergragt 2002, Vergragt 2000, Quist et al 2001).
Another important starting point was to involve stakeholders in the process of (re)
designing  the  fulfilment  of  a  household’s  needs  compatible  with  the  concept  of
sustainable development. Three household functions were studied (1) Clothing Care,
(2) Shelter and (3) Shopping, Cooking and Eating (SCE) or Nutrition, while six rese-
arch groups in five European countries were involved (Vergragt 2000). 
5.2. Approach
The Project’s approach was earlier applied from in the Sustainable Washing pro-
ject at the STD programme (Vergragt and Van der Wel 1998) before it was developed,
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elaborated and extended further.  Here  we describe  it  briefly.  For  each household
function studied in each country, an extensive process of  stakeholder identification was
performed,  covering  stakeholders  on  the  demand  side,  the  supply  side,  research
bodies, government and public interest groups. Selected stakeholders participated in
stakeholder creativity workshops aimed at identifying sustainable ways of future function
fulfilment.  The results  were used for  scenario  construction.  These normative scenarios
were not  only  assessed  in  terms of  environmental  gain,  consumer  acceptance  and
economic credibility – this part of the SusHouse approach is not dealt with in this
chapter -, but they were also used for a scenario-specific second round of stakeholder
identification. Old and newly identified stakeholders were invited to a second set of
workshops in which scenarios  and assessment  results  were discussed,  followed by
developing implementation proposals, research agendas and policy recommendations
for  achieving  the  scenarios.  Objectives  of  case  studies  in  the  SusHouse  project
included  normative  scenarios  for  the  fulfilment  of  functions  of  the  sustainable
household,  endorsed  by  a  range  of  social  partners,  scenario  assessments  and
construction  of  follow-up  agendas  containing  implementation  proposals,  policy
recommendations,  research  question  for  solving  knowledge  gaps  and  (new)
stakeholder alliances (Vergragt 2000). 
The Figure below shows the overall SusHouse approach existing of 6 stages, while
the 7th stage ‘Realisation and Implementation’ was actually not part of the SusHouse
project. It was an important aim of the project to stimulate and prepare follow-up,
but achieving it  was not part  of the project.  A more extensive elaboration on the
overall SusHouse methodology are given by Vergragt (2000), Quist et al (2000), Quist
et al (2001) and Green and Vergragt (2002).
Next, table 4 shows how the generic backcasting approach proposed earlier relates
to the SusHouse approach discussed here. It shows clearly that the steps of the Sus-
House  approach  can  be  positioned  in  the  backcasting  approach  proposed  in  this
chapter.
1. Problem Orientation
2. Stakeholder Analysis & 
Involvement




6 Back-casting Workshop & 
Stakeholder Consultation
7. Realisation and 
Implementation
Figure 2: The stages in the SusHouse project.
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Table 4: Comparison of general backcasting approach and the SusHouse approach
Backcasting approach SusHouse approach
1. Strategic problem orientation Step 1 & step 2
2. Construction of desirable (normative) scenario or fu-
ture vision
Step 3 & step 4
3. Backcasting stage Step 4, step 6
4. Elaboration (design and analysis) and defining follow-
up activities and action agenda
Step 4, step 5, step 6
5 Embedding of action agenda, activities and generating
follow-up and implementation
Step 6, Step 7
5.3. Nutrition case study in the Netherlands
Scenario construction for Nutritition or SCE in the Netherlands was based on the
results of a stakeholder creativity workshop and the Design Orienting Scenario me-
thodology  of  Jegou and Manzini  (2000)  and its  elaboration  given by  Young et  al
(2001). During the workshop stakeholders from different societal groups generated
ideas for  future sustainable fulfilment of the SCE function guided by the question
‘How can we eat in a sustainable way in 2050’. Generation of ideas was followed by
clustering and elaboration of proto-scenarios by the participants. Table 5 summarises
the SCE scenarios briefly, while Table 5 shows key features of the three scenarios.
Table 5: Brief descriptions of the three scenarios
Intelligent Cooking and Storing (ICS) is about a household that can be characterised by
high-tech, convenience, do-it-yourself and a fast way of living. Kitchen and food manage-
ment is optimised with help of intelligent technology, which also organises ordering (elec-
tronically), and delivery with help of a so-called Intelligent Front Door. Water and energy are
re-used  where  possible  through  cascade  usage.  Meals  are  either  based  on  a  mixture  of
sustainable ready-made and pre-prepared components (including vegetarian or novel protein
foods replacing meat) or ready-made meals containing a microchip communicating cooking
instructions with the microwave oven. Packaging is biodegradable and contains a (plastic) mi-
crochip with relevant consumer information about origin, treatment and preparation. 
Super-Rant (SR) combines elements from the present supermarket and restaurant, but these
are shaped into a neighbourhood food centre within a compact city. Here you can go for a
meal (e.g. by a subscription to the neighbourhood cook), for food shopping, to purchase a
take-away meal or to eat together for different prices. In many households only the microwa-
ve oven, a water cooker and a small fridge are left. Waste is collected for local energy produc-
tion. Food is grown in a sustainable way. 
In Local and Green (L&G) household members grow a considerable share of their foods
themselves. Additionally, they buy and eat seasonal foods that are locally grown and purcha-
sed at local shops, small supermarkets, or are bought direct from the grower or hobby garden
as ‘fresh’ unprocessed ingredients. Regional specialities are important and are consumed in
the region by both inhabitants and tourists. Imported products are still available but expensi-
ve, because environmental costs are incorporated in the price. Furthermore, there is a strong
green consumer demand in this scenario. 
These scenarios can be seen as depicting more sustainable alternatives for possible
present and future ways of living. These are not meant to select the most sustainable
scenario and develop a strategy to bring everyone towards the most sustainable scen-
ario. That would be as worse as any traditional blueprint planning and would deny in-
dividual autonomy and present plural society. 
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Table 6: Stakeholder panorama and backcasting results for the Intelligent Cooking and
Storing scenario
Stakeholder panorama
Key stakeholders for realisation of this scenario include consumers, retailers, food processors
& manufacturers, packaging producers, kitchen equipment & appliances producers, govern-
ment.
Necessary changes (preliminary back-casting analysis)
• Technological  : novel kitchen technology and appliances (including a huge efficiency in-
crease), new ICT for kitchen systems and production chain management, plastic chips,
biodegradable packaging, cascade usage for water and energy, sustainable transportation,
distribution and delivery systems.
• Cultural/behavioural  : sustainability for granted, further shift towards ready-mades and
convenience, acceptance of new technologies, shift towards more sustainable substitutes
(e.g. vegetable based Novel Protein Foods in stead of meat), shift towards services.
• Structural/Organisational  : role supermarkets will change due to large scale delivery and
change  towards  food  management  services,  kitchen  manufacturers  deliver  complete
automated systems that communicate instead of single kitchens and single appliances,
close co-operation and joint management over the complete production chain and in-
formation available  to  consumers;  sustainable  food  production (regional  or  efficient
large scale production where this can most environmentally efficient).
Table 5 uses the Intelligent Cooking and Storing (ICS) scenario as an example to
show the stakeholder panorama and results from a preliminary backcasting analysis
based  on  an  identification  of  the  for  achieving  the  scenario.  Backcasting  analysis
refers here to the analysis,  which is  done by looking backwards from the scenario
using the leading question ‘What technological, cultural, and institutional-organisatio-
nal changes are necessary for realising this scenario’.
Three scenario assessments were conducted The first is an environmental assessment
using a system analysis approach with indicators to assess if the scenarios achieve a
Factor 20 reduction in household environmental impacts. The economic assessment used
a questionnaire to assess each scenario for economic aspects like competition, em-
ployment etc. Finally, the  consumer acceptance analysis used consumer focus groups to
evaluate the acceptability of the scenarios to consumers and to identify adopter pro-
files. In short, the assessments revealed that the Intelligent Cooking & Storing scen-
ario  and  the  Local  &  Green  scenario  would  reduce  the  environmental  burden
considerably. However, quite surprisingly, for the Super-Rant scenario it was found
that - using energy data from present restaurants - the energy requirement would even
increase.  It  was concluded that better data would be necessary, and that there is a
huge potential for environmental improvement in the Dutch food service sector. 
Scenarios and assessment results were fed into a second stakeholder workshop fo-
cussing on implementation, follow-up and the construction of action and follow-up
agendas. In addition, implementation proposals were elaborated, policy recommenda-
tions were developed, and even new innovative ideas were proposed. Furthermore,
the unprocessed results contained the ‘raw material’ for policy recommendations and
also for the construction of an action agenda. 
5.4. Follow-up and impact
So, what kind of follow-up was achieved in this case (Quist et al 2002)? Concrete
stakeholder co-operation, new partnerships and alliances around proposals were scar-
ce in the last  workshop.  Nevertheless,  there was  considerable interest  from stake-
holders, and also concrete intentions to continue the process aiming at concrete fol-
low-up, co-operation around concrete proposals and activities, and at imbedding of
Quist/Vergragt   429
results  in  processes  taking  place  in  other  networks.  Additional  activities  after  the
workshops appeared therefore to be necessary for realising follow-up towards imple-
mentation. Furthermore, a number of initiatives were started, but it proved to be hard
to get these funded. 
However,  concrete  co-operation  developed  between  stakeholders  around  ideas
and proposals. It led for instance to a workshop focusing on domestic appliances for
treating Novel Protein Foods at home, organised jointly by a research body and a
company, while other stakeholders (many of them not involved in the SusHouse pro-
ject) were recruited. After the workshop the organising parties developed a concrete
research proposal on optimising kitchen appliances and food supply chains from an
environmental point of view. It was supported by a number of stakeholders from dif-
ferent societal groups. Furthermore, the Dutch research group originally involved in
the SusHouse project developed also new proposals including a programme proposal
for a transition towards sustainability in eating-out and the food-service sector. It has
been nominated for funding and aims at bringing together innovative parties from the
food-service sector in the Netherlands. Finally, results and conclusions from the Sus-
House SCE function were used as input for the policy process of the Dutch Ministry
of the Environment on sustainable food consumption.
Nevertheless, the SusHouse project can be characterized as a successful applicati-
on  of  backcasting  for  generating  ideas  and  bringing  together  stakeholders  around
these ideas. However, in terms of implementation, kicking off concrete innovations,
multi-stakeholder coalitions, or systemic changes, the project has not reached its aims.
Apparently, also here more is needed in terms of governance or innovative capacity.
6. Conclusions
6.1. Backcasting approach
This  chapter has presented participatory backcasting as a novel, innovative and
promising approach for long-term strategising for sustainability, based on stakeholder
involvement, construction of normative sustainable futures, stakeholder learning, in
combination with design and analysis activities an construction of follow-up agendas
meant  for  guiding  implementation.  Participatory  backcasting  has  potential  for
planning in sustainable development, for identification and exploration of promising
sustainable technologies, sustainable system innovations and transitions, for guiding
technology  choices  and for  generating  alternative  more  sustainable  trajectories  for
present dominant trends and developments. 
We have described how backcasting originated from the 1970s and how it original-
ly was developed as an alternative for traditional forecasting and planning. Its original
focus was on policy analysis for energy planning. It evolved to sustainability issues,
while later on utilisation of knowledge and the implementation of outcomes became
much more important. Participatory backcasting using normative scenarios should be
seen as rather opposite to the so called strategic scenario approaches using a range of
possible futures and having become popular after the success of Shell – though there
is agreement on the importance of learning (see e.g. Van der Heijden 1996). One of
the  differences  is  that  Shell  uses  the  scenarios  to  scan  and  understand  possible
changes in its  business environment, so that the company can anticipate on these.
This can be contrasted to developing normative visions on the future direction of a
company or of society as a whole.
We also have found that backcasting can refer to a concept or philosophy, a study,
an approach,  a methodology,  or  an interaction process  among participating stake-
holders. In addition, it can refer to an assessment/analysis (sometimes referred to as
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the backcast) or to the specific step of looking back from the desired future within an
overall stepwise (but iterative) approach or methodology. This implies also that back-
casting can be dealt  with on the conceptual or holistic  level, the level of social or
multi-actor processes, the level of overall approaches and methodologies containing
of multiple steps, methods and instruments and on the level of specific steps, me-
thods or instruments within such an overall approach or overall methodology. So, this
makes very clear that backcasting is more than looking back from a desirable future.
However, it also implies that further work needs to be done to define the approach
and to distinguish this clearly from other elements within the approach for which also
the term backcasting is used. 
Participatory backcasting has a number of key features and elements. First, there is
the explicit normative nature of backcasting approaches, which can be made explicit
in the early beginning of the backcasting process, and which leads to normative future
visions or normative scenarios. Other important elements include broad stakeholder
participation – which is  meant  from the major  societal  groups  distinguished  here:
companies, research, government and public interest -, conceptual learning by stake-
holders involved - with respect to sustainability solutions, possible sustainable futures
and the possible contributions from themselves and other stakeholders, and last but
not least the process and its transparency. . Important background assumptions are a
social  shaping  or  constructivist  perspective,  the  importance  of  interaction  among
participating stakeholders,  and the recognition that existing rules and structures are
not or not well equipped to deal with sustainable development and sustainable solu-
tions. 
This  chapter  has  also proposed  a general  scheme for  participatory  backcasting
consisting of five stages, while distinguishing four major activities: 1) Orientation; 2)
Design; 3) Assessment; and 4) Participation. This implies that different tools and me-
thods are necessary within a backcasting framework for which also four groups have
been proposed: design tools;  participatory tools; assessment tools and process (ma-
nagement) tools. It is important to realise that the backcasting approach is not only
multi-disciplinary, but also trans-disciplinary. This implies not only clear knowledge
demands, but equally important – and even more difficult to be met - clear process
demands. 
It seems possible to position backcasting approaches in a family of approaches
using normative scenarios and stakeholder participation. For instance, Rotmans et al
(2000) report on normative scenarios for sustainable areas in Europe in which stake-
holders were involved, while Street (1997) reports on the use of scenario workshops
as a participatory approach to sustainable urban living. Concerning the latter, which
involved four groups, namely citizens, local policy makers, the private sector and tech-
nology experts, the scenario workshop approach included (1) creating visions and (2)
looking at ways of turning those into reality.  However, further study is necessary on
how these relate to backcasting.
6.2. STD Novel Protein Foods case and SusHouse Nutrition (SCE) case
Concerning the NPF case at the STD programme, it can be concluded that back-
casting was applied successfully and led to a sustainable future vision, stakeholder in-
volvement from the four major societal groups distinguished here: companies, rese-
arch bodies, government and public interest groups. The vision and elaboration also
led to  the  identification  of  attractive  NPF examples  from different  vegetable  and
fungal sources analysed for their consumer aspects, cost aspects, environmental po-
tential, possible socio-economic impacts and the fundamental and applied knowledge
that is presently lacking. To bridge the knowledge gap R&D programmes were de-
fined  and  elaborated,  while  also  a  possible  development  trajectory  was  sketched.
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Furthermore, considerable follow-up was realised both in public R&D and in private
R&D,  while  also  NPF  related  activities  were  found  at  the  ministry  of  the
Environment and public interest groups.
Concerning the SCE case at the SusHouse project, it can be concluded that back-
casting was also successfully applied and led to several sustainable future visions and
stakeholder involvement from the four major societal groups. The sustainable future
visions  were  successfully  elaborated  and analysed on  environmental  improvement,
consumer attractiveness, economic aspects, the necessary changes for realisation and
action agendas and implementation proposals were defined and elaborated during sta-
keholder workshops. However, follow-up was much smaller than in the NPF case.
So, from the two case studies reported in this chapter it can be concluded that
backcasting can be a strong approach for  developing alternative  sustainable future
visions utilising the expertise and knowledge of a broad range of stakeholders. Back-
casting  analysis,  further  elaboration  of  attractive  clusters  and  ideas  and  additional
assessments can further lead to definition of follow-up agendas, containing R&D-ac-
tivities and programmes and other important activities  concerning implementation,
strategy development,  policy recommendations  and short  term proposals  attractive
for single stakeholders or co-operating stakeholders. However, the cases reveal diffe-
rences. A major difference is the difference in follow-up and implementation. While
the NPF case of the STD programme appeared to be rather successful in this sense,
the SCE case of the SusHouse project seems to have much less impact concerning
follow-up, stakeholder endorsement and conceptual learning among stakeholders. 
The question emerging now is what could be a possible explanation for this diffe-
rence between the two cases? Both were successful in involving stakeholders and in
constructing,  elaborating and analysing sustainable alternatives  for future  need and
function fulfilment. Both cases led to follow-up agendas and ideas for implementation
and activities, but only in case of the Novel Protein Foods, there was obviously utili-
sation of the results  and concrete follow-up and implementation of the outcomes.
Was it the difference in the organisational and institutional setting? Five ministries
establishing  the  STD programme  versus  the  European  Union  and academic  self-
organisation in the SusHouse project? Would it have to do with the type and level of
stakeholders involved? Or was how the process is organised and managed decisive? It
could also have to do with the system ‘outside’ the backcasting experiment as it can
be both enabling and constraining. Enabling in the sense that it is open for the outco-
mes and constraining in the sense of ignoring or fighting back. No clear answer can
be given, but further study could increase our understanding. So, further evaluation of
existing backcasting experiments and backcasting practices seems to be necessary, and
it might give answers to questions raised here, and might contribute to improving the
effectiveness with respect of follow-up and explanation through improving our un-
derstanding of the factors enabling and constraining this. A research agenda has been
proposed for this (Quist 2003).
Another, more fundamental, question that arises here is the viability of a backcas-
ting approach as a first step to a large-scale structural and cultural social and technolo-
gical change process (called a ‘transition’ in present Dutch policy literature (Rotmans
et al 2001).  Obviously,  backcasting works well  as  a tool of  generating visions  and
scenarios that do not fit in present-day trends, and that spur stakeholders to think
‘out-of-the-box’. However, the implementation of major change is a long-term pro-
cess involving innovation and governance by multiple stakeholders. Elsewhere one of
us  (Vergragt  2001)  has argued that  future  visions,  which are shared among stake-
holders, are a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving system innovation
towards  sustainability.  Stakeholder  management  is  also  very important  and  should
take into account the culture and the interests of stakeholders, trying to understand
their motives for collaboration, and understanding in which phase of the process they
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can play a role.  Further dealing with stakeholders in these types of innovations  is
extremely time-consuming and therefore  costly.  This  is  increasingly the case when
future options deviate from existing development paths and explore new cultural and
structural options.
6.3. Backcasting and related approaches
It is possible to relate backcasting to at least three categories of approaches. The
first  one  is  scenario-based  foresighting  approaches.  These  include  the  already
mentioned  strategic  scenario  approaches  as  known from Shell,  the  socio-technical
scenario approach as proposed by Elzen et al (2002), and the earlier varieties of back-
casting.  However, in this  type of  approaches,  the analytical relevance is in general
stressed and construction is in general done by the researchers themselves sometimes
based on expert consultation, while one of the core issues in participatory backcasting
is broad stakeholder involvement representing different mindsets. 
The second category is the one of participatory approaches like practiced in Con-
structive Technology Assessment. Here, the core issue is broadening the development
and design process of technologies and artefacts with societal actors and aspects. Ho-
wever, it does not automatically lead to sustainability as it depends on the incorporati-
on aspects and the participating actors, and it does not automatically include norma-
tive visions as a starting point. An emerging methodology is Strategic Niche Manage-
ment (e.g. Hoogma et al 2002). Strategic Niche Management refers to experimenting
with new technological options in a space protected (by the government) from market
pressures, in order to enable stakeholders (both producers, users, regulators) to learn
about the new technology and the embedding in its context. This approach is not so
much strategic  and long-term oriented,  but  focuses  on  concrete  technologies  and
artefacts that are already available. SNM may be part of a long term strategy which in-
cludes implementation of new technologies, as for instance can be set out with parti-
cipatory backcasting. However, it  is yet unclear how the removal of the protection
mechanisms (as suggested in SNM) could take place in a balanced way, on the one
hand without killing the technology in an early phase, on the other hand without offe-
ring protection that cannot be continued in the long term. 
A third category related to backcasting includes all participatory approaches using
normative future visions,  while ensuring broad stakeholder involvement.  Examples
have already been mentioned (e.g. Street 1997, Rotmans et al 2000). An important
emerging one is transition management as proposed by Rotmans et al (2001), which
currently has a strong influence on environmental policy in the Netherlands. It is also
meant for achieving transformations or system innovations towards sustainability ta-
king at least decades. Like backcasting it has characteristics like (Rotmans et al 2001)
long term thinking as a framework for guiding or shaping short-term actions, a focus
on learning and mutli-actor involvement. Participatory backcasting, however, does not
focus so much on keeping a large number of options open, nor does it include impro-
vement of existing systems. The key of backcasting is to identify possible alternatives
and to explore and develop trajectories (recognising the constructive and evolutionary
nature of such trajectories). Furthermore, transition management emphasises the go-
vernance and leading role by the government, while participatory backcasting, as dealt
with in this chapter, emphasises that the governance of system innovations towards
sustainability needs to include its multi-actor character (in a smart way). Furthermore,
participatory backcasting assumes that future visions can be seen as multi-actor con-
structed and may therefore have the potential to develop into so called guiding visions
or images (Grin & Grunwald 2000). The latter is much more difficult, if all options
are kept open as long as possible, as is proposed in transition management.
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Despite these differences,  it  might be possible  that  transition management and
participatory backcasting could be seen as complementary. Backcasting seems to be a
strong approach for constructing future visions endorsed by a wide range of stake-
holders  and for identifying and exploring alternative socio-technical  systems,  while
transition management might be strong in implementation and managing the imple-
mentation process necessary for realising the transition on the long term. However,
further study is needed in order to improve our understanding on this issue.
6.4. Backcasting: relevance for government and governance
Change processes towards sustainability on the level of system innovations require
the  participation  and contribution  of  all  four  societal  groups  distinguished  in  this
chapter, which were business, government, research and the public & public interest
groups. Business is important for producing sustainable products and services. Rese-
archers and research bodies are important for developing the knowledge necessary for
future sustainable alternatives. The public is important for at least two major reasons:
democratic  legitimisation  and as consumers,  as  sustainable  alternatives  need to be
consumed before the environmental benefits can be realised. In general, it can be said
that it is important to mention that it is not only important that societal groups or
specific stakeholders play their role, but also that interaction takes place between and
among stakeholders contributing to shared visions and, if appropriate,  joint or co-
ordinated action.
But what should be the government role2 and what kind of governance could fa-
cilitate system innovations or transformations towards sustainability? We argue that
the role of the government is indispensable because of the long time horizon,  the
complexity of the processes, and the need for an actor that guards the general directi-
on of sustainable development. However, government needs to reflect upon its own
functioning, and has to develop a concept of governance that is suitable for influ-
encing transitions.
Government  participation  seems  to be  crucial  for  further  development,  imple-
mentation and embedding of the results  of a backcasting experiment.  Government
could be part of backcasting in various roles. First of all, like in the STD Programme,
government agencies could actually set up and finance backcasting activities as part of
their long-term oriented strategic research policy, for instance for sustainable develop-
ment. In this  way, backcasting activities acquire the credibility and the legitimating
that is necessary to attract major stakeholders. As an example, in the STD Program it
was a very important  feature that the Programme was organised by five Ministries
jointly, and that they accepted the challenge of factor 20 environmental efficiency as a
long-term goal as a legitimate starting point for the Programme. Secondly, govern-
ment agencies and employees can participate in workshops and other activities that
are  part  of  the  backcasting  activities  aiming  at  system  innovations  towards
sustainability. They can participate in their role as experts, as representatives of their
department or agencies, or as individuals that can perform boundary-spinning roles,
connecting the thinking within government agencies with thinking in other multi-sta-
keholder arenas. Thirdly, government agencies can set rules and regulations and more
generally change the regulatory environment in order to endorse projects and activi-
ties that are part of the backcasting endeavour. For instance, in the case of Novel
Protein Foods, governments could regulate the meat chain and the alternative (novel
protein) chains in such a way that the more sustainable alternative might acquire a
competitive  advance  with  respect  to  the  incumbent  production  and  consumption
chain. As an example, the California Zero Emission mandate of 1990 has spurred a
2 It should be realised that governments are plural in itself and that therefore specific actors
or stakeholders can be distinguished in the government.
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lot of research and development activities both in electric vehicles and in fuel cell de-
velopments. Here, backcasting can be used again for exploring possible zero emission
futures.
Concerning  the  governance  of  system  innovations  or  transformations  towards
sustainability, Grin et al (2003) have explored the contours of a novel governance po-
licy concept for governing system innovations or transitions. They argue that govern-
ments need to develop a third generation of environmental policy in addition to the
second generation based on stakeholder orientation and social learning. The bounda-
ries for this second-generation environmental policy have been reached because of
structural impediments in society: the physical infrastructure, social conventions, exis-
ting regulations, available knowledge and the knowledge infrastructure. The challenge
is how to formulate a policy that addresses this cultural and structural entrenchment
without falling into the trap of planning by blueprints They argue that it requires not a
huge planned attack on the existing system, but system changes may be brought about
by “….concrete contextual practices that, to a certain extend, do not follow the existing rules….”.
Various practices may reinforce each other and eventually may lead to a system inno-
vation. For the government there are two roles: foster innovative practices, and foster
mutual reinforcement of these practices. The former was also recommended elsewhe-
re (Irwin et al 1994, Vergragt 2000). Mutual reinforcements of innovative practices
may be achieved by developing connective infrastructures, regulation on a more gene-
ral level, technologies that fulfil  social needs in various contexts, and research pro-
grams aimed at investigation of knowledge gaps. It may be added that forms of net-
work management aiming explicitly at connecting innovative practices may be useful
here. 
So,  what does  this  mean practically in cases of  plural  multi-actor contexts  and
multi-actor processes in our constructive world, while there are no rule sets and in-
stitutions available (as mentioned already in Section 3.4 when dealing with the theore-
tical aspects  of backcasting)? It should aim at higher  order  institutional and policy
learning  through  participatory  development  and  exploration  of  long-term  future
visions. However, it needs to be investigated further how future visions play a role in
contextualising and connecting individual innovative practices,  and how to provide
them with a meaning that goes beyond the innovative practice itself. 
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Environmental Policy Shift 
Through Technological Innovation
Joseph Huber
Martin-Luther-University,  Halle an der Saale
1. Technological  Environmental  Innovations (TEIs) and Metabolic Consist-
ency
Environmental innovation includes any kind of innovations – technical, economic,
legal, institutional, organisational, behavioural – that lead to an improvement of eco-
logical quality, regardless of any additional advantage or motive (Klemmer et al. 1999
25, also Hemmelskamp/Rennings/Leone 2000).
This  chapter just deals with technological environmental  innovations (TEIs).  A
technology  is  a  body of  knowledge,  especially  know-how,  but  also  includes  some
theoretical know-why as well as know-what-for (also Freeman 1987 235, Kemp 1997
pp7). As far as know-how is concerned, a technology is a method of applying a speci-
fic knowledge base for achieving a specified operative purpose by special operative
means such as tools (instruments, materials, machinery, plant equipment, infrastruct-
ures) and practices. Products – as much as production processes and services – are
specific instrumental manifestations, or apparatus-like implementations of a techno-
logy. Products, processes and services tend to be marketable, commercialised applica-
tions of a technology. 
In order to qualify as a TEI for entry into the database of this study, technological
innovations  had to  meet  one  or  several  aspects  of  the  environmental  innovation
strategies as listed in Table 1.
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Table 1: Selected concepts of technological environmental innovation according to the

































x x x x x x x
Sustainable resource 
management
x x x x x x
Cleaner technologies x x x x x x
Benign substitution x x x
Product design for 
environment
x x x




Another,  and  perhaps  more  coherent  way of  deciding  whether  a  technological
innovation qualifies as an environmental innovation, is to determine whether a new
technology  or  product  contributes  to significantly  increasing eco-efficiency and/or
improving ecological or metabolic consistency. These terms are closely linked to the
sustainability discourse and to the concept of industrial metabolism (Ayres 1996), or
industrial  ecology  respectively.  Criticism  of  the  shortcomings  of  the  previous
sustainability  discourse  has  been  a  key  element  in  the  more  recent  discourse  on
ecological modernisation (Andersen/Massa 2000, Mol/ Sonnenfeld 2000), and within
this  context  it  was  the  starting  point  of  the  concept  of  ecological  or  metabolic
consistency  (Huber  2004,  2000),  sometimes  also  referred  to  as  eco-effectiveness
(Braungart/McDonough 2002 103–117).
Metabolic consistency focuses on the structural, qualitative side of technology, not
just input-output-quantities within basically given structures. Ecological consistency is
about  how  to  re-embed  the  industrial  metabolism  within  nature’s  metabolism  by
introducing new technosystems,  regimes and practices,  thus changing technological
structures  and the metabolic qualities of products and processes, rather than mere
quantity of turnover within old structures. E.g., energy demand on giga and tera levels
may not be an ecological problem as such if the energy were based on clean fuels such
as hydrogen, or represented fuelless energy from solar, wind, hydro and geothermal
sources.  Whereas  an  efficiency  approach  primarily  appeals  to  green  savings  com-
missioners, a consistency approach calls for green inventors and investors.
In terms of various lines of ecological discourse, TEIs can thus be characterised as
being  the  operative  tool-set  of  technological  regimes  aimed  at  ecological
modernisation, i.e. structural change towards benign or at least strain-relieving effects
on resources, sinks, ecosystems and the biosphere. TEIs eliminate, or reduce, or help
to  control  environmental  hazard  (risk).  TEIs  create  metabolic  consistency  and
optimise eco-efficiency. TEIs can be add-on as well as integrated, although integrated
solutions are in almost any case preferable from an ecological point of view. 
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2. Collection of TEIs and database 
The criteria of TEIs and its systematics emerged in the course of long-standing
empirical research, which has since 2001 also been carried out in connection with the
Key Environmental  Innovations group of the German Federal Research Ministry’s
Initiative on Sustainability and Innovation. An explorative databank has been created
which now numbers 305 datasets, with a total of more than 500 examples of TEIs.
Corresponding to the approaches  of  innovation  life  cycle  analysis  and product
chain analysis, the datasets include information on a technology (products, materials,
processes,  practices),  its  structural  impact,  the life  cycle stage of  development  and
diffusion,  on  rival  like  technologies,  competitiveness  and  adoptability,  as  well  as
ecological properties and environmental improvements which have been achieved or
can be expected.
The databank has been fed by a continuous survey of innovations as they were
reported  in  articles  in  a  number  of  specialised  journals  and  newsletters  from  the
beginning of 2000, partly earlier, through to March 2003.
3. Some examples and trends of TEIs
• Typical  examples and trends of  TEIs include the following.  They all  represent
innovative regime shifts from mature conventional technologies to new ones that
are metabolically  more consistent,  and normally  also much more efficient  than
previous like technologies:
• Replacement of fossil fuels with clean-burn hydrogen, the use of which does not
require additional end-of-pipe purification of emissions
• Substitution of  clean electrochemical fuel  cells  for  pollutant furnaces and com-
bustion  engines  in  manifold  applications,  from  power  stations  to  vehicle
propulsion
• Clean coal, notably in zero-emission central power plants on the basis of IGCC
technology  (integrated  gasifier  combined  cycle)  and  CO2 sequestration.  The
purpose of these power plants is to produce hydrogen by steam reformation as
much as to generate electricity.
• Fuelless  energy  such  as  photovoltaics  and  further  regenerative  energies  which
make use of sun radiation, geothermal flows, or wind and water currents
• Decentral micropower, i.e. new sources of electricity generation that are leading
towards distributed power generation (which includes a certain number of large
central stations). Over-centralised power generation and one-way distribution will
thus be replaced by an integrated two-way-flow grid management.
• Transgenic  biochemistry  which  makes  use  of  enzymes  and  microorganisms
especially  designed  and  bred  for  various  production  tasks,  thus  replacing  the
conventional high-temperature high-pressure chemistry that poses a heavy burden
on the environment and human health
• Substitution of high-hazard chemicals for more benign low-impact substances and
new  specialty  chemicals  which  are,  among  other  things,  biodegradable,  non-
persistent, non-accumulative and non-toxic
• Biofeedstocks replacing petrol as a raw material to a certain extent
• New materials which are simultaneously ultra-light and ultra-strong, saving larger
volumes of conventional materials and energy
• Micromachines and nanotechnology which relieve pressure on resources and sinks
compared to larger conventional machines and chemical production
• Substituting  sonar,  photonic  and  microfluidic  analyses  for  cumbersome  con-
ventional methods involving many hazardous ingredients,  and thus considerably
improving quality and performance of production
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• Circular production processes  in which water,  auxiliary substances,  metals,  bulk
minerals and fibres are recycled at an optimum rate
• Last  but not  least,  overcoming the ecologically  devastating practices  of  today’s
over-intensified and inappropriately chemicalised agriculture by introducing sound
ecological practices in combination with high-tech precision farming and, again,
modern biotechnology which makes use of transgenic organisms.
Since biotechnology is a sensitive issue, it may deserve a  brief comment: genetic
engineering in agriculture, as well as transgenic biotechnology in chemistry, nanotech-
nology, materials processing, waste management, pharmacology and medicine, has to
be considered  as  an important  field  of  TEIs,  full  in  the  knowledge that  such an
assessment  will  certainly  remain  controversial  for  another  one  or  two  decades  to
come.  As  tends  to  be  the  case  with  true  key  innovations  of  major  structural
importance, people’s sense of security is undermined. Conservative opposition and
risk aversion are strong. It takes time to replace uncertain expectations with realistic
experience. Not all  feelings of uneasiness  are unfounded, but in most cases it  has
turned out that in fact they were. Almost all transgenic innovations seem to spur effi-
ciency, and most  of the examples represented in the database are environmentally
benign in that they allow to substitute, e.g., for conventional high-temperature high-
pressure  processes,  hazardous  chemicals,  resources  input  and  emissions  output.
Biotechnologies improve on productivity and product quality. In comparison to these
advantages, fears of particular disadvantages are dwarfed, or are untenable in face of
the facts. But not all applications – such as pesticide-resistant crops – can be said to
be metabolically consistent. Some are not, or not yet.
4. TEIs tend to be upstream the product chain and upstream a technology’s
life cycle
In  terms  of  integrated solutions  versus  add-on measures,  85% of  TEIs  in  the
database represent integrated solutions, 15% environmental add-on technology. This
is  hardly  surprising,  serving  to  confirm  what  was  to  be  expected.  Of  the  85%
integrated solutions, 49% can be said to be driven mainly by ecological motives so
that these are TEIs by prime intention, whereas in 36% of the examples ecological
motives, though these may also be considered, cannot be said to be the main reason
behind that innovation.
The central  finding which emerges from the present  investigation is  that  most
TEIs, and also the most important TEIs in terms of structural impact, tend to be
upstream in the manufacturing chain, and upstream the learning curve in the life cycle
of a technology or product. The upstream tendency of TEIs is all the more true if we
consider energy technology to be upstream in any production function in that it is a
primary basic input component at each step in the manufacturing chain. 
In  the  environmental  literature,  the  term  ‘life  cycle  analysis’  is  often  used  in-
terchangeably  with ‘product  chain  analysis’  or  ‘eco-balances’  that  try  to  gauge  the
environmental impact of a product from first input by extraction of raw materials to
last  output  by  being  definitely  phased  out  as  waste.  What  they  represent  more
precisely, however, is analysis of the vertical manufacturing chain or product chain as
shown in Figure 1. By contrast,  another meaning of life cycle analysis refers to an
innovation life cycle or technology life cycle as shown in Figure 2, i.e. the evolutive
existence of a technology or product species.


























Figure 2: The innovation life cycle
Figure 1:  The product chain
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As can be seen in Figure 3, more than a quarter of the datasets (27%) relate to
energy,  including  vehicle  propulsion  and energy design  of  buildings  (not  however
innovations  related to energy demand of  appliances).  The number of  TEIs  in the
realm of energy is matched only by 24% of technologies relating to the extraction,
processing and reprocessing of materials,  which accounts  for 34% if  agriculture is
included,  and  44% if  TEIs  in  the  realm the  chemical  industry,  52% if  emissions
control is added to this.  
Figure 3: TEIs according to realm of innovation  (n = 298)
We can try to specifically ascribe energy technologies and emissions control to the
sectors where they actually occur within the vertical manufacturing chain. We can thus
make a distinction between end-products on the one hand, and intermediate products,
and primary or base products, both representing pre-products, on the other hand. We
can furthermore distinguish user or consumer behaviour (practices) from producer
practices  (behaviour  and  regime  rules).  We  again  exclude  TEIs  regarding  off-site
measuring  and  monitoring.  This  results  in  the  categories  of  (a)  primary  or  base
production and materials, (b) materials processing and intermediate productions, (c)
final  productions  and  products,  and  (d)  user  behaviour  or  consumer  practices  as
shown in Table 2.
In this  way the upstream concentration of TEIs emerges even more markedly.
Primary productions and base products represent the biggest slice with 44%, materials
processing and intermediate products 27%, making up 71% of the TEIs in primary
and intermediate productions.  Final  productions  and end-products  represent  25%.
Most  of  this  relates  to  building  and  vehicles  rather  than  office  and  household
appliances  and  consumer  goods.  By  contrast,  innovative  practices  regarding
consumption  and private user  behaviour (such as  soft  driving,  car-sharing,  leasing
instead of buying, avoiding overheating of rooms, etc.) at 4% do not count for much.
Even if this figure were doubled or tripled, the finding and its message would basically
remain the same: TEIs are upstream rather than downstream in the manufacturing
chain. 
As a rule of thumb one can say the more products and production processes are
placed  chain-upwards,  the  more  important  the  potential  of  their  environmental
impact is. This is particularly the case with regard to the difference between all of the
steps  of  extracting  and successively  (re)processing materials,  which regularly  cause
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which causes comparatively less impact. In the same sense it can be said that it is the
processes of production rather than the use of products which cause environmental
impact. 
Table 2: TEIs (products, processes, practices) according to chain position
Primary productions or base products 
e.g. raw materials, primary fuels, power stations, agriculture,
forestry, base materials (steel, cement, pulping, tanning, …),
secondary raw materials from recycling, also incl. related add-
on-purification technology
Materials processing and intermediate products
e.g. metal and surface working, paper making, wood
processing, furniture, textiles manuf., production of
cycleware, dyeing/coating, food processing, etc., including
related 
energy technology (e.g. industrial furnaces, stoves, burners),





      71 %
44 %




Buildings, vehicles, utility and consumer goods, including
related energy technology (e.g. car propulsion, house heating,
electr. demand of appliances), also incl. related add-on-purifi-
cation technology, and producer practices
25 %
User behaviour, consumer practices 4 %
n = 288 100 %    
There is, however, an important exception: long-lived complex energy apparatus
such  as  motors  in  cars,  jet  engines,  power  plants,  heating  systems  and  electric
appliances  which  consume  large  quantities  of  fuel.  Food,  feed  and  fuels  have  a
metabolic rate of almost 100%. This makes a big difference to use-materials which by
and large keep their physical structure when used. If there are important, unresolved
environmental problems to be found in the use of final products, they indeed have in
most  cases to do with the fuels  and the energy apparatus  involved in using those
products. 
As regards the innovation life cycle stage of TEIs, as summarised in Table 3, 3% are
just  an  idea  on  paper,  10%  are  in  an  early  stage  of  research  and  laboratory
demonstration,  26%  in  a  more  advanced  stage  of  development,  i.e.  36%  in  the
development stage. 35% then are at market launch or shortly thereafter, or otherwise
being  introduced  to  regular  practice.  16%  are  in  experiencing  growing  adoption,
though this  does not always represent an impressive  take-off.  The remaining 10%
represent mature technologies in a rather late stage of structuration and diffusion.
Table 3: TEIs according to stage of life cycle
Idea, concept on paper 3  %
Early stage of research and laboratory demonstration 10  %   
Advanced stage of development 26  %
About market launch or introduction, or shortly thereafter 35  %
Experiencing growing adoption 16  %
Mature stage 10  %
n = 289 100  %
  
The distribution in Table 3 was to be expected. Ideas and early experiments are
normally not communicated to a broader public, just as technologies in a late stage of
their life cycle are normally not subject to public attention since nothing particular is
occurring any more. It is nonetheless important to have this documented empirically,
because it confirms one of the basic recommendations that can be drawn from life
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cycle analysis: true progress which includes structural change, particularly regarding a
change in the ecological consistency of the industrial metabolism, requires a change in
path; i.e. it requires the development and implementation of new technologies rather
than the modification of mature systems already in place. 
It is important here to understand that with technologies, as with living organisms,
the key features of a novel thing and its life course are determined upstream rather
than downstream, i.e. with regard to an organism, in its genetic code and in its early
days of growth, experiencing and learning; and similarly with regard to technologies,
in their conceptualisation and design, in the early stages of research and development,
i.e.  the early stages of structuration and diffusion.  What remains to be determined
during  later  stages,  consists  of  incremental  changes  and  modifications  of  minor
importance, after the point of inflection of a learning curve has been passed. Most of
the environmental pressure which is caused by producing and using a certain kind of
product or technology is determined right at the beginning with the conceptualisation
and design of that product or technology. Once in place, there is not much left which
one can do about it, aside from some improvements in later new-generation variants
of  that  product,  some  percentage  points  of  materials  and  energy  savings  in  the
factory, and a few percentage points by being a good consumer. 
As is shown in Table 4, most TEIs do indeed bring about change in ecological
consistency. In about a quarter of the TEIs, there are significant efficiency increases
without a change in metabolic properties. Typical examples of this include reuse of
parts and recycling of materials, e.g. of solvents or sulphuric acid, or increased fuel-
efficiency  in  internal-combustion  engines.  Three  quarters,  however,  involve  some
consistency change. 
The biggest share, at 41%, is that of examples where there are both consistency
improvements and efficiency increases, e.g. latest-generation solar cells, fuel cells of
any kind, and many biotech applications of where there is simultaneously less or no
environmental pressure and higher yield. The percentage of such double-surplus-TEIs
is nevertheless lower than was hypothetically supposed, whereas the number of cases
in which there is less inconsistency rather than really benign improvements are more
than was expected. 
Table 4: TEIs according to ecological consistency and efficiency
Consistency improvement
without efficiency change, or efficiency unclear, or even slightly decreased 16 %
Consistency change in the sense of lesser degree of inconsistency
without efficiency change, or efficiency unclear, or even slightly decreased 8 %
Consistency change in the sense of lesser degree of inconsistency 
combined with increase in efficiency 
12 %
Both consistency improvement and efficiency increase 41 %
Mere efficiency increase
without actual change in ecological consistency
23 %
n = 281  100 %
   
Typical  examples  of  lesser  degree  of  inconsistency  without  efficiency  change
include  exhaust  catalysts,  transmutation  of  nuclear  waste,  GM  crops  tolerant  of
agrochemicals,  or HCFC-22 (chlorodifluoromethane) as a halocarbon replacements
for conventional CFCs. 
Replacement  with  SF6 then  is  an  example  of  lesser  degree  of  inconsistency
combined with some efficiency increase,  because on eco-balance SF6 helps to save
CO2 emissions.  Further  examples  in  this  category  tend  to be  incremental  process
innovations  which help  to  reduce  hazardous  auxiliaries  or  materials-content  while
simultaneously increasing output. 
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An example of benign consistency improvements without efficiency changes are
hydrogen-fuelled internal-combustion engines. Previous generations of solar cells and
wind power, though clearly clean and metabolically consistent, even came with less
efficiency than conventional like technologies.
5.  Conclusions:  Paradigm  shift  from  downstream  to  upstream  the  product
chain and technology life cycles
The  central  message  from the  above findings  concerns  a  paradigm shift  from
downstream to upstream in the vertical product chain and in technology life cycles. I
would like to mention four aspects of such an upstreaming of environmental action
and policies.
First,  if  environmentally  significant  technological  innovations  are  to  be  found
chain-upwards  rather  than  chain-downwards,  then  priorities  would  need  to  be
refocused onto those industrial operations where large environmental impact actually
occurs – in energy, raw materials,  agriculture, chemistry and base industries,  partly
also in building and vehicles.
Second, the key actor groups that have to be mobilised are technology developers,
product designers and producers rather than users and consumers. With a focus on
products  and  production,  one  would  not  be  spending  too  much  time  with  user
behaviour and consumer demand. New technologies do not occur by way of demand
pull.  Important  environmental  innovations  originate  on  the  supply  side.  They are
science-driven and technology-pushed, induced by ideas and interests, one of which
may be solving environmental problems – though further selective impulses from the
side of regulation, government and user demand certainly come in later on. 
The fact that most environmental impacts are determined and caused upstream in
the  life  cycle  and  upstream  in  the  product  chain  puts  final  consumption  in  a
somewhat paradoxical role. This ecological paradox of consumption is as follows: On
the  one  hand,  expectations  of  high  and still  rising  levels  of  affluence  are  indeed
among the main driving forces behind the ongoing growth of industrial production
and the large volumes of turnover of the industrial metabolism; on the other hand,
however,  the  immediate  contribution  of  consumer  behaviour  to  the  industrial
metabolism is rather low, about 5–15% to gauge it generously. This is because most
of the environmental pressure, the big ecological footprints or materials rucksacks of
consumer society, occur during the different steps upstream in the product chain, and
are determined by the basic principles of a technology and the physical design of a
product,  in the early stages of  their life cycle.  In contrast,  consumption in service
businesses  and  private  households  entails  final  steps  downstream  in  the  product
chain. Approaches such as ‘sustainable consumption’ or ‘sustainable household’ can,
in the end indeed, not be particularly effective in changing the industrial metabolism. 
Third,  in  upstreaming  environmental  activities,  chain  management  by  key
manufacturers  and  trade  businesses  has  a  particular  role  to  play.  It  is  the  manu-
facturers  of complex end-products such as buildings, vehicles, appliances, and also
large  retailers  such  as  mail  order  firms,  who  are  in  the  position  to  effectively
implement supply chain management. This is none of a user’s nor of a government’s
business. 
Final  demand  may  be  decisive  with  regard  to  the  diffusion  of  innovations.
Demand itself, however, cannot innovate, it cannot ‘buy into existence’ things which
do not exist, i.e. things which are not on the market yet – with one exception, which is
the demand by key manufacturers and large trade businesses, because they have, or
can have if they wish so, a decisive influence on suppliers along the product chain,
and a defining influence on the design and redesign of products.
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Fourth,  as  far  as  government  is  concerned,  upstreaming  environmental  policy
would  induce  a  shift  of  emphasis  from  regulation  to  innovation.  Environmental
policy, much more than has hitherto been the case, would have to become a policy of
technology development, or will have to cooperate systematically with technological
R&D  policy.  In  consequence  there  would  have  to  be  a  shift  in  the  pattern  of
environmental  policy  from  bureaucratic  procedural  control  to  co-ordination  of
national innovation networks, European at the EU level, including suitable and well
balanced financial support by granting regular research funds and seed money, as well
as providing venture capital and introductory aids in appropriate ways. What has to
stay,  though,  is  to  set  strict  environmental  performance  standards  (Ashford  1985,
Kemp 1997 pp.317, Hemmelskamp/Rennings/Leone 2000). This remains by far the
most effective controls  instrument for environment and innovation alike (which is
not  astonishing  given  the  fact  that  environmental  standards  are,  or  immediately
translate into, technical standards). 
In  face  of  the  discussed  findings  on  TEIs  one could go as  far  as  to  say:  en-
vironmental  awareness  and  will-building,  regulation  by  law  and  environmental
authorities, green marketing, and even green business management remain ultimately
pointless in the absence of a prior strategy of technological environmental  upstream
innovation to give a common focus to environmental policies.
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Industrial Ecology – 
A New Platform for Planning Sustainable Societies
Ramesh Ramaswamy
Technology Exchange Network, Bangalore, India
Introduction
“Whereas  conventional  economics  deals  with  the  flow  of  money  through  the
economic system, Industrial Ecology or the “economics of resources” deals with the
flow of resources through the economic system”1
This chapter deals with the relatively new field of Industrial Ecology. The principal
basis of Industrial Ecology is that, to develop sustainable societies, it is necessary to
perceive the system as a whole, understand the flows of resources through the system
and consider finding solutions at a systemic level. The economic planning processes
should involve an understanding of how resources flow through the system, with a
view to optimizing such flows. The word “resources” refers to material, energy, hu-
man and other identified resources and not just to monetary resources. 
The scope of Industrial Ecology could be depicted as in Figure 1 As can be seen
from this figure, the perspective encompasses, not just industry as it is normally un-
derstood, but other components of the socio-economic system as well.
What is Industrial Ecology?
Industrial Ecology explores the assumption that industrial system can be seen as a
certain kind of ecosystem. After all, the industrial system, just as natural ecosystems,
can be described as a particular  distribution  of  materials,  energy,  and information
flows. Further, the entire industrial system relies on resources and services provided
by the Biosphere, from which it cannot be dissociated
1 Ramaswamy, Ramesh, Relevance of Industrial Ecology in Developing Countries, Perspec-
tives on Industrial Ecology, Greenleaf Publishing, UK, 2003
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The key elements of an Industrial Ecology perspective are:
a) it is a systemic, comprehensive, integrated view of all the components of the in-
dustrial economy and their relations with the Biosphere.
b) it  emphasizes the biophysical  substratum of human activities,  i.  e.  the complex
patterns of material flows within and outside the industrial system, in contrast with
current  approaches  which  mostly  consider  the  economy  in  terms  of  abstract
monetary units, or alternatively on energy flows.
c) it considers technological dynamics, i.e. the long term evolution (technological tra-
jectories) of clusters of key technologies as a crucial (but not exclusive) element for
the transition from the actual unsustainable industrial system to a viable industrial
ecosystem.
Application of Industrial Ecology in Developing Countries
The concepts of Industrial Ecology can be effectively used in developing coun-
tries. Although some of these countries are considered to be rich in natural resources,
their availability to the local society is often extremely limited. Any effort to improve
the productivity of resources would greatly enhance their economies, quality of life,
and sustainability. Principles of Industrial Ecology, which aim to maximize resource
productivity, should be central to the economic and development planning process.
Four studies were carried out in India during the period 1995 to 1998 that high-
light the use of Material Flow Analysis, the core methodology in Industrial Ecology,
in developing a planning platform. In the context of developing countries, since the
Figure 1: The Scope of Industrial Ecology
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discussion  centers  around  resources,  it  has  been  referred  to  as  Resource  Flow
Analysis  or  RFA.  A fifth  case  on  a Corporate  Sugar  Complex  in India  has  been
included in this set of cases, that points to new approaches to corporate planning, in
the context of Industrial Ecology.
The base format that has been used in the analysis of resource flows in all the four
cases presented is shown in Figure 2.
This format would help to understand the flow of resources through the system
(material, energy, land and manpower). Such an understanding could help societies to
assess the opportunities available to them by maximization of the productivity of limi-
ted resources, and to more fully assess the threats from their use (or misuse). 
The case studies from India showcase the utility of this approach. Each of these
cases illustrates in a specific way the relevance and utility of the Industrial Ecology
perspective in planning.
Case Studies From India2
Although the data has not been updated (the data pertains to the early and mid
1990s), the core issues have remained unchanged over the years and are adequate for
the purpose for which they are presented here. Figure 3, shows the sites of the case
studies in India.
2 Erkman Suren & Ramaswamy Ramesh, Applied Industrial Ecology – A New Platform for
Planning Sustainable Societies, AICRA Publishing, India, 2003
Figure 2: Regional Resource Flow Diagram
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Case Study of the Textile Industry in Tirupur
Tirupur is a major center for the production of knitted cotton hosiery. The town is
located in the south of India and has a population of about 300,000. The 4,000 small
units in the town specialize in different aspects of the manufacturing process. 
The aggregate annual value of production in the town is around US $ 825 million.
Much of  the  produce is  exported bringing in  very  valuable foreign  exchange.  Till
about the 1980s, for decades, the center was only manufacturing white undershirts
called  “banians”,  which  are  commonly  worn  by  men in  India.  The industry  then
discovered  the  lucrative  international  market  for  colored  T-shirts,  which  led to  a
boom in exports. This enormous growth in the production of colored textiles, led to
an increase in the dyeing operations in the town.
Water is scarce in the area and the wet processing of textiles (particularly dyeing)
has rendered the groundwater unusable. A large quantity of salt is used in the dyeing
process and the process wastewater (90 million liters per day) is highly saline and is
contaminated with a variety of dyes and chemicals. As there is hardly any other source
of freshwater nearby, trucks bring in water from groundwater sources (which are yet
to be polluted) as far as 50 km away at an enormous cost. The industry has internali-
zed the cost of transporting water in its operations 
The shortages of clean water have been a source of great concern, as the people in
the area have no water for their domestic needs. The water pollution has also totally
Figure 3
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ruined the agricultural operations in the region. The pollution control authorities have
been striving hard to stop the industries from polluting the water
A massive US$ 30 million project is under way to treat the wastewater at Common
Effluent Treatment Facilities. After such expensive treatment, the water will still be
unusable, as the facility does not include any system for desalination of the wastewa-
ter.
A RFA (Figure 4) was carried out for the town. Only when the figures were aggre-
gated did the industrialists  realize that  they were collectively spending over US$ 7
million annually on buying water and in addition, the annual maintenance cost of the
effluent treatment plant would be an enormous burden.
Since water is used at so many different points and the industrialists had internali-
zed the cost of buying water in their operations, neither the total volume of water
used in the town nor the amount of money collectively spent by the industry in buy-
ing water, were immediately obvious. An RFA for the town opened the eyes of the in-
dustry to the magnitude of resources consumed. 
These aggregate figures also showed that water could be recycled profitably. On
the basis  of  the  study,  a private entrepreneur  developed a water recycling system,
which could be installed in each dyeing unit. The system used the waste heat from the
boilers already working in the dyeing units for the recycling process.  This is a relative-
ly low cost system, which is gaining popularity in the town.
Similarly, since the use of the firewood is distributed over nearly 1200 points, it
was not obvious that nearly 500,000 tonnes of firewood were being used annually in
the town. There is grave concern over rapid deforestation in India. The possibility of
setting up a central steam source, with the option of solar preheating, was suggested
as a way to reduce the consumption of firewood.
Another outcome of the study was that it highlighted the fact that the calorific va-
lue of the municipal solid waste (garbage) was high as it contained large quantities of
textile  and  paper  wastes.  This  could  be  used  effectively  to  partially  replace  the
firewood being consumed in the town.
The case illustrates the significance of the Industrial Ecology approach in the con-
text of a developing country. For many years a number of research and development
institutions have carried out “pollution control”  & “cleaner production” studies in
Tirupur to minimize water use, minimize use of dyes and to “improve” the quality of
the effluent. No references could be found to any study aimed at evaluating the possi-
bility of profitably recycling the wastewater in the town, which should have been the
first priority,  from the point of view of Industrial Ecology. Again, since ”pollution
control” was seen as the only issue, no attempt appeared to have been made either to
minimize the use of scarce firewood or to leverage the high calorific value of the solid
waste in the town.
The case clearly illustrates the use of an RFA to understand various materi-
al flows in an area and its use for planning.
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Case Study of the Foundries in Haora
There are nearly 500 cast iron foundries in Haora, a suburb of Kolkata (formerly
Calcutta), in Eastern India. The air pollution from the foundries has been a source of
concern. The pollution control authorities  have been insisting on the foundries in-
stalling pollution control systems to mitigate the emissions. The poor health of the
engineering  industry  in  the  eastern  region  has  affected  the  financial  health  of  the
foundries here, which now subsist on manufacturing very low value-added products
like manhole covers. Since pollution from the foundries was a major source of con-
cern for the state authorities and a matter of public debate, a number of agencies had
launched studies to develop and set up technologies and equipment for limiting air
pollution.
One of the governmental research agencies had developed a process to use natural
gas instead of coke (the major cause of pollution) that the foundries were presently
using. This process was in an advanced stage of development. It was considered likely
that  the  environment  protection  authorities  may insist  on the foundries  in Haora
Figure 4: RFA for the textile industry in Tirupur. Units: water: thousand liters
per day, electrical energy: thousand kWh per year, others: tonnes per year
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using this new technology to eliminate the pollution problem. Since natural gas is not
available in the region, the use of this new technology could substantially increase the
cost of production and the foundries would not be competitive any more.
An RFA of the region showed that the industry could adapt the new technology to
use coke oven gases instead of natural gas. As the eastern region is a major coal pro-
ducing area and as there are many independent coke ovens, coke oven gas is easily
available  locally  and  is  often  wasted.  Depending  on  the  economics,  either  the
foundries could be relocated near the coke ovens or the coke oven gases could be
transported to the foundries.
The study highlights the relevance of an RFA to an Industry planner, as it would
point to unused resources (by-products or “wastes”) in a region. The Industry (or a
group of industries) could consider how they might leverage the availability of any of
these unused resources to their advantage and for their sustained operations.  This
could be done by establishing new linkages between industries in different sectors
(like foundries and coke ovens).  This is far from obvious, unless an RFA facilitates
detecting such resources in a systematic way
. 
Case Study of the Leather Industry in Tamil Nadu
Tamil Nadu, a state in the south of India, is the premier center in India for the
processing of leather. Water is scarce in Tamil Nadu. India had traditionally been a
major center for the export of hides and skins. In the 1970s, the government of India
banned the export of raw hides and skins with a view to improving the value addition
of production, and thereby enhancing the inflow of scarce foreign exchange. Environ-
mental issues were not an important part of the agenda of in India those days.
This boosted the leather processing activity in India in general and in Tamil Nadu
in particular. The industry is a major foreign exchange earner and important to the
economy of the state and to the country. Meanwhile, compliance with strict environ-
ment regulations has rendered the processing very expensive in the developed world.
The leather industry (which is made up of thousands of small industries) is a major
user of water, as each tonne of hide/skin needs 30,000 to 50,000 liters of water for
processing. This is a large volume, as the average per capita water availability for ur-
ban settlements in India is estimated at around 30 liters per day. Table 1 gives details
of the number of large and small leather processing industries in different parts of
India.
Table 1:  Leather Industries in India. Source: Report on the Capacity Utilization  &
Scope for modernization in Indian Tanning Industry. CLRI, Adyar, Chennai, 1990
State Small Scale Large Scale Total Percentage
Share
1 Tamil Nadu 536 41 577 53.3
2 West Bengal 227 6 233 21.5
3 Uttar Pradesh 140 7 147 13.6
4 Andhra Pradesh 18 5 23 2.1
5 Maharashtra 27 3 30 2.8
6 Karnataka 15 1 16 1.5
7 Punjab 8 3 11 1.0
8 Other States 37 9 46 4.2
Total 1008 75 1083 100
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 The growth of the industry has resulted in extremely high water pollution in the
regions where the tanneries are concentrated.  The leather industry has been under
pressure from the pollution control authorities and many have subscribed to a Com-
mon Effluent Treatment Plant. The water after treatment continues to be unusable, as
it is very saline. The sludge from water treatment continues to be a serious problem.
A detailed study in the context of Industrial Ecology helped in redefining the pro-
blem, which till then had been only viewed as a “pollution control” issue, as the efflu-
ents did not meet the specifications, laid down by the law. Many academic studies
have been undertaken to ensure that the effluent quality “comes as close as possible”
to the standards using the “Best Available Technology”.
However, the problem is much more serious. The tanneries are using a resource;
water, which is extremely scarce in the region. It is also contaminating groundwater
resources of the local community, which is causing great hardship to the population,
as it is depriving them of desperately needed water. It will not be long before the soci-
al pressure and the law courts bring the leather industry to a halt. In the context of In-
dustrial Ecology, the first priority is to focus on the use of the local resource, water.
The  local  community  cannot  afford  to  spare  water  for  the  industry.  One  option
would be to relocate the tanneries along the coast, where they could draw seawater
instead of using valuable freshwater. If the industry is unable to develop processes
that can use seawater as it is, it will have to desalinate the seawater for its use. The
treated wastewater could be discharged into the sea, as long as all pollutants other
than salt are removed.
Figure 5 gives a perspective of a possible new scheme for the industry.
The study points to a new strategy option for sustainability of the leather industry
in the region, by re-definition of a problem with a focus on resources. The second
significance of the case study is to point to the need for industries or industry groups
to  carry  out  studies  on  resource  availability  in  the  region,  while  establishing  new
manufacturing centers or expanding the present centers. This could be critical to their
long-term survival and their peaceful co-existence with the local community.
Figure 5: A Perspective For The Development Of The Leather Industry
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Case Study of the Damodar Valley Region
The River Damodar basin, in the eastern part of India, covers a vast area. This
mineral-rich region (near Kolkata) is the source of much of the coal produced in In-
dia. Coal is a major energy source in the country. Many large power utilities and steel
plants are located here, in addition to industries  associated with coal,  such as coal
washeries and coke ovens. The region is considered very highly polluted. An industrial
metabolism study was undertaken in the region. The quantities of the “flow” of two
of the major local resources, the waters of the River Damodar and coal, were studied.
The results of the study gave a good overview of how the waters of the river and coal
are used in the system. 
Since agriculture consumes nearly 85% of the waters of the river, it was critical to
estimate the impact on the agricultural produce, of the thousands of tonnes of po-
tentially toxic wastes dumped into the river, resulting from the high levels of industrial
activity upstream. The study pointed (quantitatively) to the extent of dangers and the
need to monitor the flows of these toxins through the river and the groundwater, the
two sources of water for the population. The study also pointed to the need to moni-
tor the possible danger of the toxins moving up the food chain through the fish in the
river and the food crops cultivated in the region. No such evaluation had yet been
done.
All along, to reduce the high levels of air pollution, the policy of the regulatory
authorities had been to focus on the “major” polluters, which in their opinion were
the steel and power plants.  These plants have access to some of the best available
technologies for controlling their pollution. However, a study of the flow of coal gave
surprising results. Huge quantities of coal are consumed in millions of homes and in
the informal sector. In this sector, coal is used in very inefficient combustion systems,
obviously without any pollution control systems, which makes the whole area extre-
mely polluted. It was obvious that if the air had to be clean, a new fuel policy would
have to be evolved. Some new systems of transportation of coal also need to be evol-
ved to minimize the spillages during transportation, a major contributor to the dust
levels of the region.
This case highlight the importance of a quantitative study of the resource flows in
a region. Even a broad understanding of the “flow” of the resources serves as a guide
to the policy maker and gives a new perspective and a direction for policy planning.
The case also highlights another important issue. In developing countries, the con-
sumption of materials and the consequent dangers to health and environment from
the informal and domestic sectors could be very large as compared to those from the
formal industrial sector. It is just not enough to study the industrial sector. An Indus-
trial Ecology based system-level perspective is essential to identify the major flows of
materials  in a  region  for  planning  resource  optimization  and  for  solving  environ-
mental problems.
Case Study of a Corporate Paper–Sugar Complex
Industrial  Ecology  offers  the  possibility  of  an  alternative  corporate  planning
model. This is illustrated by the case of a paper company, Seshasayee Paper and Board
Ltd (SPB), in Tamil Nadu. SPB started a paper mill, which went into commercial pro-
duction in 1962. In order to ensure regular supply of raw material, a sugar mill was set
up. The waste from the sugar mill  (called bagasse)  was used as a raw material  for
papermaking. Another waste from the sugar mill, molasses, was used in a distillery
nearby for  the  production  of  ethyl  alcohol.  In  order  to  ensure  regular  supply  of
sugarcane for the sugar mill, the company took interest in the cultivation of sugarcane
by organizing the farmers in the region. The company struck long-term agreements
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with the farmers to buy back their produce and, in turn, took the responsibility of
supplying them with water. Much of the water supplied for cultivation was the treated
wastewater from the paper manufacturing operations. The company also used bagasse
pith (a waste after the paper making) and other combustible agricultural wastes in the
region, as an energy source in their captive power plant. The company had developed
an interesting complex of industries, which could be depicted as in Figure 6.
This case study is intended to highlight an alternative corporate planning model,
which is  compatible  with the  concepts  of  Industrial  Ecology.  Usually,  a  company
plans its growth within a product-market matrix. It tries to define its business as spe-
cifically as possible such that its energies in acquisition of capabilities and skills are
clearly focused. Many organizations would be reluctant to enter into areas unfamiliar
to them. Environmental issues are often seen as secondary to the main goals of the
company.
A model where a company sets up not one, but a complex of diverse industries,
where one industry uses the wastes of another, is a viable option for sustainable in-
dustrial growth in developing countries. The case of SPB also shows that there is a
high potential for Industrial Ecology in rural areas, where integrated agro-industrial
complexes can benefit the local community through efficient use of resources.
Conclusion
In addition to attempting better resource management, the relevance of Industrial
Ecology to governance in developing countries is important in two aspects.
• All along most policy making has often laid greater focus on the manufacturing
step, more specifically in the large organized industry. This is clearly not adequate.
A systemic approach such as Industrial Ecology takes into account the other sec-
Figure 6: The Paper-Sugar Complex Of Seshasayee Paper And Boards Limited, In-
dia
 458   Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference
tors of the socio economy, as well as consumption patterns and attempts a more
holistic solution
• In particular,  in developing countries,  where the “Large Formal Industry” con-
tributes to a very small part of the material flow through the system, it is impera-
tive to factor in the material flows in the massive “informal small sector”. The
RFA presented in this chapter provides one such format that could integrate such
material flows. 
The case studies presented illustrate this view.
In: Klaus Jacob, Manfred Binder and Anna Wieczorek (eds.). 2004. Governance for Industrial 
Transformation. Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change,
Environmental Policy Research Centre: Berlin. pp. 459 - 478 .
Section E: New Instruments
Assessing  the  Link  Between  Environmental
Management  Systems  and  the  Environmental
Performance of Companies: 
An Eco-Efficiency Approach
Julia Hertin, Frans Berkhout
SPRU – Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex, United Kingdom
Marcus Wagner, Daniel Tyteca
Université catholique de Louvain, Institut d'Administration et de Gestion, Belgium
1. Introduction
Policy  instruments  that  rely  on voluntarism,  learning  processes  and procedural
change, rather than direct regulatory control have in recent years come to play a more
prominent  role  in  the  environmental  policy  mix  of  many  industrialised  countries.
They have been promoted by those who maintain that traditional hierarchical regula-
tion is ill-equipped to promote environmental improvement and that environmental
policy should become more decentralised and based on shared responsibility. Critics,
on the other hand, are sceptical that soft instruments can deliver real environmental
improvements.
This chapter contributes to the debate on the impact of new environmental policy
instruments by presenting evidence on the effectiveness of one of the most promin-
ent of these instruments: environmental management systems (EMS). It draws on the
Measuring Environmental Performance of Industry (MEPI) project, which collected
and analysed environmental performance data for 280 companies and 430 production
sites in 5 manufacturing sectors in 6 EU countries.
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The first section discusses the rationale behind the increasing adoption of volun-
tary and procedurally-based instruments in general, and EMS in particular. We then
review existing empirical evidence regarding the link between EMS and environmental
performance, based on research carried out in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the UK
and Finland. The main part of the chapter presents the authors' own analysis. It is
based on data collected during the MEPI research project and uses three different
methods: 1) Statistical analysis on the firm-level (multiple regressions);  2) Statistical
analysis on the production site-level (simple regressions); and 3) Longitudinal analysis
on the production site-level. The final part draws conclusions about the potentials and
limits of environmental management systems, and briefly explores the wider implica-
tions  of  the analysis  for  the  role  of  soft  policy  instruments  in  the  environmental
policy mix.
2. Soft policy instruments and the EMS / performance link
Much has been written about a shift from traditional hierarchical regulation to-
wards a different set of instruments in environmental policy-making (Gunningham
and Grabosky 1998). The widely used term 'new instruments' includes a range of dif-
ferent  coordinating  and  steering  mechanisms  including  economic,  procedural,
information-based,  self-regulatory,  co-regulatory  and  voluntary  instruments.  They
have in common that they aim to achieve their objectives by means other than the
hierarchical prescription of legally-binding rules and standards which can be enforced
by public authorities.
Although it can be argued whether new policies complement or replace the 'com-
mand and control' approach, it is now widely accepted that the use of alternative in-
struments  is  indeed  increasing  in  many  countries  (Jordan  et  al  2003).  Looking
empirically at the factors that have led to the adoption of new environmental policy
instruments in eight industrialised countries, Jordan and colleagues (2003a: 202-205)
have identified a range of different drivers, some of which relate to changing ideas
and beliefs,  while others  stem from organisational,  political  and economic factors.
One of the key drivers is seen to be the assumption that new instruments are a more
effective way of achieving environmental improvements. 
Whether this assumption is borne out in reality has been widely discussed, espe-
cially  with regard  to  economic  instruments  (Tietenberg  1991;  Newell  et  al.  1999).
Here, we focus on a different range of policies that have been called 'soft instrument-
s'. This term describes instruments that aim to achieve environmental aims without
employing direct coercion through law, or induce change by altering relative prices.
They  include  voluntary,  procedural  and  information-based  policies.  Although  the
term ‘soft’ may appear vague, it accurately describes the main characteristics of these
policies: to attain environmental  policy objectives without introducing legal or eco-
nomic (i.e. ‘hard’) constraints. Prominent examples of soft policy instruments are en-
vironmental management systems, environmental product labelling, public disclosure
requirements, best practice dissemination, industry codes of practice, and voluntary
agreements1.  Although soft instruments do not impose legally binding standards of
environmental performance or behaviour, they do have in many cases a legal basis.
Why  should  we assume that  instruments  that  provide  information,  attempt  to
modify procedures and rely on the motivations of actors are more effective than leg-
ally-binding rules and regulations? Critics have often argued that the new emphasis on
soft instruments is not so much driven by changing ideas about governance, but have
emerged as an attempt to scale-back environmental policy in the face of global com-
petition, economic recession and powerful economic interest groups. We would not
1 Here, we understand voluntary agreements as those without legally-binding commitments,
sanctioning mechanisms and other enforcement procedures.
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dispute that actors who aim to prevent a strengthening of environmental policies have
often been supporters of soft instruments. However, soft instruments are based on a
specific  rationale  and on a distinct  model  of  behaviour  and decision-making  with
regard to the environment.
The intellectual basis of soft instruments is provided by a wide range of recent the-
ories in the social sciences that can be described as cognitive approaches (for example
Schön 1983; Dryzek 1987; Fischer 1995; Weick 1996). Cognitive approaches argue
that the behaviour of actors is to a large degree determined by their subjective inter-
pretation  of  reality,  rather  than  being  the  outcome  of  'objective'  and  rationally-
determined interests.  It follows that any attempt to change behaviour needs to be
based on an understanding of the frames of interpretation, discourses and knowledge
sets which influence how these actors make sense of their world and action within it,
and how they respond to changes in interpretive frames, discourses and so on. More
specifically, soft instruments are based on the assumption that polluting behaviour is
(at least in part) the result of institutionally-situated perceptions of reality (or ignor-
ance about the state of things). Interpretive frames that stand in the way of environ-
mentally beneficial decisions could be, for example, the assumption that reducing en-
vironmental damage is always associated with costs, that companies do not have any
environmental  responsibilities  beyond legal  compliance,  or  that  environmental  re-
sources are free goods.
Closely related to the first, a second assumption is that by changing the sense-mak-
ing of individuals and organisations, it is possible to change the attitudes and beha-
viours of those individuals and organisations – which, in turn, will ultimately have an
impact  on  the  environmental  impacts  of  behaviours.  This  could  be  achieved  by
providing  information  (for  example  about  environmental  costs  or  best  practice),
through more subtle and long-term processes of learning and capacity-building,  or
through processes of awareness-raising about the liabilities and responsibilities of the
polluter.
A third, more implicit, assumption is that 'hard' barriers should not stand in the
way of the behavioural changes induced by a policy instrument. There appears to be a
strong link with the Porter hypothesis that equates pollution with both environmental
and economic inefficiency, and asserts that business has large potentials for cost-ef-
fective environmental measures. In this view, the well-established fact that organisa-
tions do not always exploit win-win potentials (e.g. Sorrell et al 2002) results from im-
perfect information, cognitive limits and inappropriate organisational structures with-
in firms (Porter and van der Linde 1995: 131).
By encouraging organisational change, EMS are thought to have a direct impact on
environmental performance. For instance, the preamble to the EMAS (Eco-Manage-
ment and Audit Scheme) regulation of the European Union states:
“The objective of EMAS shall be to promote continual improvements in the en-
vironmental performance of organisations” (EMAS regulation, Art 1.2)
These improvements in performance are to be achieved through the imposition of
management  controls.  However,  this  link  between  management  and  performance
cannot be taken for granted. Research has documented that improving environmental
performance is not usually the principal motive in a company's decision to adopt an
EMS. A business survey carried out amongst Swiss firms identified 14 reasons for im-
plementing an EMS which were considered to be ‘very important’ or ‘quite important’
by at least half of the 158 respondents (Hamschmidt 2000). The benefits included in
this list ranged from ‘strengthening innovation’ and ‘customer loyalty’ to ‘prevention
of new environmental legislation’, with 'enhancement of corporate public image' rank-
ing highest.  Only three of the 14 had a direct relationship with performance ('risk
minimisation', 'certainty of legal compliance' and 'support of ecological transformation
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of the line of business'), and they were ranked at positions 4, 9 and 12 (Hamschmidt
2000: 4).
3. EMS and environmental performance: Evidence from other studies
Studying the effectiveness of EMS
Since the European and international environmental management standards were
introduced in the mid 1990s, it is estimated that approximately 63,500 companies and
production sites have adopted a certified or registered EMS2 worldwide, and many
more systems not audited by third parties exist. The fact that there is substantial ex-
perience with environmental management in companies has triggered a large number
of research projects, evaluations, dissertations and doctoral theses into the effects of
EMS. It is surprising that despite the recent growth of this literature (for recent re-
views see for example Dyllick and Hamschmidt 1999; Steger 2000; Ammenberg 2001;
Ankele et al 2002), empirical evidence about the environmental effectiveness of EMS
is still sparse. One of the reasons is that many studies have focused on the direct eco-
nomic costs and benefits associated with EMS. Economic benefits, are not, however,
a  reliable  indicator  of  environmental  effectiveness  because  savings  can  be  made
without reducing pollution. For example, a company can save costs by organising en-
vironmental responsibilities better or by identifying cheaper methods of waste dispos-
al. Conversely, the adoption of an EMS may lead to unanticipated and costly pollution
abating measures. For example if the use of an EMS revealed that the firm was in
breach of regulation, investment in abatement technology might be obligatory.
Even those researchers who have attempted to assess the link between EMS and
environmental performance have rarely been able to make valid statements about the
overall environmental effectiveness of EMS. Several reasons may be given for this ap-
parent anomaly. Of greatest importance, many studies suffer from a shortage of en-
vironmental  performance  data.  In  most  countries,  environmental  reporting  is  not
mandatory and most companies prefer not to publish quantitative performance data.
ISO 14001 does not require disclosure  of environmental information.  Even where
data on emissions, materials use or non-compliance incidents are provided in environ-
mental reports or EMAS site statements, it is rarely presented in a comparable format.
Despite the activity of organisations such as the Global Reporting Initiative, there is
no standard approach to environmental reporting and measurement. Public emissions
registers exist only in a few countries such as Britain, the United States and the Neth-
erlands, and the quality and usability of the data in these registers varies. With data be-
ing sparse and from heterogeneous sources, only a few research projects have had the
capacity to carry out the costly and time-consuming data work necessary to conduct
comprehensive  studies  of  the  environmental  performance  consequences  of  EMS.
Most studies only look at a very small number of companies and rely on data gener-
ated through companies’ self-assessment due to the absence of verified performance
information.
The quantitative analysis of environmental performance of companies also poses a
series of conceptual and methodological challenges. First, environmental performance
is a complex and multi-dimensional issue. There is no universally accepted approach
to the inherently subjective task of weighing different environmental impacts against
each other. Any overall assessment or ranking based on a judgement of how green-
2 There are around 3,500 EMAS registrations in the EU and more than 60,000 ISO 14001
certifications  world  wide.  Data  source:  EMAS  website
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/emas) [page accessed 20 June 2004] and ISO
World  /  Umweltbundesamt  (http://www.ecology.or.jp/isoworld/english/analy14k.htm)
[page accessed 20 June 2004].
Hertin/Berkhout/Wagner/Tyteca   463
house gas emissions compare to chemical spills or special waste will produce highly
contested  results.  It  is  also  debatable  whether  the  fact  that  companies  operate  in
different natural environments should be taken into account when considering pol-
lution that has local impacts. Second, companies carry out distinct business activities
under different economic, technological and regulatory conditions. Some businesses
will always find it more difficult  to improve their environmental performance than
others, even if they operate in the same sector. For example, it may be that the specif-
ic demands placed on a company by its customers prevent the adoption of a cleaner
technology. Third, it is difficult to decide where the system boundaries should be set
with regard to environmental performance. Are companies only responsible for dam-
age caused by operations within the firm gates or should issues such as the supply of
raw materials and components, transportation to and from the company, product use
and disposal be included in the assessment of environmental performance?
Given these difficulties in establishing a robust framework for performance evalu-
ation, most studies have used proxies that can be measured through postal or tele-
phone surveys, for example satisfaction with the EMS, perceived environmental bene-
fits, or types of measures put in place. Although this is a justifiable response to the
challenges outlined above, the reliance on ‘effort indicators’ and self-assessment limits
the validity of the findings.  It is important to recognise that conclusions are often
based on the (empirically informed) judgement of researchers and their interviewees
rather than on quantitative evidence. In the remainder of this section, we summarise
the results of some of the larger and more performance-oriented studies (see Table 1).
Results from key studies
There  is  a  surprising  consistency  in  the  broad  direction  of  the  findings,  even
though some studies (such as UNI/ASU 1997; Kuisma et al 2001) adopt a generally
more optimistic  tone than others (for example FEU 1998; Jäger et al 1998; Steger
2000; Wagner 2002). In general, researchers found that a majority of respondents re-
ported a moderate level of environmental effectiveness stemming from EMS adop-
tion,  although  a  considerable  variability  between  companies  was  also  observed
(UNI/ASU 1997; Steinle and Baumast 1997; Kuisma et al 2001). For example, 60%
of  firms  surveyed  by  a  study  in  Switzerland  perceived  small  improvements,  10%
thought that  their EMS had led to large environmental improvements,  and the re-
maining 30% experienced deterioration or were unable to make a judgement (Ham-
schmidt 2000). When measured in economic terms, the short-term benefits (e.g. due
to lower water and energy bills) were often thought to be of a scale comparable to the
costs of adopting the EMS. An overall link between profitability and EMS presence
has not been found in a large sample of German manufacturing firms (Wagner 2002).
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EMS appears to be related to improvements in the traditional areas of environ-
mental management. Empirical studies of EMS in operation show that most compan-
ies focus on on-site production efficiency. The most significant improvements appear
to have been made in the areas of waste management, energy use and water consump-
tion (UNI/ASU 1997; Kuisma 2001; Steinle and Baumast 1997; Dyllick and Ham-
schmidt 1999). Interestingly, all of these are areas in which direct cost savings can be
made because the environmental goods involved have to be purchased.
There is widespread agreement that EMS have largely failed to broaden the scope
of corporate environmental management because they do not systematically address
environmental concerns outside the factory gate, for example transport and logistics,
sourcing of raw materials and other inputs, product design and end-of-life considera-
tions (cf Steger 2000; Hamschmidt 2000; Kuisma et al 2001; Jäger et al 1998; Ankele
et al 2002). There were also few indications that EMS has driven continuous environ-
mental improvement (Jäger et al 1998; Steger 2000).
There is mixed evidence regarding the effect of EMS on legal compliance with en-
vironmental regulation. Steger (2000) and Jäger et al (1998) conclude that EMS do
support compliance. Steger points out, however, that it is difficult to determine the
actual environmental effects of better compliance because non-compliance is often
concerned with formal infringements rather than material breaches. In contrast, Dahl-
ström et al’s (2003) study was unable to confirm this link. The study - which is one of
the few analyses that draw on a comprehensive set of independent performance as-
sessments - found that EMS sites have a better procedural performance (as assessed
by the regulator) but did not find a significant correlation between EMS and the likeli-
hood of incidents, complaints and non-compliance events.
There are also doubts about whether EMS represent an autonomous driver of per-
formance improvements. In Steger's  study (2000),  most respondents held the view
that  the  environmental  objectives  of  the  company  could  also  have  been  attained
without an EMS. Hamschmidt (2000) reports that while most would agree that an
EMS had some influence on environmental performance, only a few saw it as a key
factor. EMS do not appear to lead to fundamentally different environmental object-
ives and strategies, but promote streamlining of existing environmental responsibilit-
Table 1: Key studies on the environmental effectiveness of EMS
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ies. Interestingly,  external stakeholders tended to have a more positive view of the
costs and benefits than companies themselves (Steger 2000).
4. Analysing the link between EMS and organisational environmental perform-
ance
The MEPI approach
The following analysis reports research carried out in the context of the Measuring
Environmental  Performance  of  Industry  (MEPI)  study  (cf  Berkhout  et  al  2001;
Tyteca et al 2001) in which the authors were investigators. The MEPI project opera-
tionalised performance as the environmental efficiency of the production process: the
level of input of energy and materials and the level of output of waste and pollution per unit of product
output. Where there was insufficient data on production output, environmental indicat-
ors  were  normalised  on turnover or number of employees.  All inputs and outputs
were measured in physical terms such as weight or volume (with the exception of
some sectors  where product  output was  captured as monetary value).  The project
covered six industrial sectors (electricity generation, pulp and paper, fertilisers, textile
finishing, book and magazine printing, and computer manufacture) and six European
countries (Austria,  Germany, Italy,  Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK). Within
this limited scope, the project team aimed to collect data on environmental perform-
ance for as many companies and production sites as possible.  Data were collected
from four  sources:  corporate  environmental  reports;  national  pollution inventories
(UK and Netherlands);  EMAS statements;  and completed surveys  in the fertiliser,
printing and textile sectors. We estimate that for the more concentrated sectors (pa-
per, electricity and fertilisers) the MEPI data set covers between 50 and 80 % of pro-
duction in the six countries (see table 2).
While the database with more than 15,000 performance data points for 274 firms
and around 400 production sites provides a valuable research resource, it also has a
number of limitations:
• The data set is incomplete, with many missing values. On average, only 28% of the
performance indicators for which we collected data were  available for a given firm
or site in a given year. Principal component analysis (PCA) was carried out to es-
tablish that environmental performance could adequately be reflected by a subset
of all indicators. For example, CO2 emissions were found to be indicative of all air
emissions in the electricity sector (cf Berkhout et al 2001). This enabled us to re-
strict  the analysis  to a smaller  number  of indicators  for  which data were more
complete and to reduce the need to aggregate indicators.
Table 2: Number of firms for which data was collected (by sector and country)
Country Computer Electricity Fertilisers Paper Printing Textile All
Austria 0 9 0 8 2 1 20
Belgium n.a. 2 4 4 4 5 19
Germany 5 27 2 43 33 13 123
Italy 4 6 7 10 5 11 43
Netherlands 0 4 7 17 0 14 42
United Kingdom 0 10 6 8 2 1 27
All countries 9 58 26 90 46 45 274
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• A number of sectors consist of a heterogeneous set of firms, which have structur-
ally  different  environmental  profile  because  they  produce  different  products
and/or use different technologies. Some - but not all - of these differences have
been captured through the analysis of sub-sectors.
• A significant share of the data has undergone little or no third party validation.
• In some sectors, the sample of firms is assumed to over-represent large companies
and good performers, since we expect that these would have a higher propensity
to publish data and reports.
In the remainder of the section, we report three ways in which the link between
EMS and  environmental  performance  was  analysed.  Throughout  the  analysis,  the
'presence of an EMS' was operationalised as the presence of a management system
that is certified to an internationally-recognised standard (ISO 14001 or EMAS).  A
company was counted as being EMAS certified if all its sites had adopted this stand-
ard. The link between EMS and environmental performance was investigated through
examination of three hypotheses:
Hypothesis  1:  Firms with an EMS have a better  environmental  performance
than those without
In a first step, we aimed to establish whether companies with a certified EMS per-
formed better than those without. Analysing every sector individually, we established
significant differences between individual normalised performance levels achieved by
EMS firms and those displayed by non-EMS firms based on non-parametric analysis.
The analysis used those indicators that were identified as being most suitable during
the PCA. Non-parametric tests were chosen since they do not assume a normal distri-
bution of the variable analysed. Given that some environmental performance indicat-
ors had very skewed distributions, it would have been inappropriate to utilise para-
metric methods, since this may have introduced distortions in the results (e.g. para-
metric tests may distort significance levels). Missing values for any of the indicators
are treated on a case-by-case basis  (pairwise exclusion),  i.e. if  for a case data were
missing on a specific indicator, this firm was then excluded in the testing for only this
variable, but was included in the testing for other indicators where data were available
for this case/firm. Due to the large number of missing variables, the analysis did not
control for any firm characteristics other than industrial sector. The results of examin-
ing Hypothesis 1 can be summarised as follows:
Fertilisers
Non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests for significant differences between compan-
ies that were ISO 14001 or EMAS certified and companies that were neither were ap-
plied to the six relevant indicators identified in the PCA (NOx, VOC emissions, Haz-
ardous and municipal waste arisings, total water and energy use).  The results reveal
three significant links to environmental performance:
• ISO 14001 and EMAS certified companies tended to have lower NOx emissions per
total sales than non-ISO 14001/EMAS firms (U=2, W=5, Z=1.78, 0.10 level (2-
tailed), df=14 for EMAS and ISO, since the same firms are concerned).
• ISO  14001  and  EMAS  certified  companies  have  significantly higher hazardous
waste levels per total sales (U=0, W=21, Z=-2.0, 0.05 level (2-tailed), df=9, again
firms for EMAS and ISO are identical) and VOC emissions per total sales (U=0,
W=21, Z=-2.0, 0.05 level (2-tailed), df=9) than non-ISO/EMAS firms.
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Electricity
Using the Mann-Whitney test, none of the thirteen environmental performance in-
dicators tested (solid waste,  municipal waste,  recycled waste, CO2,  NOx,  SO2,  dust,
coal input, gas input, oil input, renewable fuel input, total fuel input) showed signific-
ant differences for the EMAS units (no ISO14001 certified units were available at the
firm level).
Pulp and paper
Two of the nine performance indicators (water input, energy input, solid waste,
hazardous waste, CO2 emissions, chemical oxygen demand, SO2 emissions, nitrogen
and phosphorous) identified in the PCAs showed significant differences depending
on whether a firm was verified according to EMAS / certified to ISO14001 or not. In
particular, it was found that: 
• EMAS certified companies tended to have lower COD emissions per tonne of pa-
per  than  non-EMAS  firms  (U=127,  W=155,  Z=-2.463,  0.05  level  (2-tailed),
df=91), as did ISO 14001 certified companies (U=266, W=344, Z=-2.481, 0.05
level (2-tailed), df=93) compared to non-ISO firms.
• EMAS certified firms were found to have significantly higher total energy inputs
per  tonne of  paper (U=1, W=596,  Z=-4.754,  0.01 level  (2-tailed),  df=37)  than
non-EMAS firms  and the same was  found for  ISO 14001 certified  companies
which  also  had  significantly higher energy  inputs  per  tonne  of  paper  (U=18,
W=579, Z=-3.761, 0.01 level (2-tailed), df=37) than non-ISO firms.
The major reason for the coincidence of EMAS and ISO findings is (as was for
the fertilizer sector) that there is a strong correlation between EMAS verification and
ISO certification, i.e. most firms certified to ISO are also verified under EMAS.
For the paper sector therefore, the link between EMS and performance is also am-
bivalent, with the majority of indicators not showing any significant differences. 
Textile finishing
For  this  sector,  only data on EMAS could be analysed,  since no ISO-certified
firms were in the data set. For EMAS, no significant differences were found for any
of the 11 different environmental performance variables identified in the PCAs.
Printing
Only three of the 9 performance indicators tested showed a significant association
with EMAS and ISO14001 in the non-parametric tests applied to the data:
• EMAS/ISO-certified firms (being in this case identical for both EMSs) have signi-
ficantly  lower  sulphur  dioxide emissions  per  employee (U=10, W=25, Z=1.839,
0.10 level (2-tailed), df=16).
• ISO/EMAS firms tended to have lower total water input per employee than non-
certified firms (ISO: U=96, W=162, Z=-2,131, 0.05 level (2-tailed), df=43; EMAS
(at slightly lower levels of significance): U=102, W=147, Z=-1.425, 0.10 level (1-
tailed, 2-tailed test statistically not significant, 2 firms which are ISO-certified are
not verified according to EMAS), df=43).
• ISO-certified  firms tended to have  higher total  energy  input  per  employee than
non-certified firms (U=71, W=116, Z=2.043, 0.05 level (2-tailed), df=39). A simil-
ar  finding,  though not  at  such  high  significance  was  made for  EMAS (U=73,
W=101, Z=-1.337, 0.10 level (1-tailed, 2-tailed test not significant), df=39).
Table 3 summarises the results of testing Hypothesis 1.
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Overall, three conclusions can be drawn. First, the tests show that, in the large ma-
jority  of  cases,  companies  with an EMS did not  perform significantly  better  than
those without. In particular, significant differences could be identified for the envir-
onmental performance variables analysed in only three of the five sectors analysed.
Second, in those sectors where significant differences were found, there were as
many instances in which EMS firms were significantly more eco-efficient as non-EMS
firms. In each sector where significant differences existed, results were found pointing
in both directions i.e. pro and contra EMS firms. Thirdly, no real differences could be
identified between companies with EMAS or ISO systems. This is mainly because
largely the same firms were verified under EMAS and certified to ISO 14001.
Overall, the few and, to some extent ambiguous, differences suggest that EMS are
not the only powerful driver of corporate environmental performance. However, al-
ternative explanations are also possible:
• The methods adopted to operationalise both the presence of an EMS and environ-
mental performance may not be sufficiently  precise and nuanced to capture an
EMS-effect.
• An EMS-effect may have been disguised by the stronger influence of other explan-
atory variables some of which have been captured in the data (e.g. country, sub-
sector, company size), while others have not (e.g. technologies, market conditions,
management culture).
• It may be argued that poorly-performing firms tend to adopt EMS because they
feel the need to address the issue or to signal commitment. In this case, the lack of
significant differences could be due to a lower performance baseline, rather than
the ineffectiveness of EMS.
• Conversely, it may be that the majority of companies without registered/certified
EMS, have some form of internal EMS and that what is being measured in this
analysis is the increment of performance change achieved through involvement of
a standard management system and third-party verification.
While these and other explanations cannot be dismissed, it should be noted that
the lack of significant links between EMS and performance contrasts with other hy-
potheses tested where significant associations were found more consistently (for ex-
ample between EMS and company size, EMS and profitability).
Table 3: Overview of results at the firm level
Industry
sector
Variable Performance  level  for
firms  with  certified
EMS
Significance level
Fertilisers NOx per unit of sales





Pulp/Paper COD per tonne of paper 





Printing SO2 per employee
Energy input per tonne of paper
lower (with EMAS/ISO)
higher (with EMAS/ISO)





No significant differences identified
Electricity No significant differences identified
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Hypothesis 2: Sites with an EMS have a better environmental performance than
those without
In a second step, we aimed to establish whether production sites with a certified
EMS performed better than those without. Again, we analysed every sector individu-
ally  and focused on core indicators identified through the PCA. Compared to the
firm-level tests, the analysis was refined in two ways. First, different years were ana-
lysed individually. Second, the analysis was largely based on rankings derived from an
aggregation of indicators  based on the model of Jaggi and Freedman (1992). Three
different Jaggi/Freedman ranking methods were tested and compared. Because this
approach required a more comprehensive data set,  the sub-set of the data with the
most consistent  coverage was used (i.e. electricity and paper sectors, 1995 to 1997
data). Rankings were constructed on the basis of CO2, SO2, and NOx  (electricity) and
NOx, water use and Chemical Oxygen Demand discharge (paper).
As with the firm-level analysis, some correlations between EMS and performance
were found, but in general correlations were weak, sometimes ambiguous and usually
not statistically significant. The results can be summarised as follows:
Electricity
In both 1996 (see figure 1) and 1997 (similar result),  sites with ISO 14001 per-
formed worse across the basket of indicators than those without. Sites with EMAS
performed slightly better than non-EMAS sites in 1997, but for 1996 data no effect
could be detected. None of the results was statistically significant.
Paper
The analysis in the paper sector produced only one significant result:  sites with
both ISO and EMAS had lower COD emissions (1996 and 1997) than those without
(see figure 2). 
Overall,  only a few tentative correlations  between EMS adoption and environ-
mental performance were found at the site-level. This gives additional weight to the
firm-level results, particularly because the object of analysis is defined more precisely.




















ISO14001 (electricity, 1996) EMAS (electricity, 1997)
Relationship between ISO14001 and JF rank-
ing ("-1" = site ISO certified, "0" = site not
ISO certified)
Relationship EMAS and JF ranking ("-1" =
site EMAS certified, "0" = site not EMAS
certified)
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Hypothesis  3:  Sites  improve their  environmental  performance trend after  ad-
opting an EMS
In the final test, the performance of production sites over time was assessed to
test the hypothesis that the adoption of an EMS had a positive impact on perform-
ance trends. The analysis was based on all performance time series of three or more
years where a certified EMS was introduced during that period (but not in the first or
last year of the series). We then established the trend before and after the adoption of
the EMS over all available years3 using a 'least square' method and calculated the differ-
ence between both trends (figure 3). The data-base contained 165 of these perform-
ance time series related to 24 different production sites in four sectors (that is, each
site was represented by an average of seven performance indicators).
It should be noted that this analysis does not explore whether sites improved their
performance during the observed period, but whether EMS adoption resulted in a rel-
ative change of trend in performance. In this sense, an EMS is also seen to be effect-
ive if it lowers the rate at which the performance worsens. If the adoption of an EMS
did not contribute to an improvement of the performance trend, we would expect an
equal distribution between improving and worsening trends.
3  The year of EMS adoption is included as endpoint in the trend 'before adoption' and as
starting point in the 'trend after adoption'.
Figure 2: EMS effect on the site-level (paper)










Influence of  ISO and EMAS certification on COD
("0" = site not certified, "-1" = site certified)
Figure 3: Example of
performance trend series (EMS
adopted in year 2)
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When analysing the trend of all indicators individually, we found that in 98 cases
(59%) the performance trend improved after EMS adoption, while in 67 cases (41%)
the trend worsened (figure 4). This means that on average the adoption of an EMS
appears to have had an impact on a minority of all performance measures. Further
analysis generated several other findings:
• There was a high variability between sectors, with only the paper sector showing a
strong EMS effect.
• There was no clear difference between the effects of EMAS and ISO14001.
• There was no strong difference between environmental indicators where the level
of performance is directly related to economic costs (e.g. hazardous waste, energy
use) and those where cost was not a factor (noise, most air and water emissions).
When the data was aggregated by production site, a similar picture emerged (table
4). Out of 24 sites, 10 (42%) saw a trend improvement on most indicators in the years
after EMS adoption,  while 7 (29%) saw more declining than improving indicators.
Another 7 (29%) production sites displayed an equal number of improving and de-
clining trends (see table 4).
Overall, the analysis confirms the previous finding that the link between EMS and
performance is weak as was also found by Wagner (2002) for energy efficiency as one
component of environmental performance. That the third test has not identified a
stronger effect is surprising. The longitudinal approach is a more targeted method of
Table 4: Results of performance trend analysis aggregated by site
Result of performance trend analysis
aggregated by production site 
Production sites where: No of sites Share of sites
- the trend of most indicators improved
after EMS adoption
10 42%
- the trend of most indicators declined
after EMS adoption
7 29%
- there was a balance between improv-
ing and declining trends
7 29%
Total 24 100%
Figure 4: Change of performance trend after EMS adoption (by sector)
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evaluating the 'EMS hypothesis' because it reduces the potential impact of intervening
variables and should make actual performance effects visible.
5. Conclusions: The EMS / performance link
The results of the analysis presented here can be summarized as follows:
1. There is little evidence to suggest that companies or production sites that have ad-
opted a  certified  EMS perform significantly  and  consistently  better  than  those
without.  This  finding  can,  however,  be  explained  by  different  substantial  and
methodological factors and does not in itself disprove the EMS hypothesis. Pos-
sible explanations for this finding are
- EMS are not a strong driver of environmental performance improvement.
- EMS are a driver of environmental improvement, but this effect is concealed by
other stronger determinants of environmental performance.
- The limits of data availability do not allow an analysis sufficiently precise and nu-
anced to distinguish the effect of EMS on environmental performance.
2. There is certain evidence that the adoption of EMS has a positive impact on the
performance trend across a minority of indicators. This finding appears to have special
significance because performance time-series capture large-scale emissions, waste
and resource use trends of industrial installations which are important in their own
right. However, there are again more than one possible explanation for this find-
ing:
-  EMS  are  not  a  consistently  strong  driver  of  environmental  performance
improvement.
- EMS are a driver of environmental performance improvement, but the areas of
improvement lie outside the performance dimensions captured by MEPI eco-effi-
ciency indicators (e.g. logistics, product performance, business travel).
- EMS are a driver of environmental performance improvement, but the effect is
not sufficiently large to outweigh other factors which determine year-on-year vari-
ations (e.g. plant utilisation, product specification, investment cycle).
In our view it is unlikely that the analysis presented here has failed to detect a
strong  EMS / performance  link  merely  because  environmental  improvements  oc-
curred in areas other than the environmental efficiency of production. Qualitative re-
search reported in section 3 found that EMS have not usually broadened the scope of
environmental management to include impacts outside the factory gate. This suggests
that  if  an  EMS  /  performance  link  exists,  it  would  be  found  in  the  functions
examined  in  the  MEPI  study.  A  more  plausible  interpretation  is  that  EMS have
proven only a relatively weak driver of environmental performance. In particular, the
result of the longitudinal analysis that the trend in performance frequently worsened
after the adoption of an EMS can only reasonably be explained through the presence
of other influencing factors.
What could be the reasons for the limited environmental effectiveness of EMS?
Our analysis does not provide a positive explanation of these findings. Interpreting
the results in the light of previous research into EMS, we would like to propose a
number of possible explanations. First, the results could be seen to confirm the view
of other evaluation studies that EMS are a tool for performance improvement, rather
than being a driver of change. Put differently, EMS may in fact be a necessary, rather
than a sufficient  condition for successful  efforts  to reduce resource use and emis-
sions. Taken together with Hamschmidt's (2000) result that environmental perform-
ance is not usually the main motive for companies to adopt an EMS, a weak EMS /
performance link becomes a plausible result.
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Second, the modest effectiveness of EMS could also be due to shortcomings in
the implementation and enforcement of current  procedures rather than implying a
fundamental criticism of EMS. A number of studies have shown that the outcome of
EMS depends strongly on the way in which they are put into practice. Current envir-
onmental management standards are believed to encourage companies to implement
EMS in a formalistic and procedural way (Dyllick and Hamschmidt 1999). Third, it is
also possible that there is a time lag between EMS adoption and performance im-
provement because companies need time to adjust to newly-introduced routines and
procedures. The effect of a 'learning lag' is well known in the literature on the rela-
tionship between innovation and productivity, which finds that companies suffer pro-
ductivity losses during the period immediately after the introduction of an innovation
(Conceição et al 2003). The MEPI performance time-series are not sufficiently long to
test this hypothesis. It is also possible that improvements are made only under certain
circumstances, for example in sectors with short investment cycles, or in countries
with less stringent regulations and enforcement. The MEPI analysis did not collect
data that would allow identification of those conditions under which EMS tend to
have an impact on performance. 
Fourth, procedural improvements made through the introduction of an EMS may
not lead to environmental improvement because of cost barriers. Although EMS have
been  found  to  help  companies  to  identify  cost-effective  environmental  measures
(Steger 2000), the results  from this study suggest that the effect of these measures
could be small when compared to the overall environmental impact of the company.
It remains an open question, whether this is due to shortcomings of the EMS tool
(e.g. focus on ability to manage current processes rather than improving the innovat-
ive capacity),  or  whether  it  implies  a  more  sober  view with  regard  to  the  overall
potential for win-win solutions. 
Given the uncertainty about how the results can be explained, policy recommenda-
tions need to be made with care. We do not believe it would be appropriate on the
basis of this analysis to conclude either that EMS are ineffective, or that that policy
support for EMS should be withdrawn. Any conclusion about the link between EMS
and environmental  performance  is  necessarily  preliminary,  because  more  compre-
hensive data are needed and long-term effects have not yet been studied. Moreover,
EMS may have benefits other than environmental performance - for example in terms
of regulatory certainty,  internal and external  communication or awareness raising -
that may justify policies encouraging their diffusion.
The weak link between EMS and performance is, however, a matter of concern if
EMS are envisaged as serving as a substitute for  other policy instruments. Scaling-
back  regulation  or  environmental  taxes  for  firms  with EMS (often  referred  to  as
‘regulatory relief’) is practiced or under consideration in many European countries, for
example in the form of fewer inspections by regulators,  reduced rates for plant li-
cences, or exemptions from environmental charges (Wätzold et al 2001; Dahlström et
al 2003). On the basis of the research presented, we would argue that there is cur-
rently no evidence to suggest that EMS have a consistent and significant positive impact
on environmental performance. Any substantial regulatory relief based on the simple
assumption that companies with an EMS perform better than those without would
therefore be inappropriate. 
More broadly, the findings of this study contribute to the broader debate about
the effectiveness of soft policy instruments. We would share the view that there is a
strong cognitive element in environmental decision-making in firms. The question is,
however, whether procedural and information-based instruments with a very low de-
gree of intervention will be able to change interpretive frames and provide the know-
ledge required to bring about innovation in organisations that leads to observable en-
vironmental outcomes.
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CO2 emissions per FU 39.00 42.00 -0.887 0.417 0.208
NOx emissions per FU 30.00 33.00 -1.307 0.225 0.112NOx per total sales 2.00 5.00 -1.776 0.103 0.051
SO2 emissions per FU 39.00 42.00 -1.022 0.347 0.173VOC per total sales 0.00 21.00 -2.000 0.071 0.036
Dust emissions per FU 18.00 21.00 -0.120 0.943 0.471
Total solid waste per FU 24.00 27.00 -1.188 0.276 0.138Hazardous waste per total sales 0.00 21.00 -2.000 0.071 0.036
Municipal waste per FU 21.00 1149.00 -0.180 0.917 0.458Municipal waste per total sales 0.00 10.00 -1.852 0.133 0.067
Recycled waste per FU 21.00 924.00 0.000 1.000 0.512Total water per total sales 20.00 23.00 -0.301 0.807 0.403
Coal input per FU 21.00 1452.00 -0.367 0.833 0.407
Total fuel input per FU 1.00 2.00 -0.878 0.667 0.333
Gas input per FU 20.00 21.00 -0.464 0.750 0.375
Total oil input per FU 24.00 25.00 -0.160 0.926 0.463
Renewables input per FU 0.00 1.00 -1.464 0.333 0.167
Total energy input per FU 0.00 1.00 -1.342 0.500 0.250Total energy per total sales 9.000 12.000 -1.256 0.260 0.130
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Table A.2: Test Statistics for EMS effects in the Paper Sector (Exact Tests; ISO & EMAS separate; FU: Functional Unit, here: tonne
of paper produced)
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CO2 per FU 132.00 1167.00 -0.088 0.943 0.472 CO2 per FU 175.00 211.00 -0.124 0.913 0.456
SO2 per FU 37.00 47.00 -0.822 0.444 0.222 SO2 per FU 27.00 37.00 -1.455 0.160 0.080
Total solid waste
per FU
63.00 1009.00 -0.067 0.967 0.483 Total solid
waste per FU
120.00 148.00 -0.505 0.632 0.316
Recycled waste per
FU
97.00 107.00 -0.808 0.441 0.220 Recycled
waste per FU
150.00 178.00 -1.282 0.208 0.104
COD per FU 127.00 155.00 -2.463 0.012 0.006 COD per FU 266.00 344.00 -2.481 0.012 0.006
Nitrogen per FU 44.00 47.00 -0.954 0.381 0.191 Nitrogen per
FU
189.00 217.00 -0.992 0.332 0.166
Phosphorus per FU 22.00 25.00 -1.185 0.278 0.139 Phosphorus
per FU
60.00 70.00 -1.044 0.318 0.159
Total energy input
per FU
1.00 596.00 -4.754 0.003 0.003 Total energy
input per FU
18.00 579.00 -3.761 0.009 0.009
Total water input
per FU
443.00 498.00 -0.136 0.898 0.449 Total water
input per FU
579.00 684.00 -0.486 0.634 0.317
























CO2 per FU 35.00 56.00 -1.121 0.280 0.139COD per FU 76.00 427.00 -0.09
7
0.944 0.472





VOC per FU 5.00 6.00 -0.543 0.750 0.375
Recycled  waste  per
FU
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4.00 7.00 -1.461 0.198 0.099 Carbon dioxide per
employee
5.00 6.00 -0.372 0.857 0.429
Sulphur dioxide per
employee
10.00 25.00 -1.839 0.071 0.034 Sulphur  dioxide
per employee
10.00 25.00 -1.839 0.071 0.034
Total  waste  per
employee
73.00 508.00 -1.139 0.267 0.133 Total  waste  per
employee
63.00 498.00 -1.539 0.129 0.064
Hazardous  waste
per employee
42.00 252.00 -0.543 0.621 0.311 Hazardous  waste
per employee
55.00 245.00 -0.127 0.926 0.463
Total ink input per
employee
186.00 252.00 -0.779 0.445 0.223 Total ink input per
employee
179.00 245.00 -0.939 0.356 0.178
Isopropyl  alcohol
input per employee
11.00 336.00 -0.200 0.923 0.462 Isopropyl  alcohol
input per employee
33.00 39.00 -0.121 0.928 0.464
Total fuel input per
employee
105.00 633.00 -0.256 0.812 0.406 Total fuel input per
employee
121.00 166.00 -0.467 0.654 0.327
Total  energy  input
per employee
73.00 101.00 -1.337 0.190 0.096 Total  energy  input
per employee
71.00 116.00 -2.043 0.041 0.021
Total  water  input
per employee
102.00 147.00 -1.425 0.161 0.081 Total  water  input
per employee
96.00 162.00 -2.131 0.033 0.016
In: Klaus Jacob, Manfred Binder and Anna Wieczorek (eds.). 2004. Governance for Industrial 
Transformation. Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change,
Environmental Policy Research Centre: Berlin. pp. 479 - 490 .
Coherence in Industrial Transformation 
Erik Hagelskjær Lauridsen, Ulrik Jørgensen
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University of Denmark, Denmark
Introduction
The most recent element on the South East Asian environmental agenda is the
ISO series of international environmental management standards, i.e. the ISO 14000
series. These have recently been appropriated to use in a.o. the newly industrialized
Thailand, but it is still an open question wither these will be able to function in a
comparative way to the European situation. In the European context the ISO 14000
series  standards  have  to  some  extent  promoted  a  situation  of  industrial  self
governance  by  functioning  as  a  platform for  integrating  enforcement  control  and
environmental  housekeeping  concerns,  as  well  as  being  a  tool  that  brings
environmental  concerns  to  the  level  of  the  top  management  as  it  provides  a
framework for integrating environmental considerations into the business activities of
the company as a permanent concern of the company management. In this manner
the  environmental  management  systems  have  worked  to  align  the  elements  that
constitute the context of the systems, thus promoting the coherence among these.  It
is evident that ISO 14000 can function as a catalyst of environmental change, but like
with a chemical catalyst the necessary preconditions must be present in order for the
desired reaction to take place.
The most radical objective of the ISO 14000 standard is its attempt to initiate and
sustain  continuous  improvements  of  the  environment  related  to  the  organization
where it is implemented. By introducing an objective of continuous improvements a
proper implementation of the standard requires more than just setting up a system of
management  procedures,  but  also  for  the  establishment  of  a  description  of  the
environment,  that  can  be  used  to  prioritize  the  environmental  activities  of  the
company.  Environmental  management  systems  (EMS)  develop  different  environ-
mental objectives and acquire different regulatory meanings in changing contexts. The
importance of the context which the EMS are implemented in, is described through
elements,  that  have  previously  been  identified  in  the  literature  as  individually
significant domains in relation to function of environmental management: regulatory
regimes and available technology (Jørgensen 2001), the competence of the networks
of  environmental  professionals  that  work  in  the  environmental  organisation,  in
consulting and regulatory enforcement (Simmons & Wynne 1993) and dominating
business  cultures.  Our  argument  is,  that the  ability  of  the  standard to  achieve  an
impact is  dependant  on the constitution of  ’coherent’  environmental  issues  in the
context,  where  the  management  system  is  applied.  This  is  exemplified  with
comparative discussions on the function of environmental management systems in
the different contexts of Denmark and Thailand.
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The  Thai  context  of  a  combination  of  a  recent  industrialization  and  a  young
democracy draws attention to the preconditions that in a western context often are
taken  for  granted,  when  discussing  the  function  of  environmental  management
standards: Management culture, enforcement practices, regulatory structures, personal
networks  and  last  but  not  least  the  existence  of  a  network  of  environmental
professionals.  Many  of  these  elements  have  not  undergone  the  mutual  alignment
processes which we commonly refer to as ‘modernization’.
Based on findings from a research program on the comparative use of EMS1, we
argue that EMS have become a ‘voluntary  supplements  and extensions  to existing
legislation’ in the European setting, while EMS in the setting of recently industrialised
countries like Thailand and Malaysia appear to function very differently as ‘awareness
creators and legislation enforcement’. As a result of this, EMS may over time due to
other  mechanisms  create  more  homogeneous  and  standardized  environmental
performance between countries. 
Reflections on recent theoretical development
In general the introduction of EMS like ISO14000 is expected to build and sustain
trust in companies’ environmental efforts and performance (Deegan, 2002). However,
in specific cases the performance of environmental management has been shown to
be  dependant  on  a  number  of  individually  significant  domains  in  relation  to:
regulatory regimes and available technology (Jørgensen 2001), the competence of the
networks of environmental professionals that work in the environmental organisation,
in consulting and regulatory enforcement (Simmons & Wynne 1993) and dominating
business cultures.
The standard as such, although, is just a management standard, prescribing certain
procedures to be followed by the certified company, which leaves a quite open agenda
for  the  choice  of  environmental  objectives  and  performance criteria.  Previously  a
number of issues in the ISO14000 standard have been identified where the standard
contains interpretative flexibility (Behrndt 2002). This has been followed up in more
detail  by  identifying  the  implicit  assumptions  and  contextual  expectations  of  the
standard (Jørgensen 2003). The standards leave open a number of ‘hot spots’ to be
defined throughout the implementation process: the delimitation of the organisation
and territory, the identification of significant environmental aspects (objectives), the
extent  to  which  design,  planning  and product  chain  management  is  included,  the
interpretation  of  what  counts  as  legal  requirements  and  the  interpretation  of
continued  improvements.  The  importance  of  the  embedding  of  EMS  becomes
evident as this interpretative flexibility leads to the definition of different priorities
concerning environmental objectives, even though the concept of environment may
be shaped in similar ways. 
Furthermore  does  the  acceptance  and  influence  of  EMS  in  the  business
community rely on how they perform and contribute to develop environmental issues
and to translate them into concrete problems in specific settings. It is EMS’ ability to
support  the  enactment  of  the  environment  which  is  crucial.  This  follows  the
argument that making environmental problems concrete requires that they are enacted
and thereby given meaning in local settings (Georg & Füssel 2000). But also the more
1 The chapter is based on studies of EMS in the context of the EMP project organised in
LUCED. In this project EMS are seen as travelling concepts that pursue certain objectives
and results, and as concepts that need to be identified, used and thereby constituted in the
specific contexts, where they are implemented. E.g. ISO 14000 is as such a management
prescription for  taking  up  environmental  issues.  As this  standard  does  not  specify  the
specific conceptual understanding of the environment, the business and regulatory context
become very important for the meaning and working of the system.
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general understanding that these enactment processes involves the construction and
attachment  of  social  meaning  and  representations  for  negotiation  and  mediation
(Latour  1999).  The environmental  objectives  are shaped by the  concrete  activities
which they  are embedded in.  This  identification  of  the  role  ISO14000  underlines
previous understandings of environmental management systems as human constructs
(Roome 1991).  EMS’ are human constructs  that  are  developed in  relation to  and
intertwined  with  other  human  constructs  like  science  and  politics.  And  more
important and consequential is that what we understand as nature and environment is
shaped in these interactions (Braun & Castree 1998). 
When  EMS’  travel  to  be  used  in  new  settings  it  is  not  only  a  management
technology which is  transferred.  As the management technology is  implemented it
becomes a key element of  the embedding of  the environment  and as such also a
central  contribution  to  the  local  constitution  of  the  environment.  How  the
performance of the EMS is sensitive to the context where it is implemented, may be
less evident in many European cases where EMS operate under relatively comparable
and  homogenous  regulatory  conditions.  But  when EMS are  implemented  in  new
settings as e.g. recently industrialised Asian countries, greater variations in the agenda
setting role and performance of the systems can be identified as results of the varying
conditions. New conceptions of the environment piggy-back (Sørensen 2000) onto a
number  of  the  different  initiatives  that  are  introduced  in  order  to  facilitate  the
development  of  local  environmental  strategies;  legislative  norms,  the  Cleaner
Production promotion programs and EMS. Thus travelling EMS is a case of both
technology transfer and the appropriation of key conceptions of the environment.
The context of new regulatory elements in Thailand
EMS’  are spreading  relatively  quickly in  the  recently  industrialised  countries  in
South East  Asia.  Outside Europe and Japan these  countries have the third largest
concentration of ISO 14000 certified systems (ISO 2002). The EMS’ are commonly
introduced either based on demands from trans-national corporations’ headquarters
or  as  a  response  to demands  from major  customers  -  also often  involving trans-
national corporations in the product and distribution chain. A third important reason
for  implementing  EMS  is  as  a  preparation  for  export  to  European  countries  in
competition  on  the  international  market.  Some  characteristics  of  the  companies
introducing  ISO14000  systems  in  Europe  and  South  East  Asia  are  similar.  It  is
typically the larger companies that first introduce EMS (Hansen 1999), but while the
European companies see their EMS as a way to integrate environmental management
in  the  overall  management  of  the  company  and  demonstrate  that  they  are
environmentally  reliable to a large number  of stakeholders,  companies  introducing
EMS  in  South  East  Asia  are  oriented  towards  exports  for  the  international  i.e.
European market and see EMS as a way to gain acceptance by their major industrial
customers on these markets. 
The present promotion of EMS is not the first attempt to make the Thai industry
more environmentally  friendly.  The issue has most  notably addressed through the
concept of Cleaner Production, which has been attempted disseminated to the Thai
industry through a number of programs2. But CP has in general only been taken up by
2 CP projects in Thailand include a.o.:
- The Industrial Environmental Management Project 1990-1995 (Federation of Thai Industries,
FTI/ Institute of Environmental Management, IEM - supported by USAID).
-  The  CDG  project  on  Industrial  Pollution  Control  for  SME’s  in  Thailand  1992-1994
(AIT/CU/CMU/DIW).
-  Promotion of  Cleaner  Technology in Thai  Industries 1996-1998 (FTI/Thai  Environment
Institute, TEI - supported by DANCED).
- The Cleaner Technology Unit at TEI.
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the single companies approached by the various programs. The programs have often
been designed to provide knowledge of new technological alternatives, and in many
instances these alternatives have been implemented in the production. However, the
implementation of CP has not spread to other similar companies, nor has it spread
into subsequent  CP initiatives  in the original  company. There is  only  very limited
uptake of the CP idea in industry. “Technology is not a problem or a barrier, but the
lack of knowledge on how to practice CP is.” (Zatz 2003).  The CP development has
always  stopped  once  the  consultants  leave,  as  the  companies  don’t  develop  new
initiatives directed at their specific context by themselves. 
An evident question is thus, whether EMS can overcome the problems that have
appeared in the attempts to promote the use of Cleaner Production in Thailand? Will
the implementation of EMS in Thai industry lead the companies to begin to develop
their own significant environmental issues?
The general experiences from the European context on this issue are not clear.
Certainly  new environmental  priorities  are established in  relation to the numerous
operating  EMS’s,  but  as  of  present  these  environmental  priorities  are  hardly  ever
tested, i.e. they are seldom used for real discussions on the environmental behavior of
companies. Therefore it is hard to tell whether they are the right issues to take up.
EMS have in their original European context avoided ending up in discussions on
whether they are dealing with the right problems because they have been directed at
dealing with problems that were already well-established as coherent issues in relation
to an accepted environmental legislation and a network of professionals.  However,
this  does  not  imply  that  the  general  establishment  of  priorities  is  unproblematic.
Experiences show, that this is only the case as long as it can be kept as an implicit
decision among professionals. Public disputes have demonstrated that these questions
are very difficult to handle when they are stated explicitly. Examples of these kinds of
discussions range from attempts to evaluate a single event (the Brent Spar incidence)
to technological systems (the GMO debate) to the overall state of the environment
(the Lomborg debate).
The local context of implementation with regards to the general conditions for
economic  and  environmental  development  hold  significant  differences  as  the
regulatory situation and enforcement, the production processes and equipment, the
available  competences  of  local  professionals  and  the  predominant  management
culture in general show important differences. These contrasting points are detailed in
the following:  
The regulatory situation 
While  a  number  of  European  countries  have  been  through  a  crisis  and
strengthening of the enforcement of environmental legislation in the late 1980s, most
Asian countries have a strong regulation as expressed in words and legislation, but still
very  weak  and  uneven  enforcement.  A  change  in  this  situation  would  include
improving  the  competencies  of  regulatory  officials,  but  there  is  resistance  from
industry towards empowering officials  with improved environmental knowledge, as
this  may  function  as  one  more  instance  for  corruption  and  becoming  critical
counterparts to the companies. At the same time a number of different programs on
- First Asia Pacific Roundtable on Cleaner Production 1997 (Pollution Control Department,
PCD).
- CP in municipalities 2000-2001 (PCD/TEI).
- Cleaner Production for Industrial Efficiency, CPIE (PCD/Environment of the Royal Thai
Government). 
- Cleaner Technology Capacity Building at DIW 1998-2003 (Department of Industrial Works -
supported by DANCED).
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cleaner technology, efficient production and environmental management have been
promoted.  But  while  these  programs  have  been  part  of  actions  trying  to  make
companies  go  beyond  regulatory  requirements,  government  agencies  and  foreign
donor  organisations  promote  other  separate  programs  that  introduce  cleaner
technology  as  technology  transfer  options  in  order  to  initiate  companies’
environmental  activities  on  a  business  opportunity  basis.  These  programs  also
typically operate with only brief knowledge of the existence of other similar initiatives.
Different  from  the  situation  in  e.g.  Europe  these  programs  have  primarily  been
promoted as technology transfer actions while in the European context typically had a
strong element of technological innovation and process improvements.
Often  the  implementation  of  an  ISO  14000  system  will  be  the  fist  time  the
environmental legislation is applied to a company’s activities - at least in a systematic
way.  The  norms  of  the  Thai  environmental  legislation  are  rather  strict  and  quite
comparable to European standards. But these norms are not fully enforced. Rigorous
enforcement of the legislation would probably be a major problem to industry, and it
might even be economically critical for some part of the production seen in relation
to the dominant business culture and investments. Case studies in the EMP project
revealed,  that  many  big  and  respectable  companies  have  obvious  problems  in
complying with the legislative standards3.  This does not appear to be a large problem
in relation  to the relevant  authorities4.  Several  of  these companies  are ISO 14001
certified even without actually complying with existing legislative demands. Interviews
with environmental auditors and consultants revealed that this is due to a widespread
practice  among  auditors  of  accepting  strategies  to  achieve  regulatory  compliance
rather than demanding this as a prerequisite of acquiring a certificate: “We got our
certificate  for  having  good intentions”5.  There  appears  to  be and  obvious  parallel
between these auditors lack of pursuing the norms of the ISO 14001 standard and the
authorities weak enforcement of the norms of the environmental legislation.
In some ways the strict but not enforced legislation perform very well. The strict
norms produce legitimacy for the formal environmental regulation created by govern-
ment. From the governments perspective it is thus better to have a strict legislation,
which lacks enforcement, than a less strict but enforced legislation which reflects the
actual  conditions  of  industry.  The  strict  norms  may  also  function  as  a  basis  for
bringing up environmental problems as scandals in the press or as issues of NGO’s
and thereby shaping a ground for public environmental enquiries without the need of
government and state authorities to secure and enforce the policies in detail.
In some incidences, where government offices have been too eager to pursue the
enforcement of the legislation, these offices have even been closed. As a result of this
subjugation  of  enforcement,  even  the  Pollution  Control  Department,  PCD  of
MOSTE6 will not necessarily include private industry in their initiatives. A program
established by the Pollution Control Department of to support the implementation of
CP program in municipalities  is  e.g.  directed  only  at  the  internal  activities  of  the
municipalities.  The  program  involves  schools,  hospitals  and  markets  run  by  the
municipality, but no initiatives towards private companies, that contribute to a much
larger extent to the local environmental problems (In-na 2003).
3 A big car manufacturer  had e.g.  evident problems with VOC vapours from gluing and
painting. A metal rack producer was also producing deaf employees. A battery company
had to much dispensed solids in its waste water.
4 Thai  companies  are  regulated  by  a  number  of  different  authorities  according  to  their
location, size and production.
5 Environmental manager at the car manufacturing company.
6 Ministry Of Science Technology and Environment
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The industrial processes and technology
In  most  Thai  companies  the  production  technology  has  been  imported  or
transferred and not developed locally. This leaves the Thai companies like many other
companies  in  South  East  Asia  with  a  lack  of  basic  knowledge  of  the  technical
principles  of  the  production  and  too  little  capacity  for  product  development  and
improvements.  Product  requirements  and  standards  are  typically  defined  in  the
industrialised  countries  leaving  only  little  space  for  local  improvements  and  local
competence building in the supplying company. 
This lack of local knowledge on specific details in the production also makes it
difficult to establish specific environmental initiatives that are closely related to the
actual  production.  Thus  concrete  initiatives  as  e.g.  waste  management  may  be
implemented in a manner where it is hardly related to the actual production. Given
the current problems of the institutional waste handling in Thailand this appears to be
a very relevant issue. However in the brochure presenting the company’s ISO14000
system to the public, the waste separation process is not presented as an issue which
is related to the main activity of the company, i.e. the manufacturing of automobiles
and parts for automobiles. On the tour of the shop floor, the guide likewise does not
point  to  any  waste  separation  activities  in  the  production7.  Rather  the  waste
management appears  to be a concern related to the offices  of the administration8,
where  they  use  paper,  cardboard  boxes  and  printer  cartridges.  Colored  bins  for
sorting  office  waste  at  the  car  factory  show  a  kind  of  visible  beauty  and  also
superficial  understanding of the environmental agenda for voluntary actions at the
same  time  as  it  shows  a  visible  and  for  company  management  easy  example  of
environmental response. 
This  is  also  the  case  for  the  car  manufacturing  company’s  focus  on  heavily
regulated waste water outlets that can be rather easily monitored and controlled. The
focus on waste water discharge conditions is in general showing the role of EMS in
bringing  the  legislative  requirements  onto  the  companies’  agenda.  Again  the  car
manufacturing company is illustrative for their focus on BOD-related discharges from
the employee’s canteen instead of factory based outlets from production.
The examples demonstrate that there is only a weak relation between the actual
environmental  performance  of  the  production  and  the  concrete  environmental
monitoring and relief activities that are established in relation to the implementation
of  ISO 14001 on the  factory.  There  appears  to  be a  lack  of  knowledge on both
environment and production issues which could unite these elements and put them
into  a  broader  framework  of  prioritisation  and  negotiations  of  environmental
importance, which seem to be crucial to the vision of continued improvements.
Similar patterns of environmental initiatives that were hardly related to the content
of the actual production were observed at other factories. In one place brooms were
decorated with ribbons in honor of H.M. the Kings birthday: The workers would
7 This is in contrast to the tour of the Danish company, where several waste management
initiatives  were  pointed out  even though waste  management  was not  a  priority.  Waste
management is normally a very visible feature of the company’s environmental initiatives
compare to e.g. the substitution of solvents.
8  In the car manufacturing company this was shown in the introduction of waste bins, with
an obvious visual impact, but questionable in their environmental overall impact besides
their  contribution to employees knowledge.
“Waste management:
1.  Yellow bins are  for  common waste as  food,  fruit  peels,  dust,  paper  scrap and used
diskettes.
2. Green binds are for reusable waste as plastic bottles, cardboard boxes, steel wire scrap,
soda cans and newspapers.
3. Red bins are for hazardous waste as all kinds of batteries, printer ink, chemical markers,
correction markers and glue.”
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sweep  the  floors  of  the  factory  to  show  their  commitment  to  protect  the
environment.  Another  company  would  use  treated  waste  water  to  sprinkle  their
greens on the factory site, thus both maintaining literally ‘green’ surroundings while
also reducing the amount of waste water produced and discharged.
The  focus  seem  to  be  on  separating  waste,  reduce  energy  consumption  and
treating waste water, which already are in the focus of environmental legislation – and
this  is  not  specific  for  car  factories  alone.  Other  environmental  aspects  typically
relevant for a car manufacturing company such as e.g. substituting specific organic
solvents by alternate processes to reduce air pollution and improve health and safety
conditions  include change of  processes  and  use  of  other  materials,  were  typically
recognized by the employees working with environmental topics in the company but
at the same time seen as very complicated, at a change of practices would demand
very specific, new production knowledge.
The competences of environmental professionals
Consultants  are not widely used in Thailand as they are conceived by business
management to be too expensive. This leaves the certifying companies with a rather
difficult  task,  as  they  often  become  involved  as  part  time  consultants  for  the
companies they certify. The often strict division between consultants and certifying
companies found in Europe is therefore less obvious in Thailand. 
Also, the overall purpose of implementing e.g. ISO 14001 is not to improve the
environmental  capacity  and competence of  the organisation,  but  rather  to  achieve
certification9. The process of ISO 14001 implementation, is a process which then has
to very specific and specialised in-house knowledge and routines of production with
rather abstract descriptions of what is the environment10. Here it appears that many
companies lack the necessary competences. To some extent this  weak competence
can be seen as a side effect of the weak legislative enforcement. The lack of a proper
practice of enforcement in the every day activities of the environmental authorities
has been counterproductive to building competencies on the environmental problems
of industry among the staff of the authorities. This tendency is further supported by
the  lack  of  use  of  environmental  consultants  as  a  way  of  distributing  a  common
interpretation  and  practice  concerning  the  criteria  for  enforcing  the  general
requirements in the legislation.
When EMS’ are implemented it is therefore often done by in-house technicians or
more  frequently  quality  assurance  managers  that  only  have  general  knowledge  of
current environmental issues and discussions. This gives the certifying companies an
opportunity to focus their advice on management issues and to limit their demands to
the  companies’  environmental  competence  or  to  their  use  of  environmental
consultants. Many of the certifying companies offer a range of different management
certificates, especially different varieties of quality management, and health and safety
management systems. Therefore their knowledge of the specific environmental issues
needed to control the environmental performance of their clients may be limited.
The competence of the professionals in industry have been developed by previous
promotion programs of cleaner technology, cleaner production and other programs in
relation to the environmental  agendas of industry,  and through the distribution of
9 Whereas  uncertified  EMS are  not unusual  in  Danish companies,  no examples  of  such
practice have been encountered in the EMP project, nor in the litterature in general. As a
part of a focus group interview in the EMP project it  was even stated directly by 8 Thai car
manufacturing companies as the common reason for engaging in EMS activities.
10 The ISO 14001 standard does provide suggestions for where to identify the environment as
general lists as ”emissions to air, ground and water”.
 486   Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference
EMS through business and management networks But these projects are reported to
have had virtually no lasting effect (Zatz 2003). Specific technologies are implemented
at  specific  factories  during  the  project  period,  and  in  some  instances  these
technologies  are  also  spread  in  similar  companies.  But  it  is  only  the  specific
technologies that are spread. The cleaner technology thinking itself is not anchored in
the companies, and no new activities on further cleaner technological development
are seen afterwards.  The experience of the cleaner technology projects is to a lesser
extent than in the Danish context spread through discussions in networks of related
professionals.  For  knowledge  on  environmental  issues  it  appears  to  be  personal
networks - the extended group of friends and family that serves as the dependable
source of good advice.
Business culture 
The business culture in South East Asia often reflects a traditional paternal family
structure of ownership and control. While managerial professionalism is part of the
promotion  of  EMS in  Europe  supporting  the  involvement  of  employees  and the
spreading of knowledge in the organisation, the paternal structure of management is
very dependent of centralised decision making and may not in the same way support
the spreading and development of knowledge in companies. Knowledge on diverse
matters  as  economy,  organisation,  technical  equipment  and  environment  is  the
privilege of central management. At the same time poor knowledge on environmental
issues  in  general  and viewing the  environment  issue  as  a  ‘luxury’  problem that  is
predominantly  taken up by the ‘rich’ countries  and that  should only be dealt  with
when more basic necessities have been taken care of does still play a major role both
in the rhetoric and practices of companies in developing countries.
The  implementation  of  management  systems  as  ISO  14001,  but  also  more
dominantly  ISO 9001  can  be  seen  as  a  sign  of  emerging  change  in  the  paternal
management  strategy.  Following  the  economic  crisis  of  1997  where  the  personal
networks of the paternal business culture showed to be insufficient, there has been a
need for  building new mechanisms of  trust.  The management standards  including
ISO  14001  can  be  seen  as  such  trust  devices  that  are  introduced  in  order  to
demonstrate reliability. Thus the focus on the certificate rather than the certification
processes.  But it  also supports  an implicit  understanding of  the  environment  as a
distinct and separate problem for companies, being of at type that can be handled and
‘solved’. As such the environment is seen as objective and as a problem that can be
addressed in ways that give companies the opportunity to manage their own processes
in a sustainable way.
The  environmental  policy  of  the  Car  manufacturing  company  states:  “The
company  shall  see  to  that  every  single  production  process  is  not  harmful  to  the
environment”. This phrasing establishes the environment as something, which is only
an issue if something goes wrong. Whereas, in a European context the environment is
considered  as  a  continuous  concern,  like  the  ISO  14001  standard  mentions
continuous improvements. The similar objective would her talk of “minimizing the
environmental impact” instead of avoiding environmental harm as this recognizes the
inevitable impact of production on environment and maintains this as a permanent
issue of the company. 
Discussion
Perspectives from science- and technology studies provide us with a framework to
conceive the regulatory elements that have appropriated from their western origins as
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artefacts which are constituted and used in a specific context (Latour 1999; Sørensen
2000).  The intentions  and impacts  delegated to the working of  these  artefacts  are
complex and not  based on consensus  among all  involved  actors,  although certain
impacts  on  industrial  behaviour  and  impacts  on  environmental  performance  are
supposed to be the outcome. Understanding these artefacts, e.g. EMS as an integrated
part of and in continuous exchange with their surroundings, stresses how they will
identify  and  pursue  different  objective  depending  on  the  context  in  which  they
function. In the description above the conditions of EMS are described as 4 domains.
A description such as this provides an analytical background for understanding how
the practitioners  manage the earlier  mentioned interpretative  flexibility  of  the ‘hot
spots’ of the written ISO 14001 standard.  The domains provide the ‘social’ setting
which  provides  a  number  of  taken  for  granted  issue  that  serve  to  limit  the
interpretative flexibility of the standard in the specific case, which is a prerequisite for
making it  operational.  The four  domains  can as  such  function  as  a model of  the
embedding of EMS which will show the specific differences in the components and
the path of change to be expected and to promote.
The  local  conditions  are  thus  more  than  just  a  backdrop  onto  which  the
environmental  regulation  is  performed.  Rather  the  environmental  activities  are
embedded in this setting. Both the conditions created by the historical past and the
present context of implementation play an important part in the working and impact
of  the regulatory elements.  The historical  context of  implementation is crucial  for
what has to be taken into consideration and which roles have been delegated to the
different  elements  and  aspects  of  the  system.  This  supports  the  idea  that
environmental regulation consists of historic and setting specific roles to be delegated
to different elements. With regards to EMS, it is a predominant model to conceive
environmental  management  systems  as  a  response  to  independently  existing
environmental problems and knowledge of these. 
In this manner the EMS exposes a common implicit assumption of environmental
regulation, i.e. the underlying existence of a number of underlying facts about nature
and the environment.  The four previously  described domains each contribute in a
different  manner  to  the  production  of  this  pre-existing  environment.  Thus,  the
environmental outcome of EMS can be understood as the interaction of previously
existing  environments.  The  separate  domains  produce  environment  with distinctly
different cognitive and practical features:
• The environment as object of legislation (e.g. norms)
• Environment as specific technical measures (e.g. machinery and equipment)
• Environment as management objective (e.g. statements and policies)
• Environment  as  knowledge  and  experience  of  professionals  (e.g.  exemplary
references)
These  in  turn  exist  on  the  background  of  a  dominating  public  environmental
discourse which however only in a few cases gives an expression of its own, typically
through the press or local action groups. 
In order to understand the performance of the individual regulatory artefacts as
EMS in the newly industrialised countries of South East Asia, the interaction of these
four domains must be analysed. Apparently the environmental agenda is transformed
in  the  newly  industrialised  countries.  The  most  noticeable  effect  of  this
transformation is an increasing focus on legislative compliance as a result of the poor
existing enforcement activities. In some instances this is followed by low priority on
the more advanced continuous cleaner technology development. 
When  EMS  promotes  a  focus  on  abiding  to  the  legislations  demands,  the
necessary investments in cleaning technology in order to live up to these demands
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takes resources from continued development. Also they may function as sunk costs in
relation to the existing production technology, e.g. in the shape of an expensive waste
water  treatment  facility.  In  some  instances  it  even  appears  as  these  sunk  costs
function as a barrier to the further implementation of cleaner production elements.
This is the case when heavy investments in filtering technologies provide a continued
technological dependency on more dirty production processes and thus blocks an up-
dating of production facilities. In the EMP project this appeared to be the case for the
Battery manufacturing company that would invest heavily in reducing emissions from
a production of second grade batteries that can no longer be exported. 
The importance of coherence
It  is  not  evident  hot  to  evaluate  the  success  of  EMS implementation  in  new
settings such as the recently industrialised countries of South East Asia. Counting the
number  of  implemented  systems  is  not  in  itself  representative  to  environmental
achievements.  But  also  more  qualitative  assessments  of  i.e.  the  environmental
priorities of the implemented systems can be misleading without relating these to the
rest of the context.
The  implementation  of  EMS in these  countries  is  often  supported  by  various
promotion programs. These are financed by foreign donor organisations. The transfer
of  new  technology  as  EMS  is  based  on  the  idea  of  supporting  ‘progress’.
Development is seen as the linear path of history, and development aid as attempts to
boost the progress in order to move more quickly through the earlier stages of this
line.  This  concept  of  linearity  is  also  prevailing  in  the  field  of  environmental
regulation.  Newly  industrialised  countries  in  Southeast  Asia  are  considered  to  be
‘lagging’ behind on environmental protection and should be brought up to common
western standards. To the promotion programs EMS is such a technology which is
expected to be transferred to work in similar ways that it did in e.g. Europe.
  However, the development of an environmental agenda depends not only on any
of the single features above, but also on the combination of these. A well performing
environmental effort requires for these features to be interrelated, for the involved
actors to be able to transfer knowledge elements and have some common references
for good performance, and to share visions of environmental improvements and the
routines  and  everyday  practice  of  engineering  and  management.  The  individual
elements of environmental governance/regulation may all  be present,  but they will
not  manage to work together to accomplish a self  sustaining basis  for  continuous
improvements. As a manner of providing an analytical understanding and evaluation
of  the  success  of  EMS in new settings  we suggest  to  include a discussion  of  the
matter bringing the different elements together, i.e. the coherence of the context into
which  the  environmental  agenda  is  embedded.  Coherence  is  a  possibility  of
investigating and even evaluating the success of EMS in new settings. The description
of the embedding of EMS suggests that the potential of EMS lies in achieving better
relations and as such more coherence among the different domains. The potential for
industrial transformation through improved environmental management is limited by
the lack of relatedness, i.e. coherence
The  question  of  coherence  is  not  only  a  question  of  bringing  different
environmental  issues  together,  but  also  a  way  of  analyzing  whether  different
interested parties are committed to maintain a discussion of environmental problems
in relation to specific issues. The concept of coherence draws on the actor-network
theory  understanding  of  ’alignment’  processes  (Latour  1999).  Alignment  is  the
element of bringing actants together to establish a new network. As different actants
are  engaged,  enrolled  and  committed  the  network  gradually  gains  strength  and
undergoes  a  process  of  translation.  Heterogeneous  elements  as  legislative  norms,
Lauridsen/Jørgensen   489
regulatory practice (e.g. enforced legislation, corruption practices), ’natures’ response,
production  facilities,  workers  practice,  individual  concerns,  management  practice,
environmental  management  standards,  customer  demands,  supplier  capacity,
competence of consultant and sector structure are combined to contribute to new
entities  of  environment  -  well  performing  environmental  problems.  Coherent
environmental  issues  are  ‘good’,  i.e.  manageable  environmental  problems  that  are
recognized  by  a  wide  group  of  actors  and  associated  with  commonly  accepted
practices of representation. The concept of coherence adds a normative element to
the description of alignment processes by referring to environmental issues, which are
embedded in well-aligned actor-networks.
Coherence is an attempt at conceptualizing the combination of different aspects
and  perspectives,  and  thus  as  source  of  further  development.  Coherence  also
addresses,  that  there  may  appear  as  a  high  level  of  awareness  of  individual
environmental  problems,  while  these  are still  not  interconnected in a manner that
would  accommodate  a  future  development  of  the  problems.  In  a  situation  with
coherent environmental problems these will function as a frame for the discussions.
This does not imply that the different interested parties necessarily agree about the
state of the environment, but that there is a limit to how far the conflict may spread
as the different actors are engaged to keep these representations at the centre of their
discussions.  The  coherent  environment  functions  as  a  boundary  ordering  devices
(Sluijs et al. 1999)  that keep actors obliged to discuss the environment within the
same frame, thus avoiding conflicts to ‘spill over’ and develop into situations that are
difficult to control and without democratic mechanisms of solution. These unhappy
situations  can be recognized by their  combination of  physical  violence, corruption
and prolonged conflict resulting in a general waste of resources11.
The lack of coherence between the different domains of the South East Asian
context reflects how the different elements in some instances have been developed in
parallel as separate entities  that  are otherwise not related. The coherence that may
have  existed  between  the  separate  elements  in  their  western  origins  seems  to  be
lacking  after  the  individual  implementation  and transformation  to  the  South  East
Asian  context.  Rather  than  developing  and  improving  individual  elements  as
legislative norms or management programs, it  seems to be the mutual connections
that need to be developed and strengthened. The EMS in the European context does
function by using these relations. However, the transformation to newly industrialised
countries demonstrates that these relations and the coherence they constitute is not
necessarily  present  in  countries  that  have  different  histories.  As  a  result  of  this
development, the predominant picture of EMS is presently a situation where EMS is
left to function as procurement of enforcement. It does not look as if the EMS will in
themselves  support  a  development  towards  continuous  improvements  beyond the
definitions of the existing legislation.
11 A well known example of this kind of situation is the current state of the Klong Dang
waste water treatment plant in Samut Prakarn. This mega project based on investments
from the Thai government, ADB (and Danish development aid) is now physically 95%
finished, but cannot be connected to the appropriate pipelines because of local protests.
Meanwhile a former vice-minister is connected to a corruption scam in relation to the land,
where  the  facility  has  been constructed.  But  even without  the  corruption element,  the
incoherent environment is a cost. 
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Australian Experience with Greenhouse NEPIs
Dr. Ros Taplin
Coordinator, Environmental Management Program,  Graduate School of the Environment,  Macquarie Uni-
versity, Australia
The Spread of New Environmental Policy Instruments (NEPIs) to Australia
Much of the theoretical and empirical discussion of ‘new’ environmental policy instru-
ments (NEPIs) focuses on European experience and relates to ecological modernisation or
industrial transformation (Anderson and Massa 2000; Christoff 1996; Gibbs 2000; Jordan
et al. 2000, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Knill and Lenschow 2002; Wurzel 2001). These per-
spectives concentrate on the contemporary evolution of interactions between environ-
ment, economy, society and public policy. Government imposed command and control
measures to manage polluters are seen to be ‘old’ instruments that will be phased out
with a shift to self regulation and incentives for industry. An intermediary phase of co-
existence of ‘new’ and ‘old’ policy instruments together with ‘new’ and ‘old’ institution-
al structures to facilitate the implementation of agreements is expected. The theoretical
assumption regarding NEPIs is that they have greater effectiveness and efficiency. The
concept that such a change in the role of government would have positive environ-
mental outcomes was initially academic but has been embraced by politicians in several
European nations (Weale 1992). Micro-scale (voluntary agreements, eco-labelling, en-
vironmental and carbon taxes,  and emissions trading) and meso-scale initiatives (na-
tional environmental plans and strategies for sustainable development) have been insti-
tuted.  Jordan  et  al. (2003a)  identify  eight  driving  forces  for  the  implementation  of
NEPIs:
1. dissatisfaction with environmental regulation
2. perceived superiority of NEPIs
3. neo-liberal ideas about deregulation
4. influence of the European Union in forcing adoption of NEPIs by some member
states
5. growing international  competition and economic recession driving a search for
more cost-effective policy instruments
6. growing domestic support from elected politicians
7. interaction  between  different  types  of  NEPI  (e.g.  the  threat  of  environmental
taxes has popularised voluntary agreements and emissions trading)
8. climate change has pushed governments to actively explore emissions trading and
voluntary agreements.
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In  particular,  implementation  of  the  1992  Framework  Convention  on  Climate
Change (FCCC) has been characterised by adoption of NEPIs and notably voluntary
agreements. Governments including those in the EU, the US, Canada and Australia
have taken steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions via NEPIs. This has been in an-
ticipation of the Kyoto Protocol coming into force. Article 4.2 of the FCCC states
that each developed country party shall:
‘…adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of
climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and pro-
tecting and enhancing its  greenhouse  gas  sinks  and reservoirs.  These  policies  and
measures  will  demonstrate  that  developed countries  are  taking the  lead in modify
long-term trends  in  anthropogenic  emissions  consistent  with  the  objective  of  the
Convention.’
Also Article 2.1 of the Kyoto Protocol states:
‘Each Party…shall…Implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in
accordance with its national circumstances, such as…encouragement of appropriate
reforms in relevant sectors aimed at promoting policies and measures which limit or
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases…’
Both of these Articles point towards development of new policies and measures.
Policy formulation and implementation in relation to NEPIs in Europe has been
underway for nearly two decades. However, according to Jordan et al. (2003a):
‘Attempts made in the late 1980s and early 1990s to replace regulation with NEPIs
did not amount to much. In fact, there is now a widespread recognition that regula-
tion is a necessary aspect of NEPI design and use.’ (Jordan et al. 2003a)
They report that barriers to NEPI introduction in Europe have included:
1. lack of expertise and familiarity
2. opposition from environmental pressure groups
3. opposition from vested interests (e.g. energy intensive industry opposition to
carbon taxes and emissions trading)
4. fears about competitiveness
5. public protests related to distributional impacts of environmental taxes (i.e.
related to rising fuel prices)
6. EU requirements  (e.g.  voluntary  agreements  taking the form of legal  con-
tracts)
(Jordan et al. 2003a)
From the early 1990s onwards, NEPI adoption moved beyond Europe along with
greater internationalisation of environmental policy via environmental regimes. The
report of the World Commission on Environment and Developoment (Brundlandt
1998), the UN conferences in Rio in 1992 and Johannesburg in 2002, and the influ-
ence of international organisations such as UNEP, the OECD and the Global Ecola-
belling Network all  have strongly shaped and influenced the direction of  environ-
mental policy both locally and globally. Tews et al. (2001) observe that: 
‘The recent shift in the prevailing policy pattern from a sectorially fragmented and
largely legal regulatory mode to an integrated environmental policy approach relying
increasingly on ‘softer’  and/or more flexible instruments  such as voluntary  instru-
ments, ecolabels, or ecological tax reforms is equally proceeding on a global scale. …
in addition to the national  demand for adequate environmental policy instruments,
the spread of policy innovations is influenced by
• the presence or absence of international platforms or promoting agencies, which
have placed the advancement of certain NEPIs on their agenda; and
• the specific characteristics of the policy innovation itself.’
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Jänicke and Jörgens (1998) also reflect that environmental policymaking at the do-
mestic level has come under considerable international scrutiny and the influence of
epistemic communities. As Hass (1992) describes, these groups are knowledge based
networks of environmental bureaucrats, diplomats and scientists who influence envir-
onmental policy innovation on the international environmental agenda and develop
shared perceptions of innovations that should be adopted at the national level.
Australian officials and scientists have been active participants in these internation-
al environmental fora and processes from the early 1990s. After the Rio conference,
Australia  adopted  several  meso-scale  ‘new’  environmental  policy  instruments
including a  National  Greenhouse  Response  Strategy,  a National  Strategy  for  Conservation  of
Australia’s Biodiversity, and a National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (Com-
monwealth of Australia 1992a, 1992b, 1992c).1 All of these initiatives arose from in-
ternational agreements or commitments and arguably from a desire to maintain Aus-
tralia’s image as with a good environmental citizen. However, Australia has a very dif-
ferent economic base to the European nations such as Germany, the Netherlands,
Denmark, and the United Kingdom which have also been proactive epistemic com-
munity participants. As Walker (1994) has said:
‘Australia’s dependence on exports of primary or minimally processed products,
the dominance of foreign capital in manufacturing investment, and the large size of
the service sector…all create strong pressures on governments, state and federal, for
economic  growth  mythologised  as  ‘development’…the  interlocking  of  Australian
business,  government  and  bureaucracy  is  pronounced  reflecting  a  convergence  of
government and private interests in ‘development.’
Regulatory policy in Australia is responsibility of the states and has been character-
ised as  ‘haphazard,  ad  hoc  and piecemeal’  (Walker  1999a)  and  ‘generally  reactive’
(Walker 1999b). It has been over the last two decades been accommodative towards
industry. In many cases environmental regulations that are put in place are not well
implemented or monitored due to lack of resources available to regulatory agencies.
Also stringent regulatory standards are not set when it is perceived industry is not able
to comply with them.
At the same time the precautionary principle, measures directed towards ecologic-
ally  sustainable  development  and  public  participation  in  the  policymaking  process
have come to underpin regulatory, legislative and institutional undertakings at federal,
state and local government levels in Australia over the last decade. Crowley observes
that:
‘There is  no doubt that  policy rhetoric  has become more eco-friendly recently,
with the adoption of notions such as ecological integrity, sustainability, diversity, pre-
caution, synergism, whole-of-life-cycle planning and best practice environmental man-
agement.’ (Crowley 1999)
In particular, development, implementation and review of environmental policies
and programs at the micro level have focussed on the goal of international best prac-
tice. The now standard directive given to consultants by federal and state environ-
mental agencies as a component of policy reviews is to research and make recom-
mendations taking into account best practice. This aspiration for international  best
practice policies to be adopted and especially NEPIs would appear to conflict with
developmentalist goals of enhancing an economy largely dependent on resource ex-
tractive and energy intensive industries. However, NEPIs are not seen in Australia as
a constraint on development (Papadakis and Grant 2003).
1 The  National  Greenhouse  Response  Strategy was  subsequently  revised  and  reissued  as  the
National Greenhouse Strategy (Commonwealth of Australia 1998) (Bulkeley 2000; Taplin 1994;
Taplin and Yu 2000).
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Environmental micro-policy critique has been seen as being potentially fruitless in
the current Australian situation with the argument being that ‘…many Australian the-
orists  fail  to  focus  upon  micro  detail…when  politics  is  so  clearly  driving
environmental policy performance…’ (Crowley 1999). By contrast the remainder of
this chapter does address the micro level of Australian NEPI implementation so as to
derive some case study understanding of what the political status and role of NEPIs is
in Australia.
Australian Greenhouse NEPIs
Aspects of Australian experience with NEPIs have been discussed by Papadakis
and Grant (2003). Also Jordan  et al. (2003a) have compared Australian adoption of
NEPIs with the uptake in European nations. Papadakis and Grant (2003) comment
that Australian NEPIs are predominantly controlled by the state which has ‘…genu-
ine interest in and experimentation with new tools…’ and that the regulatory situation
with respect to command and control regulation versus adoption of NEPIs is charac-
terised by:
‘…continuity  in  traditional  regulatory  approaches,  with  several  qualifications:
growing emphasis in voluntary agreements, targeting of resources to encourage the
creation of competitive  eco-efficient industries,  the importance of strategic  (rather
than operational)  interventions  by the Commonwealth and other  agencies  and re-
search on economic or market-based systems (such as emissions trading).’ (Papadakis
and Grant 2003)
Australia is not seen internationally as a leader in the adoption of NEPIs (Jordan et
al. 2003a) in comparison to the Netherlands, Germany and Finland but has under-
taken a range of NEPI initiatives and, in particular, in relation to climate change. Ex-
perience with two particular NEPIs administered by the Australian Greenhouse Of-
fice, the Greenhouse Challenge and Greenhouse Friendly programs, is discussed here.
These  policy  instruments  have  been  implemented,  together  with  numerous  other
greenhouse policy initiatives, notwithstanding the Howard Liberal-National Coalition
Government’s negative position regarding the Kyoto Protocol (Yu and Taplin 2000).
This standpoint was stated openly by the Prime Minister in a speech in November
2002:
‘Currently it is not in the national interest to ratify the Kyoto Protocol because,
under the terms of this arrangement, many of our competitors do not face the obliga-
tions  we would  face.  Australia  would  lose  investment  to  these  countries  and the
greenhouse  gases  would simply  change location.  Indeed many countries  have less
stringent  environmental  standards  than  Australia…For  example,  under  the  Kyoto
Protocol, a company wishing to establish a new aluminium plant in Australia may face
a greenhouse-reduction cost penalty that they would not face in countries like China
or India. In a competitive global market, this cost burden may be enough to see the
plant  is  built  elsewhere,  leaving  Australia  the  poorer  without  any  global  gain.’
(Howard 2002)
The Greenhouse Challenge and Greenhouse Friendly Programs
A  fundamental  underpinning  of  the  Greenhouse  Challenge  and  Greenhouse
Friendly programs is that they were formulated in line with the ‘no regrets’ framework
set out in the  National Greenhouse Strategy (Commonwealth of Australia 1992a; 1998)
and accordingly are not intended to compromise business objectives of profitability
and growth. Aspects of the operation of these programs are given below.
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The Greenhouse Challenge Program
The Greenhouse Challenge program was initiated in 1995 in response to a request
from major Australian industry players (many having transnational affiliations) for a
voluntary agreement on greenhouse between government and industry. At the time
there had been considerable public debate in Australia about the potential introduc-
tion of a carbon tax although little serious interest had been expressed by the federal
or  state  governments  or  elected politicians.  Major  industry  actors  approached  the
Keating Labor Government to institute a voluntary greenhouse program with a view
to avoiding a carbon tax (Commonwealth of Australia 1999). The business impacts of
carbon taxes that were being reported from other countries undoubtedly drove this
request for a greenhouse NEPI in Australia.
Voluntary  agreements  on greenhouse abatement have been taken up in several
countries (Commonwealth of Australia 1999; WBCSD and WRI 2001). Such agree-
ments were instituted from 1992 onwards and include:
• Netherlands: Long Term Energy Efficiency Agreements (1992)
• Canada: Climate Challenge Voluntary Challenge and Registry (1994)
• New Zealand: Industry Challenge (1994)
• USA: Climate Challenge Program (1994); EPA Climate Leaders Initiative; Volun-
tary Reporting on Greenhouse Gas Emissions (1605b Program) 
• Germany: Joint Declaration of the German Industry on Global Warming Preven-
tion (SVE) (1995)
• Japan: Keidanten Voluntary Greenhouse Action Plan for the Environment (1997)
• UK: Greenhouse Reporting Program (1999)2
Accordingly, it can be seen that voluntary agreements on greenhouse were already un-
derway in  the  Netherlands,  Canada,  New Zealand and the  US when the  Australian
Greenhouse Challenge program was initiated.
The Greenhouse Challenge Office (GCO) was set up in Canberra in 1995 as a federal
interdepartmental  effort  and  was  overseen  by  three  agencies:  the  Department  of
Primary Industries  and Energy (DPIE),  the Department of Environment,  Sport  and
Territories and the Department of Industry, Science and Tourism. The GCO was loc-
ated in DPIE offices. When the Howard Coalition Government gained power in 1996,
the program was allowed to continue notwithstanding cuts to other areas of funding for
climate change. In 1998, the GCO was transferred to  the status of a program admin-
istered by the Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO) with the inception of the agency.
The Greenhouse Challenge program facilitates the establishment and monitoring of co-
operative agreements between members of industry and government. Idutry members
undertake to abate their greenhouse  gas emissions  through energy and process  effi-
ciency and by enhancing greenhouse sinks. As indicated above, the program is admin-
istered by the Commonwealth but does not have legislative backing. In May 2003, there
were 820 participants in the Greenhouse Challenge program.
Organisations that volunteer to join the Greenhouse Challenge program enter into a
cooperative  agreement  that  is  non-binding  and is  not  a  legal  contract.  Cooperative
agreements can be individual, facilitative or aggregate:
• ‘Individual cooperative agreements are agreed with a company to reduce emis-
sions for the company
• Facilitative agreements are made with a representative body such as industry asso-
ciation which actively encourages its members to join the Greenhouse Challenge
2 Also interestingly the World Wildlife Fund instituted a voluntary Climate Savers Program
for industry (WBCSD and WRI 2001).
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• An aggregate agreement is made an industry sector, or part thereof, with an in-
dustry  association  entering  into  agreement  to  reduce  emissions  on  behalf  of
named member companies (e.g. Cement Industry Federation).’ (Commonwealth
of Australia 1999)
Greenhouse Challenge members are required to prepare an action plan for green-
house emissions abatement and under their agreements to report annually on their
progress with emissions reductions. Actual details of member reports are confidential
but summative information is  publicly  reported.  Also aggregate agreement  reports
from industry associations do not identify abatement by individual corporate entities
but only for the sector as a whole (e.g. cement and aluminium industries). As such,
there is a considerable lack of transparency in aspects of handling of information by
the program.
The  Greenhouse Challenge Factors and Methods Workbooks (AGO 2003a) are the key
supporting documents of the program. The workbooks outline the process of how a
business organisation can calculate the greenhouse gas emissions associated with its
operations. Data inputs required by the workbooks include quantities of solid fuels,
gas and electricity consumed. Confidence in greenhouse gas calculations directly cor-
responds to the accuracy of these measured amounts. The success of the Greenhouse
Challenge Program in turn relies on the accuracy of greenhouse reporting. The focus
on accurate emissions reporting has ramifications for potential involvement of Aus-
tralia in carbon trading (domestically or internationally under the Kyoto Protocol) and
environmental reporting.
The issue of the quality of reported greenhouse emissions data under the Green-
house Challenge Program first arose during the 1999 review of the Greenhouse Chal-
lenge program and subsequently  with the 2002 independent verification.  Reporting
varies from ‘comprehensive and detailed documents’ to inconsistent (i.e. not annually)
reporting of variable quality. The Greenhouse Challenge Evaluation Report stated:
‘Because reporting requirements were not defined at the beginning of the program
there has been a blurring over time of what is required, and this has resulted in incon-
sistent reporting across participants and uncertainty among some participants…Much
of this has been because, in an attempt to keep the program flexible to encourage
broad  participation,  no  standard  format  for  agreements  was  originally  developed.’
(Commonwealth of Australia 1999)
Commentary from participants in the Greenhouse Challenge program included:
‘We used the workbook to put together the first progress report. There was no
consistency and we didn’t know what they were looking for. We did a brief report,
while others did huge reports.’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1999)
Some standardisation of the annual report format has occurred since these com-
ments were made with the implementation of an electronic proforma report format.
However, consistency in reporting is still proving a challenge due to the variations in
types of members and industry sectors involved and the capacity of companies to ful-
fil reporting requirements.
Verification by independent environmental auditors is seen to be a mainstay of the
Greenhouse Challenge program as it ‘…continues to play an important role in im-
proving the quality of reporting…as well as enhancing the level of program transpar-
ency and public accountability.’ (AGO 2003b). The 2002 Independent Verification of
the Greenhouse Challenge was the third independent verification organised by the
AGO3 and  arguably  more  comprehensive  than  previous  rounds.  Twenty-three
members’  reports  and  reporting  procedures  were  verified  under  commercial-in-
3 A  pilot  independent  verification  was  run  for  four  members  in  1998.  In  2000,  31
Greenhouse Challenge members were independently verified.
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confidence requirements regarding company data. The independent verification found
that:
• ‘I6 Members were verified as having reporting that was comprehensive, compar-
able and free from material discrepancies;
• 1 Member had a material discrepancy in relation to their greenhouse gas inventory;
• 3 Members has material discrepancies in abatement estimates (2 of these Members
also could not be fully verified due to a lack of supporting documentation); and
• 3 other Members could not be verified due to a lack of some supporting docu-
mentation.’  (AGO 2003b)
These results would be unacceptable for a financial audit as would the generous
materiality threshold of 10% that was adopted for the verification (AGO 2003b). Any
discrepancy of greater than, or equal to, 10% of abatement reported was considered
material or significant. This is quite a liberal materiality threshold as voluntary green-
house programs implemented in European nations use 5%.  Lack of systematic emis-
sions and sink data archiving by companies proved to significant problem that arose
during the verification with several of the members revealing that they were not able
to retrieve their records (AGO 2003b). Also some verifications for companies were
delayed due to overdue annual reports and/or delays in report approval by the AGO
(AGO 2003b).
A final and important aspect of the operation of the Greenhouse Challenge pro-
gram is the role of the Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) which was first established
in1998. The JCC provides a decision-making forum for government and industry rep-
resentatives on key program and implementation issues for the Greenhouse Challenge
program. All members of the JCC need to reach consensus for decisions on issues
such as materiality, the requirements for reporting,  and content of documents and
guidelines that are prepared in relation to the program. This means that industry via
the JCC has considerable influence on the program’s implementation and may block
any decisions that are considered detrimental to industry’s economic viability. 
Several recommendations for improvement of the Greenhouse Challenge report-
ing procedures and the independent verification process were made by the AGO in
2003. These included moving to a 5% materially threshold for the next round. The
AGO report on the 2003 independent verification stated:
‘…a general conclusion that can be drawn from this verification round is that on-
going refinement of verification procedures and more explicit guidance to both verifi-
ers and Greenhouse Challenge members is required to ensure that reporting and veri-
fication standards continue to move towards world’s best practice.’ (AGO 2003b)
The goal of international best practice for the program has several barriers due to
the implementation of the program to date. These include:
• right of veto by industry to any modifications or new initiatives associated with the
program
• lack of reporting stringency
• non-binding nature of the cooperative agreements
• lack of data transparency due to commercial-in-confidence considerations particu-
larly with industry association aggregate reporting
• uneven implementation by members
Some Greenhouse Challenge members take their obligations seriously and report
regularly and accurately but the quality of reporting of some members is not of an ac-
ceptable standard.
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Greenhouse Friendly Product Labelling Program
The Greenhouse Friendly program was launched in 2001 and involves promotion
and certification of ecolabelling for climate change abatement. Consumer goods and
services that have all cradle to grave greenhouse gas emissions offset by corresponding
emissions abatement can be certified. Independent environmental auditors verify the
life cycle assessments of products that companies submit to the AGO.
Unfortunately the Greenhouse Friendly program has not been embraced by indus-
try or the consumer. By the end of 2003, the only products certified, somewhat incon-
gruously, were petroleum and electricity products: ‘Ultimate’ premium unleaded fuel,
and Global Choice commercial fuels marketed by BP; and electricity by AGL. BP has
provided sink abatement to offset their emissions associated with their products.  The
greenhouse emissions associated with AGL electricity are offset through landfill gas
flaring projects.
Although this program is directed towards consumers, it is questionable whether
the Australian public is even aware of the Greenhouse Friendly ecolabel and whether
AGO resources directed towards the program have resulted in effective greenhouse
abatement action.
Ecolabels have been very successful in Europe and particularly in the Netherlands
and Germany where they are widely supported by industry, the public ad NGOs. Part
of the reason for industry’s support in these nations appears to be that ecolabels often
have been the precursor for tax benefits. However, Australian experience with ecola-
bels has been less satisfactory (Johnson and Lundie 2002). This has been due to envir-
onmental NGO and consumer association concerns about greenwash together with in-
dustry critique of ecolabels. In particular, the Australian Government initiated ‘Envir-
onment Choice Australia’ label was withdrawn after two years of operation in 1994
due to lack of industry  support.  Recently  in 2002, a new NGO environmental  la-
belling body has been established as a further attempt to promote ecolabelling in Aus-
tralia. This new program has not had significant impact as yet. Given this background,
the Greenhouse Friendly ecolabel was probably doomed from the very start.
Concluding Discussion
NEPIs in the form of voluntary agreements  have been used extensively in the
Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. As mentioned earlier in the chapter,
Jordan et al. (2003a) have noted that European Union as a whole has been reluctant to
adopt voluntary agreements entirely free of a legislative superstructure because of:
• the suspicions or mistrust of environmentalists
• perceived transparency problems with VAs
• officials’ concerns about long-term enforceability and effectiveness
• industry’s preference for tradition regulation because of its level playing field nature.
These  transparency,  enforceability  and  level  playing  field  concerns  parallel  the
shortcomings of the Greenhouse Challenge program in Australia and call into ques-
tion the effectiveness  of voluntary agreements as currently  adopted in Australia in
comparison to the traditional regulatory approach.
Examination of aspects of the Greenhouse Challenge program reveal that it is cur-
rently a weak NEPI.  Capacity  building has  been undoubtedly the most  significant
achievement of the program to date. Training has been provided for consultants in
greenhouse gas reporting and the program has provided information to professionals
in  numerous  business  and industry  sectors  related to greenhouse  emission  assess-
ment. This capacity building for could have long-term benefits if Australia eventually
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becomes involved in domestic or international emissions trading. In addition, the pro-
gram has assisted in facilitating the uptake of energy efficiency upgrades and the re-
porting of these by small and medium enterprises (SMEs); arguably energy improve-
ments by major industry players may have been implemented for financial reasons re-
gardless of the program.
If the Greenhouse Challenge NEPI is to become more effective, improvement
with  regard  to  quality  of  reporting,  adherence  to  data  archiving,  the  materiality
threshold and provision of a level playing field for all members is essential. Also pub-
lic accountability issues such as transparency of industry association agreements and
industry control of the JCC are significant concerns. 
Examination of the Greenhouse Friendly ecolabel reveals that it is a failing NEPI
although ample resources have been allocated to it. This has been due to lack of in-
dustry  interest  and  participation.  It  is  difficult  to  appreciate  why  the  Greenhouse
Friendly  program was  initiated given previous  lack of  business  support  for  ecola-
belling programs in Australia.
The limited effectiveness of the Greenhouse Challenge and Greenhouse Friendly
NEPIs can be attributed to several factors:
• lack  of  industry  incentives  for  participation.  Industry  involvement  has  been
patchy; in some cases participation has been exemplary but in others the response
has been unmotivated;
• the AGO’s implementation procedures;
• the AGO’s capacity to put into effect compliance with agreements; and
• the design of the process for collaboration and information sharing between the
AGO and industry.
As mentioned earlier, the political backing of the Greenhouse Challenge program
moved from the Keating Labor Government to the Howard Coalition Government.
Both Governments were supportive of light handed regulation or deregulation and were
accommodative towards industry’s desire for the establishment and continuation of
voluntary  greenhouse  mitigation  and  reporting.  Although  considerable  Australian
Government  and  industry  resources  have  been  directed  towards  the  Greenhouse
Challenge NEPI, its impact has been inconsistent. If the program is not carefully sup-
ported, monitored and reviewed with legislative and legally binding contractual im-
provements made to enhance effectiveness, it has the potential to move to the status
of symbolic policy (Edelman 1964). Whether this happens is dependent on political
support. Crowley (1999) has observed about the current Australian Government that
unfortunately:
‘Today notions of federal environmental responsibility have sunk to previous un-
known depths  under  the  conservative  Howard  Coalition  Government,  even  as  it
claims to be staking out new policy terrain…’
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1. Introduction
The total expenditures for public procurement within the EU-15 countries for the
year 2002 was estimated to amount to 1.5 trillion €, which is about 16 % of the Uni-
on’s GDP. The Importance of total public procurement by Member State varies sig-
nificantly: from 11.9 % of GDP in Italy to 21.5 % of GDP in the Netherlands.
The 1990’s brought the insight that environmental problems could not be solved
through environmental policy alone. As a consequence the concept of sustainable de-
velopment evolved, which integrates social environmental and economic policy ob-
jectives. Thus, the need for an integrative policy became obvious. Environmental, so-
cial and economic considerations shall be part of all other policy fields.
Public procurement  in the European Union is subject to many legislative rules
(92/50/EEC 93/37/EEC, 93/36/EEC, 93/38/EEC, 97/52/EC, 98/4/EC), mainly
aiming at increasing transparency of public procurement activities as well as increas-
ing cross border procurement in order to reduce the expenditures for public procure-
ment. Finally also environmental, social and consumer protection aspects are taken
into account (2004/17/EC, 2004/18/EC).
Green purchasing - or eco-procurement - encompasses  all activities  that aim to integ-
rate  environmental  considerations  into  the  purchasing  process,  from  the  identification of
the need, through the selection of an alternative,  to the provision to the user. Green pur-
chasing tries  to avoid unnecessary purchases by reviewing the actual need for the product
and seeking other solutions. If this is not possible, it seeks to purchase a greener variant
that  supplies  the  same  (or  better)  quality  and  functionality  as  the  conventional  choice
(Erdmenger 2003, p.11).
The implementation of eco-procurement into public procurement is of high im-
portance. Public purchasing for a long time has been used as a tool for achieving pub-
lic policy goals. Historically, national industrialisation has been supported by public
purchasing from domestic heavy industry. In the same way the supply of environ-
mentally friendly products could be fostered, because the public authorities act as a
market participant and the magnitude of their procurement has the ability to influence
the market. The thorough introduction of eco-procurement into public procurement
practice has the capability to serve as a general model for private procurement too.
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Green public procurement can promote “green markets” and thus act as a stimu-
lus for environment oriented innovation in companies. 
Technological  change is always connected with social  change and rooted in social  systems and
organisational networks (Mulder et al. 1999). It is guided by engineering ideas and very
much  driven  by  economics  and  policies,  procurement  policy;  especially  public
procurement policy can play a mayor role in this concern.
Most policy documents on sustainable development mention eco-procurement as a com-
plementary  tool  to  environmental  policy.  In  fact  the  potential  environmental  impacts  of
green purchasing have not even been calculated (Erdmenger 2003, p. 11).
2. The R E L I E F  project
To close this gap, the project named: ‘Environmental Relief Potential of Urban
Action on Avoidance and Detoxification of  Waste Streams through Green Public
Procurement’  (RELIEF),  funded  under  the  key  action  programme  “City  of
Tomorrow  and  Cultural  Heritage”  within  the  5th Framework  Programme  of  the
European  Commission,  was  designed.  The  RELIEF project  was  divided  into  a
research  and  an  implementation  phase.  Within  the  research  phase  methods  for
assessment and calculation were developed and applied. The present paper refers to
one of the principal items in this phase, namely the calculation of the European relief
potential.  In  order  to  enable  the  calculation  of  relief  potentials,  an  intense  co-
operation between economists, natural scientists and public authorities, was essential.
The RELIEF project started in February 2001 and was finalised in November 2003.
3. Basics for quantification of environmental benefits within the procurement
of products
The quantification of the environmental benefits of green purchasing has to be
based on the comparison of the purchased products and their alternatives causing dif-
ferent environmental burdens. However, this will be only reasonable if the considered
products have the same purpose or in other words, if the product alternatives possess
the same service function. 
The service function of a product specifies the service provided by the use of a
product.  For  instance  the  service  function  of  a  heavy  goods  vehicle  consists  in
transporting goods. Thus, a heavy goods vehicle and a freight train provide the same
service function. The dimension of the service function should be a commensurable
physical value named  functional unit e. g. for the transport of goods the physical
value: transportation work (transportation work = mass  ´ distance [ton-km]) can be
used as functional unit. 
The relief potential concerning procurement represents the magnitude of the re-
duction of potential environmental impacts, expressed by means of suitable indicat-
ors, which can be achieved by purchasing a specific quantity of a particular ‘green’
product instead of a ‘non-green’ product. In other words, it is the difference between
potential environmental impacts of a particular combination of a ‘green’ product and
a ‘non-green’ product in terms of avoided environmental impacts for a given number
of functional units.
The determination of the relief potential consequently requires the knowledge of
the potential environmental impacts per functional unit of a ‘non-green’ product as
well as those of that ‘green’ product which substitutes the ‘non-green’ one. Addition-
ally, the number of functional units relevant on the European level or the European
public sector is a mandatory input.
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In order to determine the environmental burdens of products in their entirety, it is
necessary to consider the whole  li f e cy cl e  of the products. In a simplified view the
lifecycle  of  a  product  can  be  divided  in  four  stages:  raw  materials  extraction,
manufacturing,  use  and  disposal.  In  general  different  products  have  potential
environmental impacts of different magnitude during the specific lifecycle phases. For
a  given  product  also  each  lifecycle  stage  may  have  different  types  of  potential
environmental impacts.
The best approach to identifying and quantifying the environmental impacts from cradle to grave
for one or more products is  c alle d  li f e c y cl e  as se s sment . A lifecycle assessment addresses the
whole lifecycle and includes a broad range of environmental impacts (Schmidt 2003, p. 135).
A general framework how a lifecycle assessment has to be carried out has been
described in a series of ISO (International Organisation for Standardisation) standards
published in the period of 1997 to the present.  Generally, a lifecycle assessment is
divided into four stages. The first stage consists  in the definition of the  goal and
scope of the study. The second stage comprises the collection of information on the
interactions  with  the  environment  for  all  activities  in  the lifecycle  of  a product  is
called  inventory  analysis.  The  third  stage  called  impact  analysis aimes  at  the
evaluation of the significance of potential environmental impacts, by using the results
of the inventory analysis. In general, this involves the combination of inventory data
with specific  environmental  impacts.  In  this  stage  of  the  lifecycle  assessment  the
inventory data are assigned to impact categories like global warming ozone depletion,
nutrification, etc. This allows the aggregation of different contributions to the same
impact  category  and  to  express  them  with  a  single  indicator  value,  like  CO2-
equivalents in the case of global warming, CFC-11-equivalents in the case of ozone
depletion and NO2-- or PO44--equivalents in the case of nutrification (see Table  1).
The final stage of a lifecycle assessment is called interpretation. Therein the findings
of the inventory assessment and the impact assessment are combined.
4.  The  scientific  approach  for  determination  of  the  relief  potential  per
functional unit
The determination of a relief potential, as already mentioned, is based on the com-
parison of products having the same service function, but different environmental im-
pacts. Generally a relief potential can be calculated using one of the following proced-
ures:
1. Determination of the difference in environmental impacts resulting from the com-
parison of two existing products considering their respective entire lifecycles, e. g.
two buses are compared by comparing every single component of the two vehicles
over their respective entire  lifecycle. The precondition for this  procedure is the
availability of lifecycle assessments of  the same quality (basically using identical
system boundaries as well as impact categories) for each and every component of
both products, a request which in most cases proves to be impracticable.
2. Determination of the difference in environmental impacts resulting from the com-
parison  of  two  existing  products  considering  only  those  components  of  the
products which primarily determine the products’ service function over the entire
lifecycle, e. g. not every component of two buses is considered, but only those
components mainly responsible for the service function, namely the engines. For
products  comprising  a  high  number  of  components,  this  procedure  is  easier
operable  since  the  requirements  regarding  the  number  and  the  scope  of  the
underlying lifecycle assessments is not that demanding.
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The structural complexity of many products and the unavailability of comprehens-
ive lifecycle assessments for many products make simplifications unavoidable. 
In the  RELIEF project a procedure for  setting up a lifecycle assessment-based
environmental calculation was developed (Schmidt 2003, p. 140).
As a result of this methodology a relief potential is obtained, which describes the
difference between environmental impacts of a ‘green’ product and the ones of a re-
spective ‘non-green’ product. It is expressed as the value of the specific category in-
dicator per functional unit for each environmental impact category common in life-
cycle assessment.
The  most  important  environmental  impact  categories  considered  by  lifecycle
assessment as well as their respective category indicators are shown in Table 1. 
The relief potential per functional unit thus is not a single figure, but a vector of
the  magnitude  of  avoided  environmental  impacts  in  the  respective  environmental
impact categories. The calculation is performed according to the following Formula 1:
Table 1 - Environmental impact categories common in lifecycle assessment
Environmental impact category Category indicator
Global warming t CO2-equivalent
Stratospheric ozone depletion g CFC11-equivalent




Human toxicity via air m3 air
Resource Consumption GWh
Waste Formation tonnes
CO2 Carbon dioxide CFC-11 Chlorofluorocarbon C2H4 Ethylene SO2 Sulphur dioxide NO3
-
Nitrate m3 air Refers to the amount of air necessary to dilute an emitted amount of   toxic
substances up to a concentration which turns out to be no   longer toxic for humans
Source:  Author’s  version based on Schmidt 2003, table  8.2, p 145





















































Source:  Author’s  version based on Schmidt  2003
with: rp Relief potential per functional unit
IC Environmental impact category




m Number of considered environmental impact categories 
m=1, 2, …, m
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According to Formula  1 a negative value within a specific environmental impact
category will denote an abatement of environmental burdens, if the ‘green’ product is
purchased instead of the ‘non-green’ one. On the contrary a positive value within a
specific environmental impact category will denote a rise of environmental burdens, if
the ‘green’ product is purchased instead of the ‘non-green’ one.
In  order  to  get  a  clear  impression  about  the  relative  importance  of  the  relief
potential per functional unit a supplementary approach was chosen in the  RELIEF
project:  the results  are normalised so that the results  may be expressed in  person
equivalents. A person equivalent is the potential contribution from an average person in a year to
a given environmental impact.(Schmidt 2003, p. 143) For impacts of global relevance, like
global  warming  or  the  depletion  of  the  stratospheric  ozone  layer,  the  person
equivalents relate to an average global citizen. For impacts having regional relevance,
like acidification, nutrification etc. an average European citizen is assumed. 
Taking global warming, this is an environmental impact of global relevance. The
total world wide contributions to this impact in 1994 were 43.3 billon tonnes of CO2-
equivalents from all anthropogenic sources. With about 5.61 billion world citizens in
1994 this equals an annual contribution of 7.7 tonnes of CO2-equivalents per person.
In other words, one person equivalent for the environmental impact category global
warming, equals 7.7 tonnes of CO2-equivalents (Schmidt 2003, p. 143).
5. Products under investigation
Unfortunately, there are no detailed statistics available on public sector-consump-
tion for different product groups. Therefore, the first step to be taken was to determ-
ine the products of high importance regarding public sector purchases.
For  this  reason  six  European  cities  (Stuttgart,  Malmö,  Zürich,  Kolding,
Miskolc,  Hamburg)  joined the  R E L I E F  project  and provided data  for  the
analysis  of  the importance of products  for  investigation in the project.  One
approach in this context was to look at the actual spending of the respective
administrations. 
Regrettably, only few products are in detail recorded in the cities’ budgets and of-
ten, no procurement monitoring system is in place to assemble the respective data.
Therefore, much of this data had to be collected from the individual departments and
their book-keeping on certain purchases.
Table  3 indicates the spending of the six local  authorities  involved in the
R E L I E F  project.  It  is  obvious  that  this  data is  not comparable. The cities
have very different  sizes  and the administrations  have different  tasks.  Also,
product categories can be defined differently.  Still  this data provides  indica-
Table 2 - Person equivalents
Environmental impact category Person equivalents based on statistical data from 1994
Global warming 1 PEG Ù 7.7 t CO2-equivalents
Stratospheric ozone depletion 1 PEG Ù 81 g CFC11-equivalents
Photochemical oxidant formation 1 PEEU Ù 25 kg C2H4-equivalents
Acidification 1 PEEU Ù 74 kg SO2-equivalents
Nutrification 1 PEEU Ù 24 kg NO3
--equivalents
Human toxicity via air 1 PEEU Ù 3.6x10
9 m3 air
PEG Global person equivalent PEEU European person equivalent
Source:  Author’s  version based on Schmidt 2003, table  8.2, p. 145
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tions  about relevant and less  relevant product  groups (Erdmenger 2003, pp.
117-120).
The key findings of this investigation may be summarised as follows:
• Construction, energy, furniture and IT equipment are financially very important
product groups for all six local authorities.
• The importance of food for canteens and public transport varies with the respons-
ibility of the city.
• Product groups such as cleaning products (not the services!), office material and
paper are of only minor financial importance.
Whether or not a specific product became subject of investigation was however,
also dependant from the availability of environmental data (lifecycle assessments) and





• Food products (Wheat, Meat and Milk)
The relief potential of procurement - The theory
The relief potential per functional unit for a given combination of a ‘green’ and a
‘non-green’ product is a specific value related to this particular product combination.
It therefore possess only a limited significance to answer the question what the poten-
tial environmental consequences on the European level caused by a change in pro-
curement practice towards environmentally friendlier products might be.
Thus,  a  main  issue  in  the  RELIEF project  consisted  in  up-scaling  the  relief
potential per functional unit to the European level and to figure out the importance
of public procurement in this concern.
The order of magnitude of the relief potential within the area of procurement de-
pends on the amount of functional units, which at a particular time:













Cleaning products 155 n. a. 563 242 7 614
Energy 29,875 9,000 8,777 2,382 34 72,644
Food for canteens 307 12,000 12,850 1,910 0 n. a.
Furniture 2,390 4,000 6,461 336 3 5,215
IT equipment 8,104 675 19,799 957 67 15,364
Paper 464 1,400 573 146 17 409
Office equipment 1,699 100 721 282 14 256
Person Transport 1,164 5,979 n. a. 2,294 31 2,122
Renovation of
buildings
44,686 n. a. 107,734 3,934 1,064 52,425
Road construction n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 2,198 64,985
n. a.  not available
Source:  Erdmenger 2003, pp. 118
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• are requested from the market and
• actually substitutable by an environmentally friendlier product.
Generally,  the European market for  a specific  product  may be subdivided in a
share for the ‘green’ products and one for the ‘non-green’ products. Furthermore, a
share of a product mainly purchased by public authorities can be defined. This may
then be again subdivided in one part for which public authorities already purchase the
‘green’ alternative and in an other part for which they don't.
The  calculational  approach  to  determine  the  Theoretical  European
Market  Relief  Potential’  which  focuses  on  the  total  functional  units  of  a
given  product  on  the  European  market,  as  well  as  the  ‘Theoretical
European public procurement relief potential’, referring to the respective
amount  of  functional  units  influenced  by  European  public  purchasers  is
shown  in  the  following  Formula  2 and  Formula  3.Both  relief  potentials  are
based on the assumption that the ‘non-green’ amount of functional units for a specif-
ic product which is either available on the European market or purchased by public
purchasers, is completely substituted by the respective ‘green’ product. 
Figure 1 - Structure of the European market for a specific product
Total amount of functional 
units of a specific product 
sold on the European 
market
Amount of functional units of 
the ‚green‘ product sold on the 
European market
Amount of functional units of 
the ‚non-green‘ product sold 
on the European market
Amount of functional 
units of the ‚green‘ 
product purchased by 
public authorities
Amount of functional 
units of the ‚non-green‘ 
product purchased by 
public authorities
Total amount of functional 
units of a specific product 
purchased by public 
authorities
Source:  Author’s  version based on Pierrard 2003
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7. The relief  potential of  procurement - Coming down to earth
For most of the products analysed, it was impossible to determine the European
share of the ‘green’ product. Also investigations of the share of the ‘green’ product
already purchased by public authorities on the European level proved to be a very
time consuming  task,  which would have exceeded the framework of  the  RELIEF
project by far.
Thus, the actual share of the ‘green’ product available on the European market on
the one hand and purchased by public purchasers on the other hand was unknown.
However, that share was not neglected, but implicitly included in the definition of an
average product, which finally was used as the ‘non-green’ alternative in the calcula-
tions.



















































Source:  Author’s  version based on Pierrard 2003
with: RPEM Theoretical relief potential for the European market for a specific product 
combination
rp Relief potential per functional unit for a specific product combination
IC Environmental impact category
m Number of considered environmental impact categories m=1, 2, …, m 
nfu Number of functional units for a specific product
tg Total ‘green’
tm Total market























































Source:  Author’s  version based on Pierrard 2003
with: RPEP Relief potential related to European public purchasing for a specific 
product
combination
rp Relief potential per functional unit for a specific product combination
IC Environmental impact category
m Number of considered environmental impact categories m=1, 2, …, m 
nfu Number of functional units
pg ‘Green’ related to public purchasing
tp Total related to public purchasing
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Taking electricity as an example, the share that ‘green’ electricity already has on the
market  contributes  to  slightly  lower  environmental  impacts  of  average  electricity,
which is then considered as the ‘non-green’ product (see Section 8.1). 
In analogy for personal computer systems the assumption was made that the aver-
age personal computer is one which complies at least with minimum Energy Star re-
quirements. This assumption is justified by a market survey showing that almost no
personal computers lacking an Energy Star label are available on the market anymore
(see Section 8.2).
The same applies to the product line-buses. The average bus is considered to com-
ply already with the actual Euro III specification (see Section 8.4). 
Sometimes though, the implicit consideration of the amount of functional units of
the ‘green’ product already available on the market was not possible e. g. for food
products  (see  Section  8.5).  Thus,  the  calculated  theoretical  relief  potentials  might
more or less exceed the actual figures.
The availability of market data on the number of functional units influenced by the
decisions  of  public  purchasers  or  traded  on  the  European  level  also  is  a  major
constraint in calculating the European relief potential of products. As a result of the
RELIEF project  it  became  clear  that  nearly  every  product  needed  a  different
approach to determine the relevant amount of functional units.
Nevertheless,  the general approach for the calculation of the relief potential re-
mained to be the determination of the amount of total functional units of the specific
product traded on the European market, as well as the determination of the corres-
ponding amount of functional units influenced by the public sector.
The results of these investigations then were multiplied with the relief potential
per functional unit. The relief potential per functional unit is always calculated by sub-
tracting  the  environmental  impacts  (related  to  one  functional  unit)  of  the  ‘green’
product from those of the average product being the object of investigation. Among
the variety of products the ‘green’ product was by definition the one which showed
the least environmental impacts for most of the considered environmental impact cat-
egories. 
Finally, the calculated relief potentials were expressed in person equivalents to en-
able the comparison of the relief potentials within the same environmental  impact
category for the different products. Nevertheless, the relief potential for each environ-
mental impact category is expressed in the same unit namely ‘person equivalents’ it is
impermissible to compare or calculate a trade-off between the figures of different en-
vironmental impact categories.
Furthermore, the calculated relief potentials for the respective products were cal-
culated on an annual basis. The relief potential over the whole lifetime of the product
then may be easily calculated by linear extrapolation. 
For reasons of feasibility and transparency for the purchaser, it was necessary to
reduce the number of impact categories, as they are predefined in the lifecycle assess-
ment procedure, to the 4 or 5 most important ones. Thus, the calculated relief poten-
tials do not represent the whole range of environmental impacts but concentrate on
the politically most important, or the most momentous ones.
8. Selected results (Pierrard 2003)
Because of its dependence on local circumstances, the local information (see Sec-
tion  5)  could  not  easily  be  extrapolated  to  the  European  level;  therefore  other
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information sources had to be tapped into. These had to be individually identified for
every product being under investigation.
8.1. Electricity
The functional unit for electricity is one GWh of consumed electricity. The main
environmental impacts occur during the production stage.
‘Green’ electricity was assumed to be electricity generated from renewable energy
sources in accordance with the European directive 2001/77/EG. The European aver-
age electricity mix was considered as the ‘non-green’ product. 
The main data source for the determination of the total amount of functional units
on the European market is the International Energy Agency databases (IEA 2002).
The  observed  consumption  of  electricity  in  Europe  (EU-15)  for  the  year  1999
amounted to 2,232,669 GWh.
The amount of functional units related to the consumption of public authorities in
1999 was determined, using various national electricity reports, to be about 6.2% or
148,460 Gwh.
8.2. Personal Computers
For personal computers the functional unit is one PC consisting of a central pro-
cessing unit and a computer screen. The main environmental impacts occur during
the use stage as a result of the use of electrical power. A likely use pattern for an aver-
age office PC was assumed.
The ‘green’ PC was identified as being one with low energy consumption accord-
ing to a good Energy Star standard, equipped with a thin film transistor (TFT) display.
As the average product a PC complying with minimum Energy Star  requirements,
equipped with a cathode ray tube display (CRT) was assumed.
The amount of functional units sold on the European market for the year 2000
was 27,431,912 units (EITO 2001). Statistical data on the number of purchased units
by public authorities were not available. Therefore, the calculation of the amount of
functional units related to the public sector was based on population statistics. The
number of public employees in EU(15) was retrieved from OECD-statistics (OECD
2001),  it  was  multiplied with the  share  of  white  collar  workers  obtained  from an
EUROBAROMETER survey (EUROBAROMETER 1994) and with the number of
business PC’s per white collar worker (EITO 2001). Finally it was divided by the an-
nual replacement rate of PC’s in the public sector. The replacement rate was assumed
to be 5, i. e. every PC is replaced after 5 years. Thus, a number of annual purchased
PC’s by public authorities of 2,836,512 units or a share of 10.3 % results.
8.3. Copiers
For copiers the functional unit is one copier. From lifecycle assessments the use
stage was identified as the one causing the most environmental impacts as a result of
the use of electricity. A likely use pattern assuming 1,500 copies a day or 2,250,000
copies a year was assumed.
As the ‘green’ copier an appliance with enhanced energy saving capabilities com-
plying with good Energy Star requirements was identified. The average copier is one
possessing no energy saving capabilities.
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The  copiers  sold  on  the  European  market  during  the  year  2000  amount  to
1,418,637 units (EITO 2001). The share of 14.75% or 209,184 units purchased by the
public sector was derived from European Input-Output statistics (Horbach 2002). 
8.4. Line-Buses
The functional unit for line-buses is one bus-km. The main environmental impacts
occur during the use stage as a result of fuel consumption.
The ‘green’ bus is defined to be one complying with EURO IV specification des-
pite the fact that such buses are at present time not yet available on the market. Buses
complying with the EURO III specification are considered as the average and there-
fore ‘non-green’ product.
The number of newly registered buses and coaches in Europe in the year 1999 was
30,957 (ACEA 2002). A survey among producers showed that approx. 50% of these
vehicles are line buses, the remaining are coaches. The assumption that one bus drives
100,000 km during one year was made. This equals an annual number of functional
units of 1,547,850,000 bus-km. The producer survey also showed that approx. 48% of
the line-buses are purchased by public authorities. Thus, a share of the public sector
of 24% or an amount of functional units of 742,968,000 bus-km may be calculated.
8.5. Food products
The functional  unit  for  food products  is  1000 tonnes  of consumed food.  The
main environmental impacts occur during the production stage, mainly within the ag-
ricultural sector.
The ‘green’ product is one, which is produced considering the rules of or-
ganic  farming,  as  they  are  stipulated  in  the  ‘Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No
2092/91 of 24. June 1991 on organic production of agricultural products and
indications  referring  thereto  on  agricultural  products  and foodstuffs’.  Food
products produced by conventional farming are considered to be the average
or ‘non-green’ products. Within the R E L I E F  project the relief potential for
wheat  representing  the  product  group  cereals,  for  meat  including  beef,
poultry and pork as well as for milk was determined.
The number  of  functional  units  consumed on the European level  for  the year
2000 was retrieved from FAO databases (FAO 2002). Wheat amounts to 90,389 units,
meat to 31,649 units and milk to 114,757 units. The share of 3.15% or 2,887 units for
wheat, 997 units for meat, and 3,615 units for milk, purchased by the public sector
was derived from European Input-Output statistics (Horbach 2002).
Considering all this information as well as the scientific approach for the
determination of the relief potential  per functional unit presented in Section
4 and 7 the relief potentials  per functional  unit  for  the considered products
were calculated and are shown in Table  4.  Negative  numbers  indicate  a de-
crease of environmental  impacts,  and positive numbers an increase of envir-
onmental impacts in the respective environmental impact category.
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Summarising these results,  the ‘Theoretical European public procurement
relief potential’ for the selected 7 products were calculated and are presented
in Table 7. 


























2.0x10-6 -36.6 -479.3 -24.4
Stratospheric
ozone depletion




0.2 -0.2x10-3 -3x10-3 -1.8x10-5 -5.2 -96.8 -3,2
Acidification -28.8 -4.2x10-3 -64x10-3 -2.0x10-5 -27.0 -554.1 -40.5
Nutrification -9.9 -1.5x10-3 -2x10-3 -2.3x10-5 -212.3 -3,264.3 -159.2
Human toxicity
via air
n. a. n. a. n. a. -9.5x10-6 n. a. n. a. n. a.
n. a.  not available
Source:  Author’s  version based on Pierrard 2003
Based  on the  data  shown in Table  4 and Table  5 the  ‘Theoretical  European public
procurement relief  potential’  was calculated.  The respective results are presented in
Table 6.
Table  5 -  Market  volumes  in  the  European  Union  and  of  European  public
authorities for selected products




Electricity Consumption of 1 GWh 2,232,669 148,460 6.2%
Personal
Computers
1 Unit 27,431,912 2,836,512 10.3%
Copiers 1 Unit 1,418,637 209,184 14.8%
Buses 1 bus-km 1,547,850,000 742,968,000 24.0%





Source: Author’s version based on Pierrard 2003
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9. Conclusions
Considering  the  results  presented  in  Table  7 it  becomes  obvious  that  public
purchasing is a key tool for ‘greening’ the market place. Green public procurement is
capable  of  achieving  significant  savings  in  terms  of  environmental  impacts,  and
therefore is far from being only a complementary policy tool to accompany the ‘real’
mechanisms  presumed  of  being  able  to  change  the  environmental  situation
significantly.
The chosen approach to calculate the relief  potential  of  products  seems to be
rather  academic  at  the  first  glance.  However,  appearances  are  deceptive.  The
simplifications  made  in  the  RELIEF project,  like  the  focus  on  the  most  relevant
service functions, the most polluting lifecycle stages as well as the concentration on
those  environmental  impact  categories  depicting  the  most  urgent  environmental
problems, on the one hand and an adequate flexibility for the determination of the
market volumes of  the  different  products  under  consideration on the other  hand,
provide  results  with  a  reasonable  range  of  accuracy  to  serve  as  an  input  for  the
decision making process of purchasers. 
Table  6 - Relief potentials of selected products for the whole European market





Copiers Wheat Meat Milk Buses
Global  warming
[PE]








28,200 -600 -700 -77,000 -31,700 -11,600 -13,400
Acidification [PE] -4,273,800 -11,800 -13,400 -77,000 -146,400 -146,500 -14,400
Nutrification [PE] -1,462,500 -4,300 -4,900 -604,500 -947,000 -575,500 -16,900
Human toxicity via
air [PE]




-182,900 -1,000 -300 -1.0 -1.0 -0.4 60 
Waste  Formation
[t]
-6,711,100 -16,900 -19,200 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a.
Source:  Author’s  version based on Pierrard 2003
Table  7 -  Total  relief  potential  of  the  selected  products  in  selected  en-
vironmental impact categories achievable by European public procurement
Environmental impact category Theoretical European
public  procurement
relief potential
As % of the Theoret-
ical European market
relief potential
Global warming [PE] 7.86x106 6.4%
Photochemical  oxidant  formation
[PE]
0.11x106 7.3%
Acidification [PE] 4.68x106 6.1%
Nutrification [PE] 3.62x106 4.0%
Resource Consumption [GWh] 0.18x106 6.4%
Source:  Author’s  version based on Table  6
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